



HISTORIC IMPACT, CAPITALISATION OF SDC'S BILATERAL COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

META ANALYSIS REPORT

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Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANA	National Authority for Water
APCI	Agency for International Cooperation
CCA	Climate Change Agreement
CdC	Basin Committee
CP	Country program
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DC	Development Cooperation
DEH	Direction for Development and Humanitarian Aid
DRI	Integrated rural development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRU	Grupo de Desarrollo Rural
DWS	Drinking water and sanitation
EU	European Union
FDHAS	Audits
FISE	Fund for Social Investment for Emergency
FOES	Fondo de Contravalor Ecuatoriano Suizo
GFA	GFA Consulting Group GmbH
GruS	Bolivian Development Partners Group
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HIC	Historic Impact Capitalisation
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
INATEC	National Technical Institute (Nicaragua)
INTA	Instituto Nicaragüense de Tecnología Agropuecuaria
IWRM	Integrated Water Resources Management
IZA	Swiss international cooperation
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MACCIH	Support Mission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras
MRTA	Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru
MSME	Micro, small, and medium enterprise
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAGRICC	Environmental, Risk Management, and Climate Change Adaptation Program
PAM	Performance Assessment Matrix
PARDN	Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement national

PDHL	Local Human Development Project
PGLIM	Program Local Governance and Municipal Investments
PNDP	National Operational Development Plan
PRAC	Programa Regional para América Central
PRS	Poverty reduction strategies
PSDH	Strategic Development Plan for Haiti
RC	Regional Cooperation
RM	Risk Management
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SECO	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
ToC	Theory of Change
UCA	Central American University
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VET	Vocational Education and Training
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene

1 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

The analysis presented in this report forms part of the **Historic Impact Capitalisation (HIC)** of the **bilateral engagement of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)¹ in Latin America and the Caribbean**. The HIC project is embedded in a comprehensive institutional knowledge management initiative, accompanying the gradual phasing out of the SDC's bilateral cooperation activities from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) until 2024. In the framework of the project, the HIC team presents a historical documentation of the main activities and major achievements of the bilateral cooperation, identifies relevant lessons learned, and based on that will provide communication material for SDC-internal knowledge management as well as for external communication towards a wider public.

The HIC project encompasses the **bilateral cooperation activities** of SDC in **eight countries in LAC**, in which SDC has been active since 1964, emphasizing the five currently remaining priority countries Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Cuba and Haiti. In addition to those, Ecuador, Peru, and El Salvador are covered during the first part of the HIC project (meta-analysis). Importantly, the focus of the assignment is fully on SDC's bilateral cooperation, implying that activities having been implemented under one of the other instruments (e.g. humanitarian aid, global cooperation) or outside SDC's area of responsibility (promotion of peace and human security; economic development cooperation) are not covered.

The contract for project implementation between SDC and GFA was signed on **20 May 2022 and will run until 31 July 2023**. The inception workshop in Bern, during which SDC representatives and HIC team members discussed the proposed project methodology and work plan, took place on 12 September 2022. Afterward, the HIC team started the implementation phase I, focusing on the elaboration of a meta-analysis of documents related to SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC, which the SDC Evaluation Manager provided to the team. From mid-January 2023 on, implementation phase II will begin, which will focus on the elaboration of five thematic deep-dives in the currently remaining priority countries.

The present report presents the findings of the meta-analysis for the eight countries in focus and is structured as follows:

- **Chapter 2** summarises the methodology of the meta-analysis and discusses methodological limitations.
- **Chapter 3** is the core of the report. For each of the eight countries it describes major milestones of SDC's cooperation, depicts the development of approaches and thematic areas, and presents the main achievements as well as the first lessons learned. It also discusses the results at regional LAC level.
- **Chapter 4** wraps up and illustrates the main takeaways for the following HIC phases.
- The **annexes** comprise methodological background material and further detailed country analyses.

¹ Throughout this report, for the purpose of improved reader-friendliness, whenever referring to Swiss bilateral cooperation activities in LAC, also in periods, in which SDC still had a different institutional name (e.g. DCA/DEH), the name SDC is used consistently.

2 METHODOLOGY OF THE META-ANALYSIS

The methodology applied for this meta-analysis is based on **SDC's Approach Paper** for the HIC assignment and was **further developed by the HIC team during the Inception Phase**, based on an initial review of available documents. The meta-analysis should be seen in close conjunction with the five thematic deep-dives, which will be elaborated in the framework of the HIC project from mid-January 2023 onwards. Both products will effectively complement each other and, when considered together, will contribute to the achievement of the HIC project's objectives.

The meta-analysis should “**capture SDC's historic contribution to poverty reduction and the achievement of other relevant development goals in all eight countries in LAC**” and “document the evolution of development approaches [...], aid modalities and methodologies across the decades” as well as “where appropriate, it should also capture historic lessons learned.” (SDC Approach Paper for the HIC project, p. 6) The key characteristics of the meta-analysis are summarized in the following table:

Table 1: Key characteristics of the meta-analysis

Focus	Summative/descriptive presentation of SDC's bilateral cooperation with LAC (e.g. objectives, thematic priorities, modalities/instruments/methodologies) and the overall main results achieved ; where appropriate including first historic lessons learned
Countries	Focus on eight LAC countries , in which SDC has been active since 1969
Sectors/ themes	Focus on all sectors
Time frame	No time restriction (1964 – 2022)
DAC criteria covered	Focus on effectiveness, impact, and sustainability ; relevance and coherence will also be discussed, as far as the data situation allows
Methods of data collection	Document analysis of SDC-internal documents and semi-structured interviews with current and former SDC staff
Presentation of results for each country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Historic timeline per country ➤ Dynamic Theory of Change (ToC) per country ➤ Narrative descriptions of timelines and dynamic ToC per country ➤ Evaluation matrix with results regarding the DAC criteria and first lessons learned ➤ Narrative presentation of main results regarding the DAC criteria and first lessons learned

The meta-analysis primarily consisted of document analysis with **two main subcomponents**:

1. A **summative/descriptive presentation** of what SDC's bilateral cooperation with LAC looked like over time in terms of overall objectives and ToC, thematic priorities, applied instruments, and methodologies, among others. The results are presented in chapter 3 of this report and in the annexes in the form of **historic timelines, dynamic ToCs, and explanatory descriptions** for each of the eight countries.
2. An **analytical summary and aggregation of relevant findings** on the **effectiveness, impact and sustainability** of SDC's engagement along the respective guiding questions presented in the developed evaluation and capitalisation matrix (see Annex 1). Insights on the criteria of relevance and coherence are also documented, as far as the data situation allows. For each country, first historic lessons learned are also discussed. The results are presented in chapter 3 of this report and in the country-specific evaluation matrices in Annex 8.

The document analysis was complemented by **34 semi-structured interviews** (see section 2.1 below).

The meta-analysis focused on the **country level**. In addition to that, the main results were also tentatively summarised and discussed in terms of commonalities and differences at regional LAC level.

2.1 DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES

The meta-analysis primarily consisted of a **document analysis** of the following types of SDC documents²:

1. Country cooperation strategies and programmes (for Central America also regional strategies/programmes)
2. Reviews/evaluations of cooperation strategies/programmes
3. Historic reviews and capitalisations
4. Mid-term and final evaluations of projects and programmes

² Some of the documents provided by SDC were marked as confidential. All references to document sources in this report clearly mention document titles (also for the confidential documents), which should be considered by SDC whenever this report is disclosed to third parties.

5. Further project/programme documentation

The HIC team created a filterable document overview in Excel to make a **criteria-based selection of the documents to be analysed**. The most important document types turned out to be numbers 1-3 of the above list. For the analysis along the DAC criteria, additional evaluations of projects and programmes were taken into account in order to – by way of example – illustrate the aggregated findings. Project and programme evaluations available to the HIC team originated from the last 10-15 years, but not to earlier decades.

Hardly any other project/programme documents beyond evaluations were included in the analysis, at most some project final reports. The number of available documents varied largely between the eight countries with which bilateral cooperation has taken place. This implied that in some cases it was meaningful and possible to analyse nearly all available documents, whereas in other cases it was necessary to follow a strict prioritisation. For the financial analysis of the funds implemented in the eight countries, the HIC team additionally used an overview of the official development assistance (ODA) bilateral cooperation expenditures by SDC to countries in LAC, which was provided to the team by SDC's statistical service.

The structured document analysis was complemented by **34 semi-structured interviews** with current and former SDC staff as well as some independent experts. The SDC Evaluation Manager provided a list of possible interview partners to the HIC team, out of which the team selected the interviewees. A list of the consulted interview partners is enclosed as Annex 2. Most of these interviews were conducted online based on an interview guideline, which was closely aligned with the guiding questions in the evaluation and capitalisation matrix (Annex 1). The interviews served to discuss, critically reflect and triangulate as well as complement the insights and first findings of the document analysis. The team treated all statements by the interview partners confidentially and all references to interviews in this report have been anonymised.

In addition to the analyses at country level, for further contextualisation of the results, the HIC team also researched the most relevant **international development theories** since the 1940s (see Annex 3). This served to underpin the team's analysis on the most important milestones and developments of approaches and instruments of SDC's cooperation with LAC and to examine a possible influence of these international theories on SDC's chosen strategies and priorities. Moreover, the team analysed all **Swiss international cooperation strategies** (IZA strategies) since 1959 and illustrated the results in the form of a historic IZA timeline (Annex 4). This helped the team to understand the overall priorities of Swiss international cooperation over the decades, with a particular focus on LAC, and allowed us to analyse how far chosen priorities at the country level were in line with these overarching ideas. In the same line of thought, the team included some of SDC's regional strategies and guidelines for LAC in their analysis.³ Whenever appropriate, references are made to these contextual analyses throughout this report.

2.2 DATA ANALYSIS AND FORMATS FOR THE PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

All documents and interview protocols were analysed according to a **uniform scheme, using the software MAXQDA**. Already during the inception phase, the team developed a MAXQDA coding scheme (Annex 5) based on the guiding questions of the Evaluation and Capitalisation Matrix. This allowed the team to extract and pool all necessary information for answering the guiding questions. Based on the MAXQDA outputs, the team then filled in the evaluation matrices per country, presenting the main results and prepared the summarising descriptions for chapter 3 of this report.

For each country, the following products summarise the main results of the analysis:

- **Historic timeline** per country (see Annex 6)
- **Dynamic Theory of Change** per country (see country sections 3.1-3.6 and Annex 7)
- **Narrative descriptions of timelines and dynamic ToC** per country (see Chapter 3)
- **Evaluation matrix** filled with results regarding the DAC criteria and first lessons learned (see Annex 8)⁴
- **Narrative presentation of main results** regarding the DAC criteria and first lessons learned (see Chapter 3)

The **historic timelines** per country include categories like “thematic focus” or “main partner organisations”, which the team filled with the respective country information for the relevant period. Accordingly, the timelines

³ The team only had very few documents at regional LAC level at their disposal (see bibliography in Annex 10) and SDC interview partners confirmed the overall limited relevance of regional strategy documents for the actual implementation of SDC's bilateral cooperation (especially as compared to IZA strategies). Nevertheless, the available regional documents were screened and taken into account in the meta-analysis.

⁴ Please note that the sources (documents/interviews) for all statements made along the DAC criteria for each country are only documented in Annex 8 (evaluation matrices) in order to keep the main report clearer.

depict key milestones of SDC's engagement and summarise the development of objectives, thematic priorities and instruments.

The **dynamic ToC** take up some of the information from the historic timelines on SDC's country strategies and complements it with country-specific context data. The ToCs serve as a further visual presentation of SDC's engagement over time. If no formulated overall ToCs were available in the strategy documents (which was the case for the majority of the periods), the HIC team reconstructed and formulated them based on the available strategic information. Considering relevant context factors was important for the HIC team's analysis of achieved overall objectives, the engagement's impact and sustainability.

2.3 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

The present meta-analysis underlay several methodological limitations, which should be highlighted to interpret the results in terms of their **robustness and significance**.

1. **Analysis of secondary data:** A general limitation of all meta-analyses of this kind is that they are per definition primarily analyses of secondary data (in this case SDC documents). This meta-analysis was further complemented by some additional information from interviews. This implies that the analysis' quality largely depended on the underlying data quality. Only information which was available in the provided documents could be analysed and summarised to answer the guiding questions. Inconsistencies or gaps regarding the content in the documents led to corresponding gaps in the presentation of the meta-analysis results. Moreover, methodological weaknesses of the analysed evaluations also directly influenced the quality of the meta-analysis results and partly limit its robustness.
2. **Available documentation** (in quantitative and qualitative terms): The available documentation strongly limited the implementation of a state-of-the-art meta-analysis with the goal as defined at the beginning of this section. Verifying to what extent SDC contributed to poverty reduction and the achievement of other relevant development goals in LAC and thus examining the engagement's effectiveness, impact and sustainability can only be done in a methodologically sound way, if the underlying documentation provides the necessary information for these criteria and particularly if there is a sufficient number of documents referring to the same topic. In the case of this meta-analysis, this was hardly fulfilled. Particularly, comprehensive and methodologically sound impact analyses for SDC's interventions are very scarce. Available project evaluations in many cases do not include considerations on the projects' impact either but focus exclusively on the achievement of project outputs. Several interview partners confirmed that there is generally a lack of well-founded impact analyses for SDC's interventions in LAC. This made it impossible for the HIC team to come to robust conclusions for some countries and DAC criteria.
3. **Varying data quality between the eight countries:** The level of detail of the documentation between the eight countries varied. For some countries (especially those, with which SDC's cooperation started comparatively recently, i.e. Haiti and Cuba) the documentation was quite comprehensive. For other countries, there were larger gaps regarding the depiction of SDC's cooperation over time. For some countries, many evaluations at the cooperation strategy or project level were available, for others there were only a few. For some countries, the documentation was so comprehensive that only a part of the available documents could be analysed. Lastly, for some countries, the HIC team could rely on already existing capitalisations regarding SDC's bilateral cooperation (e.g. Ecuador and Bolivia), for others comparable documents were not available (e.g. Central America, with one exception). This influenced the analysis and led to some unavoidable heterogeneity in the presentation of the results.
4. **SDC-internal perspective:** In line with SDC's expectations as laid out in the Approach Paper, the meta-analysis was designed to reflect almost exclusively an SDC-internal perspective. Most of the analysed documents were SDC-internal documents (e.g. all cooperation strategies/programmes, many of the cooperation strategy reviews, most capitalisations and historic reviews). While some of the analysed evaluations were external, some of them were also conducted internally at SDC. With few exceptions, the interviewees were also either current or former SDC staff. Analyzing this way was in line with the intended purpose of the HIC project. It must, however, necessarily be taken into account when interpreting the results, especially those regarding effectiveness, impact and sustainability of SDC's engagement.

Possible mitigation actions for the above-mentioned limitations are very limited, given that it is of course not possible to change the type, quantity and quality of the available secondary data ex-post. Nevertheless, the HIC team continuously requested further documents from the SDC head office in Bern, the cooperation offices abroad as well as from interview partners to support the basis for analysis as much as possible. During every interview, the team put emphasis on those guiding questions, which could not be answered sufficiently during the document analysis, intending to close information gaps.

In hindsight, taking into account the above limitations, a critical reflection must conclude that, given the available documentation, a meta-analysis of this kind is only partially able to fulfil the defined objective of comprehensively capturing SDC's historic contribution to poverty reduction and the achievement of other relevant development goals in the eight countries in LAC. It will not lead to methodologically robust conclusions, but rather provide an informative overview and be partly exemplary and anecdotal.

3 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

3.1 BOLIVIA

3.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH BOLIVIA

Switzerland's development cooperation with Bolivia **began in 1969**. Previously, from 1961 on, the Swiss Technical Cooperation Service had already financially supported Swiss NGOs in the country. The official beginning of development cooperation, however, is seen in the year 1969, when first contact with Bolivian state institutions was established and the first Swiss development experts were sent to the country. Bolivia remained an important priority country for Swiss development cooperation in LAC for several decades.

The development of SDC's bilateral cooperation activities with Bolivia over time reflected by formulated overall theories of change is depicted in Figure 1, along with highlighted major political events in the country and other context factors (dynamic ToC). Moreover, a historic timeline for SDC's engagement in Bolivia can be found in Annex 6.

1969-1980

The thematic focus until 1980 was on projects in the field of **agriculture** and particularly **livestock**, which were mainly coordinated from Lima. In 1973, a **coordination office** was opened in Cochabamba. In 1975, a long-term cooperation agreement between Switzerland and Bolivia came into force and Bolivia became a **priority country** in the framework of Swiss development cooperation, implying that the main coordination of all actions was also shifted from Lima to La Paz. The strong focus on agricultural projects remained, now also including projects on agricultural mechanisation and forage seed, for instance. However, the orientation of the engagement became broader towards an integrated understanding of **rural development**, with additional activities in the fields of rural infrastructure, health, ecology/forestation and education. **Bolivian partners at that time were still relatively few**, namely the *Corporación Boliviana de Fomento*, the Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Cochabamba. All projects were primarily implemented by **technical experts from Switzerland**. Priorities at that time were mainly defined based on the identified needs in the country and the perceived added value of Swiss technical support.

1982-1992

The brutal **coup d'état** of General Garcia Meza in 1980 marked an incision not only for Bolivia's democratic and economic development but also for the Swiss development cooperation activities in Bolivia. The latter were temporarily reduced drastically and only slowly increased after a return to democracy in 1982. The following years were marked by an economic crisis and several beginning state reform initiatives on the Bolivian side. Until 1985, the Swiss engagement concentrated on strengthening the old projects which were still in operation and developing new initiatives, thereby maintaining the clear focus on **rural areas** and the **agricultural sector**. In those years, **cooperation with Bolivian NGOs** was initiated, also with view to risk diversification after the experience made in 1980.

Between 1985 and 1992, along with comprehensive economic and political reform and structural adjustment processes in Bolivia, the rather classic and modest Swiss programme took a **notable leap forward regarding thematic areas, financial resources and approaches**, according to the available documentation: The purely micro-level focus on local projects was opened to initiatives at the micro, meso and macro level; projects in rural areas were complemented by first engagements in urban spheres; the exclusively bilateral approach was from then on supplemented by multilateral activities; purely intra-sectoral initiatives developed to inter-sectoral projects; and finally, as mentioned above, the primarily governmental partner structure became increasingly open to the non-governmental sector. The budget for development cooperation with Bolivia more than doubled between 1985 and 1987. Thus from 1986 on, Swiss development cooperation started to provide support for state reform initiatives and, for the first time in LAC, applied cooperation instruments like bilateral **balance of payments assistance** and **debt relief measures** – all of those internationally coordinated. A significant instrument at the time was the *Fondo Social de Emergencia*, aimed at mitigating the social costs of the structural adjustment programmes, which was implemented as co-financing with the World Bank. Along with these efforts, since 1986, **SECO** was also active in the country.⁵ The engagement focused on the Andean highlands, the inter-Andean valleys as well as on poor urban neighbourhoods. Of course, some initiatives at macro level had national relevance.

⁵ The engagement of SECO ended in 2005. Since 2017 Bolivia is again a country for complementary measures of SECO.

1992-1997

The macroeconomic support measures were gradually reduced in the course of the 1990s. At the end of the decade, the focus was primarily on debt relief and capacity building on debt management. During the 1990s, SDC actively developed the new thematic areas of **small-scale business development in urban areas**, including activities in the fields of **vocational training**, as well as **environment and natural resources**. The latter gained increasing importance following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro and the Adoption of the Bolivian Environmental Act in 1992. The many years of experience of Swiss development cooperation in the forestry and agricultural sector were then being actively incorporated into broader environment-related actions. The important engagement of SDC in the area of **financial systems development and microfinance** is also rooted in the 1990s. From the mid-1990s onwards, Switzerland additionally focused on **governance** topics like promoting **decentralisation**, **local governance** and **citizen participation** as well as **reforms of the judicial system** (focus e.g. on improved respect for human rights, access to justice and fair trials). These thematic orientations were also clearly related to the adoption of the Bolivian People's Participation Act in 1994 as well as the adoption of the Bolivian Decentralisation Act in 1996. Agriculture and rural development were still priority topics, but their relevance, also in terms of financial resources, had decreased considerably. Also during this decade, the transversal topics of **gender**, **governance**, **environment** and **empowerment** came up for the first time. The cross-cutting themes of **gender**, **governance**, **human rights** (treated explicitly as cross-cutting since 2013), **conflict sensitivity** and **climate change** (both since 2018) have remained relevant until today. Bolivian partners during this time were still governmental and semi-governmental bodies, NGOs and networks of NGOs as well as increasingly also the **private sector**. SDC's projects were more and more implemented through contractors (NGOs, consulting etc.) and less by SDC directly.

1998-2008

Since the end of the 1990s, the overall priority topics of Swiss development cooperation have remained largely unchanged, being until today – with varying weight and changing specific project focuses – the following:

1. **Good governance and democracy**
2. **Sustainable use of natural resources**
3. **Sustainable economic development** (including projects in rural as well as urban areas)

Policy dialogue with the Bolivian government, private sector and other development agencies as a major part of the development cooperation was already envisaged since the end of the 1980s but became increasingly important in the 2000s. In this context, the inter-institutional network **Grupo de Desarrollo Rural** (G-DRU), substantially initiated by the Swiss, played a major role. At international level, the **Millennium Development Goals** and the adoption of the **Paris Declaration** undoubtedly influenced the cooperation with Bolivia, evident for instance in the very clear programmatic approach adopted from 2008 onwards and the increased international coordination. Moreover, the years since 2006 were marked by **Evo Morales' presidency**, the first Bolivian president with indigenous roots, who initiated far-reaching reform processes in the country focusing on reducing inequalities and combatting poverty. Comprehensive social programmes aimed at redistribution and the new Bolivian constitution (signed in February 2009), which aimed at promoting equal opportunities and guaranteeing equal rights for women and men, offered important points of reference for development policy.

Not only in this decade, but throughout the whole time period of SDC's bilateral cooperation with Bolivia, the key drivers for changes in SDC's strategic orientation were thus a mixture of political and socio-economic context factors in the country, changes in international development trends and main development paradigms (summarized in Annex 3) as well as overall Swiss or SDC-internal priorities. According to several interviews, particular Swiss (e.g. foreign policy) self-interests, however, seemed to have played a minor role.


2008-2024

Over the last 15 years, three thematic programmes have been implemented, whose overarching orientation continue to correspond to the above-mentioned three fields. Changes in the Bolivian context required continuous adaptations and reorientations at project level, especially regarding the negative effects of climate change and the implementation of reforms in the Bolivian justice sector as well as in decentralisation. Since 2013, the programmes include measures for **adaptation to and the mitigation of climate change**. Moreover, since that year important initiatives in the field of **access to justice** are being implemented.

Evo Morales' time in office abruptly ended in 2019 with an electoral and political crisis. Even though the political situation calmed down after transparent elections in October 2020, the **overall social and democratic situation remains fragile** until today, which clearly also influences SDC's engagement. The COVID-19 pandemic also left clear marks in the country.

The bilateral cooperation in Bolivia will come to an end in 2024, with a gradual phasing out from the different fields of intervention. Cooperation in the area of governance ends in 2022. In the following years, the priority areas will be **climate change and the environment** as well as **economic development**.

Figure 1: Dynamic Theory of Change for Bolivia



3.1.2 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH BOLIVIA

Relevance

The analysed documents clearly indicate that the chosen priorities by SDC were **well in line with the actual development needs of Bolivia** over time. In many cases, however, it remains unclear, on what basis this conclusion was reached. Also at project level, the appropriateness of the interventions to address Bolivia's most pressing development needs in the different thematic fields was confirmed. From 1997 onwards, Bolivia developed its first National Development Plan. From this moment on, SDC's cooperation strategies clearly refer to the priorities stipulated in the plan and align planned activities of the SDC projects to it. From the 2000s onwards, reference is also made to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (and later Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)), which were defined by the Bolivian government to be most relevant for the country. HIC interview partners confirmed this impression that in general SDC succeeded in choosing strategic priorities coherently and proportionately in relation to the development priorities in Bolivia. The proven **flexibility and openness to the partners' and beneficiaries' needs** was mentioned repeatedly as a general important success factor of SDC's interventions, which is also closely related to their identified high relevance.

The alignment of SDC's activities in Bolivia to the **overall Swiss development priorities** remains less clear, as many strategy documents for Bolivia do not refer to Swiss priorities at all. Some of the documents refer to the IZA strategies of the time or explicitly mention decisions by the Federal Council relevant for development policy. An early capitalisation report of 1989 also makes reference to the Swiss Federal Law on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of 1976, to which the cooperation priorities and approaches in the 1970s

and 1980s were aligned; later documents, however, do not mention that law. References to SDC's regional strategies or guidelines for LAC are very rare. Comparing the overall IZA priorities for LAC (see Annex 4) with the stipulated priorities at country level in Bolivia shows that both seem to be in line. The defined IZA priorities, however, are in most cases relatively broad.

Coherence

Regarding cooperation and coordination **among the different SDC projects** and SDC expert teams in Bolivia, references in the documents and assessments by interview partners were positive. From the late 1980s onwards, there were regular meetings among all SDC experts in the country and potentials for synergies were used as good as possible. Coordination of the bilateral cooperation activities **with activities in the field of humanitarian aid** was less relevant in the case of Bolivia as compared to other countries in LAC. Over the decades, humanitarian aid in Bolivia was applied in a targeted manner, mainly in cases of crises or natural disasters. Coordination between both fields was thus only necessary to a limited extent and worked well, according to the available documents. Regarding **coordination with SDC's global programmes**, according to interview partners, the coordination worked well, but was not very intensive. The bilateral programmes in Bolivia partly worked with the same implementing organisations as the global programmes based in Lima. After 2024, the global programme on climate change will possibly take over some of the bilateral activities currently implemented in Bolivia.

With respect to the coordination between **SDC and SECO**, the analysed documents and the interviews provided a different picture. The analysed documents generally made reference to a close coordination between both institutions and highlighted that the activities in the field of economic development were well aligned and complementary over the years. Also, there was geographical complementarity: SDC focused on rural areas as well as small/medium cities, whereas SECO focused on medium/large cities. The interviewees, however, were more critical regarding the cooperation and coherence of both institutions' interventions. Some even referred to a constant rivalry between them. Especially the period before the clear division of countries between SDC and SECO in 2005 is depicted rather conflictive. In recent years, an SDC colleague in La Paz focusing on the economic development programme has dedicated 20% of her working time to SECO projects, which is likely to be very useful for the complementarity of both institutions' activities, according to the HIC Team.

Donor coordination in Bolivia seemed to work well according to the documents – at least from 1986 on. Concerning earlier years, different documents state that there was clearly a lack of coordination between the different donors. From 1986 on and along with the upcoming macroeconomic support measures for Bolivia, coordination among the bi- and multilateral donors increased and improved notably. Along with the support for structural reforms, **Consultative Groups** among the different bi- and multilateral donors began to be held periodically until 2003. Moreover, the informal group of the so-called **"like-minded" bilateral donors** (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Canada), which was set up in 1990 by a Swiss initiative, contributed significantly to a better coordination of bilateral efforts. Bolivia's efforts to establish a National Development Plan (from 1998 onwards) further increased and improved international donor coordination.

Over the years, SDC increasingly had an active role in shaping donor coordination and policy dialogue. In 2006, the **Bolivian Development Partners Group** (GruS), whose main objective was to strengthen coordination and harmonisation of international cooperation, was created in La Paz. Moreover, the development of the **Joint European Strategy 2017-2020** (EU and Switzerland) further fostered cooperation among the international stakeholders. The positive picture regarding donor coordination and the elaborated donor mappings was also confirmed by the majority of the interviewees. Regarding donor coordination in more recent years, however, it was highlighted that more joint funding and policy dialogue of bi- and multilateral donors instead of a mere information exchange would have been needed in order to build up more competence in government and reach sustainability and upscaling of innovations. Finally, SDC has also successfully promoted the trilateral cooperation approach in Latin America for decades, as mentioned in the phasing out programme.

Effectiveness

The results achieved in Bolivia in the different sectors over the decades were **very diverse and broad**. The themes and sectors with the most prominent development results, according to the analysed documents and interviews, were the following (for more details on the results please **see the evaluation matrix for Bolivia** in Annex 8):

- **Rural development** with a focus on **agriculture**: livestock breeding, innovation and mechanisation of agriculture, (fodder) seed production; the fruitful cooperation with the University of Cochabamba in this field should also be highlighted here;
- **Decentralisation**, citizen participation, municipal democracy: SDC as pioneers, who worked in this field from very early (mid-1980s) on;
- Promotion of **vocational education and training**: bringing several people into newly developed vocational training; anchoring the dual education system in the relevant national institution;

- **Financial services** / microfinance: development of innovative financial services; significant contributions to the design of public policies, institution-building, and access to credit;
- Strengthening the **rule of law** / the judicial system and improving access to justice; and
- **Natural resource management** / biodiversity conservation / forestry / integrated water(shed) management and climate change adaptation.

Regarding development approaches and instruments through which SDC successfully contributed to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in Bolivia, the following should be highlighted (according to the available documentation):

- **Technical advice** and **capacity building** contributing to greater competence of staff in the different kinds of institutions were in many documents and interviews highlighted as the most important and successful approach of SDC.
- Cooperation with **universities** and **research institutes** in the field of agriculture, focusing e.g. on improving university education, implementing participatory research as well as projects with communities, proved to be very effective.
- SDC's explicit focus on **empowerment** and support of the **Bolivian civil society** was an important success factor for achieving project goals. Empowerment was thereby not only a theoretic principle, but served as an important strategic basis for the design of new interventions since the end of the 1990s.
- **Policy dialogue, multi-stakeholder approach**, and **bringing together different actors**: SDC has been very involved in policy dialogue at different government levels and with civil society, academia and the private sector as well as in bringing different actors into conversation with each other. In its projects, it focused specifically on cooperation with a wide range of stakeholders, also as a means of risk-spreading in situations of political crises.
- A focus on **interventions at the local level** combined with **approaches to influence the system level** has proven to be an effective driver for change for the benefit of the disadvantaged in the Bolivian environment.

Some documents and interviewees suggested that a challenging aspect of SDC's project implementation was partly a **lack of focus in the thematic orientation**, implying that too many differently oriented projects were implemented at the same time, with SDC being unable to demonstrate sufficient know-how in some topics. The thematic breadth and lack of focus of SDC's engagement was also criticised in an evaluation of the OECD DAC in the year 2000. The documents e.g. refer to too many fields of intervention and too many different partners, implying that the program would have required a further concentration. Moreover, it was explicitly mentioned that an increasing concentration of the intervention fields would have helped to better meet internal requirements of effectiveness and efficiency as well as to better prioritise fields of work at national, subnational and local level. Interview partners added that SDC's technical competence could have been even more founded in all fields of work with a stronger thematic concentration.

Available documents and interview partners agree on SDC having managed to reach a **wide range of institutions** at different government levels, in the civil society, academia and the private sector, thereby focusing on the local level and on rural areas. In its cooperation, SDC succeeded in anchoring knowledge in the institutions. However, personnel changes, particularly in centralised government institutions, have always been a major challenge for SDC in Bolivia. Personnel in decentralised institutions with continuity in higher batches was often more easy to be reached. Regarding the **project's beneficiaries**, the focus was mostly on vulnerable population groups (small-scale producers, micro-entrepreneurs, women, young people and indigenous people) in the Altiplano and the interandine valleys as well as in small and medium-sized cities.

Impact

Since its beginning, the Swiss cooperation with Bolivia has had an overall focus on **reducing poverty**. Given the lack of sound impact analyses mentioned in section 2.3, the results presented here are primarily based on assessments of the interviewees, on summaries from cooperation strategies making reference to previous strategy periods as well as partly on statements in capitalisations.

In general, several interview partners mentioned that the **Swiss influence on overall poverty reduction was clearly limited**, mainly due to the limited financial resources (also in comparison to other bi- and multilateral donors). SDC's main contributions to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities are seen **via the technical know-how of project teams**, thus via long-term **technical advice and capacity building**.

Some examples of hints to achieved positive impacts in the different thematic fields, as found in the documents, include:

- **Seed production:** A capitalisation from 2009 emphasised the positive impact on overall productivity as well as income of the farmers, consumption, the creation of value chains, and overall food security; all of which implying a better quality of life.
- **Technical vocational education and training:** A sustainable impact was achieved via capacity building and the creation of sustainable education and training structures.
- **Decentralisation:** The Swiss long-term interventions significantly contributed to the development of a civic culture and a democratic institutional framework in Bolivia that is capable of contributing to an effective reduction of poverty and the consolidation of a democratic society.
- **Climate Change:** As a result of the different projects, local authorities and the rural target population are sensitised and better trained in relation to climate change, which will allow them to better adapt and thereby increase their resilience.

Structural changes in norms or systems could also be achieved in different fields through the creation of stable institutions, norms and laws, for instance through SDC's support to the decentralisation process, the anchoring of the dual education system in the relevant national institution and the creation of sustainable microfinance structures. Moreover, **policy dialogue** at different government levels has helped to shape and implement laws, policies, plans and finances in a way that is more conducive to development.

Sustainability

In general, most interview partners confirmed that, although there are definitely some positive examples of thematic fields in which sustainable results were achieved (see below), sustainability of project successes and the handing-over to local partners has over the decades been **a challenging topic for SDC**. The **most important obstacles** regarding sustainability over the decades were i) political instability, ii) frequent changes of personnel in partner institutions, iii) a lack of adequate competences in the partner institutions (partly as a consequence of i) and ii)) and iv) in some cases heavy bureaucracy.

What definitely remains are the capacities built and the achieved technical know-how of the reached beneficiaries. In many cases, project results had higher chances to persist when the private sector was involved as cooperation partner. Positive examples of certain thematic fields include:

- **Decentralisation and citizen participation:** Relevant topics and examples are anchored in law; SDC's early experiences from engaging in improved citizen participation at regional and local level from the mid-1980s onwards were effectively incorporated into national efforts to decentralise the Bolivian state from 1995 onwards (Ley de Participación Popular); established structures remain, municipalities have the necessary capacities. An important role in this context played inter-institutional networks, such as the G-DRU in the 1990s.
- **Agriculture and sustainable forestry:** Projects were characterised by a continuous and pragmatic approach, long-term partnerships, good integration into the social and economic environment and the development of relevant technologies. Over the years, this has resulted in a large number of programmes, which have in some cases become independent in the form of their own companies or foundations.
- **Microfinance:** SDC contributed effectively to building sustainable structures in this area. Today, comprehensive microfinance structures exist in the country. The private sector also plays an important role in this field.
- **Vocational education and training:** Sustainable impacts could be achieved by the creation of sustainable education and training structures, partly privately organised.
- **Projects with Bolivian NGOs** could in many cases be handed over to them.

A challenging example refers to:

- **Environment and management of natural resources:** A number of interview partners confirmed that until today, institutions in the area (particularly at national level) are still fragile and people change a lot, which clearly challenges the sustainability of project successes.

Regarding replication and scaling-up of successful approaches, some interview partners confirmed that this has for a long time been and partly still is a challenge. In some thematic areas - such as watershed management or financial services - it was possible to incorporate experience into sector policies and thus achieve the desired scaling-up. Some successful project approaches were taken up by other donors as well (e.g. SIDA). Also, there was regional scaling-up in LAC by SDC itself, for instance in the fields of forestry or microfinance. In recent years, there were co-financing with multilaterals (World Bank, IDB) has become more popular, which should allow for further upscaling, according to the HIC Team.

3.1.3 HIGHLIGHTS AND FIRST HISTORIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR BOLIVIA

Regarding SDC's cooperation with Bolivia, the following aspects particularly stood out:

- SDC turned out to be a **successful pioneer** in some thematic fields in Bolivia: In areas such as **microfinance** or **decentralisation** SDC started its engagement from very early on and pursued the focus with staying power, in some cases for decades, culminating in the sustainable anchoring of proven approaches in standards and laws.
- SDC's very active engagement in **donor coordination** and the proactive launching of respective exchange formats and groups in Bolivia also stood out. It turned out to be a success factor for effective project implementation in the country.
- Even though not Bolivia-specific, the **territorial long-term engagement** with geographic priorities which in many cases remained stable for the whole period of SDC's cooperation in the country is noteworthy.

Moreover, the following lessons learned can be derived from the analysis:

- An important success factor turned out to be SDC's **flexibility** and **openness** towards partners and political developments in Bolivia as well as regarding **project approaches** and **project management**. This was highly appreciated by partners in the country and allowed SDC to effectively reach project objectives in line with Bolivian priorities. At the same time, it goes along with the challenge of not losing focus in the thematic orientation.
- SDC's interventions were characterised by **continuity, long-term presence and long-term cooperation** with stakeholders in the country and in certain territories. Some of the programs lasted 20 years and more, which allowed to build up trusting relationships with partners and perceive changes over time, which in turn might have increased the willingness to further support successful approaches on the Bolivian side.
- The **technical expertise of SDC project staff** was / is perceived as a strong and important success factor for SDC's cooperation by local partners. SDC's main contributions could be achieved via expert know-how and targeted capacity building.
- Especially for the work on democratisation and decentralisation, but also in other fields, **anchoring in civil society** turned out to be an important success factor. Work with CSOs has led to increasing demands for accountability and a more effective response to specific problems, more and better services, transparency and participation. Similarly, **cooperation with the private sector** turned out to be very effective and conducive to sustainable results.

3.2 PERU

3.2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH PERU

The framework agreement between Peru and Switzerland was signed in 1964 and it still represents the legal basis for Swiss development cooperation with Peru - Peru was the first priority country for Swiss development cooperation in Latin America. Despite the fact that the bilateral cooperation phased out from the country in **2011**, Peru continues to represent a priority country for SECO and has a function as a regional hub for SDC climate change, water, and disaster risk management Programmes. The period after 2011 is, however, not covered in this report, as it exceeds the scope of the HIC project. Similarly, other instruments such as the already mentioned SECO, the thematic Global Programme Water and Climate Change as well as Humanitarian Aid (HA) are not covered in this part. Although not highlighted, their work continues to constitute crucial importance for the country.

1964 – 1981

At the beginning of the 1960s, more than 50% of the Peruvian population lived in rural areas⁶. When compared to the urban population, the rural population displayed severe multidimensional poverty characteristics: lack of access to the most basic services, such as education, health, water and sanitation (particularly for the rural population). Nutrition represented also a significant problem. Not only were poverty rates extremely high, productivity levels were low. Hence, at the outset, initiatives in the country focused on livestock and improving agricultural production in rural areas as well as the development of the forestry sector. This included, among others, the promotion and improvement of **cheese production** throughout the country. It also involved the transfer of technology and the training of small producers and sought to generate economic activities that would

⁶ According to World Bank Data

bring dynamism to the regions of intervention. Breeding projects, where livestock from Switzerland was imported to Peru with the aim to genetically improve local livestock, were dominant for several years. A **1972** evaluation of the **approach** criticised it for being focused too exclusively on pure technology transfer and recommended that more attention should be paid to the beneficiaries of the cooperation and their economic, social and organisational problems. Consequently, the cooperation focused on "grassroots" development and the search for forms of cooperation that encouraged the participation of those concerned (such as farmer co-operatives). This led to a **diversification of the sectors of intervention** (health, alpaca breeding, multi-sectoral support to native Amazonian communities) as well as the launch of an integrated rural development project in Ayacucho.

1981 – 1990

In the 1980s, Peru returned back to democracy after 12 years of military rule, electing Fernando Belaúnde as its President. The Swiss Cooperation opened up both thematically and in terms of partners. **New instruments** (financial aid, co-financing) as well as **new partners** (NGOs, multilateral development banks) were included into the cooperation scheme. However - and particularly since 1982 - the extension of the armed conflict (*Sendero Luminoso* and *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru* (MRTA)) in the rural areas of the country, and the disinterest shown by the Government under Belaúnde in the Sierra, put the Swiss programme at an impasse. No - or little - counterpart funding from the official partners, and a continuously difficult security situation regarding the implementation of projects carried out in direct collaboration with grassroots communities hindered further project implementation. The search for projects that complied with the priorities of the Swiss law on international development cooperation led SDC to **diversify their partners**: three projects were launched with Peruvian NGOs. Moreover, SDC also relied on the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on co-financing. The diversification of sectors continued with the inclusion of small-scale fishing, audio-visual training and support for workers in the informal sector. Furthermore, programmes started to seek to support the most vulnerable in the country and to improve regional and social imbalances, as well as to strengthen the organisation of disadvantaged sectors. SDC also invested in programmes in Lima to support the urban population. At the end of the 1980s, the political situation in Peru became increasingly volatile: since *Sendero Luminoso* and *MRTA* launched the "people's war" in 1980, up to 70,000⁷ people had died. In 1989, the development programme had to be halted due to the security situation in the country and the threat to the state posed by *Sendero Luminoso* and *MRTA*. By then, more than 3,000 political murderers were reported (1990). The overall threat also affected SDC projects: in 1982, a rural project in Ayacucho was directly affected by the ongoing guerillera war⁸. Due to an overall dangerous situation, in 1990, Switzerland largely – although not completely – phased down activities in **bilateral cooperation**, keeping one project coordinator in the country.

1990 – 1995

In 1990, SDC decided to minimize its presence of bilateral cooperation in Peru, meaning that it had lost its status as a priority country. Nevertheless, and as an answer to the difficult situation in the country, financial support through instruments such as **Humanitarian Aid** increased.

Due to an improved security, economic and political situation, in 1993, SDC decided to reinstate bilateral cooperation in Peru. The scenario was different when compared to 1990: Alberto Fujimori, who was elected president in 1990, managed to restore macroeconomic stability in the country. With his policies of the "*mano dura*", he managed to significantly curtail guerillera activities in the country. The return of bilateral cooperation was also seen as an opportunity to learn from the "mistakes" of the past while allowing SDC a new start: Peru became immediately a **priority country**.

SECO contributed to the rehabilitation of the macroeconomic situation: the implementation **modalities** included the so-called counterpart fund (*Gegenwertfonds*), which was created as a result of bilateral debt relief (1994). This was considered necessary as the financial situation was desolate at the end of the so-called "lost decade": Peru had reached a yearly inflation rate of almost 7,500% in 1989, poverty rates rocketed up to 56%⁹.

1995 – 2001

During the mid-late 1990s, poverty reduction continued to be the **main objective** of the SDC's bilateral cooperation. It ran in line with six key problems that were identified for Peru in 1995: widespread poverty in both rural and urban areas, a divided society (culture of inequality), rapid dismantling of the state apparatus without replacement, formalistic-superficial democratisation process, political violence and human rights violations as well as destruction of natural resources. The thematic focus was on **rural water and sanitation, sustainable agriculture** and promotion of handicrafts and SME industries. Additionally, in 1996, SDC started to implement


⁷ Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission states in its final report (2003) that it has received reports of approx. 24,000 deaths/missing people. It however estimates that up to 70,000 people could have died in the conflict. This number is however disputed by some scholars, such as Silvio Rendon, who estimates that approximately 50,000 people have died in the conflict.

⁸ In 1982, 20 cows of rural project in Ayacucho were slaughtered and a building was burned down.

⁹ According to WorldBank Data

its first actions in the field of good governance. Bilateral cooperation returned to the Andes (Cusco/Apurímac and Cajamarca) as well as Lima, but not to the Amazon. Gender and environment, whose importance was further increased in the 1990s, were seen as **transversal topics**, together with good governance. The cooperation programme also introduced the **approach** of an explicit **empowerment strategy** that aimed at giving local forces a greater role in activities (e.g. local representation in decision-making bodies). Accordingly, a focus on aspects connected to good governance and decentralisation was indicated. In terms of **instruments**, technical bilateral cooperation **worked alongside SECO and Humanitarian Aid**. Efforts were made to link the various levels of intervention and to participate in policy dialogue.

Figure 2: Dynamic Theory of Change for Peru



2002 – 2012

In the last ten years of bilateral cooperation, poverty reduction continued to represent the main objective of Swiss development cooperation activities. Thematically, the cooperation continued to work in **good governance**, **sustainable economic development** and services for a **local development**. None of the proposed areas of work were completely new to Swiss development cooperation: the emphasis was rather on seeing the activities from a more integrated perspective that was better suited to the needs of the country. Gender, environment and good governance continued to be **transversal topics**. The reactivation of the economy as well as the establishment and "restoration" of structures in the area of rule of law were the priority concerns of the post-Fujimori government. New impulses at the local level were expected from the announced decentralisation measures, which, used positively, could trigger a local dynamic for poverty reduction. Politically, ten years of the authoritarian rule of the "*Fujimorismo*" left a country with weakening political institutions and widespread corruption, according to commentators.

In the last cooperation strategy (2009 – 2011), the main objective of Swiss cooperation was „to contribute to socially balanced, democratic and sustainable development, in particular through a system-oriented co-design of policies that ensure social equity, access to justice and sustainable development“. In this context, particular importance was attached to the promotion of economic growth aimed at improving the incomes of the poor (focusing on pro-poor growth). Emphasis was put on **strengthening of democratic institutions**, **promotion**

of **sustainable economic growth** and **reduction of vulnerabilities** (to natural disasters and climate change, strengthening the sustainable use of natural resources). According to the HIC Team, it seems that particularly the last point was connected to the “start” of the thematic Global Programmes Climate Change and Water in the country. In 2012, technical bilateral cooperation ended while Global Program activities remained. Also, Peru continued to constitute a priority country for SECO. The exit of bilateral cooperation was seen as a necessary measure, since Peru now faced challenges typical for an upper middle income country¹⁰ and required an adjustment of the instrument mix, which, according to the Swiss cooperation, justified the transition from SDC to SECO instruments.

3.2.2 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SDC’S COOPERATION WITH PERU

Relevance

According to the interviews, programmes in Peru succeeded well in responding to pressing needs in the country. Particularly after 1980, the Swiss Cooperation cooperated more closely with the national institutions/government and implemented its activities according to the **National Development Plan** of the country. According to the HIC Team, one can also draw a connection to the dominant development discourse of the respective decade: technological transfer in 1960s, basic needs approach in 1970s, human development in 1980s, neoliberalism in 1980s and 1990s, as well as adherence to the MDGs since 2000 (see Annex 3). In order for the aid to give a tangible impetus to development, SDC also began to intervene at the **social and societal level** and in production structures. Comparing programmes in Peru and Swiss International Strategies, there is a clear overlap of priorities. For instance, the 2002 – 2007 Cooperation Strategy explicitly refers to the Swiss interest in supporting **poverty reduction strategies**, support for selected regions with **fragile statehood, conflicts and security risks**, and contribution to shaping a globalisation that promotes development.

Coherence

In Peru, several **SDC instruments** (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security¹¹, global programmes) as well as activities by SECO were (or are still) implemented in the country. Particularly after 2000, stronger coordination modalities between the instruments were implemented – for example in the thematic area of “sustainable use of natural resources” (Strategy 2009 – 2011), where technical bilateral cooperation coordinated together with HA interventions in disaster prevention on a technical and political level. It was mentioned in several interviews that particularly the coordination between TA and HA was seen as very successful: Peru is highly exposed to natural hazards, (such as earthquakes and floods). It was however also mentioned that although a **coordination system** between the respective actors existed (SDC, SDC HA and SECO), a closer exchange between them would have benefitted the overall work of the Swiss development cooperation in the country: the 2001 analysis of the country stated that, taking the example of SME development, a stronger involvement of SECO would have benefitted the overall work in the sector. Whereas some of the priority topics of the bilateral cooperation were taken over by SECO (or Global Programmes) during the phasing out from the country, other initiatives (e.g. technical education and governance) were ended after leaving Peru in 2011.

Cooperation with other international actors increased after 1980; it was mentioned in the interviews that a **more coordinated** and **systematic approach** would have been beneficial for an overall coherent international cooperation system. As a consequence, SDC took a more systematic approach in the 1990’s: for instance, access to rural drinking water represented a highly successful area of cooperation, where SDC cooperated already since the 1980s with the IDB as well as with other donor agencies in LAC. A successful coordination format, according to the available documents, was the “joint working groups” for the specific sectors, which international actors used for an exchange with governmental institutions such as the *Ministerio de Agua and the Ministerio de Agricultura* in Peru. SDC had an active role in the promotion of these coordination groups.

Effectiveness

According to the documentation, the overall balance is positive, with concrete results at policy level, such as legislation for vocational training, for environmental protection and for decentralisation (e.g. two regional governments have policies and standards in the area of **water and sanitation/water management**). Moreover, results were achieved in the area of:

- **Production of dairy products/Agriculture**
- **Local Governance**
- **Technical Education**
- **Economic Development**

¹⁰ According to the [World Bank](#), Peru became an upper middle income country in 2008.

¹¹ This was implemented however under technical cooperation as instruments connected to peace did not exist in the 1990s.

The results are portrayed more in detail in the evaluation matrix in Annex 8. **AGUASAN** was a programme with particularly high effectiveness: highly effective results were reached in Cusco and Cajamarca, where AGUASAN supported the (difficult) development of adapted technologies for the mountain regions and management instruments for the operation of the drinking water systems. It is estimated that 700,000 rural and urban residents benefitted from such projects directly and up to 2 million people in an indirect way¹².

The sole emphasis on technology and know-how transfer was criticised internally already in 1972. As a response, SDC introduced a wider range of instruments. This included the “typical” technical cooperation instruments such as **capacity building activities and promotion of participatory approaches**. Overall, Swiss cooperation was usually seen as **flexible, adaptable** and **efficient** in its work.

The number of involved actors increased with time. The government was seen for many years as the main partner, with whom SDC managed to keep a good working relationship. However, whereas national stakeholders always played an important role (e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture), documents suggest that stakeholders at the **local level** found themselves often excluded from cooperation processes, particularly in the early years of bilateral cooperation. It seems that this changed with the stronger focus on governance topics by the end of 1990s. Still, SDC encountered limitations that were connected to the strongly centralist system in the country. Nevertheless, in line with decentralisation processes in Peru after the change of government in 2001, SDC strengthened cooperation schemes with targeted departments: many projects were put into action directly with regional governments. On a national level, cooperation with institutions in the area of technical education and economic development proved to be successful. Furthermore, the role of the government changed during the 1990's; the Peruvian government under Alberto Fujimori retracted from coordination in development cooperation with the Swiss. At the same time, the role of NGOs rose (also for Swiss bilateral cooperation). However it was mentioned in one of the interviews that the rapid increase of national NGOs in the 1990s led to a new set of difficulties that resulted in parallel implementation processes, with too many actors involved, who hindered the efficiency of the actions implemented¹³. This situation improved after 2000, following a more efficient system of cooperation with NGOs.

Impact

Poverty reduction and the **reduction of inequalities** has been seen as the main objective of Swiss cooperation over the decades. SDC's contribution to poverty alleviation at national level in Peru cannot be clearly pinpointed based on the available documents. On a regional level – e.g. in Cusco, SDC has significantly contributed to a higher access to rural water with AGUASAN and has indirectly contributed to the reduction of poverty through their support to the most vulnerable population. AGUASAN represents a special case, as its impact on poverty in the Peruvian communities in the Andes was seen as particularly meaningful, due to its territorial and integral approach. The support to the **institutionalisation** of processes in national and regional counterparts was seen as one of the main achievements that Swiss cooperation interventions have achieved in Peru. On a national level, Switzerland has also made a contribution to Peru's adherence to the Paris Declaration on Harmonisation and to the adoption by the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI) of a new policy for international cooperation in 2007.

Sustainability

Particularly the initiatives in the **water management** and **agricultural programmes** are seen as a success today. It was mentioned in an interview that in the case of rural water management, thanks to the SDC interventions, an efficient national water management system as well as national rural water programme were developed that continue to be implemented by the government and benefits in a direct and indirect way more than 2 million people, according to an interviewee. Initiatives in the rural **water management sector** were seen by many as the most successful topic in upscaling efforts. It continued to be a part of the Peruvian Government policies and was an example not only for other SDC water projects in the region, but also for other donors, such as the IDB. An important point to mention, which was often highlighted in the interviews as hindering factor, were the many changes in the Peruvian Government and hence the **lack of continuity** in development strategies from the Peruvian counterparts. Strategies between SDC and the respective Ministries were developed and agreed upon, however often overthrown, once a new government came into place. Since 2001, no Peruvian president was able to secure a consecutive second term.

¹² Information from an interview

¹³ The Country Programme 1995 – 1997 also mentions the high heterogeneity and atomisation of the NGO sector in the country.

3.2.3 HIGHLIGHTS AND FIRST HISTORIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR PERU

Regarding SDC's cooperation with Peru, the following aspects particularly stood out:

- Peru represents a unique case, where **different cooperation instruments** were used at the same time. Despite the fact that Technical bilateral cooperation ceased out, Peru continues to represent an important country for Swiss Development Cooperation, having achieved the transition from traditional bilateral cooperation to a new approach adapted to the needs of a middle income country.
- **The AGUASAN** Programme was seen as highly successful not only because it provided water and sanitation infrastructure and participatory management structures to the most vulnerable population, but it also succeeded in promoting empowerment processes of these populations.
- SDC has been one of the first international development actors in the important topics of climate change and **natural disaster risk reduction** programmes in Peru. The global thematic programmes in these topics continue to be implemented in the country as anchored in a long experience (20 years) and strong partnership.

Moreover, the following lessons learned can be derived from the analysis:

- SDC's approach to establish defined themes at different levels of intervention (micro, meso, macro) proved to be effective and brought **operational results into the policy dialogue**, as seen in the case of AGUASAN.
- The **partner mix** and the work at different levels have led to close cooperation with various national as well as international partners. Particularly in the area of water management, AGUASAN has led knowledge management processes on the regional level in LAC.
- Whereas cooperation with national institutions has been seen as successful, cooperation with local actors was rather weak in early years of bilateral cooperation. The approach to support inter-**institutional cooperation** in disaster relief **and disaster risk management** is seen as highly successful. Openness to innovation and promotion of new thematic areas was effective.

3.3 ECUADOR

3.3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH ECUADOR

SDC's cooperation with Ecuador started in **1969 and finished in 2009**. Before phasing out, two country programmes were elaborated. The thematic focus was consistent throughout the 40 years.

1969-1981

The official start of the bilateral cooperation took place in 1969. At that time, the **main objective** was to support agricultural production through technological and knowledge transfer. **The thematic focus** was on the construction of irrigation infrastructure and agricultural production, moving from a *subsistence* agriculture towards a *market* agriculture. The most relevant **instrument** to reach this end was technological transfer. Prioritising rural areas and agriculture in this context was a **key milestone** of Swiss cooperation, in line with the country's economy, which was based on the export of agricultural products (plantain, corn, among others). The **main partners** during this cooperation period were ministries and secretaries at national level, with practically no participation of local governments or other local stakeholders. With the oil boom in 1972, Ecuador experienced an accelerated economic growth. Between 1972 and 1979, the military governed the country. The Swiss cooperation reduced its budget and closed its office until 1984. The reasons are only briefly mentioned in the capitalization documents and are mainly related to the strengthening of public investment during the decade of the 70's, which also reflects on the changes of the political and economic vision of the time. In a context of state modernization, resources and projects coming from international cooperation became less prominent for the ruling government of the time, which therefore contributed to a (temporary) abandonment of the relations between the Ecuadorian state and the Swiss cooperation office.

1982-1990

The return to democracy was marked by the extensive growth of external debt, an overall liberalization of the national economy and the considerable efforts towards the privatization of public services (with several marking events as described in the Dynamic ToC below). Public administration was shaped under structural adjustment principles, and there was a marked absence of agrarian public policies and state interventions in the sector, which reinforced the historic inequalities between the rural and the urban sector. On the contrary, during this period, the **main goal** of Swiss cooperation was to support the rural population in a situation of poverty, particularly indigenous communities in the Andean region. Both **geographic and thematic focus** were defined: while

working on agriculture and irrigation, SDC started working in parallel with small rural and urban enterprises, completing the circle of agricultural production. Geographically, SDC was targeting the Andean region only. **Cross-cutting issues** start showing up, mainly related to a sustainable use of soil and water for agriculture and reforestation. According to the available documentation, the most relevant **key milestone** within this period was the integration of a demand approach – here, market mechanisms to improve commercialisation of agricultural products – to the existent supply approach (production). Swiss and Ecuadorian NGOs became relevant as local **implementing organisations**.


1991-1998

The **main objective** of the cooperation strategy in this period was to strengthen the links between the urban small industries and the rural agricultural production. The guiding paradigm evolved from a local approach to a territorial one - another **key milestone** of the strategic orientation. **Thematic and geographic focus** remained in line with previous periods, but new **cross-cutting** issues arose: gender and environmental sustainability appeared for the first time explicitly. Humanitarian aid was limited in its scope, and focused on the answer to natural disasters. During this period, the key **implementing actors and organisations** were the local communities and NGOs. Swiss organisations also played a big role within SDC's programs. And in spite of being the official **main partners**, coordination with governmental counterparts was rather weak. This reflects the circumstances of the time, which were marked by a high political instability and the beginning of a deep social crisis. Indigenous movements became highly relevant actors on the political arena during this period, which was a turning point in the rising protests of the time. Poverty and inequality grew at national level, but also markedly between urban and rural areas.

1998-2002

Heavily affected by the 1999 crisis –which, as described in the ToC, had a number of repercussions, including the dollarization of the economy and the accelerated growth of poverty–, the **main objective** of the first official country programme (CP) for this period was to support the disadvantaged population and producer associations in the sustainable use of their development potentials; promoting equitable development of men and women, as well as to contribute to the preservation of natural resources. This objective was established in a context of a migratory exodus caused by the economic crisis, and even though this process took place at a national level, the largest part of both the population's impoverishment and migration fell on the rural population. Therefore, placing the **thematic focus** on agriculture, irrigation, forestry and environment, promotion and support to small industry, as well as vocational training (showing up in the CP for the first time) were key to support the rural side of the country. Humanitarian aid was limited in its scope, and focused on the answer to natural disasters. A relevant **instrument** to reach the cooperation's goals was the FOES (*Fondo de Contravalor Ecuatoriano Suizo*), which provided financial resources to the ongoing projects and which stood out as alternative to the orthodox economic approach of the time. In the first CP, **empowerment** of indigenous communities appeared not only as an additional **cross-cutting issue** but also as a **key milestone** of the overall work of SDC within the country. In line with this vision, the key **implementing organisations** were local NGOs and producer groups.

Figure 3: Dynamic Theory of Change for Ecuador



2002-2006

Although some first signs of economic recovery were visible, marked socio-economic inequalities remained. The second CP defined its **main goals** accordingly: to contribute to the reduction of poverty and socio-economic inequalities - especially in the rural Andean region, maintaining **geographical focus** - in order to defend their own democratic interests and demand their rights, while promoting a sustainable management of natural resources. Projects and activities were clustered in three **thematic lines**: Income and employment, decentralisation and local development, environmental management. Within **cross-cutting issues**, gender strategies became more concrete, and environmental sustainability was materialised in regulatory frameworks and public policies. **Empowerment** remained as a guiding principle of SDC's strategy. In order to contribute to decentralisation processes, important efforts were made to strengthen the institutional capacities of local governments.

2007-2009 – phasing out

SDC finished their projects in close coordination with the local beneficiaries, counterparts, and implementing organisations by 2009 (although the cooperation office closed in June 2010, after finalizing administrative tasks). As described in the available capitalization and lessons learned documentation, **the phasing out of Ecuador was framed within SDC's review of its geographical and thematic portfolio** worldwide, which in turn aimed to increase the efficacy of its cooperation and reorient the available resources towards other regions. This last phase of the bilateral cooperation established **clear communication and transparency as its key principles**, and was carried out in close contact with the local staff. During this phase, SDC highlighted its role as agent of change throughout the bilateral cooperation period, working permanently at macro and meso, but above all at a micro level, placing great efforts in the empowerment of the neglected rural population and fostering local capacities.

3.3.2 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH ECUADOR

Relevance

The document review showed that **the goals pursued during SDC's presence in Ecuador were aligned to the local needs**. It is clear that SDC's focus was on the rural sector, as it was this sector which was facing the most urgent needs. Yet paradoxically, as described in the different capitalisation reports, the cooperation's strategy cannot be described as 'in line' with the country's development agenda, since the rural and agricultural national development policies from this time were poorly elaborated.

In a context in which the national development was oriented towards urban spheres (70'), and neoliberalism was fiercely implemented (80' and 90'), **bilateral cooperation aimed to build linkages between the countryside and the cities** in order to increase the benefits of the cultural and economic heterogeneity within the country. The alignment of SDC's activities in Ecuador with overall Swiss development priorities remains unclear, as there is practically no information on this in the country strategies/programs and the capitalisation documents.

Coherence

The revised documents highlight a good overall coordination within SDC's projects. Key to this was a **solid steering at the sectoral level**, with complementary actions to upscale the measures (to the macro level) or to ground them to the micro level. Another important element was the **close work with Swiss NGO**. Similar to the other Andean countries, humanitarian aid was less notorious than the bilateral cooperation between SDC and its counterparts, and more targeted towards a response to natural disasters. Similarly, the **role of SECO** in Ecuador is mentioned only towards SDC's last period in the country. The 2002-2006 Country Programme states that Ecuador was part of the regional programme SIPPO, but it remains unclear if there were other joint initiatives between SECO and SDC. Regarding cooperation with other international donors, especially Germany and the Netherlands, and complementarity in projects is acknowledged. The collaborative work led to synergies and efficiency gains, especially in the fields of financial services development and the commercialisation of agricultural products.

Effectiveness

A large part of evaluations and capitalisation documents were built upon testimonies, and quantitative assessments of the effectiveness of SDC's cooperation with Ecuador are scarce. Nevertheless, the extensive reporting efforts carried out during the phasing out years show that there is an overall positive perception of SDC's work in Ecuador, and that important results were achieved, particularly in the rural sector. The following achievements stand out:

- **Irrigation:** The scale and budget concentration of the social construction of the irrigation programme in Ecuador was atypical for SDC. In no other country was there a programme with such a high level of investment, continuity, and thematic concentration. It was not only successful in terms of access – allowing around 15.000 families to benefit from irrigation infrastructure – but also in relation to promoting empowerment.
- **Agriculture and rural microfinances:** Regarding agriculture, the cooperation's approach was dealing not only with production, but also with commercialisation and capacity development. Complementary, rural microfinance programs supported by SDC allowed producers to access credit and financial services. The number of cooperative members increased by 130% between 1999 and 2008.
- **Natural resources management:** By working closely with indigenous communities and local actors, SDC contributed to build a new approach towards natural resources management, based not only on an environmental perspective, but also considering the socio-economic factors.
- **Good governance practices and vocational training programs:** Cooperating at micro- and meso-level and working closely with local governments supported strengthening institutional capacities. As for **vocational trainings**, the developed modules had a significant reach and were evaluated as positive and useful by the participants.

Relevant instruments within bilateral cooperation were (i) the co-financing of capacity development initiatives between SDC and saving cooperatives, which motivated local actors to shape their own capacity development programs, and (ii) external debt-relief mechanisms to provide financial resources for projects. Another key resource was the close work with the indigenous and rural population - this cooperation also being relevant regarding project sustainability. Indigenous communities were among the main stakeholders reached by the cooperation, not as passive beneficiaries but as very active co-developers of projects.

Impact

In terms of its impact, SDC's bilateral cooperation contributed mainly **to a reduction of poverty for the rural population**, especially of those families whose economic activity was focused on agriculture and cattle. A positive impact could clearly be measured in some cases, as in the case of the province of Azuay, where due to SDC's programs and sustained by a better access to irrigation, agriculture raised its revenues and hence the rural family income rose from USD 1,596 in 2001 to USD 3,456 in 2009. More available income had two other important effects: (i) rural families increased their savings capacity, and (ii) allowed them to send children to school on a more regular basis, improve housing conditions as well as food security and quality. Finally, SDC's key role in the **creation of new economic activities** (e.g. cheese and handcraft fabric factories) allowed to create new job opportunities for rural families.

As for SDC's other long-term impacts, three points stand out. First, **empowerment of indigenous communities** through their recognition as valid interlocutors had a significant impact on their political life. Second, the **shift of women's role in agriculture**, which changed patterns of access to and control of resources and benefits within the peasant families, whereby women gained access to land, technical knowledge, and microcredit. Finally, the creation of an **environmental agenda** and its subsequent institutionalization is another significant impact regarding SDC's work in Ecuador.

Sustainability

During the phasing out, SDC discussed who should take over the projects. There were economic and financial considerations, and a strong commitment to sustain the bonds and trust relations created throughout the years of Swiss cooperation among different stakeholders. In all cases, the **biggest difficulty refers to financial sustainability after SDC's exit**.

Other results achieved throughout the 40 years of cooperation remained. One key factor to this end was the **support to local technicians/experts**. The different capacity development initiatives were carried out from *the inside*, allowing a *Training of Trainers* effect. The learned techniques and skills remained within the communities, and some of the projects that started in SDC's first cooperation period (such as the cheese factories) were still operational nowadays. As for the replication of the results, a notable outcome was the **institutionalisation of (i) a vocational training model**, which took place during the phasing out years, and of **(ii) environmental policies**. Finally, SDC's support to saving cooperatives and **rural microfinances** is still noticeable at present.

3.3.3 HIGHLIGHTS AND FIRST HISTORIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR ECUADOR

Regarding SDC's cooperation with Ecuador, the following aspects particularly stood out:

- **Highlighting the social nature of infrastructure projects:** as mentioned above, **the irrigation project in Ecuador was a very special initiative during its time**. One of the keys for its success was the involvement of the local communities in the construction and later management of the required infrastructure. This connection was particularly important regarding the project's sustainability and the multiplying effect of its benefits.
- **Putting empowerment into practice:** the **Swiss cooperation office** was in close contact with the rural and indigenous communities in almost all stages of the different projects, going from its design and up to its finalization and handing over to the local actors. This approach was not generalized –especially during the 70' und 80'– among other donors, and even within the governmental institutions.
- **Creating connections between the rural and the urban:** the **territorial approach** aimed to connect these historically **divorced realities**, and to increase both the job opportunities and the economic benefits that result from working in productive chains from a whole perspective. Some of the small enterprises (cheese factories, for example) that were created in SDC's active years in Ecuador are still operative nowadays, and they continue making the best out of this urban-rural dynamic.

Moreover, four decades of cooperation left numerous lessons learned. Some of the most relevant are:

- **Support to long-term processes:** rather than focusing only on project implementation, considering the role of the projects within the cooperation strategy and the fulfilment of its objectives.
- **Decentralisation does not equal local development.** The latter one requires citizen participation, articulation with local capacities and transformation of local government institutions, which are not necessarily given beforehand. Considering that decentralization comes across numerous programs and countries within SDC's activities, it is crucial to also focus on the other 'requirements'.

- **Low-profile actions:** Actions focused at the micro level are more effective to build trust relations, especially in changing political contexts. Local beneficiaries need to be actively involved in cooperation activities as decision-making stakeholders.
- **Social ownership:** Instead of formulating highly novel interventions, consolidating ongoing initiatives. Designing projects that respond to the demands of the target group, based on their capacities and resources. This principle was highlighted in the existing literature and also in the interviews conducted, as it does not seem to be self-evident in other types of interventions during the analysed decades.
- SDC grounded its work at the **micro and meso level**. This strength must not be lost in the scaling-up, but used as an entry point as a way to continue to influence broader processes.
- **Environmental sustainability and social/citizen participation** must be considered in a context of poverty alleviation. In the absence of means of subsistence it is unlikely that individuals and communities will be able to participate in territorial development processes. This reflection is also applicable when dealing with other cross-cutting issues such as gender and/or anti-corruption policies and programs. If not understood within the local needs, the designed initiatives might not reach the desired impact.

In addition to this, the Ecuadorian experience left a number of **lessons learned specifically related to the phasing out:**

- An exit decision must be closely reviewed with local workers and partners.
- Evaluation results can serve as very important inputs to knowledge management during phasing out processes, but only if they are methodologically sound. The evaluations used during the phasing out in Ecuador were characterised by several limitations like a lack of baselines, or too little information available from local institutions or former SDC's projects.
- There is a direct relationship between partners' institutional strengths and measures to promote sustainability. A deep analysis of the partners' capacities should be conducted when leaving.
- As recognised in SDC's exit documents, other countries can learn a lot from phasing out experiences, when dealing with their own exit process. Sharing these experiences could more actively encouraged for future phasing out stages in the countries where SDC is still active.

3.4 CENTRAL AMERICA

The development of the **Central America programme began in the late 1970s** with Honduras as the first priority country (framework contract end of 1978, coordination office from 1981). Parallel to the programme in Honduras, SDC started activities in Nicaragua after the fall of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. El Salvador became part in 1987. Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama are purposefully left out of this illustration as they do not form part of the HIC project.

In 1993, Nicaragua became a priority country and the coordination office was moved from Tegucigalpa to Managua. Also starting in 1993, SDC developed **Regional Strategies for Central America**, instead of bilateral, country-specific strategies. The rationale was that the regional approach was a supposedly consistent response to the fact that the countries of the region were relatively small, had comparable characteristics and were in need of border-independent solutions to their common problems. From the point of view of the Swiss cooperation, the regional approach, on the one hand, allowed to keep the design and development costs of projects relatively low by replicating proven actions and, on the other hand, was believed to increase the effectiveness and impact of the available resources.

The regionalisation took place in two ways: on the one hand, through successive replication of initial national projects (mainly in Nicaragua) in the fields of agriculture, water supply and sanitation, and natural resources; on the other hand, through participation in new regional actions and networks, mainly in the sectors of water supply and sanitation as well as environment.

Over the years, **the Regional Strategy approach was further defined and adapted**. It seems reasonable to argue that the description in the 2007-2012 Regional Strategy (2007, p. 12) is still in practice today: *"The Cooperation Strategy for Central America has a regional focus and concentrates country level interventions on the two poorest countries in the region (i.e. Nicaragua and Honduras). The strategy links the country focus with a regional programme component that is thematically coherent with national interventions and that facilitates knowledge sharing among countries"*. SDC defined the regional concept as follows:

- 1) A regional programme component that: a) Contributes to the solution of supra-national problems, b) Contributes to the strengthening of regional institutions and c) Facilitates access to regional markets and investment opportunities. The regional programme support has to be thematically congruent with

the country programs in Nicaragua and/or Honduras. Experiences and results of regional cooperation shall benefit primarily those two countries.

- 2) A regional Program-Management characterised by: a) Regional knowledge sharing (networking, regional learning) and b) Organisation of the Cooperation Office Team primarily by thematic responsibilities.

Interestingly, the Regional Strategies for the periods 1999-2005 and 2007-2012 were **elaborated jointly between SDC and SECO**. This discontinued as of 2013, because SECO programs in economic development and public finance were reduced as a consequence of the parliamentary bill 2009-2012 that no longer included Nicaragua as a SECO priority country, and because governance conditions in Nicaragua led to the discontinuation of the general budget support.

To the knowledge of the HIC Team, a **dedicated systematic evaluation of the Regional Strategy approach has not been undertaken** in recent years. While an independent evaluation was commissioned by SDC in 2006, covering the strategy period 1999-2005, this mainly focused on sectorial achievements at country level, and did not have a major focus on the regional approach itself (something that was also noted in SDC's Senior Management Response). One of the reasons for this might be that the independent evaluation classified the Regional Strategy of the period to be lacking clarity with regards to what the notion of "Regional Approach" (*enfoque regional*) actually entailed.

The only **external view** on SDC's regional approach seems to have taken place in the context of the OECD-DAC's Peer Review process (2009) for Switzerland, which suggested that the regional dimension does not seem to be taken into account consistently. According to the Peer Review, the specific regional component of the programme was weak (10% of the overall funding) and linkages between regional and national initiatives could be strengthened, as noted in the new Swiss Co-operation Strategy for Central America 2007-12 and in the case of disaster risk management. It therefore seemed that the rationale for subsuming country programmes into a regional programme was to increase efficiency by building synergies within the Swiss system, rather than to address regional problems through regional solutions (such as supporting regional organisations and strengthening regional integration), so the Peer review concludes.

Relevant **reflections regarding the regional approach**, as included in SDC strategic / discussion papers and as communicated by interviewees include the following:

- **Humanitarian aid** projects and interventions in **disaster risk reduction** were an important (if not the most important) part of the regional strategy, according to one interviewee.
- The **structure of responsibilities** in the region was challenging, as stated by a former Head of Cooperation: The Swiss Embassy in Costa Rica was also the consular hub for the entire region (all other representations in the region had consular agencies dependent on this hub). In addition, the representation in Costa Rica was responsible for diplomatic relations with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama and Nicaragua. The Embassy in Guatemala was responsible for diplomatic relations with its host country and Honduras. The Managua Regional Office was responsible for the development program and humanitarian assistance activities throughout Central America and, since 2018, for the Climate Change/DRR/NR regional program. The Honduras office has been responsible for the Human Rights/Governance Regional Program since 2018 and had the operational implementation responsibility in Honduras. This "intertwining" of responsibilities had the advantage of a lively exchange, but needed social skills and the will to work together to avoid communication breakdowns or to "iron them out" if necessary.
- In SDC's internal Discussion Paper *Concepto Regional* (2016) four points were identified for **justifying a Regional Program**:
 1. Existence of global/regional challenges, problems or risks.
 2. Regional integration dynamics where regional organizations/associations play an active role (political, economic).
 3. Additional flexibility offered by a regional program compared to a country program, including the possibility of entering a new country - Allows for more efficient risk management (entering/leaving countries)
 4. Joint analysis of the regional context leads to the conclusion to opt for a regional program from an effectiveness/relevance point of view.

The paper further argued that these points coincided in several aspects with the Central American situation; according to the HIC Team, this assertion is surely not shared unequivocally by all SDC colleagues.

- In the "**Note to Management**" for SDC's 2017 Management Retreat, the following reflections are found:
 - a) Regional programs should preferably be conceived where regional institutions with specific goals exist.

- b) If these do not exist or are substantially underperforming a regional approach needs to be decided with great caution. It should be considered only if:
 - a. either support to national level organizations alone can lead to a regional cooperation,
 - b. or if capacity building of the regional institution by a joint donor group (including multi-laterals) is possible and effective.
- c) There should be clear evidence of the commitment of involved countries (governments) and regional institutions to act jointly on the issue(s) to be addressed by a program.
- d) A regional engagement (in particular for a small donor) must supplement and reinforce its country-level programs. Support to regional programs and/or issues without linkages to the country level runs a risk to be inefficient because it lacks the 'reality check'.

The degree to which the above reflection were discussed at SDC's Management Retreat, and whether or not this had consequences for the Regional Approach in Central America, is unknown to the HIC Team. If indeed these reflections are accepted as trend-setting, then it would seem to be the case that, in hindsight, a Regional Approach for Central America was not in fact indicated.

3.4.1 HONDURAS

3.4.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH HONDURAS

SDC's engagement in Honduras can be divided into four periods, based on the similitude of the overall goals mentioned in the respective strategies:

Period 1978 – 1992 (Bilateral Strategy)

Cooperation between Switzerland and Honduras began in 1978 with the signature of the first frame-work agreement. A coordination office was opened in Tegucigalpa in 1981. The main **objective** of the bilateral programme was to support integral human development through enabling the target population to better meet their basic needs on their own (see also the dynamic ToC in Figure 4 below). SDC followed a needs-based approach, very much in line with the development theory *en vogue* at the time (see also the overview of development theories in Annex 3). The **sectoral focus** during this period was on agricultural vocational training, agrarian reform and mechanisation, smallholder support, rural water supply, the dairy sector, agricultural technology, food security, and integrated rural development. As of 1986, the sectors health, handicrafts and small industries as well as housing and settlement construction were added. The main implementation **modality** was direct management in cooperation with government agencies, but preferably with small, decentralised and target group-oriented organizations, independent of politics. It was emphasised already in the 1982-1985 Bilateral Strategy that public and private actors could also be an interesting alternative, and that the Swiss experts should rather act as advisors than as executors. **Cross-cutting themes** such as gender, governance, to some extent human rights, conflict sensitivity and more recently climate change were not specifically in the focus yet, however, the 1986 Bilateral Strategy already reflected gender aspects, in the sense that it was put forth that optimal results cannot be achieved, if working only with / through men, e.g. on the improvement of the rural subsistence economy. To quote: *"Only when the views, needs and priorities of women can determine the concept and structure to the same extent as those of men will there be a chance to achieve synergies rather than new dependencies"*¹⁴.

Until the mid-1970s, SDC's bilateral activities in Latin America had focused on South America. Several factors led to a revision of this policy. **Honduras came into focus** as a new SDC priority country because a) it had the second-lowest per capita income of all Latin American countries, b) it was one of those countries hit particularly hard by the 1973/74 oil crisis (and again by Hurricane Fifi in 1974). Moreover, its military government of the time under General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano practised a relatively open social policy, which made the feasibility of a programme meeting SDC criteria seem possible, according to SDC documentation.

In the mid-1980s, SDC considered that the phase of **rapid expansion of the Honduras programme** was coming to an end, both because Swiss development budgets were not increasing as fast as before, and because the absorption capacities of Honduran public partners were judged to be at their limits. The phase of project implementation and volume expansion was therefore supposed to be followed by a phase of in-depth work. Reflections on gender starting in 1986 paved the way for a **more dedicated integration of gender** as a cross-cutting theme.

SDC laid the **foundation for a Regional Strategy**, arguing that the socio-economic crisis in Central America (as in all of Latin America) was endemic, and that for the individual Central American countries, each alone too

¹⁴ Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der DEH In Honduras, 1986, p. 29

small and too unilaterally dependent for an autonomous overcoming of the crisis, only regional cooperation could bring the chance of a real strengthening in the long run.

Additional relevant political factors include the fact that in 1980 Honduras became a base for U.S.-backed Contra rebels fighting the Sandinista government in neighbouring Nicaragua. This led to increased militarization and political repression in Honduras, as well as an influx of U.S. military aid and personnel. In 1989, a new constitution was adopted, which created a civilian government and limited the power of the military. However, the military retained significant influence in politics and society.

Period 1993 – 2005 (Regional Strategy)

The main **objective** of development cooperation in Central America (and therefore also in Honduras) remains the better satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged sections of the population. The implementation **modalities** include direct management through bilateral technical cooperation (majority), delegation of project implementation to Swiss and multilateral third-party institutions, and the Honduras-Switzerland counterpart fund (*Gegenwertfonds*), which was created as a result of bilateral debt relief in 1993. The **sectoral focus** during this period was on agriculture and rural development, water and sanitation, SME promotion and vocational training. Environment and natural resources was a focus only during 1993-1998. **Cross-cutting themes** were gender, human and institutional development, and environmental sustainability.

In 1993, **Nicaragua was selected as the new focus country**, which required a continuous shift of activities from Honduras to Nicaragua. This shift of focus also necessitated a shift in the Coordination Office responsible for operational support of the program. The liaison office (ODENIC) in Managua was upgraded to a regional coordination office (CORMAN), and the office in Tegucigalpa was transformed into a liaison office for Honduras (ODEHON).

The **Regional Strategy no longer explicitly referred to the “Swiss Law on International development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of 1976”**. It is true that the law was formulated rather broadly, but the fact that no reference was made to it could mean that SDC’s flexibility in terms of overall approach, target group and region had increased, according to the HIC Team.

For the first time, **SDC and SECO** jointly elaborated a strategy, the 1999-2005 Regional Programme for Central America. It is reasonable to assume that this positively impacted programmatic coherence of the Swiss cooperation, according to the HIC Team.

Hurricane Mitch in 1998 was an event very much marking the country (and the region) and sparked considerable humanitarian intervention.

Cross-cutting themes became more pronounced and prominent in the Regional Strategies. Taking gender as example, SDC opined in the Regional Strategy 1999-2005 that while gender awareness in the projects had increased significantly, as had corresponding action, the problem how to best include a gender focus already in project planning remains, which is to be further addressed in the future.

During the 1993-2005 period, according to the Regional Program there was a **momentum for greater diversification of partner organisations**, amongst others to reach a broader distribution of risk. The choice of partners was ideally based on task-related criteria: State institutions were to be supported in the performance of their core tasks (primarily at the level of standards and framework conditions). For implementation and execution, however, there was supposed to be increasing cooperation with private organisations. Also, thinking ahead, and in the spirit of promoting decentralisation, SDC foresaw to increasingly enter into partnerships with municipal authorities.

In the **1999-2005 Regional Program**, SDC included for the first time SME in urban areas; previously the focus was on rural areas only. This might be due to the joint programme elaboration with SECO, according to the HIC Team.

The 1999-2005 Regional Programme is the only Programme ever for which an **external evaluation** was commissioned (according to the documentation available to the HIC Team).

In view of the **diminishing significance of the priority country principle** with increasing regionalisation, but also in view of the experience gained with the focal country Nicaragua in 1997/1998 with regard to political risk, the primacy of the focal country in Central America was to be relativized for the post-2005 Regional Program. The previous focus country concept was planned to be expanded to the concept of a **core region** (Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador). According to SDC, programme development to date had shown that it was useful to have a clear definition of the geographic focus for the intended interventions.

With regards to the political context during this period: In 1993, the country held democratic elections, which brought the Liberal Party to power. The government of President Carlos Roberto Reina pursued market-oriented economic policies, including privatization and trade liberalization, but faced significant opposition from labour unions and other groups. In 2001, Ricardo Maduro was elected president, promising to address issues such as poverty, corruption, and crime. His administration pursued a number of anti-crime measures, including

the creation of a new national police force and the implementation of stricter sentencing guidelines for criminals. However, his government faced criticism for its handling of human rights issues and for its close ties to the United States. Also, during this period, Honduras also faced significant challenges from drug trafficking and organized crime, with the country becoming an important transit point for drugs heading north from South America. This contributed to the rise of violence and crime in the country, which has remained a significant issue in the years since.

Period 2007– 2017¹⁵ (Regional Strategy)

Swiss Cooperation **aimed at** contributing to poverty reduction and promoting an equitable and sustainable development, and as of 2013 explicitly also took into account the growing environmental vulnerability and human security. The **priority sectors** were micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) support (later changed into “inclusive economic development”), good governance and public finance (later framed as “fragility and promoting inclusive governance”) and infrastructure and local basic public services. This last sector was absent from the 2013-2017 strategy and replaced by the theme environmental vulnerability and climate change. Cross-cutting issues were gender and governance. The main implementation **modalities** were direct and indirect implementation (with a tendency towards indirect implementation, in the sense of given out mandates), sector-wide approaches and joint project-financing (baskets). **Cross-cutting themes** were governance, with special emphasis on transparency in local public finance, inclusive citizen participation and accountability as well as gender equality.

The **coup d'état in Honduras in 2009**, when the Supreme Court ordered the removal of president Zelaya, deeply divided the country and raised tensions and political conflict. Donors put aid on hold, many diplomatic relations were suspended or downgraded, leaving the country in political isolation. The coup showed the incapability of the institutions to resolve a constitutional conflict and demonstrated the power of the small but very influential interest groups. The elected government of Porfirio Lobo (2010-2013) achieved the reintegration of Honduras in the international community and made significant progress in national reconciliation.

For the first time, a **logical framework** including impact hypothesis was elaborated in the strategy for the period 2013-2017. Previous strategies did not contain a logframe or theory of change (therefore, the Theories for prior periods, as included in Figure 4 below, were elaborated by the HIC Team). In the logical framework, SDC linked the overall goal – *Switzerland contributes to poverty reduction and to more equitable and sustainable development taking into account the growing environmental vulnerability and human security* – to MDG 7 (ensure environmental sustainability).


Given the new donor landscape with **fewer bilaterals**, stronger alliances were sought with IDB, World Bank and selectively with UN organisations where there was congruence between their core mandate and Swiss priorities.

As mentioned above, while the 1999-2005 and 2007-2012 Regional Programs were elaborated jointly between **SDC and SECO**, this practice was **discontinued** for the 2013-2017 Programme due to Swiss parliament-induced changes regarding regional priorities for SECO (Nicaragua no longer priority country). **Security management** in Honduras received greater attention in the 2013-2017 period.

The **poverty reduction strategies** (PRS) that provided a framework for aligning cooperation to country efforts **ceased to exist** and were replaced by a multitude of national, sectoral and local plans creating a more complex framework to anchor aid programs.

¹⁵ For the period 2005-2007 it seems unclear whether a Regional Strategy exists

Figure 4: Dynamic Theory of Change for Honduras



Period 2018 – 2024 (Regional Strategy)

SDC's **goal** for the period 2018-2024 was / is to foster sustainable and equitable development in Central America by strengthening participatory governance and human rights, socio-economic inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups, sustainable management of natural resources, and climate and disaster resilience in priority territories. In addition, with its 2022-2024 regional cooperation programme, Switzerland will implement the gradual and responsible withdrawal of Switzerland's bilateral development cooperation with Central America in line with Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy guidelines. The **priority sectors** are governance and the rule of law, employment and inclusive economic development, and climate change, disaster risk reduction and natural resources. The expected impacts of the respective thematic areas are explicitly linked to the SDGs, e.g. the strategy 2022-2024 indicates that SDC's expected impact for Thematic Area 1 – *Switzerland contributes to strengthening the rule of law with a focus on inclusive governance and respect for political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights* – is linked to SDGs 5, 10 and 16. The portfolio is executed with a mix of **modalities**, including contributions/grants to public and private institutions and cooperation mandates that are awarded through international tenders. **Transversal themes** include inclusive governance, disaster risk reduction and gender equality. SDC is convinced that the national and regional context reinforces the need to promote the systematic inclusion of vulnerable groups such as women, youth, migrants, human rights defenders or indigenous and Afro-descendant groups.

For the first time, SDC lists amongst the approaches the notion of **"Out of fragility"**. The 10 OECD Principles for Fragile Countries and the SDC guidelines for working in fragile countries (Peacebuilding and State building) are applied in the case of Honduras. The mitigation of conflict, the fostering of a culture of peace and the strengthening of democratic institutions are key targets of the cooperation. The Cooperation Office **reinforces the dialogue with SDC's Global Programs** on issues of climate change, water, food security and migration, especially in the regional components of the Strategy. For the first time, **migrants** are specifically mentioned

as target group of SDC's activities in Honduras. Of course, SDC's **exit process** at the end of 2024 will be another major milestone in this period.

Politically, Honduras continues to face significant challenges from organized crime and drug trafficking, with high levels of violence and crime. In response to the migration crisis, the Honduran government has implemented a number of policies, including efforts to create jobs and promote economic growth in the country, as well as agreements with the United States to cooperate on migration issues. However, the issue remains a significant challenge for Honduras, as many Hondurans continue to leave the country in search of better opportunities and safety.

3.4.1.2 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH HONDURAS

Given that only one external evaluation at Regional Programme level is available, the majority of the information below stems from internal and external project-level evaluations and the results as mentioned in subsequent SDC Regional Strategies.

Relevance

Interview partners **confirmed** that SDC's aid over time in the respective sectors in Honduras **responded to development needs and priorities**, and that it was in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities.

SDC Strategies for Honduras (1982-1992) and Regional Strategies for Central America (1993-2024) usually conducted an in-depth country background analysis, including a brief description of poverty reduction strategies or national development plans (if available). For example, the Regional Strategy 2018-2021 explicitly referred to Honduras National Vision 2010-2038, Public Policy and the National Action Plan on Human Rights, Public Policy against Racism and Racial Discrimination for the Comprehensive Development of Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Hondurans, etc. in SDC's results framework. Also, the external evaluation of SDC Regional Programme 1999-2005 (2006) states that the Regional Programme was relevant in terms of addressing problems, needs and considering capabilities of target groups. The sectors attended were in line with existing SDC guiding principles and were well aligned with prioritised actions of the national PRS and other national / sector development plans in Honduras and Nicaragua.

Coherence

Interview partners provided a **mixed response** to the question regarding coherence of SDC south cooperation with other SDC and Swiss activities in Honduras. The fairest formulation as suggested by one interview partner is probably: *"There were no important contradictions"* (INT 30).

The Regional Strategies for the periods 1999-2005 and 2007-2012 were developed jointly by SDC and SECO. The two available Country Strategies for Honduras (1982 and 1986) and SDC Regional Strategies all referred to humanitarian interventions. SDC's Regional Programme for Central America 1999-2005 (1999), for example, states that the programme was developed in collaboration with a large number of Swiss entities with the aim of ensuring the greatest possible coherence of development cooperation activities in Central America.

With regards to coherence and complementarity with activities of other international donors, while SDC's Bilateral or Regional Strategies at time mentioned other donors (mainly multilaterals), they generally do not refer to any specific project or programme implemented by other donors. Interview partners suggested that the number of bilateral donors became smaller over the years, therewith reducing the coherence / complementarity necessity.

Effectiveness

The external evaluation for the **Programme period 1999-2005** states that the overall balance was positive with concrete results at the policy level (e.g. national water and sanitation strategy; MSME promotion policy; environmentally sustainable agricultural technology policy; public finance and budget policy), demonstrated adoption of methods and models at the implementation level (e.g. disaster prevention, agricultural technology transfer), success in capacity development and concrete, measurable development effects (e.g. food security and income improvements resulting from the adoption of 300'000 post-harvest silos). However, the evaluation also criticises that a lack of a systematic monitoring system at Programme level did not allow for outcome and impact measurement above the project level.

SDC's **Regional Strategies** generally reflected on the results of previous strategies, however in most cases without specifically naming individual countries. Some examples that mentioned Honduras include:

- **Water and sanitation:** 80% of the population in SDC's project area has access to clean drinking water (achieved over the period 1993-1998), according to the Regional Programme 1999-2005.

- **Employment and inclusive economic development:** In Honduras, SDC contributed to the creation of 30'000 new jobs in the cocoa, coffee and shrimp value chains, among others, 30% of which are occupied by women, according to the Regional Strategy 2018-2021.
- **State fragility and inclusive governance:** According to the Regional Strategy 2018-2021, in Honduras the issue of State fragility was addressed in both a sectoral and a cross-cutting manner. More than 3'000 young police officers, of whom 25% were women, were trained under a completely renewed curriculum. In neighbourhoods subject to violence, more than 14'000 adolescents benefited from training programs; 34% of whom got employed or formed a small business.

On **project level**, internal and external evaluation generally rated the effectiveness positively, as for example the external evaluation of the **Programme for the Strengthening of Human Rights and Social Audits** (FDHAS) (2019), which states that the FDHAS has effectively empowered other organisations, platforms and social movements in their capacities for the protection, defence of rights and advocacy for the accountability of state institutions. Also the internal evaluation of the **Programme Local Governance and Municipal Investments** (PGLIM) (2014) confirmed that the programme has been effective in meeting the needs of the population and the institutional demands of the municipal and national partners. The internal revision of **SDC's Honduras Strategy** (1987) suggested that POSTCOSECHA seemed to be very effective, at the time 8.000 families had their own maize silo.

With regard to successful approaches and instruments, nothing in particular seems to stand out, other than that the DRI approach (early 1980s) was at times criticised. SDC gradually shifted from direct to indirect implementation, however the available documentation does not analyse this with view to effectiveness.

In terms of stakeholders that were reached, SDC's focus evolved from initially mainly government partners to include also private sector and civil society.

Based on the available documentation and key informant interviews, it is practically impossible to judge the overall effectiveness of SDC's Regional Strategies or sectoral engagement in Honduras. On project level, the majority of the available evaluations are either internally conducted or auto-evaluations, suggesting possibly only limited reliability, according to the HIC Team. (Regional) lighthouse projects seemed to be POSTCOSECHA, AGUASAN, PROJOVEN and MACCIH (Support Mission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras), however the latter two were only mentioned in one interview, not in the available documentation.

Impact

The available information does not lend itself to ascertain much about SDC's potential impact in Honduras. The external evaluation of **SDC's engagement in the water sector** (2020) states that despite the difficulties in documenting impacts, there is evidence that SDC WASH and IWRM interventions contributed to SDG achievements (SDGs 1, 4 and 6) and led to significant improvements in the lives of poor and marginalised people. Evidence was found of longer-term expected and sometimes unexpected benefits. The external evaluation of **SDC Regional Programme 1999-2005** (2006) ascertains that there have been major SDC supported achievements at various levels in different sectors. At macro level, a series of ruling policies or strategic papers have been elaborated and are being implemented nationwide (e.g. Water Sector Strategy in Honduras).

Interviewees opined that while SDC was a comparatively small donor in Honduras, the interventions over the years surely had a (non-measurable) impact, mainly through the numerous capacity building activities that were undertaken and the policies that were influenced.

It is the opinion of the HIC Team that while SDC's bilateral cooperation surely contributed to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities in Honduras (in the sense that it certainly did not increase them), it is not possible to quantify the contribution.

Sustainability

Much like in the case for the criterion "impact", the sustainability of SDC measures in Honduras is very difficult to assess on the basis of the available information.

The most concrete examples include the external evaluation of the **Programme Capacity Building in Integrated Risk Management** (2017), which states that evidence was found of institutional changes in DRR, with the adoption of a systemic approach, based on the development of several processes that have interacted with each other, such as: advocacy in public policies, the development of public management models, the development of methodologies and tools for their application, the development and strengthening of capacities of public officials, professionals, and social agents, and the implementation of local experiences in RM and CCA. The project has made significant progress in supporting the mainstreaming of the DRR approach in development processes, through conceptual and methodological development; and its practical application in different strategic development sectors, and at different territorial levels (national and local).

While the mid-term external evaluation of the **Programme to Support Reforms in the Justice and Security Sector** in Honduras (2017) sees a high potential for sustainability, it was of course only a mid-term evaluation, not an endline or ex-post evaluation. The external evaluation of the **Programme for the Strengthening of Human Rights and Social Audits** (2019) speaks of a “unique opportunity” for sustainability. The external evaluation of **SDC’s engagement in the water sector** (2020) states that an explicit strategy for scaling was adopted early on, where SDC’s support at project and sub-national level led to improved local governance with a participative approach that was able to mobilise funds and replicate the approach with less and less external support.

It seems unjust to claim that not much in the way of substance can be said about the sustainability of SDC’s engagement after 44 years of programme activities in Honduras. And, in the HIC Team’s opinion, it is surely not true that SDC’s efforts did not have an influence at sector level that continues to this day. On the basis of the available documentation and interviews, it seems that the sustainable results are most likely in the water, water governance and sanitation sector.

3.4.1.3 HIGHLIGHTS AND FIRST HISTORIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR HONDURAS

Regarding SDC’s cooperation with Honduras, the following aspects particularly stood out:

- **POSTCOSECHA** is known by everyone and constantly referred to due to its **overall positive balance between 1984 and 2009**, upscalability and light house effect.
- **For the programing periods 1999-2005 and 2007-2012 the Regional Programs were elaborated jointly between SDC and SECO**, likely causing extra impetus for sector programming in the area of SME promotion and economic development in Honduras
- In recent years, very **strong visibility in the water governance** sector in Honduras, including high appreciation by governmental counterparts.

Moreover, selected lessons learned at country-level from SDC’s engagement in Honduras, as described in the available documents and as mentioned during interviews, are the following:

- Modalities of **co-financing** with partners and target groups helps to promote sustainability and ownership of actions. Financing a sector-wide program and IFI co-financing can be effective for up-scaling.
- A **multi-stakeholder** approach makes programs stronger.
- Implementation usually works more smoothly where SDC is well known and has an **established trust relationship** with the partners.
- Direct implementation (by SDC in-house staff) of programs is not the most efficient **modality** when programs become bigger and more numerous.
- **Evidenced-based M&E and knowledge management** is are crucial for results-oriented programme management.

3.4.2 NICARAGUA

3.4.2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SDC’S COOPERATION WITH NICARAGUA

Due to SDC’s Regional Strategy approach the clustering into periods is the same in Nicaragua as it was for Honduras. The Regional Strategy approach also means that SDC’s objectives, sectoral focus, implementation modalities and instruments, as well as the integration of cross-cutting themes, are for the most part identical for the two countries. The below section will therefore focus on Nicaraguan particularities, rather than repeating what is already described in the Honduras section above.

Period 1979 – 1992 (No bilateral or regional strategy, rather project-based)

SDC became active in Nicaragua immediately after the end of the civil war in **07/1979** with a **reconstruction** project in the form of direct state aid (later transformed into a cooperative-led project). In addition, a **drinking water** project started in 1983, as did an integrated **rural development** project (DRI). Through its programme credits to Swiss NGOs, SDC also supported various small projects in Nicaragua.

The activities in Nicaragua were all coordinated and managed by the **coordination office in Honduras**. The decision to set up a priority programme in Honduras was based primarily on a country-specific justification. When the fall of the Somoza regime brought about a social opening in Nicaragua, SDC involvement there also became possible.

Domestic political considerations on the Swiss side prevented the growth of the cooperation programme beyond the volume achieved in 1985, although the Nicaraguan government expressed great interest and willingness to further expand the programme.

*“The HONDURAS country programme must not at the same time serve to establish guidelines for our cooperation with other countries: the relevant passages on Nicaragua and Costa Rica (pages 25 and 26) therefore do not belong in this document”.*¹⁶ This appraisal surely added to the momentum of establishing a Regional Approach for Central America.

The **Contra conflict**, which affected both Nicaragua as a second priority country and the at the time priority country Honduras, brought great economic and political tensions to the region. The development of SDC’s programme was hampered by the resulting distortions and security problems.

The **Assassination of an employee of a Swiss NGO** in 1986 by Contras was a much publicized event in Switzerland. According to SDC HQ, this had a direct impact on SDC’s program in the country (territorial priorities and financial volume). However, based on the documents provided to the HIC team and the interviews conducted with former SDC staff in Nicaragua, this impact was not mentioned.

The political situation in Nicaragua during the period was marked by a revolution, a civil war, and the subsequent consolidation of power by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). In 1990, the Sandinistas were defeated in elections by the National Opposition Union (UNO), a coalition of right-wing parties that had been formed with significant support from the United States. This marked a transition to a more neoliberal economic model and a move away from the socialist policies of the Sandinistas.

Period 1993 – 2005 (Regional Strategy)

The main objective, modalities, instruments and cross-cutting themes during this period are the same as for Honduras (basic needs, mainly direct management, focus on agriculture and rural development, water and sanitation, SME promotion and vocational training, environment and natural resources, cross-cutting themes gender, human and institutional development, and environmental sustainability (see also the dynamic Theory of Change in Figure 5 below). Nicaragua benefitted also from the Chinorte development fund and a counterpart fund (*Gegenwertsfonds*) in the electricity sector.

During the period of 1993 to 2005, Nicaragua experienced significant political, economic, and social changes. After the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections, the country shifted toward a more market-oriented economic model, with the government implementing a series of structural adjustment policies. In 2001, Daniel Ortega, the former leader of the Sandinistas, was re-elected as the head of the FSLN. The country struggled with significant social and economic challenges, while also facing ongoing concerns about political stability and authoritarianism.

SDC’s **coordination office was transferred to Nicaragua** in 1993, transforming Nicaragua into a priority country for Swiss development cooperation. Considerations for this shift included amongst others the fact that Nicaragua was, at the time, the poorest country in the region. Moreover, Nicaragua played a key role in the Central American context, as a new outbreak of armed conflict in the country would have devastating consequences for the entire region. Also, SDC’s experience with the national executing agencies of the bilateral projects has been comparatively positive, both at the project level and in the policy dialogue, and SECO also intended to increase their cooperation with Nicaragua.

The **regionalisation of programs** was progressing steadily (at the time 40% regional programs); Nicaragua as a priority country was experiencing a slight decrease in financial support in favour of El Salvador.

Noteworthy is the Nicaraguan President-ordered **expulsion of the SDC Country Director** in 12/1997 after a supposedly “impertinent” exchange of words with the then-President Alemán. All new Swiss cooperation projects were momentarily stopped. The relationship normalised in the following years after bilateral talks and international donor pressure.

Hurricane Mitch in 1998 was an event very much marking the country and sparked considerable humanitarian intervention.

Period 2007– 2017¹⁷ (Regional Strategy)

The main objective, modalities, instruments and cross-cutting themes during this period are the same as for Honduras (poverty reduction and equitable and sustainable development, MSME support [later changed into “inclusive economic development”], good governance and public finance [later framed as “fragility and promoting inclusive governance”] and infrastructure and local basic public services, tendency towards indirect implementation, sector-wide approaches and joint project-financing, cross-cutting themes governance and gender


¹⁶ Statement of SDC’s Programme Committee in the Honduras Strategy of 1986 (excerpt)

¹⁷ For the period 2005-2007 it seems unclear whether a Regional Strategy exists

equality). Nicaragua also received **budget support**. During the period, Nicaragua was a **pilot country** for the implementation of the **Paris Declaration** (see also the overview of development theories in Annex 3).

According to the external evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006, p. 5): “General budget support (Nicaragua) is a powerful instrument to promote and steer necessary policy reforms for economical growth. In particular it orients efforts toward critical issues and fields of interest (competitiveness, development of private sector, public finance management among others)”. It was discontinued in 2017.

Figure 5: Dynamic Theory of Change for Nicaragua



New “donors” like Venezuela in Nicaragua, or Brazil and Taiwan started to play a larger role in Nicaragua (and Honduras). In Nicaragua, Venezuela's assistance is valued at about 500 million USD..

The Nicaragua programme was **thematically broader than the Honduran programme** and much larger in financial terms. Partial balancing of country priorities in favour of Honduras were envisaged towards the end of the period, without reductions in the Nicaragua program.

Regarding the **political context**: the period of 2007 to 2017 in Nicaragua was marked by significant political polarization and tensions, with the government facing criticism for its handling of human rights issues and democratic institutions. The country also faced significant challenges from organized crime, environmental issues, and natural disasters. The period ended with a violent political crisis that led to widespread unrest and international condemnation.

According to one interviewee: During the period of the governance crisis (starting with the first Ortega Government back in Power from 2007 until 2018 and onwards), the Swiss Cooperation had a quite clear strategy with regard to the incremental governance changes (i.e. deterioration), which could be described as “dialogue and cooperation with the government with the aim at having some policy impact, based on being still on good terms with the authorities and having some leverage”.

Period 2018 – 2024 (Regional Strategy)

The main objective, modalities, instruments and cross-cutting themes during this period are the same as for Honduras (sustainable and equitable development, gradual withdrawal, governance and the rule of law, employment and inclusive economic development, and climate change, disaster risk reduction and natural resources, contributions/grants and international tenders, cross-cutting themes governance, disaster risk reduction and gender).

The expected impacts were explicitly linked to the SDGs, e.g. the strategy 2022-2024 indicates that SDC's expected impact for Thematic Area 3 – *Vulnerable populations increase their resilience to climate change and disasters by strengthening governance in the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources*– is linked to SDGs 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15 and 16.

According to SDC's Cooperation Strategy, the **fragilities in Honduras and Nicaragua are markedly** different. While in Honduras, the rates of violence are high and impunity for serious crimes is alarming, in Nicaragua, citizen security is one of the best in Latin America thanks to effective prevention work. This was re-evaluated in the 2022 strategy: *"In Nicaragua, the breakdown of institutions and the spiral of human rights violations in 2018 stimulated critical reflection and a thoroughgoing realignment of the strategy"*. Numerous political commentators echo this fully and describe the political situation in the country as having only worsened since the April 2018 crisis. But even under international pressure, the Daniel Ortega government has continued to rule the country with a strong and authoritative approach, intimidating and persecuting opponents, banning demonstrations, prohibiting foreign ties (through the Foreign Agents Law) and increasing its own armed presence throughout the country. The government has intensified its crackdown on civil society and the free press by revoking the legal registration of NGOs, closing media outlets, arresting journalists and ending the mandates of several international human rights monitoring organizations.

According to SDC HQ, the 2018 crisis had a direct and fundamental impact on the implementation of SDC's program in Nicaragua. The strategic vision for the realignment formulated at the end of 2018 states that a partial resumption of cooperation with the government under new modalities and on a much smaller scale than before can only be justified if it is also possible to expand activities in the areas of human rights, rule of law and dialogue promotion. A staying engaged concept paper was also defined at that time.

3.4.2.2 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH NICARAGUA

As is the case for Honduras, also for Nicaragua only one external evaluation on Regional Programme level is available. The number of available project-level external evaluations available to the HIC Team, however, is larger for Nicaragua than for Honduras. The relevance of project-level external (or internal) evaluations in the context of this present meta-analysis is limited, however.

Relevance

Interview partners **confirm** that SDC's aid over time in the respective sectors in Nicaragua **responded to development needs and priorities** and was in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities.

Regional Strategies for Central America (1993-2024) usually conducted an in-depth country background analysis, including a brief description of poverty reduction strategies or national development plans (if available). Prior to 1993, no stand-alone or Regional Strategy is available for Nicaragua. For example, the Regional Strategy 1993-1998 states that even after the 1990 elections, the priorities of the new government in Nicaragua were more in line with those of SDC than in the case of Honduras.

In terms of **critical appraisals**, the Multiannual Regional Programme Central America for 1993-1998 states that the multisectoral DRI approach as the main development strategy for (marginalised) rural regions has proven problematic, despite overlap with the national development strategy. The report states that the practice has shown that DRI projects are difficult to administer because of their complexity and size, and also run the risk of taking on paternalistic features, i.e. instead of strengthening the ownership of smallholder families, they run the risk of promoting a certain recipient mentality.

Coherence

The insights are essentially the same as in the case of Honduras. Interview partners provide a **mixed response** to the question regarding coherence of SDC south cooperation with other SDC and Swiss activities in Nicaragua. The fairest formulation as suggested by one interview partner is probably: *"There were no important contradictions"* (INT 30). According to the HIC Team, there is limited information with regard to whether synergy potentials were fully exploited and duplications avoided. It seems reasonable to suggest that while certainly not all synergies were realised, there was no noteworthy competition with regards to partners and target groups between SDC, SECO and other Swiss actors and programs.

Effectiveness

The external evaluation for the **Programme period 1999-2005** states that there have been major achievements at various levels of intervention in different sectors. At macro level, a series of ruling policies or strategic papers

have been elaborated and are being implemented nationwide such as the Technological Policy in the agricultural sector in Nicaragua, Water sector strategy in Nicaragua (and Honduras), the proposal of policy for micro-finance and Earning Cooperative Policy, the Policy for the Medium and Small Enterprises promotion – with public-private policy dialogue - in Nicaragua and, the Citizen participation law in Nicaragua. Activities in macro-economic support (general budget support) led to strengthening policy dialogue between government and donors and improving donor coordination. Support to the elaboration and release of the National Operational Development Plan (PNDO-Nicaragua) provided the basis for the elaboration and approval of the Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM) to monitor the progress of the different indicators by the donors involved in the Joint Facility Agreement.

In 2015, SDC published an **internal Progress Report**, summarising its main achievements in Nicaragua over the period **2013-2015**. Some of these include successes in inclusive economic development (6,600 agro-industrial MSMEs in the north of the country maintained their jobs and increased their income by 30% from 2012 to 2015, PYMERURAL); more than 11,000 young people have had access to professional training courses in training centres of the *Tecnológico Nacional* and non-governmental centres, Vocational Training Program), in the sector of inclusive governance (151,732 inhabitants have more and better road infrastructure, potable water, sanitation, housing and productive infrastructure services); Investments have been made through 18 municipal governments of these departments and autonomous regions (Municipal Investment Program) and climate change (13 works to protect against extreme weather events built in six municipalities in the region of Las Segovias, benefitting approximately 30,000 stakeholders / 6,000 families; the maintenance plans for these works will be assumed with the municipalities' own resources; Las Segovias Climate Change Program).

SDC's **Regional Strategies** generally reflect on the results of previous strategies, however, in most cases without specifically naming individual countries. Some examples from the Regional Strategy 2018-2022, mentioning Nicaragua, include:

- **Employment and inclusive economic development:** With new technologies and better access to markets, in Nicaragua 8'000 small bean and maize farmers managed to increase their income by 15% and 6'600 SMEs by 27%.
- **State fragility and inclusive governance:** Local Governance programs strengthened 17 rural municipalities in Nicaragua by helping the authorities to get more efficient and transparent with public spending and more accountable to the population.
- **Environmental vulnerability and climate change:** In Nicaragua, water harvesting with reservoirs and irrigation systems for 1'500 families was supported. By adopting measures to use water effectively, reforest their land and diversify their farm plans, 10'300 male and female farmers increased their resilience to climate change. As a result, they managed to increase the value of their annual production by an average of US\$195 per hectare.

On **project level**, internal and external evaluations generally rated the effectiveness positively, as for instance the internal **Report on Effectiveness Swiss International Cooperation in the field of Employment 2005-2014** (2017), which states that the large majority of youths were able to find a job and almost 50 per cent of graduates increased their income after graduation (number of beneficiaries: 5.400). The internal report on **Swiss Development Cooperation in the Water Sector** (2014) says that in Nicaragua, Switzerland has provided 285,000 persons with access to drinking water in the past 25 years. The internal final report for **Environmental, Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation Programme** (PAGRICC) (2020) ascertains that all 3 components achieved or over-achieved their respective goals, e.g. Component 2, Infrastructure for loss reduction: 49.754 people were protected, exceeding the goal by more than 140%.

As is the case for Honduras, nothing in particular seems to stand out with regard to especially successful approaches or instruments. In terms of stakeholders that were reached, SDC's focus evolved from initially mainly government partners to include also private sector and civil society.

Based on the available documentation and key informant interviews, it is practically impossible to judge the effectiveness of SDC Regional Strategies or sectoral engagement in Nicaragua. On project level, the majority of the available evaluations are internally conducted. (Regional) lighthouse projects seem to be POSTCOSECHA, AGUASAN and PASOLAC (however according to some interviewees, the light-house status of the latter is debatable).

Impact

The Impact that SDC interventions might have had over the years in Nicaragua is equally difficult to reliably pinpoint as in the case of Honduras. Some promising examples can be found in the internal **Report on effectiveness Swiss international cooperation in the field of employment 2005-2014** (2017), stating that one successful component was a certification system for youths and employed workers so they could receive officially recognised credit for successfully completing a course. The certification systems led to a new government strategy started via INATEC and a Department of Certification that issues vocational certification of 11.000

employed workers per year. Since the programme as a whole essentially modernized the courses offered by INATEC, future students would also benefit, and sustained employment impacts of the intervention were likely. The internal final report for **Environmental, Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation Programme** (PAGRICC) (2020) ascertains that four legal regulations were approved on the retribution of ecosystem services, which help implement environmental measures in the Rio Viejo sub-basin (Administrative Agreement for the Creation of the Remuneration Fund; Regulations of the Remuneration Fund; Internal Regulations of the Remuneration Fund; and Municipal Ordinance for the Application of the financial retribution mechanism). As mentioned already under effectiveness, the external evaluation of **SDC Regional Programme 1999-2005** (2005) states that at macro level a series of ruling policies or strategic papers have been elaborated and are being implemented nation-wide .

It is the opinion of the HIC Team that while SDC's bilateral cooperation is likely to have contributed to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities in Nicaragua, it is not possible to quantify the contribution (see also Chapter 3.4 "Central America").

Sustainability

In addition to the above examples of programs that contributed to the approval of laws and regulations, few internal and external evaluations or reports show solid examples of the likelihood of a continuity of an SDC-induced effect. Examples are the external evaluation of **Strengthening and Academic-Scientific Innovation in Disaster Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change** (2013-2017), concluding that the sustainability of the results and benefits of the intervention is very likely, given the strong anchoring of the intervention in the political-institutional framework of the UCA, as well as primary and secondary education institutions and in the territories, the external mid-term evaluation of **Innovation and dissemination of technologies for adapting agriculture to climate change in Nicaragua** (AGRIADAPTA) (2016-2020), stating that some conditions, such as the individual and organisational capacities, favour the continuity of the project's actions. Those structures formed around the water resources, in particular the "Drinking Water and Sanitation Committees", and those attended by public institutions, specifically the *Instituto Nicaragüense de Tecnología Agropecuaria* (INTA), were identified as having greater probabilities of sustainability. Also, the external evaluation of **Watershed Rio Dipilto Programme** (2016-2019) finds that institutional sustainability was substantially improved since both Local Governments and entities such as the New Fund for Social Investment for Emergency (New FISE) and National Authority for Water (ANA) have assumed commitments before the Basin Committee (CdC) at the end of the first phase.

As for Honduras, this relatively vague list does not imply that there is no or little sustainability of SDC's actions over the year in Nicaragua, it not possible to soundly make a case on the basis of the available information and interviews.

3.4.2.3 HIGHLIGHTS AND FIRST HISTORIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR NICARAGUA

Regarding SDC's cooperation with Nicaragua, the following aspects particularly stood out:

- Switzerland has been **at the forefront of general budget** support in Nicaragua since its inception in 2005, investing over USD 5 million per year and chairing the budget support group in the periods on various occasions.
- Due to SDC's long-standing and successful engagement in the water sector, Swiss support **has provided 285,000 persons with access to drinking water in** Nicaragua.
- **Even during the period of massive governance crisis and fragility (2018 onwards) SDC managed to stay engaged based on a comprehensive reflection and technical and financial reorientation.**

Moreover, selected lessons learned at country-level from SDC's engagement in Nicaragua, as described in the available documents and as mentioned during interviews, are the following:

- Modalities of **co-financing** with partners and target groups helps to promote sustainability and ownership of actions.
- A **multi-stakeholder** approach makes programs stronger.
- Implementation usually works more smoothly where SDC is well known and has an **established trust relationship** with the partners.
- Direct implementation (by SDC in-house staff) of programs is not the most efficient **modality** when programs become bigger and more numerous.
- **Evidenced-based M&E and knowledge management** is are crucial for results-oriented programme management.

- In Nicaragua, the breakdown of institutions and the spiral of human rights violations in 2018 stimulated critical reflection and a thoroughgoing realignment of the strategy. One lesson learned was that the **high degree of cooperation with government partners proved to be an aggravating factor**. Switzerland had to review its strategy and it replaced the local governance approach in order to then emphasise conflict transformation, the strengthening of social cohesion, and the promotion and defence of human rights.
- With regards to deteriorating governance, early on in a process of power-grab by an authoritarian regime, much **stronger and more confrontational positions** might be warranted in order to try to have more impact on governance decisions (even small ones) of the authoritarian regime.

3.4.3 EL SALVADOR

3.4.3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH EL SALVADOR

Period 1987 – 2008 (Regional Strategy)

SDC has been supporting El Salvador during **1987-2008**. The cooperation was finalised officially in 2008. As described under section 3.4 SDC promoted a regional approach for Central America, which included regional cooperation programmes and regional programme evaluations. SDC's engagement in El Salvador was always part of the **regional cooperation programmes** for Central America, no bilateral cooperation programme was set up. SDC did **not establish a cooperation office**, but temporarily a **liaison office** in El Salvador. In the interviews it was stated that there was a lack of political backing in El Salvador and no real influence at strategic levels was achieved under the framework of the regional programme. The main objective of the development cooperation in Central America, which involves the activities in El Salvador, remained for several strategic periods the **satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged sections of the population**.

Main political developments during the period were the peace process and peace agreement in 1992 after the civil war and the consecutive development of a democratic system. In the Regional Programme 1993-1998, the Swiss cooperation still mentioned the possibility of establishing a bilateral programme with El Salvador in case of a positive assessment of the elections 1994, however, it was never put into practice. Politically, the formal peacebuilding processes were among the main context factors of the 1990s, not only in El Salvador but also in other Central American countries. At the regional level, the 1990s were furthermore characterised by structural adjustment programmes that led to a stabilisation of the Central American economies, however, with the risk of rising inequalities in society. In the 2000s, the economic integration through free trade agreements and reduced border controls advanced, which was, however, not the case for the overall political integration. Hurricane Mitch 1998 and recurrent natural disasters in the whole region were a key driver for a stronger focus on disaster risk reduction, environmental protection, and sustainable management of natural resources.

In the 1980s, Switzerland initiated major projects in two main areas: **integrated rural development** and **water and sanitation**. From 1993 to 1998, the main areas of interventions included **agriculture, water and sanitation, environmental protection, SMEs** and **VET**. This thematic focus did not undergo major changes from 1999-2005, however, adding the focus on **private sector development** (especially SMEs) and **improvement of economic framework conditions, trade and investment**. In the last years of SDC's engagement in El Salvador and following the devastation of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the programme PREVAC built upon humanitarian aid efforts and promoted through technical cooperation the development of a system of disaster prevention at municipal level which can be seen as an early example for a nexus between humanitarian aid and technical development support (2001-2004). The Swiss Disaster Risk Reduction Concept for Central America (2005-2007) included El Salvador as one intervention country with high levels of risk.

Information on **main implementation modalities/methods/instruments, as well as implementing and partner organisations** can only be derived from information available at the regional level. Technical cooperation was complemented by economic and trade measures, humanitarian aid, as well as multilateral projects. Debt relief and structural adjustment policies were important measures in the 1990s, accompanied by social measures to combat negative side effects. While in the 1990s SDC implemented most of the programmes itself or outsourced them to NGOs, in the 2000s the cooperation with public sector institutions expanded and deepened as a result of growing confidence in the government. Main partner organisations have been state institutions, but also NGOs and the private sector. A greater diversification of partners was desired, as well as a strengthened participatory and decentralised approach with more responsibilities for communities and the civil society. Gender appeared as **cross-cutting issue** at regional level in the programme for Central America 1999-2005 and reappeared together with governance as new topic in the next time frame from 2007-2012.

3.4.3.2 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH EL SALVADOR

The following analysis of the achievements of SDC's cooperation with El Salvador is nearly purely based on Regional Cooperation Strategies for Central America. There is no analytical basis in the form of evaluations of SDC's engagement in El Salvador on a programmatic level. El Salvador has been mentioned in few cases as part of the regional strategies. Because of the limited information available the results presented in the following can only be regarded as indicative.

Relevance

At the Central America level, macro-economic needs analyses and the priorities of partner governments were the basis for sectoral projects. Priority sectors were **generally relevant** and coherent with the respective national priorities. The whole Central America Programme was evaluated as relevant in terms of its orientation, needs and considering the capabilities of target groups, use of adequate instruments, forms and levels of intervention. These results oriented at the relevance of SDC interventions are referred to the Central America level, while no concrete information for El Salvador is available.

Coherence

Regarding coherence at the Central American level, the Swiss Cooperation put emphasis on the application of **different instruments** (humanitarian aid, bilateral development cooperation, SECO, etc.) in a concentrated manner. However, no information was obtained whether this objective was reached. Regarding the coherence and complementarity with the **engagement of other international development actors** the HIC team analysed that the international donor community had a strong presence in Central America, which made the donor coordination especially necessary. In the area of good governance, this was tried to be achieved through regular meetings of the bilateral donors with the objective to make use of the experiences of other donors. However, the high number of international donors also led to fragmentation and inefficiencies, especially in relation to capacity constraints of national governments, according to the available documentation.

Effectiveness

Concrete development results for El Salvador can again only be derived from the regional programme results, of which El Salvador was part. The HIC team only found **limited information for the specific case of El Salvador**. Good regional results were achieved in the **water and hygiene sector**, in which SDC was one of the most prominent donors. One example was the regional **AGUASAN programme**, which was also implemented in El Salvador. Although the programme was highly complex, it had high rates of coherence and integration at different vertical and horizontal levels. Projects generated access to clean drinking water for the rural population and national water utilities were trained in water **supply and maintenance issues**. In the **agricultural sector**, the focus was on training in soil conservation and on farming methods, which led to increased food production and reduced harvest loss. One prominent successful example was the **POSTCOSECHA programme**. On the other hand, in the **environmental programmes** effectiveness was generally weaker. The focus was on the development and dissemination of new methods of sustainable resource management, including trainings and awareness-campaigns. In general, the **lack of a systematic monitoring system** at PRAC level did not allow for outcome and impact measurement above the project level with the only exception of a meta-impact study in the agricultural sector showing economic benefits for farmers. In the area of **disaster risk reduction**, the **CORRES programme** in El Salvador provided municipalities with hazard maps, risk analyses and trainings on local risk management and raised awareness at the community level.

The HIC team can again only derive **development approaches and instruments** applied by SDC for El Salvador from the regional programme level. One of the most important approaches for El Salvador was the regional programme approach for Central America – without this it is questionable whether El Salvador would have received SDC support at all, according to the HIC Team.

Monitoring instruments were developed over time. While initially a clear results framework at the programme and sector level was absent, which made it difficult to identify impacts and changes, this began to change in 2004 with the introduction of planning matrices to formulate monitoring needs and indicators for the measurement of impacts.

The applied **multi-stakeholder approach** with a broad variety of partners and actors was one of the strengths of the Central America Programme, according to the documentation. From 1993-1998 more than 100.000 families, mostly in poor rural areas, had been reached. In DRR actions, not enough focus was placed on the involvement and capacity development of the organized population.

Impact

Impacts have been particularly visible in the water and sanitation sector, however results at the impact level were **difficult to assess because of the lack of a monitoring system that includes comprehensive impact analyses, especially some years after the finalisation of project activities**. Of course, some of the examples given under the criterion “Effectiveness” could equally be mentioned here. As detailed information on the impact of the programmes at national level in El Salvador is lacking, the HIC team cannot give further details on the contribution to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities in El Salvador. The same is the case for questions of long-term key changes of SDC’s bilateral cooperation in El Salvador.

Sustainability

No detailed information on the sustainability of SDC’s engagement in El Salvador is provided in the documentation. At regional level and with regards to the upscaling of measures, the integration of bilateral projects and pilot experiences into broader national programs was often addressed at a late stage during the phasing-out process and not during the project design phase. With regards to a potentially lasting application of new technologies, it was stated that, while most of the developed techniques and introduced innovations were relatively easy to apply and to be adopted by target groups, other technologies were not economically affordable by the poor.

3.4.3.3 HIGHLIGHTS AND FIRST HISTORIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR EL SALVADOR

Regarding SDC’s cooperation with El Salvador, the following aspects particularly stood out:

- **High effectiveness and good results** have been achieved in the **water and hygiene** sector through the **AUGASAN** programme that was successfully replicated in El Salvador that generated access to drinking water and training on sustainable water supply and maintenance.
- The regional POSTCOSECHA programme, which was also implemented in El Salvador, made a notable contribution to the nutritional situation of the rural population of El Salvador. **Innovative nexus approach** through the connection of humanitarian aid and technical cooperation at municipal level after the devastation of Hurricane Mitch: the **programme PREVAC built upon humanitarian aid efforts and promoted through technical cooperation the development of a system of disaster prevention at municipal level which can be seen as an early successful example for a nexus between humanitarian aid and technical development support (2001-2004)**.

We cannot derive concrete lessons learned for El Salvador from the regional programmes and evaluations. For Central America a central conclusion is the importance to find a **balance between the prioritisation of priority countries and to remain flexible at the same time**. There was a need for adaptations and flexible approaches due to contradictions between long-term regional development programmes and rapidly changing national policies. The replication of national projects to other countries in the region can be a lesson learned as it implies less effort in the conceptualisation, however, not a faster implementation of the project itself. It is assessed as favourable to combine new thematic sectors with already successful running thematic programmes. Furthermore, a lesson learned is to continue with sector concentration and programme consolidation in those fields where there is a high level of positive experiences and where SDC plays a leadership role. Of high importance is the introduction of sector objectives and verifiable indicators included in comprehensive performance matrix as monitoring tool.

3.5 CUBA

3.5.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SDC’S COOPERATION WITH CUBA

SDC launched its bilateral cooperation with Cuba in 2000. In 1998, the SDC’s Directorate Committee endorsed in principle an active Swiss presence in the widely expected **transformation process** in Cuba. An initial scoping mission, jointly carried out by the Political Department II, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Latin America Section, found that a special programme would be useful and feasible. Bilateral cooperation in Cuba has been widely described as quite unique, as the social situation in Cuba, in contrast to most countries of the region, has not been marked by extreme socio-economic inequality or poverty. Interviewees called the Cuba Programme “**the most political**” in the sense that it has been primarily driven by diplomatic considerations rather than acute need for aid. Since the revolution, Switzerland had maintained good relations with the Socialist country, illustrated also by its role as protecting power for US interests who maintained no diplomatic ties with Cuba over decades (1961–2015). Bilateral cooperation was openly communicated as an important **strategic instrument to deepen relations** with Cuba and become a strong international partner during the expected upcoming political and economic opening, and contribute to a **peaceful change process**.

2000 – 2003 (Pilot Phase)

In 2000, SDC established its cooperation office in La Habana. In a first step, a pilot programme was launched in the same year, which – with the greater goal of strengthening opportunities for political dialogue and ultimately in preparation of a future special programme - financed projects that focused on **concrete, local solutions**. **Economic development** was one of the focus areas for transfer of knowledge and technology (e.g. post-harvest grain storages in agriculture or bambus as construction material). **Local governance** too, through capacity development of relevant stakeholders, including civil society, was identified as a topic with great potential and where Switzerland with its tradition of decentralised government could make a meaningful contribution. In addition, facilitation of **exchange in the international arena** was to help overcome Cuba's international isolation. These thematic priorities were not only the basis for the first Special Programme that started in 2004, but run steadily through all of SDC cooperation strategies with Cuba ever since, showing a remarkable continuity in the Swiss approach.

2004 – 2010 (Special Programme)

The Special Programme was characterised by a range of medium- to long-term projects, to which **humanitarian aid, often in the form of milk powder donations and hurricane disaster relief** was added. Unlike the EU, which in 2003 had suspended all technical assistance following a government crackdown on Cuban dissidents, Switzerland remained committed and even expanded bilateral cooperation. “**Continuity**” is not only a word often found in the available strategy papers but one that has been mentioned by most interviewees as unique quality and comparative advantage of Swiss development cooperation.


2011-14 (-16) (Priority status and launch of Cooperation Programme)

In 2013, Cuba became a **priority country**, which saw the programme grow significantly in size. By 2020, the annual budget had increased to CHF 12m (compared to CHF 3m in 2011). Along with that, greater emphasis was put on consolidating the wide range of small-scale measures into larger projects, an adjustment that was recommended by external evaluators and later described evolution towards a **more systematic and targeted programme with projects of scale**. Besides the two thematic priority areas, emphasis has been put on the transversal topics of **gender and anti-discrimination** in a wider sense, including based on ethnicity and sexual orientation. Work in these areas has increasingly received attention in SDC strategies, and interviewees regularly highlighted respective results as examples of success stories. 2015 saw an important reorganisation, with Embassy and Cooperation Office now being functionally integrated and under one roof.

2017 – 2024

Participatory municipal management is highlighted as central in the new strategic cycle, reflecting thematic continuity, whilst underpinning the steadily increasing demand for advisory and capacity development on **local governance** issues (e.g. preparation of local development strategies, citizen participation). Access to food and sustainable local economic development remain priority areas, with practice-oriented vocational training being introduced as new topic. Support to gender equality and anti-discrimination is presented in a way that suggests yet another upgrade in relevance, making it similar in rank to thematic priority areas. Some interviewees suggested that 2017 heralded a phase of an increasingly tense cooperation environment overall, but conversely, renewed interest in SDC cooperation from the Cuban side. The **Exit Programme (2022-24)** seeks to further anchor the results in the partner system and puts great emphasis on assuring systemic impact and sustainability.

Figure 6: Dynamic Theory of Change for Cuba



3.5.2 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH CUBA

Relevance

SDC cooperation departed from the assumption that a political and economic opening of the Socialist country is to be expected and that it is in Switzerland's interest to position itself as strong partner who can play a constructive role throughout the process. International cooperation has been seen as the adequate approach to further develop bilateral relations and allow for **dialogue, including on sensitive issues** such as civil rights, with a **country deeply sceptical of foreign involvement**. Available documents, including external evaluations, as well as insights from interviews suggest that this assumption was correct. The overall relevance of Swiss cooperation with Cuba has been, without exception, assessed positively throughout the years. Various interviewees stated that the interest on the part of the Cuban partners has gradually evolved from technological know-how (primarily in agriculture) and infrastructure to capacity development on a wider set of topics relevant to local governance. Regularly conducted external evaluations find that the SDC strategy was and still is coherent with the strategic framework established by the Government of Cuba, and more, in line with top government priorities, in particular capacity building for decentralised management, food production and housing, promotion of local democratic participation and social and gender equity. The strategic orientation to **go local** has been repeatedly affirmed and is characteristic of all successive SDC programmes in Cuba. In the wider context of Swiss international cooperation, it has been confirmed that the Cuba Programme is designed in a way relevant to achieving overarching strategies of SDC and Swiss foreign policy, in particular through the promotion of freedom, rule of law, equal opportunities and sustainable development in line with the United Nation Agenda 2030. Against this background, the relevance of the SDC Cuba Programme is rated as high.

Coherence

Formal coordination has been limited, largely because national authorities are leery and suspicious of strong cooperation between foreign actors on the island. Donor coordination has for the most part been **ad hoc, informal and project-specific**. Against the backdrop of rather limited donor presence, such informal coordination has widely been considered sufficient and effective, especially with the EU, active member states, and UN agencies. At project level, the UNDP implemented Local Human Development Project (PDHL) was coordinated through a national committee as well as sector specific working groups (e.g. housing, disaster risk prevention etc.) in which interested donors came together. Coordination among Swiss contributions, above all, technical assistance and humanitarian aid has been described as unproblematic by SDC staff. With respect to coherence within the project portfolio, external evaluations have suggested measures to streamline projects (“consolidation” of many small-scale projects), apply stronger focus to projects contributing most to overall objectives, and better harness synergies where individual projects operate in the same district or municipality. These recommendations have been taken up in successive strategies, and SDC measures to strengthen coherence in programming and implementation have been recognised and assessed positively in later evaluations. SECO had been active in Cuba before 1998, specifically in relation to foreign debt restructuring and relief, but never had an own programme. **Consultations with SECO** took place in the context of annual planning.

Effectiveness

Both, external evaluators and SDC staff frequently highlighted the **above average value for money**, pointing to the **significant results** that had been achieved with comparatively small financial resources. The mid-term evaluation 2009 found the most significant results in the areas of agriculture and housing, with 22% of the country's farmers participating in local innovation measures that have resulted in an “average increase in agricultural yields of over 75%, that 15,000 farmers have a silo to store their harvest without loss, and that 7 municipalities have or are in the process of developing a self-supply strategy for food”. In the area of housing, a 2009 evaluation found that “40 municipalities currently have a workshop that can produce the equivalent of 200 to 400 new houses annually”. Moreover, “[o]f the 75 municipalities implementing local development projects with SDC support, 61 (81%) increased their own budgets; 59 (79%) submitted their local development plan for public consultation; citizen participation increased from 20 to 58% on average; 39 (48%) municipalities created citizen information and advisory services. Around 3 million people in municipalities with agricultural production projects have more and better quality products in local markets. The value chains of 9 agricultural products were improved. Energy from renewable sources was incorporated into the agrifood chains, increasing the annual electricity generated by 5 times. 1,277 women victims of gender-based violence received care in specialised services set up by SDC projects. As of 2021, 13,707 students in agriculture, construction and services (4,695 women, 1,218 socially disadvantaged and 76 with special educational needs) and 3,196 teachers are benefiting from improvements in TVE. 18,630 people benefited from the improvement or creation of jobs, 500 of them in cooperatives or private enterprises. Interviewees moreover highlighted SDC's **excellent reputation** in the country and the trustful cooperation with Cuban decision makers and civil society alike, which have seen Switzerland become a valued partner in policy dialogue at the highest level, including, albeit to a limited extent, on sensitive questions surrounding the respect for human rights.

Impact

Recent years saw **important changes to the legal and policy framework** to which the SDC Programme directly contributed through results and lessons learned produced from local activities, as well as the high level advisory provided by Cuban SDC staff in legislative processes. The Annual Report 2021 underlines: “The key achievement of the 2017-2021 strategic cycle is to have translated the main innovations supported by [the Programme] into new laws and public policies:

- **2019 Constitution:** recognises municipal autonomy, role of non-state actors and mechanisms for direct citizen participation; sanctions discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation, colour, etc.
- **Territorial Development Programme (2020):** formalises the Local Development Strategy as a standard tool for decentralised local management.
- **National Plan for Food Sovereignty and Nutritional Education (2020)** and State Plan to Confront Climate Change (2017): favour productive management with local resources, consultations between the public and private sectors, value chains and practices for adaptation to climate change and the use of renewable energy sources.
- **National Programme against Racism and Discrimination (2020)** and **Programme for the Advancement of Women (2021):** recognise equity gaps associated with gender and race and propose targeted actions for their mitigation.”

In addition, the creation of the National Institute of Territorial and Urban Planning (OTU) that is entrusted with strengthening the role of **municipal and provincial development strategies**, advancing the implementation of the new urban agenda and facilitating **access to housing** gives an indication of structural change in a key

area SDC programmes have been active in over the past decades. This holds true also for the work of the Office of the Historian of the City of Havana, a long-standing cooperation partner of SDC in Cuba, whose management model based on important **participatory mechanisms in planning and budgeting** has been declared a **national standard** and its replication across the country is supported by Government.

There is therefore significant evidence that SDC interventions have contributed to higher-level effects, new standards and systemic changes. Mid- or long-term impact assessments, however, were not undertaken.

Sustainability

The Cuba Programme is very distinct from others, due to the **specific country context**. Local SDC staff are in fact temporarily seconded staff of government administration, universities, and other public bodies. All activities carried out by the programme are subject to intense scrutiny and prior approval by the relevant government authorities. While this has regularly been reported to be slowing down project work, it also created unprecedented integration into the cooperation system and unusually high ownership of partners. Evaluations have pointed out the need to assure **systemic anchoring of the local initiatives** supported by SDC. In recent years, there is evidence that this has been rather successful thanks to direct advisory to high-level decision-makers provided by SDC experts, a result of years of investment into building trustful relations. Following the decision to end the Cuba Programme by 2024, SDC was quick to plan an “**integrated strategy for knowledge management** and communication, aimed at assuring sustainability of results and accountability”, which would focus on “technical products to support training and the scaling of innovative practices, for the implementing institutions; policy advocacy products, aimed at leading national public policy institutions...”. The strategy is currently being developed for implementation in the upcoming two years. Activities until 2024 prioritise the consolidation of achievements to date along with their replication and upscaling for lasting and systemic effects.

3.5.3 HIGHLIGHTS AND FIRST HISTORIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR CUBA

Regarding SDC’s cooperation with Cuba, the following aspects particularly stood out:

- SDC with **strong visibility** in international cooperation with Cuba.
- National programme officials already prior to SDC engagement **prominent experts and champions** in their field – widely confirmed to be strong advantage of Swiss cooperation in Cuba.
- Local mandates and **close integration with partner system** assured above-average ownership of Cuban actors.
- Switzerland perceived as **development partner at eye level** and without hidden geopolitical agenda – this also allowed SDC to both stimulate discourse and actively work on new topics that up to then were considered political taboos (e.g. decentralised government, gender equality, racism).

Moreover, the following lessons learned can be derived from the analysis:

- Swiss cooperation has been characterised by its orientation towards **tangible benefits** for the population – the **focus on local solutions** has been effective and was later successfully translated into changes in the legislative and policy framework. Placing emphasis on **improving processes (“doing things differently”)** can help carefully introduce important principles and values (e.g. participation, anti-discrimination) that pave the way for more wide-reaching changes.
- SDC’s policy often tries to concentrate its activities to one or few regions of a country. In the Cuban context, evaluators pointed out that there is **more likelihood of impact if an approach or methodology is tested more widely in different parts of the country** so that partner institution have stronger arguments to propose the tested approach as solution for the whole country.
- Both internal and external assessments have regularly highlighted the **high value for money** demonstrated in the cooperation with Cuba. The emphasis on **human and institutional capacity development, process support and knowledge management** (as opposed to direct financing of goods and services) reflects current trends of international cooperation.
- SDC cooperation with Cuba has adapted to the very specific cooperation context and therefore is of an atypical nature. What is evident is that the Swiss objective to build cooperation and become a **trusted partner** has been successful. Some interviewees linked this fact to the absence of a hidden geopolitical agenda, which made Switzerland a **credible and acceptable partner for government and civil society alike**.

- Many interviewees highlighted the **prominent role of national programme officials as a key factor in the successful development of the Cuba Programme**. Already before assuming their role in SDC programmes, the national officials had been widely recognised as **experts and champions** in their respective areas of work and enjoyed **considerable visibility in the country**. This was instrumental in **opening doors for cooperation with government stakeholders** which repeatedly have been described as rather **wary of development partners**.
- SDC programmes in Cuba are formally local mandates in most cases. Contracting international companies to implement SDC mandates in Cuba is not permitted. It was found that local mandates require strong involvement by SDC staff, comparable in terms of workload to programmes run by SDC itself. Different ways of **co-financing with other donors** allow to leverage action and **reduce the administrative burden on the Cooperation Office** and proved to be a feasible approach. At times, **NGOs** were involved to play an important role in **taking over project manager functions**, which allowed SDC staff to concentrate on conceptual work and quality control.

3.6 HAITI

3.6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH HAITI

2006- 2008 (First Humanitarian Programme)

While Swiss civil society and non-governmental organisations have been present in Haiti since the 1950s and 1960s, the Swiss government's involvement only dates back to the 1990s. Following an evaluation of the priority health projects at the time, SDC's Humanitarian Aid (HA) gradually withdrew after 1999. It was only after the 2004 crisis of internal unrest and the collapse of the Aristide government and natural disasters that SDC's Humanitarian Aid Department underlined its solidarity with Haiti in a portfolio analysis in 2005 by declaring the start of a special humanitarian programme in the areas of emergency aid and reconstruction. Collaborating with (Swiss) aid agencies and charity organisations, SDC's humanitarian efforts used **existing structures and local knowledge**. A humanitarian aid programme office in Haiti was opened in late 2005 and a **first humanitarian programme** was developed for **2006-2008**. The programme's **main objective** was to minimise poverty and improve living conditions of the most vulnerable men, women and children through concrete projects in the areas of (1) Food security, (2) reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS, (3) Rehabilitation of social infrastructure.

2011-2013 (Strategic Cooperation HA and DC, Mid-Term Cooperation Programme)


Funds for bilateral cooperation increased slightly since 2004, yet SDC did not consider Haiti a priority country at that time. Following the devastation caused by the 2010 Earthquake, Switzerland's official presence in Haiti increased with the integration of the embassy (mid-2011) and by the Federal Council's resolution on international cooperation 2013-2016, followed by an official agreement between Switzerland and Haiti, which included Haiti as a new priority country for cooperation as part of the strengthening of Switzerland's commitment in fragile contexts. In its **Mid-Term Cooperation Programme (2011-2013)**, SDC specifically focused on post-earthquake reconstruction, with the majority of funding allocated to humanitarian aid. The Mid-Term Cooperation Programme explicitly linked Swiss support to the 2010 Haitian National Action Plan that identified (1) Sustainable and secure social infrastructures; (2) agriculture and food security and (3) natural resource management and disaster risk reduction as national **priorities**. The cooperation programme explicitly refers to the need to focus on target groups rather than strategic objectives driven by Switzerland.

2014-2024 (Cooperation Strategies)

SDC has mainly operated through three strategies while in Haiti: A first **Cooperation Strategy covering the period 2014-2017**, a second **Cooperation Strategy** that covered the **2018-2021** period and the third, and most recent strategy, the **Cooperation Programme** covering **2022-2024**. The **main objectives** of the three Cooperation Strategies focus on improving living conditions of the poorest, improving the resilience of the populations and autonomy of Haitian public and private institutions to move towards a more resilient, just and equitable society.

From its 2014-2017 Strategy onwards, Switzerland has striven to orient its programming **towards a more developmental approach** while deepening its response **to governance challenges**; in its 2014-17 strategy on all levels (local, intermediate and central), while focusing on **local governance** from 2018 onwards. Agriculture and food security remain a priority theme in the first two cooperation strategies, while the first ('14-17) includes additional priority plans for reconstruction and disaster risk reduction, and the latter ('18-21) focuses on plans for employment and economic development. The current strategy combines both and focuses on **shock-resilient economic development** in addition to **local governance and strengthening the resilience of people and institutions**.

Figure 7: Dynamic Theory of Change for Haiti



Above-described thematic axes were and are reinforced by **cross-cutting themes**. Since its first strategy (2006), SDC promotes gender equity and social inclusion. From 2011 onwards, SDC has paid particular attention to decentralisation in the context of good governance and incorporated it as a transversal theme in all its actions. SDC saw the necessity to empower the state bodies to avoid a system of "humanitarian development". Additional cross-cutting themes range from emergency preparedness (2006) and disaster risk reduction (2011) to participatory approaches that transversally put actors at the centre.

Since the beginning of SDC's engagement, ongoing urgent needs seem to be blurring the line between humanitarian and development aid. Although the HIC team notices a clear **evolution of cooperation over the years**, neither the Cooperation Programme in 2011-2013 nor the Cooperation Strategy in 2014-2017 explicitly refer to the need to link HA and DC interventions through a nexus approach. The '06-08 programme mentions the seeking of synergies between DC and HA to maximise the results of its commitment and respond to the vast humanitarian needs, while the '14-17 strategy refers to the complementarity between HA and Regional Cooperation (RC) approaches to be pursued and strengthened. Based on an analysis of evaluations of previous strategies, SDC embedded the three working principles (1) Putting actors at the centre, (2) **Nexus humanitarian aid/development cooperation**, (3) Starting from the local as a lever for change, in its 2018 strategy, herein officially referring to the Nexus for the first time. The areas of intervention of the 2018-2021 cooperation strategy were reformulated to foster synergies between both fields with **a planned humanitarian programme office beyond the withdrawal** of bilateral cooperation from LAC in 2024. The current Cooperation Programme (2022-24) focuses on a close collaboration between humanitarian aid and bilateral cooperation as well as on a high degree of flexibility in the **mix of instruments**. It is increasingly oriented towards the most urgent humanitarian needs and towards sustainable reconstruction.

3.6.2 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SDC'S COOPERATION WITH HAITI

Relevance

Document analysis and interviews clearly indicates that SDC aimed **to align itself and its activities and programmes with a harmonised vision of the Haitian government**. Since 2011, SDC maintained a clear line of support. Both, its thematic focus and range of activities are considered highly relevant. The *Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement national* (PARDN), presented by the Haitian government to the donor conference in New York (March 2010) after the earthquake acted as a guideline for the country's development and for development of strategic activities for SDC. Up to its recent strategy, **SDC's strategic orientation continues to support ongoing national strategies** enshrined in the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (PSDH).

The alignment of **SDC's activities in Haiti to the overall Swiss development priorities** remains less clear, as many strategy documents for Haiti only refer to it on a side note. An alignment is primarily identified in thematic focal areas. According to the 2011-2013 Mid-Term Programme, SDC's commitment in Haiti is linked to **overarching foreign policy goals**. It further highlights that the focus point of restoring and improving access to basic services remained one of the most important tasks of international cooperation, including SDC. The following strategy (2014-2017) states that SDC's programme in Haiti contributes to the general objectives of Swiss foreign policy: to work for stability in the world through international cooperation and peace-building activities, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Additionally, interviewees emphasised that the **Fit-for-Purpose approach** adapted by SDC globally, was followed throughout its engagement in Haiti

Coherence

Regarding cooperation and coherence among the different SDC activities, the document analysis as well as interviews highlighted an **overall good coordination within SDC's projects**. Key to this was the **mix and high degree of flexibility of instruments (DC and HA)** that included regular meetings and coordination. The integration of the embassy and the cooperation office as well as sharing of certain infrastructures and services further ensured the coherence of Switzerland's action in Haiti. Interviewees highlight that synergies and consultations have intensified over the years. The paragraph "effectiveness" (below) further elaborates this Nexus approach.

In contrast to the close cooperation between different SDC activities, **coordination between other international development actors** is seen as insufficient. The perceived chaotic and not-coordinated delivery of assistance in Haiti is particularly criticised after the earthquake in 2010. One interviewee summarised the coordination as an information exchange, rather than a strategic coordination, while another interviewee stated that the fragmentation of the Haitian government is reflected in the landscape of international donors. Further, strategy evaluations refer to the need to strengthen collaboration with multilateral organisations to be able to scale up Swiss cooperation projects. Despite a general lack of coordination, to some extent attributed to the complex ecosystem in Haiti, to some due to different interests, Switzerland is perceived as "**honest broker**", facilitating discussions on how each donor defines the nexus and their individual programs, e.g., in their role as co-chair of the donor group in Haiti.

Effectiveness

Throughout the analysed period (2006-today), the **mix and high degree of flexibility of instruments** contributed to the effectiveness of SDC's engagement. An evaluation of 2011 highlights the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development as strength of SDC allowing for a **planning for a transition for early stages**.

The document analysis and interviews showed that mainly **individual project results focusing on selected communities and individuals** reflect the effectiveness of SDC's intervention in Haiti. Some examples of project-related results can be found in **local governance** (better understanding of territorial governance by local actors; developed communal development plans; governance of drinking water supply systems and sanitation for communes); in **reconstruction** (reconstruction of homes, community protection shelters, integrated risk prevention processes); in **social protection and training** (direct support to households, development of national policy for social protection), **education and training** (effective building of schools and implementation of training programmes throughout different sectors), **agriculture and food security** (strengthened agricultural governance and better accessibility to services) and **culture** (increased and successful cultural exchanges between Swiss and Haitian actors).

Besides individual project results, **some overarching results** such as the nexus approach can be derived from the analysis. The following achievements stand out:

Nexus approach

- Following Hurricane Mathew in 2016, SDC **reallocated a small funding line** to support humanitarian interventions. This was regarded as a flexible and responsive approach.
- A number of humanitarian-financed projects in Haiti, mainly in infrastructure development and disaster and risk reduction, **pursue nexus thinking**. These projects have a built-in local governance component in an effort to strengthen local capacity to respond to future crises.
- Further concrete development results can be seen in successfully planned **transitions from emergency to a recovery operation and from recovery to development**. A 2016 evaluation of the SDC's Performance in a basic education programme shows that programme managers were able to maintain the innovations, networks and resources built up in the initial phase, even after the earthquake of 2010. The SDC-funded masonry programme led not only to new and safer schools in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake but also helped professionalize masonry by establishing qualification standards and subsequently institutionalizing them in training institutions in Haiti.
- The same transition can be observed after the earthquake of August 2021. The presence of an office in the affected area contributed to support the rapid response. In a second phase, SDC contributed to immediate support and recovery projects carried out by its development-funded program partners.

Flexibility in instruments and approaches

- The aforementioned **mix of flexibility** is seen as one of the key success factors of SDC's effective engagement in Haiti;
- A **dual approach of combining training and participation in policy dialogue** is seen essential in creating interest and buy-in from actors in terms of governance at municipal level. SDC's 2022-24 strategy highlights the importance of flexibility in appropriation of methods and tools by local actors who do not always have adequate skills. For example, in the agricultural sector, achieving results in value chain governance required close accompaniment, which consisted of stimulating the interest of local authorities and actors and concretising formal commitments.

Stakeholders reached and capacities built

- The document analysis as well as interviews indicated that beneficiaries of projects were those most in need, especially in times of crisis. Also, SDC **prioritised the role of local actors** in its interventions in Haiti. This enhanced proximity to the population thorough its direct offices in Jacmel and Port-Salut.
- With a few exceptions, direct political contacts with Haiti were sporadic until the earthquake. Although mainly local actors were targeted and reached, cooperation with ministries and national institutions took place to some extent. On a local level, mayors who were committed to their community were effectively reached in several projects. According to an interviewee, the intention was not to build parallel structures to the central government, but to show best-practices on local level and attract ministers into the provinces.
- An evaluation stated the need to work more closely with intermediate and/or central actors, emphasising that putting actors at the centre does not mean working only at the local level, but working with the country's state and non-state actors at different levels. However, several sources highlighted challenges, including the general challenge of working with institutions in Haiti, given the weakness of the state, and precisely SDC's short-term engagement.
- **Capacities were built mainly on the local level**. However, the high rates of criminality, strong migration "brain drain", a lack of continuity in elected offices and administrations and corruption challenges the achievements.

Impact

From 2006 onwards, SDC's strategies aimed to improve living conditions and contribute to poverty reduction. **SDC's commitment is reflected primarily in concrete project results**. According to a number of interviewees, it is difficult to measure the impact of SDC's engagement. The main reason is the recent beginning of the bilateral programme, hence the short time-frame of programmes. A coherent DC programme, with a coherent development policy focusing on change processes, only started in 2014 (according to one interviewee even in 2018).

Despite the programme being young, some impact can be seen, especially at community level. Further long-term institutional changes can be seen along the focus areas, herein local governance, agriculture and food

security as well as employment and economic development. In general, the analysis shows that impact can be seen on local level and less on a political level of influence (with a few exemptions).

The 2022-24 strategy reflects on interventions in the **Local Governance** area and concludes that SDC's engagement has contributed to a better understanding of territorial governance by local actors. The governance of wash, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) is seen as one of the success stories that has enabled several municipalities to strengthen their roles, establish their authority, and contribute to improved access to services for the population.

In the area of **Agriculture and Food Security**, local actors, both individual and institutional have been enabled to strengthen their food security and build a dynamic local economy network. A general improvement of living conditions in rural areas is highlighted in SDC's strategies and evaluations. One example being that technical improvements have enabled thousands of families to ensure greater local food availability and to achieve a higher level of income.

Interventions in the **Employment and Economic Development** area have contributed to the development of a national policy for social protection in Haiti. Necessary conditions to allow the institutional anchoring of this process are currently built, and an overall improvement in resilience and social inclusion at the level of the intervention areas has been observed.

In interviews, respondents emphasised that SDC's engagement led to long-term changes in some cases, in **particular at project-level**. However, it has to be re-emphasised that bilateral cooperation is still very young in Haiti. Given the short time frame, it has been **difficult to invest in long-term change processes that follow a holistic vision**. At this stage, there is not sufficient data to effectively analyse impact.

Sustainability

As laid out in the previous paragraph, SDC's engagement mainly focuses on an individual, **community-based approach**. Some of the established local structures with good and trusted networks remain through **SDC's practiced global vision of governance**. Switzerland has created a long-lasting good reputation on all levels in Haiti which will likely be continued through the work of Switzerland's HA. Although it is feared that the accelerated exit and abrupt termination of some programs may have an impact on its reputation, in terms of reliability.

Some examples where a continuity can be seen are:

- **Project REGLEAU:** The national body responsible for water, envisages to replicate the developed water system in other parts of the country. It aims to continue the programme with monetary assistance from the World Bank and IDB. The project is an example of the Nexus where methodological approaches are shared between DC and HA
- **Project PROMES:** The objective is to transform this project in the field of social protection. The World Bank will take over the project approach in Grand'Anse with the same partners. Further, the EU has expressed interest in replicating the project in the North-West region.

One independent evaluation from 2019 focusing on the linkage of HA rates SDC's **sustainability Medium** in this context. However, according to interviewees the linkage has tightened and HA will be able to successfully continue operating.

3.6.3 HIGHLIGHTS AND FIRST HISTORIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR HAITI

Regarding SDC's cooperation with Haiti, the following aspects particularly stood out:

- High effectiveness has been achieved through an **early and innovative adaptation of the nexus approach** and successful project **transitions from emergency to recovery operation and from recovery to development**.
- **Thematic priorities were strengthened by cross-cutting themes.** In Haiti, the focus over the years lay on local governance, gender and disaster risk reduction. Switzerland's commitment to promoting **culture as a cross-cutting theme** was also particularly successful, **adding value to Swiss cooperation based on diversity, dialogue and inclusion**.
- High effectiveness in projects (e.g., REGLEAU and PROMES) have been achieved through a **geographic concentration**.

Moreover, the following selected lessons learned can be derived from the analysis:


- SDC's comprehensive approach and **high degree of flexibility in instruments (DC and HA)** is seen as a great strength that allows flexibility in designing and implementing programmes. Strategy documents, evaluations and interview partner emphasize that support that does not aim to reduce fragility will lead to an endless cycle of humanitarian interventions. Although SDC envisages an integrative approach, it is not yet

applied in all projects and programmes. Support needs to address fragility as a means to promote development through **long-term planned change processes** with a **holistically coordinated vision and mind-sets** at all levels;

- An important success factor turned out to be the **geographic and thematic concentration in the Southern Region** (South-East, South Nippes and the Grand'Anse departments). This territorial approach contributed to increased synergies between the different programmes financed by Switzerland, better coordination of actions and to a significant improvement in results;
- Government partners are essential for sustainable change processes, but require significant financial and time resources. In the complex and fragile ecosystem in Haiti, it was a successful approach to **focus on the local level**, build trust with local partners and subsequently work at departmental and national level;
- **SDC's role as honest broker, without double agenda** and trusted long-term network helped in the implementation and coordination of programmes. Through SDC's transparent work and communication, Switzerland is perceived as a credible cooperation partner.

3.7 LAC REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 8: Overview of SDC's engagement in LAC 1964-2024, cooperation periods and development of funds for Swiss bilateral cooperation over time



The previous sections retraced SDC's cooperation with LAC at country-level. The above graphic summarises some key data for the eight countries in focus, and highlights that Swiss bilateral cooperation is rooted in South America (from 1964 onwards), was then extended to Central America (from 1978 onwards) and finally also included Caribbean countries (from 2000 onwards). In the overall period, most bilateral cooperation funds were implemented in Bolivia, followed by Peru, Nicaragua and Honduras.

Presenting **pan-regional results, commonalities and main differences on LAC-level** based on the above analysis is challenging. On the one hand, aggregating the results too much waters down any epistemological interest, and not aggregating them sufficiently misses the point of remaining on LAC-level. Selected main commonalities and differences are presented here, followed by an initial collection of lessons learned for LAC.

Main Commonalities

- There are very clear parallels regarding the **development of thematic focus areas** (see overview in Annex 9). Overlaps are even stronger within the sub-regions (South America and Central America), but are also visible for the whole LAC region. Also regarding **the development of major cross-cutting themes** there are regional similarities.
- The **development of partner structures** shows strong similarities, ranging from the important role of NGOs to the involvement of the private sector from the 1990s on to a final focus on a multi-stakeholder approach. Moreover, there are parallels regarding the **applied instruments** (e.g. focus on technical advice and capacity building; co-financings with other donors and partners).
- The **influence of international development trends** and main development paradigms (see Annex 3) is visible over time in SDC's strategies for the region. Along with that, political and socio-economic context factors of the countries in LAC seem to have been the key drivers for change in SDC's strategic orientation – much more than any Swiss self-interest.
- Both documents and interviewees suggest that SDC has always been a very **trusted and technically well-versed partner** in all of the eight countries, therewith creating a sound basis for collaboration.
- **Flexibility and openness** to the partners' and beneficiaries' needs seems to be another of SDC's trademarks in the region.
- In terms of OECD/DAC criteria, **“relevance”** and **“coherence”** are generally given for SDC's engagement in the region. The other criteria give a mixed picture, if assessable at all.
- The Swiss motive of **„solidarity”** is clearly visible in all if the strategies, be it global, regional or national strategic documents.
- **Capacity building** and empowerment were central considerations in all HIC countries.

Main Differences

- **Cuba and Haiti seem markedly different** from the rest of the HIC countries; the motivation for SDC's engagement in Cuba appears to be vastly more political than in the other countries, and in Haiti the bilateral cooperation is at times indiscernible from humanitarian aid.
- One specific instrument, direct **budget support**, was only used in one country (Nicaragua).¹⁸
- A discussion about a **“Regional Approach”** seems only to have taken place in Central America, not in South America or the Caribbean.

Lessons learned

Table 2: Lessons Learned at LAC level structured according to the five GIZ Capacity WORKS success factors

SUCCESS FACTOR	LESSONS LEARNED
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SDC's multi-stakeholder approach is regarded as effective and risk-mitigating in politically and institutionally fragile environments. ▪ The combination of a local/territorial focus with a systemic approach and emphasis on policy dialogue is regarded as effective. ▪ The transfer of successful approaches into norms and policies contributed to a sustainable impact of SDC's engagement. ▪ SDC's interventions are usually long-term projects and programs, allowing to build solid trust relationships with partners and perceive changes over time, which in turn might have increased the partners' willingness to further support successful approaches.

¹⁸ The information regarding the use of budget support in Bolivia remained unclear based on document analysis and interviews.

SUCCESS FACTOR	LESSONS LEARNED
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With regards to the Regional Approach in Central America, the benefits are possibly more theoretical than real, at least if “regional” is to be understood as the effort to contribute to the solution of supra-national problems, strengthening of regional institutions and facilitating access to regional markets and investment opportunities.
Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SDC’s flexibility and openness towards partners and political developments as well as regarding project approaches and project management is regarded as success-conducive. Modalities of co-financing with partners and target groups helped to promote sustainability and ownership of actions. Especially for the work on democratisation and decentralisation, but also in other fields, anchoring in civil society turned out to be an important success factor.
Steering	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indirect implementation (mandates) becomes the modality of choice when programs become bigger and more numerous, as direct implementation (by SDC staff) is then no longer efficient. Government partners are essential for sustainable change processes, but require significant financial and time resources.
Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The technical expertise of SDC project staff was / is perceived by local partners as a strong and important success factor for SDC’s cooperation. SDC’s main contributions could be achieved via expert know-how and capacity building.
Learning & Innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Instead of formulating highly novel interventions, designing projects that respond to the demands of the target group, based on their capacities and resources, seem to be more adequate. Evidenced-based M&E and knowledge management is crucial for results-oriented programme management.

4 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK

The present meta-analysis provides a **comprehensive overview of SDC's bilateral engagement** in eight countries in LAC. It depicts major milestones of the cooperation, the development of thematic focus areas, approaches and instruments and discusses, as far as possible, the engagement in terms of its overall effectiveness, impact on poverty reduction in the region as well as sustainability. The analysis was primarily based on a review of SDC-internal documents, complemented by some semi-structured interviews with current and former SDC staff.

The overall picture regarding SDC's achievements is positive, even though there are significant differences between the countries. SDC provided **effective long-term support in various thematic areas**, thereby often applying a territorial multi-stakeholder approach with an important role of the civil society and a focus on policy dialogue. The thematic fields, in which the cooperation proved to be most effective, varied between the eight countries in focus. The analysis of SDC's contribution to poverty reduction turned out to be highly difficult or even impossible due to the available documentation, which hardly comprised any sound impact analyses. Several interview partners stated that SDC's overall contribution was hampered due to the limited financial resources implemented in LAC. Nevertheless, SDC could make a long-term difference, especially by its continuous long-term cooperation with partners and effective technical advice and capacity building. The interventions' **sustainability remains a challenge**. Even though there are a number of positive examples of handing over successful projects to partners as well as replicating and scaling-up proven approaches, particularly political instability and changes of personnel in government institutions continuously work against sustainability.

Regarding the above results, it is necessary to emphasise their **limited methodological robustness**. The available documentation with partly limited or even lacking information on certain sectors, approaches, time periods, and especially long-term impacts of the engagement did in many cases not allow for comprehensive analyses along the DAC criteria. The results presented here are therefore in many cases exemplary and rather anecdotal.

In line with its purpose, the approach of the meta-analysis was **summative and descriptive** as well as very **broad**, focusing on eight countries, long time-spans and on all sectors. Moreover, it deliberately represents mainly an SDC-internal perspective by focusing on SDC-internal documents and interview partner. The **thematic deep-dives**, which will build on this analysis in the upcoming phase of the HIC project, will be more specific and methodologically slightly different: They will concentrate on the five current SDC priority countries in LAC and focus on just one thematic area per country as well as on the last one to two decades. Methodologically, they will be less summative, but more analytical and explicitly also include SDC-external views, e.g. by partner institutions and beneficiaries. The topics in focus will be the following:

Table 3: Topics for the five thematic deep-dives of the HIC project

Country	Deep Dive Topics
Bolivia	Rural development (with a focus on agriculture and climate change)
Honduras	Economic development
Nicaragua	Water and Sanitation (Nicaragua and regional)
Cuba	(Participatory management of) Local development
Haiti	Local governance with a focus on disaster risk reduction

The deep-dives will start immediately after the meta-analysis workshop with the HIC Steering Group in Berne in January 2023 and the Evaluation Manager's approval of the meta-analysis report.

Annex 1: Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Guiding Questions	Assessment Criteria / Indicators	Meta-Analysis		Sectoral / thematic deep-Dives		HIC report/product covering the aspect
		Data collection methods	Data sources	Data collection methods	Data sources	
0) Overarching descriptive questions						
0.1 What were the key milestones in the strategic orientation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC (country level)? What were the key drivers for these changes in focus?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	Swiss cooperation strategies; strategic planning documents at regional/country level, project documentation and evaluations; current and former SDC staff			* Meta-analysis report * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
0.2 How have development approaches, thematic/sectoral focusses as well as applied instruments developed over time (country level)? How has the integration of cross-cutting themes (gender, governance, to some extent human rights, conflict sensitivity and more recently climate change) developed over time?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	Swiss cooperation strategies; strategic planning documents at regional/country level, project documentation and evaluations; current and former SDC staff			* Meta-analysis report * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
1) Relevance						
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC's aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs ? Were the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.			document analysis; semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; workshops in the countries	country cooperation strategies; project documentation and evaluations; independent country analyses (e.g. by the World Bank); possibly national development plans and sector strategies; current and former SDC staff; staff of SDC partner organizations; independent experts in the countries; representatives of the target group	* Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
1.2 In how far was SDC's engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities ?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.			document analysis; semi-structured interviews	country cooperation strategies; project documentation and evaluations; Swiss IZA strategies; current and former SDC staff	
2) Coherence						
2.1 Was the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.			document analysis; semi-structured interviews	Swiss cooperation strategies; strategic planning documents at regional/country level, project documentation and evaluations; current and former SDC and SECO staff	* Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
2.2 Was the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors ?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activities of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.			document analysis; semi-structured interviews	Swiss cooperation strategies; strategic planning documents at regional/country level, project documentation and evaluations; current and former SDC staff; representatives of other international donor agencies in LAC (e.g. GIZ, USAID, UN-agencies, World Bank or IADB)	* Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
3) Effectiveness						
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors were achieved?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes were (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
3.3 Which stakeholders were reached and how - and which were excluded and why? Which capacities were changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
4) Impact						
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security. 4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme (ex-post) evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; workshops in the countries	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; independent country analyses (e.g. by the World Bank); current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries; representatives of the target groups	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today (<i>intended or un-intended</i>)? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion). 4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts. 4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme (ex-post) evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; workshops in the countries	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; independent country analyses (e.g. by the World Bank); current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries; representatives of the target groups	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report

Guiding Questions	Assessment Criteria / Indicators	Meta-Analysis		Sectoral / thematic deep-Dives		HIC report/product covering the aspect
		Data collection methods	Data sources	Data collection methods	Data sources	
5) Sustainability						
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (<i>for closed programmes</i> : did the benefits actually continue?); What were/are the successes and hindering factors ?	6.1.1 Exit strategies were defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets were reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures). 6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements. 6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) were closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme (ex-post) evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; workshops in the countries	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; independent country analyses (e.g. by the World Bank); current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries; representatives of the target groups	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
5.2 Did SDC's bilateral cooperation interventions lead to scalable or replicable results (<i>for closed interventions</i> : Were those actually up-scaled or replicated?)?	6.2.1 Project approaches were scaled-up in the priority regions. 6.2.2 Project approaches were replicated outside the priority regions.	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme (ex-post) evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; workshops in the countries	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; independent country analyses (e.g. by the World Bank); current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
6) Lessons Learned						
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; workshops in the countries	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	meta-analysis of documents; semi-structured expert interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff	document analysis; semi-structured interviews	project/programme evaluation reports and reviews of cooperation strategies; current and former SDC staff; project partners; independent experts in the countries	* Meta-analysis report * Deep-dive reports * Summary meta-analysis and capitalisation report

ANNEX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

The following persons were consulted by the HIC team as part of the meta-analysis.

NAME	(FORMER) FUNCTION
Amanda Ammann	Country Manager Cuba DLAC Bern
Richard Bauer	Journalist NZZ and former SDC consultant
Jürg Benz	Former Head of Cooperation Honduras
Peter Bischof	Former Head of Section Latin America Former Head of Cooperation in Nicaragua Former Ambassador in Bolivia (um 1998)
René Brugger	20 years SDC experience, lives in Bolivia
Lars Büchler	Country Manager Bolivia DLAC Bern
Roger Denzer	Former Head of DLAC and former Ambassador in Bolivia
Geneviève Federspiel	Former Ambassador Haiti
Felix Fellmann	Former Deputy Head of Cooperation Honduras/Nicaragua
Markus Glatz	Head of Cooperation Cuba since 08/2022
Christoph Graf	Former Head of DLAC Former Head of Cooperation in Central America
Martin Jaggi	Former Head of Cooperation Peru
Annette Kolff	Director International Programmes HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation
Ueli Mauderli	Current Head of Cooperation
Céline Maye	Chargée de programme Aide Humanitaire Haiti
Peter Meier	Former Head of Cooperation Ecuador
Beatrice Meyer	Head of DLAC Former Head of Cooperation in Peru and Deputy Head of Cooperation in Central America
Jocelyn Ostolaza	Project Coordinator Global Programs in Lima
Fabrizio Poretti	Chargé d'affaires & Head of Cooperation Haiti
Virginie Poyetton	HIC Evaluation Manager and Country Manager, Bolivia and Central America
Adrian Schläpfer	Former Head of Section Latin America Former Head of Cooperation in Bolivia
Sven Stucki	Country Manager Haiti and Cuba DLAC Bern
Felix von Sury	Former Head of DLAC and former Head of Intercooperation
Peter Sulzer	Former Head of Cooperation in Peru, Cuba and Honduras
Sybille Suter	Former Head of DLAC
Peter Tschumi	Head of Cooperation Cuba until 08/2022
Edita Vokral	Ambassador in Bolivia Former Ambassador in Haiti Former Regional Head of Cooperation for Central America
Arno Wicki	Head of Division Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean

ANNEX 3: OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORIES SINCE 1940s

Modernisation Theory

The emergence of the discipline of international development after the Second World War is marked by several characteristics. First, theorists and practitioners of development reoriented their own understanding and conception of development as a means of achieving a better life from the domestic sphere to the international domain. The main argument in favour of this reorientation derives from **modernization theory**, in accordance with which science and technology end suffering from economic stagnation and backwardness. Since colonial rule did not seek to improve the standards of living of the colonised societies, the urgent question for the leaders of the newly independent countries after 1945 was how to modernise the country and achieve rapid economic growth. At the same time, and with the purpose of winning the hearts and minds of the people of these developing countries, the leaders of advanced societies led by the United States initiated technical assistance programs to aid those countries in their aspiration for economic progress and prosperity (Truman 1949). In this context, **economic development** became a major subject in international relations.

The second characteristic is related to the emergence of a **new moral outlook** urging assistance programs for people of developing countries in the post-Second World War context. This moral outlook had its roots in the classical liberal tradition of the eighteenth century, encouraging entrepreneurial spirit as the engine of economic growth for prosperity. Since this path to a prosperous life was presumed to be universal in scope and breadth, it was assumed to be inspiring for all societies, regardless of their own cultures and identities. Accordingly, liberal nations were feeling **morally responsible** to share their own development experience and scientific achievements with others to boost their economic growth as the gateway to prosperity (Ekbladh 2010; Rist 2008). The Christian faith was at the heart of this sense of moral responsibility to help.

The third characteristic is the relationship of international development with the **Cold War** (1946–1989), the ideological and strategic rivalry between the capitalist, liberal democratic West and the Communist world led by the Soviet Union. Indeed, and from the beginning, international development was implanted as a strategic plan to make developing countries conform to Western liberalism as a way of reducing the threat of communism. With its European and other allies, the United States initiated aid programs, technological assistance, and foreign investment in developing countries. Aid was supposed to ensure that developing countries directed their course of life from the colonial condition toward economic growth. Economic growth, it was believed, would bring political stability in the post-colonial world and a safe environment of collaboration with Western liberal democracies. This aspiration was especially stimulated by the fear in the West of the influence of communism in the vulnerable political condition of newly independent countries. The moral responsibility to help, foreign aid programs, and alliance-making formed the mainstream approach in international development from the time of its inception in the late 1940s.

In the 1960s, a more sophisticated perspective of development appeared in the international community. In fact, at a time of massive unrest caused by the post-colonial rupture, the United Nations proclaimed the 1960s as the Development Decade. However, this initiative was still largely aligned with the mainstream view of development as economic growth propelled by foreign aid. To develop, developing countries must leave traditional social relations and enter into the preconditions for take-off via installation of infrastructure supported by foreign assistance. Following this stage, the take-off in economic growth takes place and drives the country into the stage of maturity. The ultimate stage in the attainment of economic development is the age of **mass consumption**. This mediated process of economic growth requires technological modernization and social evolution. In this model, development for a better life is portrayed with a purely economic face, since the ultimate goal of development is mass consumption.

This theory of economic growth established significant elements for the development of nations: endogenous motivation in development; the critical importance of entrepreneurial spirit, investment, and the accumulation of capital; and the role of science and technology in development. However, the theory suffered from several limitations and weaknesses. It ignored the structural causes of underdevelopment and uneven development. Lack of attention to cultural complexities, which differ from society to society, disregarding of the discriminatory nature of the international system, grounding economic growth on the false dichotomy between modern and traditional, reducing the meaning of development to the sole

materialist dimension of consumption, and formulating a one-size-fits-all solution are some of the weaknesses.

Basic Needs Approach (1970s)

Viewing development as synonymous with economic growth became less popular in the 1970s, as the view began to grow that development should be defined as the satisfaction of basic human needs. The argument behind this model of development is simple: if development is the development of human beings, then **human beings and their needs must be the focus** of development programs. Thus, development is not synonymous with economic growth (Alston 1979; Lederer 1980); **employment, poverty, and income distribution** are important too - basic needs are not restricted to income and other materialistic criteria. People need a just condition of life, marked by the fair distribution of wealth, goods, and services. More particularly, the most basic needs of people must be met in order to allow them to be capable of achieving long-term physical well-being, which means being freed from absolute poverty. There must be minimum resources available to people, including sufficient nutritional food, adequate shelter, decent clothing, education, protection from disease, and physical security. The basic needs approach came with an emphasis on the **public policy** dimensions of development. Indeed, the basic needs approach required turning the view of development upside down by pointing out that development is essentially a bottom-up construct that combines economic growth with social equity policies. With a view to the need to meet the basic needs of the poorest population of the world, the development debates in the 1970s and 1980s shifted towards the alleviation of poverty through addressing basic needs. This shift was later embraced by the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank.

Human Development (1980s)

Accordingly, starting in the 1980s, a fundamental shift in the development debates came to the fore: good development as human development. Amartya Sen, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate in economics, heralded the human development approach (Sen 1999). Human development is a normative (ethical) approach that extends the meaning of development beyond the one-sidedness of material prosperity and instead lays out a multidimensional and multi-sectoral process of socio-cultural and politico-economic changes aimed at human well-being and freedom. That is, development is seen as a process rather than an idea, a theory, and/or policies and programs aimed at helping others attain a better material life. Human development, instead, involves enhancing people's quality of life. Accordingly, the human development approach reflects a move beyond policy measures improving people's material prosperity toward enlarging people's capability in attaining their own sense and model of the better life. Human development is concerned with achieving the richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings live. This human-centred approach in development involves people's democratic participation in development. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) envisaged human development as an evaluative space to measure people's functioning capability in portraying their own well-being. For this purpose, the UNDP initiated the **Human Development Index (HDI)** to assess the development of a country based on its people's capability as the ultimate goal of development.

Neoliberalism (from 1985)

None of the four contending theories were able to offer a solution to the economic stagnation, inflation, and political instability that was making life difficult in the Western world in the 1970s and early 1980s. From the mid-1970s, the Western capitalist economies suffered slow economic growth, high unemployment, low productivity, and high inflation. In addition, the revolutionary atmosphere caused by Marxist movements and radical religious movements created a state of uncertainty for the post-Second World War liberal capitalist consensus in the West.

Business groups, right-wing politicians, conservative think tanks, and influential religious groups formed a union to move history in its "proper" direction: the **free-market economy aligned with freedom and democracy**. Politically speaking, neoliberalism (as the movement came to be called) argued for the end of history and the victory of liberal democracy as the ultimate stage of the evolution of human society (Fukuyama 1993).

The (neo)liberal revolution of the 1980s and 1990s sought to **control inflation, weaken trade unions, control government spending**, and reduce the economic activities of governments everywhere.

Though it was controversial in the West, this new (neo)liberal project gained in credibility after the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Bloc and the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991 removed the main ideological rival to capitalism. The collapse of Soviet communism created over a dozen new countries and freed several more; Western countries quickly tried to guide these countries to liberal capitalist democracy. John Williamson of the Peterson Institute for International Economics coined the term “Washington Consensus” to describe the standard set of policy prescriptions that were then promoted by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury, all based in Washington, D.C., as cures for Latin American economies plagued by inflation, slow growth, and balance of payments problems (Williamson 2004).

The Washington Consensus, in either the strict (Williamson 2004) sense or in its more popular sense as a set of pro-market policies, quickly become contentious, especially in the areas of trade liberalisation and elimination of subsidies. This new dispute was led by Joseph Stiglitz, the former chief economist at the World Bank. He argued that the Washington Consensus was unlikely to promote the development of the poorest countries in the world. Stiglitz argued that any future consensus cannot be made just in Washington. Rather, any new framework for poor countries must provide better and greater adaptation to the circumstances of the countries involved (Stiglitz 2005 and 2008). Stiglitz and others argued that Washington Consensus policies produced only limited growth. In addition, even when growth did occur, it was not equitably shared. Accordingly, imperative in such a framework is an **emphasis on the importance of equity and employment**. He also suggests a **balancing** of the role of **government** and markets that promotes and regulates markets, provides institutional and physical infrastructure, and promotes education, innovation, and technology. Stiglitz (2005) concluded that the intellectual framework for thinking about policies provided by the Washington Consensus was badly flawed. Accordingly, the Post-Washington Consensus suggested alternative frameworks encompassing the historical experience of the countries that grew faster, while addressing the issues of sustainability and equality.

MDGs & SDGs (since 2000)

To initiate sustained efforts to end poverty, to make the world more inclusive and equitable, and to create a shared future in accordance with common human values, the United Nations in its 2000 summit unanimously adopted the Millennium Declaration (UN 2000). The Millennium Declaration contained a statement of values, principles, and objectives for the international agenda for the twenty-first century. The Millennium Forum, which brought together representatives of more than a thousand non-governmental and civil society organisations, also became engaged in a series of consultations over the issues of poverty eradication and the protection of vulnerable people. Drawn from the Millennium Declaration and the consulting forum, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) served as a blueprint for measuring progress in development among the countries in the world. The goals are indeed the manifestation of the long-term search to find an effective and permanent solution to world poverty. The goals draw heavily for their inspiration from the basic needs theorists and from the human development and capabilities approach to development. The main goal, MDG 1, called for the halving of poverty in the world within 15 years and the eradication of extreme poverty.

There was a global consultation on the post-MDG global agenda in 2015. An innovation in this consultation was the responsibility of the member states to provide evidence-based inputs, analytical thinking, and field experience. The world prepared itself to define and implement political measures in support of the new agenda: the Sustainable Development Goals. A novel feature of the new agenda lies in a **global consensus to set the goals for both people and the planet**. The SDGs take the effects of climate change on oceans, forests, and biodiversity into account. Taking this more holistic view, the SDGs assert in effect that good development must be sustainable development. A remnant of the idea of the development ethicists from early 1950s, who argued that the ultimate goal of development must be human flourishing, the SDGs promise a view of good development that could potentially provide a better life for all and build a firm foundation for stability and peace everywhere in the world. (This meaning of development will be presented in Chapter 15.) Goals listed on the roster of this ambitious but promising agenda targeted elimination rather than reduction of poverty and more attention to health, education, gender, and inequality. These goals are cosmopolitan in scope and apply to all countries and all people, which is a significant departure from the MDGs and the West-Rest binary.

Annex 4: Historic timeline of Swiss International Cooperation Strategies for LAC

	Strategy period				
	1959 - 1961	1961 - 1964	1964 - 1966	1966 - 1969	1969 - 1971
Main / key objectives for LAC	(not specific for LAC): Switzerland can only pursue a so-called active policy of neutrality policy if it participates in the great works of international solidarity. One such very important and urgent work is technical assistance. Our country can take on a valuable and appreciated task in this field, even more so because it has never had colonies and has no political aims. This also explains why the underdeveloped countries, which generally tend to prefer multilateral aid, prefer our 'bilateral aid', be it official or private.	(not specific for LAC): Of the opinion that technical assistance consists mainly of the training of professional cadres. As has already been said, need to help developing countries to help themselves. This will only be possible if they have a skilled professional workforce in all fields.	no information available	no information available	(not specific for LAC): The core element of technical cooperation is the education and training of nationals of developing countries and, in particular, the development of an efficient local cadre. This indirect influence on the development process, however, only yields results in the long term, must therefore be complemented by a direct influence in the form of advisory services.
Theory of change	no information available	no information available	no information available	no information available	no information available
Thematic focus for LAC	no information available	no information available	no information available	no information available	no information available
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles for LAC	no information available	(not specific for LAC): The type of aid is to be adapted to the needs of each country. Our aid should cover a wide range of areas according to the possibilities we have. They will be, in particular, in the provision of experts, in founding or helping to found schools or training workshops, in the supply of materials and products necessary for the improvement of working and production conditions in agriculture, trade, industry and commerce.	no information available	no information available	no information available
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Special fund: The special fund is intended to finance enterprises that are of direct relevance for accelerating the economic development of underdeveloped countries. Bilateral and multilateral technical cooperation Focus as small state on bilateral cooperation	no information available	Technical cooperation and budget support, humanitarian aid; support of private actors in developing countries	Technical cooperation and budget support, humanitarian aid	Technical cooperation and budget support, economic and trade policy measures, humanitarian aid
Geographical / regional focus	no information available	Peru	Peru (Peru was chosen as a focus country both because of its close economic relation with the Swiss Confederation, as well as because of its influential colony, from whose advice and participation any development project can benefit from.	no information available	no information available
Total budget for strategic period	no information available	overall 60 Mio CHF	overall 90 Mio CHF	overall 100 Mio CHF	overall 180 Mio CHF
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	no information available	no information available	no information available	no information available	(not specific for LAC): We are therefore currently in a period of stagnation or, to put it more positively, consolidation.
Relevant context factors (LAC)	no information available	no information available	no information available	no information available	no information available
Important hints / comments			As far as the geographical distribution of aid is concerned, it intends to focus more Latin America than in the past.		Project examples: Animal breeding Peru;

	1971 - 1973	1973 - 1975	1975 - 1976	1978 - 1981	1981 - 1983
Main / key objectives for LAC	(not specific for LAC): The first and permanent objective of Swiss foreign policy is to enable our country to prosper in freedom. We must, in the service of this goal, cultivate political and economic international relations which serve peace as such and our security in particular, which strengthen our prestige and our position in the world and which provide us with the vital markets of supply and maintain.	(Not specific for LAC): The main objective is to improve the living conditions of the poorest sections of the population and to meet their most basic needs, namely nutrition, health and education.	(not specific for LAC): The objectives of Switzerland's contribution to international development cooperation are set out in Article 5 of the Federal Act on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid. The article reads: 1. Development cooperation shall support the developing countries in their endeavour to improve the living conditions of their populations. It shall contribute to the development of these countries through their own efforts. In the long term, it strives for better balanced conditions in the international community. 2. It primarily supports the poorer developing countries, regions and population groups. In particular, it shall promote a. the development of rural areas b. The improvement of the nutritional situation, in particular through agricultural production for self-sufficiency; c. crafts and local small-scale industry; d. the creation of jobs; e. the establishment and maintenance of ecological and demographic balance	(not specific for LAC): It (development cooperation) primarily supports the poorer developing countries, regions and population groups. It promotes in particular a. the development of rural areas b. the improvement of the nutritional situation, in particular through agricultural production for self-sufficiency; c. handicrafts and local small-scale industry; d. the creation of employment e. the establishment and maintenance of the ecological and demographic balance.	no information available
Theory of change	n/a	(Not specific for LAC): However, selective measures are not enough to cope with the task. What is needed is a comprehensive development policy on the part of the respective government and the will of those directly affected to help themselves. These are prerequisites that suggest what is known as integrated development planning, in which sub-goals corresponding to the diverse needs are coordinated with each other and which offers sufficient starting points for the development of the local initiative.	n/a	n/a	n/a
Thematic focus for LAC	n/a	(not specific for LAC): rural development, agriculture; industrial production; education; health	(not specific for LAC): rural development; food security; craft training; employment; ecological and demographic balance	no information available	Rural development; agriculture; health; education/VET in agriculture sector
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles for LAC	Policy of international solidarity	n/a	Discussion on new wording: development aid vs. development cooperation	n/a	n/a
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Technical cooperation and budget support; Economic and trade policy measures; humanitarian aid	n/a	Technical cooperation (multilateral and bilateral) and budget support	Technical cooperation (multilateral and bilateral) and budget support	Technical cooperation and budget support; multilateral cooperation; humanitarian aid
Geographical / regional focus	n/a	Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador	not concretely mentioned	Bolivia, Peru	Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay
Total budget for strategic period	53,1 Mio CHF	overall 150 Mio. CHF	overall 240 Mio CHF, but no specific information on LAC available	Overall 735 Mio CHF but no specific data for LAC available	280 Mio CHF (technical cooperation and budget support)
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	Over the past few years, aid to developing countries has become an increasingly important element of Swiss foreign policy - and also of foreign economic policy. At the same time, the Confederation's financial expenditure for this purpose has increased. Today it is to be regarded as an important part of our policy for a long time to come. The question was raised whether official development assistance is sufficiently well-founded in law and whether the people should participate in the decisions on development aid.	n/a	Swiss participation in international development cooperation is in line with our human obligation and the responsibility that we - closely linked to the destiny of the international community - in political and economic respect for the future of our country	Switzerland's performance in the area of official development assistance is growing more slowly as had been envisaged. This puts our country in an awkward position at the Conference on Economic Cooperation (CIECO). As the only industrialised country represented at the Conference, Switzerland had to make a formal reservation to the commitment of the other industrialised countries to its official development assistance.	Substantial increase in our country's official development assistance necessary. This increase is in line with our policy of solidarity with the most disadvantaged developing countries and peoples. We will thereby free ourselves from an international isolation which is detrimental both to our foreign policy and to our foreign economy. It is not only our relations with developing countries that are at stake, but also with our industrialised partners. So whether we look at the problem from the point of view of our moral obligation as a rich country, the requirements of our foreign policy, or the goals of our foreign economic policy, we always come to the same conclusion: we need to increase our official development assistance and we have every interest in doing so.
Relevant context factors (LAC)	n/a	no information available	no information available	no information available	no information available
Important hints / comments	Message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on a Federal Act on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid --> legal foundations but no relevant information on LAC included	Project example: cheese dairy centre Peru; development of rural and forest industry in Peru; Utilisation of banana surpluses Ecuador;	Project example: Reforestation Haiti; Rural health Peru; Support of the national forest service Peru;		Project example: Seeds production in Cochabamba (Bolivia) Project list LAC p. 102

	1984 - 1987	1987 - 1990	1991 - 1994	1995 - 1998	1991 - 1996
Main / key objectives for LAC	(not specific for LAC): In the priority countries of our bilateral cooperation we are trying to take a more targeted approach by combining the different projects and measures into a comprehensive development strategy. To this end the focal points on which our aid is focused in the development efforts of a particular country are defined in so-called country programmes.	(Not specific for LAC): The political significance of our development cooperation and humanitarian aid is that they ensure Switzerland's presence in our partner countries. This is particularly true for countries with which Switzerland has only very limited relations in other areas such as trade, investment, tourism or culture. The majority of our priority countries are in this situation. Participation in international development efforts is also in our economic interest.	Since all our partner countries are confronted with structural adjustment measures in one form or another, the Swiss development cooperation is also confronted with the question (after Bolivia also in Peru and Central America measures in this area). In each case, Switzerland will contribute specifically to the restructuring of certain sectors or participate in the dampening of the social costs of adaptation through programmes to meet basic needs. This results in new requirements for the interaction of our various development policy instruments and coordination with the donor community. We intend to use our experience in the following sectors: agriculture, forestry, education, and small-scale promotion in the reconstruction process with broad impact. In turn, our actions should be able to benefit from the improved framework conditions.	(not specific for LAC): Promoting economic and state autonomy Supporting the poor Support in overcoming environmental problems Improving production conditions Health and education Preventing migration movements	(Not specific for LAC): Based on these considerations and the postulates passed by the National Council and the Council of States, we propose the opening of a framework credit for each of the following financing of debt relief measures in favour of poorer developing countries and for the financing of environmental programmes and projects of global importance totalling 700 million Swiss francs with a term of at least five years. It enables Switzerland to send an important political signal within the framework of the 700-year political signal and to express its solidarity in a meaningful way.
Theory of change	n/a	n/a	(Not specific for LAC): The fight against poverty will remain the top priority of our programme. Based on our experience so far, we conclude that even more than in the past, it is important to see the political aspect of poverty: the poor are mainly those who have not have sufficient access to productive resources such as land, water, credit and knowledge. A political approach in the fight against poverty is needed at the level of situation analysis, policy dialogue with beneficiaries, with partner countries and donors, especially multilateral donors. Efforts must be made to strengthen the social and political position of disadvantaged groups, for example by supporting self-help organisations. The strategies of the fight against poverty will be based on the own strengths of the poor, who we see as subjects and not as objects of development.	n/a	(not specific for LAC): In view of the complex economic and social interrelationships in order to counteract overly optimistic expectations, it is important to simply relieving the debt of over-indebted developing countries is not a sufficient prerequisite for sustainably advancing their economic and social development in the long term: As was explained in the introduction, in many cases the high level of debt is all too often a symptom of a series of unfavourable events and factors which can only be partially influenced. Impacts: - on the national economy - solidarity among creditors - socialisation of the risks of individuals - Effects on the behaviour of economic actors
Thematic focus for LAC	Generally (worldwide) focus on rural development (no explicit information on LAC)	Agriculture (70% of funds); rural development; VET for farmers; rural infrastructure; health; education; water supply; development projects in urban areas	We intend to use our experience in the following sectors: agriculture, forestry, education, and small-scale promotion in the reconstruction process with broad impact. In turn, our actions should be able to benefit from the improved framework conditions	Bolivia: Structural adjustment; rural development; sustainable land-use; Promotion of urban trade and industry Peru: Small business promotion; sustainable land-use; rural water supply and sanitation Nicaragua/Honduras: rural development; rural water supply; sustainable land-use; trade promotion and vocational training Information on roof tile projects, esp. in Honduras	(not specific for LAC): - Contributions to repurchase or convert non-guaranteed, commercial debt; - Waiver of publicly guaranteed claims; - Contributions to the settlement of arrears to international financing institutions within the framework of international assistance;
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles for LAC	Focus on LLDCs and low-income countries	Although they are generally known, the guiding principles of this basic attitude should be mentioned, namely: neutrality, dispoibility, solidarity and universality. Our development cooperation depends as a fundamental and substantial part on our openness to the outside world, depends on these principles and puts them into practice in a useful, active and permanent way.	Strengthening of women	Environment; population growth and migration; research policy; fight against drugs; fight against AIDS	Connection of debt relief and environmental issues
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Technical cooperation and budget support; Economic and trade policy measures; humanitarian aid --> complementarity of instruments	Technical cooperation and budget support, humanitarian aid, as main implementation modalities	Technical cooperation; budget support; multilateral cooperation; humanitarian aid	Bilateral and multilateral cooperation; thematic and regional prioritisation; cooperation with NGOs; cooperation with the private sector; development from projects to country programmes (example Bolivia)	Debt relief; financing of additional costs; Cover difference between economically more favourable but more environmentally damaging and more expensive, environmentally friendly investments or to cover losses from the operation of environmentally friendly facilities; complementarity of bilateral and multilateral measures
Geographical / regional focus	Bolivia, Honduras, Peru	Peru, Bolivia and Honduras (focus countries), other countries: Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua	Focus countries: Bolivia, Peru, Honduras (although stronger regional approach for Central America planned) Bolivia: On the one hand we will continue to support the economy with economic and trade policy measures (balance of payments assistance and contributions to commercial debt reduction through the BAWI) and with co-financing (participation in programmes to fight poverty and increase efficiency in the public sector) to further economic consolidation. On the other hand, we will also continue the traditional programme of technical cooperation in the areas of increasing productivity of basic foodstuffs, reforestation and rural infrastructure. Peru: Security and economic crisis. The success of our traditional development projects in the areas of agriculture and forestry, promotion and vocational training is repeatedly challenged by these two factors. Under these difficult conditions, it is difficult to make forecasts for the future of the programme of Swiss cooperation with Peru. Central America: So far, our cooperation has concentrated mainly on the priority country HONDURAS, as well as on Nicaragua, the two poorest countries in the region. We have many years of experience with integrated rural development projects. In the coming years, we will consolidate these projects according to consolidate them along priority lines of action. In the 1990s we will likely to contribute more to a regional development strategy. Our main task here will be to promote social balance within the countries of this region. Ecuador (less important, focus on rural potentials in the Anden region); Haiti (no real opportunities to cooperate with the state)	Bolivia, Peru, Central America/Nicaragua	n/a
Total budget for strategic period	110,2 Mio CHF	250 Mio CHF for LAC (The total amount of financial resources earmarked for our activity as a whole in this region, will be around 44.5 million francs per year. Half of the available funds will be used for development contributions in the three priority countries in the region.)	overall 3300 Mio CHF. 140 Mio CHF for Peru, Bolivia and Honduras	3900 Mio CHF (total); bilateral programs: 2500 Mio CHF, LAC: 300 Mio CHF	Debt relief (400 Mio CHF); The framework credit for financing environmental programmes and projects of global significance in developing countries (300 Mio CHF)
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	Difficult condition of federal budget --> shortening of public development cooperation budget	The financial crises that are shaking the world economy, and of which the external indebtedness of the Third World is a to be underestimated relations with developing countries. For example, since our exports to Africa and Latin America have declined noticeably, the loans granted by Swiss banks to developing countries have decreased significantly.	n/a	All essential aspects of development policy, i.e. of Switzerland's overall relations with the countries of the South, are included in this report. This is because the overall foreign policy concept is based on the assumption that the strategic Swiss foreign policy objectives apply to European policy, security policy and development policy. As the introductory chapter of the Foreign Policy report states, foreign policy concepts must be oriented towards the new dynamics of "world domestic policy": Borders are becoming permeable, interdependencies multiply. The strategic goals for safeguarding Switzerland's interests in the best possible way - Promotion of security and peace - Promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law - Promotion of welfare - Reduction of social disparities - Protection of the natural foundations of life can only be achieved through increased participation in global cooperation. In the Foreign Policy Report, the Federal Council therefore postulates an expansion of the operational capabilities and an improvement of the possibilities and means to be able to respond more effectively to global challenges. "Leitbild Nord-Süd"	In 1991, the Confederation found itself in a dynamic foreign policy environment. The accelerated process of European integration, the structural changes in Central and Eastern Europe and in the USSR as well as the Gulf crisis have become dominant factors and growing challenges for Switzerland's foreign relations. The 700th anniversary is a fitting occasion to show strengthened and renewed solidarity also towards the weaker members of the international community. Compared to many countries in the international community, Switzerland pursues a very progressive environmental policy. Its relatively high environmental standards are an expression of the great importance that the general public and the political authorities attach to the conservation and care of the environment.
Relevant context factors (LAC)	no information available	debt crisis; security concerns (Peru)	Economic and social crisis - rising poverty - depression and hyperinflation - low economic growth rates - debt crisis as consequence - growing urban population	In most LAC economic and political reforms were successful; in LAC democratic governments are in place (Cuba and Haiti as exception); while the institutions of political participation exist formally, in everyday political life they are often facades for conditions that are not very democratic; lack of political culture and experience with democratic institutions; improvement in the protection of human rights; deepening of social inequalities; economic growth in recent years; improvement of depth situation	n/a
Important hints / comments	Example project MARGOAS (Honduras): support to rural development and farmers (p.179)		Detailed example of Bolivian Structural Adjustment Programme (p. 158)	Presentation of specific projects in the time period along the thematic priorities, e.g. brickmaking in LAC; programme "Bolivia exports"; Emergency Fund Bolivia	Message in the context of the 700th anniversary of the Swiss Confederation on two new framework credits to finance debt relief measures in favour of poorer developing countries and environmental projects of global importance in developing countries.

					Strategy period
	1999 - 2002 (2003)	2004 - 2007 (2008)	2009 - 2012	2011 - 2012	2013 - 2016
Main / key objectives for LAC	(not specific for LAC): Switzerland's technical cooperation and financial assistance continue to be geared towards the strategic objectives set out in the Foreign Policy Report of the Federal Council of 29 November 1993 and in the North-South mission statement of 7 March 1994. - Preservation and promotion of peace and security; promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law; - Promotion of welfare; - Increase of social justice; - protection of natural resources. Framework objectives: Empowerment of partners for their own development; contribution to the balance between North and South; priority support to the poorer developing countries, regions and population groups (poverty reduction).	To make its cooperation as efficient as possible and focus on real needs, SDC concentrates on a few countries in Latin America (Nicaragua/Central America, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and - newly - Cuba) and areas of work, with poverty reduction as the guiding principle.	(Not specific for LAC): The Foreign Policy Report 2006 sets three priorities: Poverty reduction, promotion of human security and shaping globalisation in a way that promotes development (not specific for LAC). Overall: Poverty reduction through improvement of health and education and strengthening of governance; human security and reduction of security risks through conflict prevention, conflict resolution and migration management; improvement of a globalisation focused on development (global public goods)	Key objective worldwide is to use the extra funding for specific bilateral projects in the sectors of water and climate change, some of them in Latin American countries.	(not specific for LAC): Bilateral engagement of SDC to combat poverty in low-income countries and inequalities regarding income and opportunities. Strengthening local development planning. Improve management of natural resources and combat consequences of climate change.
Theory of change	n/a	SDC assumes that poverty can only be permanently overcome if those affected have better opportunities to realise their own goals. Cooperation in Latin America therefore places the empowerment of the poor at the centre of its efforts. The aim is to improve equal opportunities and rights and to improve access to knowledge, resources, social services and participation in decision-making processes. The poor should be better able to represent their interests and claim their rights.	n/a	n/a	(Not specific for LAC): Poverty reduction is and remains the primary goal of Switzerland's international cooperation. The Swiss contribution is geared towards five strategic goals: 1. prevent and overcome crises, conflicts and disasters. 2. create access to resources and services for all. 3. promote sustainable economic growth 4. support transition to democratic, market-based systems. 5. to help shape globalisation in a way that promotes development, protects the environment and is socially acceptable.
Thematic focus for LAC	Central America/Nicaragua: agriculture/agricultural development; Drinking water supply and sanitation; sustainable management of natural resources; Craft and industry promotion and vocational training Peru/Bolivia/Ecuador: sustainable management of natural resources; Craft and industry promotion; Drinking water supply and sanitation	(1) Good Governance; (2) Income generation and employment (more than 40% of DEZA funds); (3) Sustainable management of natural resources; (4) Improvement of social justice (access to drinking water, social policies) -> Improvement and modernisation of the drinking water sector in Central America	See country priority areas below. No regional thematic focus on LAC mentioned. Globally thematic priority areas: (1) Income/Employment/Private Sector/Micro-Finance/VET; (2) Agriculture and rural development; (3) Education; (4) Health; (5) Water; (6) Natural Resources and Environment; (7) Governance; (8) Conflict prevention and transformation	General thematic focus of the extra funding on Water and Climate Change Adaptation. Climate: For example, production in the agricultural sector must be made more environmentally friendly for soils and the atmosphere, while at the same time increasing resilience to climate-related disturbances. For this reason, Switzerland will strengthen its engagement in these three sectors in East Asia (Mongolia). Latin America and Africa: Projects for early warning systems in the Andean Region. SDC intends to expand decentralised renewable energy production networks in India, Nicaragua , Laos, Mali, Cuba and Tanzania. Finally, Switzerland supports the recycling of Latin America refrigerators and the clean disposal of refrigeration gases	Bolivia (support in local development plans to improve investment in value chains and infrastructure; integration of the youth in the labour market; Insurances (Microfinance); management of natural resources and rural development) Cuba (improvement of agricultural productivity; local economic development; gender equality) Central America (support to micro-enterprises; financial services; VET; basic infrastructure; community development; water and adaptation to climate change) Haiti (combination of humanitarian programme after earthquake with bilateral development programmes; access to basic infrastructure; protection of natural resources; cooperation with community structures)
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles for LAC	Human Rights; Political Participation; Social Justice/Gender Equality; Demographic Policy; Environment	Gender, Environment, Governance (overall, not LAC specific)	Whole-of-government approach; thematic and geographic concentration through comparative advantages of Switzerland (both not specific for LAC). SDC treats the promotion of human rights, good governance and gender equality as an indispensable component of the supported programmes in all partner countries.	n/a	Support of economic governance; Gender
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Strengthening of the regional approach, focus on learning and systemic change programmes; Synergies between bilateral and multilateral programmes; combination of humanitarian assistance, bilateral cooperation and peace promotion; conditionality of development cooperation	Bilateral cooperation; Instrument of bilateral policy dialogue; approach is systemic to have broad outreach; multilateral cooperation	The main instrument of Swiss development cooperation are the cooperation strategies. They usually have a five-year horizon and define objectives, thematic priorities, indicators for measuring impact, national partners, division of labour and cooperation with development agencies, and concretise the above-mentioned principles of service provision. Cooperation strategies refer to national poverty reduction strategies to which Switzerland makes subsidiary contributions. They formulate concrete results for the beneficiary population and organisations. The grant includes financial contributions within the framework of programmes and projects financed by donors, as well as budget support for programmes and projects.	The additional funds of the 0.5 percent will be implemented mainly through bilateral cooperation programmes. In doing so, SDC can rely on a large network of competent Swiss partners (NGOs and others) with a good international reputation and long-standing, recognised expertise. At the same time, SDC will increase its presence on the ground and deploy qualified SDC staff in partner countries, e.g. in West Africa and Latin America . Their more than 30 years of experience in water sector is a prerequisite for success. Some part of the funds for multilateral programmes.	Switzerland implements bilateral development programmes in the most needy countries and regions of Latin America. It also supports multilateral organisations, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, whose drinking water commitment aims to improve on the basis of its experience, the UN Development Programme.
Geographical / regional focus	Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Central America/Nicaragua	Priority countries in Latin America: Central America/Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Planned: Haiti; Special Programme in Cuba	Bolivia, Central America (as focus countries in Latin America); Cuba (with special programme) Central America/Nicaragua: Cooperation with Honduras since 1979; since 1992 Central America/Nicaragua. Poverty, environmental crises, governance deficits. New: regional programme. Comparative advantages thanks to role in regional cooperation and strong profile in priority areas Income and employment, democracy, water, energy, environment, rule of law. Bolivia: Cooperation since 1969. Rural poverty. Comparative advantages in democracy, employment and income. Cuba: Special programme to open up and support local initiatives. Comparative advantages in local development, income and employment.	The additional funds are earmarked primarily for SDC priority countries (from LAC: Central America, Bolivia) and fragile states (from LAC: Cuba)	Bolivia, Cuba, Central America (Nicaragua, Honduras), Haiti
Total budget for strategic period	262 Mio CHF (12% of total budget)	296 Mio CHF	Overall 4500 Mio CHF (LAC?)	n/a	15% of the total volume (90 Mio CHF of yearly spending on bilateral cooperation); the contributions for LAC will remain at the same level of 15%
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	In its 1994 North-South Guiding Principles (Report of the Federal Council on Switzerland's North-South relations in the 1990s; BB1 1994 II 1214 ff), the Federal Council formulated a new development policy, the thrust of which is recognised to be largely in line with the OECD strategy. A central importance is attached to the call for a coherent Swiss policy for the South that encompasses all fields of Switzerland's relations with the South. The sectoral separation between different policy areas, such as environmental and economic policy or trade and development policy does not go far enough in view of the problems at hand. Following its adoption in March 1994, the North-South mission statement formed the conceptual basis for Switzerland's development cooperation. It thus became the strategic for the country, sector and annual programmes of Swiss development cooperation. This represents an important step towards raising awareness of coherent development policy and cooperation within the administration.	n/a	Switzerland sees development cooperation as part of its foreign policy. Out of solidarity towards poor and poorer countries and in its own well-understood self-interest, Switzerland provides development cooperation as a contribution to a fairer and more sustainable global development in a strongly interconnected world. In doing so, it can build on several decades of successful development cooperation.	Effective and visible development cooperation is in Switzerland's interest. It promotes alliances and international networks, expands Switzerland's foreign policy options and strengthens its influence in a multipolar world. Switzerland is integrated into the global economy to an above-average extent and its economy is more successful than average in production, trade and services around the world. This leads to the self-evident obligation to contribute to the solution of the world's global problems - poverty, consequences of poverty, the consequences of climate change, uncontrolled migration, water scarcity economic stability and the dismantling of trade barriers - with adequate performance.	not specific for LAC
Relevant context factors (LAC)	In Latin America, the transition from military to elected civilian governments was particularly profound. In 1990, for the first time in history, all states in the continent had a constitutional government. Nevertheless, the military is still the strongest "political party" in many Latin American states. Even after democratisation in many countries, there is still a lack of trust in the state, which in many places is in a crisis of legitimacy. Reforms (e.g. land rights or local self local self-government) are not being tackled. To alleviate major problems (internal migration, crime, the drug economy and environmental degradation). The population must therefore be more involved in political decision-making processes in the future. processes by allowing civil society to play a more active role.	Overall, the situation in LAC is more favourable than in most of the developing countries in Africa and Asia. In the mid-1990s there were justified hopes for an upswing in Latin America continent. The programmes to stabilise the macroeconomic situation were largely implemented and made us forget the financial crises of the 1980s. But from today's perspective, many hopes remained unfulfilled: Economic and social policy did not bring the expected results. LAC remained, as the years have shown, vulnerable to international financial crises. It is also the most socially unequal region in the world. In the 1990s the 1990s, the poverty gap widened even further, and although environmental policy has become more important in recent years, environmental degradation continues. However, positive starting points can also be identified. The societies of LAC societies have become more democratic. Changes of power legitimised by elections are the rule. A new understanding of the distribution of roles between the state and the private sector has developed in recent years. The influence of civil society has increased, even though the withdrawal of the state a vacuum that is neither filled by the private sector nor by civil society.	Latin America has recovered after years of economic stagnation. Many countries are making significant progress towards the MDGs, while others require additional efforts. 40 per cent of the 570 million people in Latin America live in poverty. 50 per cent of the active population is unemployed or underemployed. In many places, the urban-rural divide has barely narrowed. Interest in regional cooperation has grown, as has the commitment of many countries to help shape global framework conditions.	n/a	Economic growth of an average of 4-5 percent; trade surplus in the last ten years; countries that rely heavily on commodity imports and tourism are confronted with challenges like higher public debt; still consequences like inflation after financial crisis; increasing urbanization; improved health system but still lack of access to a good quality of primary healthcare
Important hints / comments	Detailed presentation of the concept of priority countries and the concept of regional programmes. Link and presentation to success story of the regional Postcosecha project in Central America; presentation of judicial reforms in Bolivia	2000: Start of a Pilot Special Programme in Cuba In Haiti, the country most in need in the region, the gradual focal point programme is envisaged as soon as the minimum conditions for promising cooperation are in place.		This Dispatch approves the increase in the currently valid framework credits for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) in the amount of CHF 640 million for the years 2011 and 2012, with the aim of increasing Switzerland's contribution to poverty reduction, water supply and adaptation to climate change in developing countries. To this end, the share of Switzerland's official development assistance will be increased linearly to 0.5 percent of the gross national income (GNI) by 2015. The present Dispatch on increasing the resources for the financing of public development aid (hereinafter referred to as "Dispatch 0.5 per cent") is based on the unchanged federal government's development policy strategy of 2008, which remains unchanged.	

	2017-2020	2021-2024
Main / key objectives for LAC	SDC's engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean focuses on specific countries and contexts where poverty remains a major challenge. In each partner country, the SDC focuses on the poorest regions and ensures that its work benefits the most vulnerable groups, especially women and girls.	Closure of EDA engagement in Latin America. Analysis to identify the needs compared to other world regions and Switzerland's interests as well as the added value of its IC. Although inequalities and violence remain high in several Latin American countries, there has been a noticeable reduction in poverty and an improvement in basic services
Theory of change	(not specific for LAC): The SDC pursues an approach that allows broader segments of the population to lift themselves permanently out of poverty and diversify their income bases. In doing so, it contributes to reducing inequalities and arming against external shocks that may result in individuals not escaping poverty or slipping back into poverty. Social consensus and state structures need to be significantly strengthened so that the population can overcome poverty permanently. More livelihood opportunities are needed that allow for sustainable economic development and are not only based on the exploitation of natural resources, as well as a more diversified economy. Illegal sources of income must be curbed. Otherwise, all other governance processes are in danger and efforts to fight corruption are doomed to failure.	N/A
Thematic focus for LAC	Private sector development; Good Governance; Decentralisation; Civil Society; reform of the security sector; TVET; rural development; climate adaptation	Focus on SECO engagement in Colombia and Peru: Priority on economic development, governance through improvement of economic framework conditions, development of the private sector, infrastructure and value chains ("Around 5.2 million people in 63 cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America benefited from sustainable urban planning measures."). Urban development projects
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles for LAC	Gender equality remains a cross-cutting theme in the new Dispatch on International Cooperation and at the same time is recognised as a strategic goal for the first time.	not mentioned explicitly for LAC
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Regional Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance, Bilateral Programmes	Mainly through WBF (SECO)
Geographical / regional focus	Bolivia, Haiti, Cuba, Central America (Honduras, Nicaragua)	Termination of EDA engagement in Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, Cuba and Nicaragua. Continuation only through WBF (SECO) projects in Colombia and Peru
Total budget for strategic period	15% of the total volume (3870 Mio CHF for bilateral cooperation)	Overall 2650 Mio. CHF for bilateral cooperation --> from that 1% for Latin America
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	Stronger overall focus on fragile countries and conflict transformation	Termination of engagement of SDC in Latin America; In February 2011, Parliament decided to increase Switzerland's official development assistance (ODA) to 0.5 percent of gross national income (GNI) by 2015.
Relevant context factors (LAC)	Strong inequalities; stronger participation of society; reduction of poverty rates; the biggest challenge, however, is the risk of the population falling back into poverty due to unsustainable resource use that damages the ecosystem and biodiversity, or as a result of natural disasters; insecurity and violence in many LAC countries	not mentioned
Important hints / comments		Through the regional focus on other world regions (esp. Sub-Sahara Africa) there is not much specific information on theory of change, context factors in Latin America to be found in the document.

ANNEX 5: MAXQDA CODING SCHEME

DOCUMENT VARIABLES	EXPLANATION
Country / region	Country or region that the document is referring to
Year	Year of publication / year of creation (in case of interview / focus group protocols)
Document type	E.g. (review of) cooperation strategy, IZA strategy, mid-term / final evaluation, (historic) capitalisation document etc.

CATEGORIES	EXPLANATION
0) Overarching descriptive issue	Code for identified overarching descriptive issue, which is not covered by subcodes (only to be used, if subcodes do not apply)
Key milestones (GQ 0.1)	Key milestones in the strategic orientation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC
Key drivers for changes (GQ 0.1)	Key drivers for changes in the strategic orientation
Development approaches / instruments (GQ 0.2)	(Changes of) development approaches/instruments and paradigm shifts
Thematic focusses (GQ 0.2)	Development / changes of thematic focusses
Cross-cutting-themes (GQ 0.2)	Integration of cross-cutting themes (gender, governance, to some extent human rights, conflict sensitivity and more recently climate change)
1) Relevance	Code for identified issue referring to the relevance of SDC's engagement not covered by subcodes (only to be used, if subcodes do not apply)
Response to development needs (GQ 1.1)	SDC's response to pressing multidimensional development needs
Swiss development priorities (GQ 1.2)	SDC's engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities
2) Coherence	Code for identified issue referring to the coherence of SDC's engagement with other international development actors not covered by subcodes (only to be used, if subcodes do not apply)
Coherence SDC and SECO (GQ 2.1)	Coherence and complementarity with other SDC activities as well as those of other Swiss development actors
Coherence other actors (GQ 2.2)	Coherence and complementarity with the activities of other international development actors
3) Effectiveness	Code for identified issue referring to the effectiveness of SDC's engagement not covered by subcodes (only to be used, if subcodes do not apply)
Achieved results (GQ 3.1)	Achieved concrete development results in different sectors
Successful approaches and methodologies (GQ 3.2)	Successful and less successful development approaches and methodologies to contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC
Reached/excluded stakeholders (GQ 3.3)	Reached and excluded stakeholders
Changed capacities (GQ 3.3)	Changed capacities (and underlying methods)
4) Impact	Code for identified issue referring to the impact of SDC's engagement not covered by subcodes (only to be used, if subcodes do not apply)
Reduction of poverty and inequalities (GQ 4.1)	Contribution to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in the priority countries and regions in LAC

CATEGORIES	EXPLANATION
Other longer-term key changes (GQ 4.2)	Other longer-term key changes; causation of higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems); contribution to changing societies in LAC for the better
5) Sustainability	<i>Code for identified issue referring to the sustainability of SDC's engagement not covered by subcodes (only to be used, if subcodes do not apply)</i>
Likelihood of continuation (GQ 5.1)	Likelihood of continuation (or actual continuation) of programmes after SDC funding ceases/ceased; successes and hindering factors
Scalable or replicable results (GQ 5.2)	Achieved scalable or replicable results of SDC projects/programmes
6) Lessons Learned	<i>Code for identified lessons learned not covered by subcodes (only to be used, if subcodes do not apply)</i>
General successes and failures (GQ 6.1)	In general: greatest successes and greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC
LL partners LAC (GQ 6.2)	Lessons Learned for partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes
LL SDC institutionally sectorally (enabling/hindering factors) (GQ 6.3)	General lessons learned for SDC (institutionally and/or sectorally), potentially relevant to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere.
LL SDC – strategy (GQ 6.3)	Lessons Learned regarding SDC's strategic processes
LL SDC – cooperation (GQ 6.3)	Lessons Learned regarding SDC's cooperation mechanisms
LL SDC – processes (GQ 6.3)	Lessons Learned regarding SDC's implementation processes
LL SDC - steering structure (GQ 6.3)	Lessons Learned regarding SDC's steering structures
LL SDC - knowledge management, learning and innovation (GQ 6.3)	Lessons Learned regarding knowledge management, learning and innovation at SDC

Timeline Bolivia

	1961-1969	1969-1980	1980-1982	1982-1985	1985-1992
Main / key objectives		Establish first contacts with Bolivian institutions ; gain an understanding of the country , its political, socio-economical and cultural context, the technical competence level within institutions etc. Provide technical support mainly in the field of agriculture in order to increase production efficiency and agricultural yields .		The overall goal is to improve the satisfaction of basic needs of families of small farmers and farming communities in the inter-Andean valleys and highland areas of the country.	The overall goal of Swiss development cooperation remains the improved satisfaction of basic needs of the disadvantaged parts of the population .
Theory of change		If targeted technical advice to agricultural producers in the areas of livestock, fodder seeds and agricultural mechanisation is implemented, through entry points at the local level, at the Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Cochabamba, a contribution can be made to the further development of overall agricultural production and thus to poverty reduction in the country.		If in addition to project-level technical support, the country's stabilisation at macro level is supported, projects will have a better chance to achieve a sustained impact. If the agricultural sector is further strengthened, production efficiency increased and rural infrastructure improved, if micro-entrepreneurs in urban areas are supported in their activities and if the overall social costs of the economic adjustment process can be mitigated by internationally-financed targeted actions, not only the country's economic development, but also the democratic and social development will be effectively fostered, thereby in the long-run improving the satisfaction of the population's basic needs.	
Thematic focus		Between 1969 and 1980 practically only agricultural projects are supported. Until 1975 focus mainly on livestock and fruit growing . In 1974 an evaluation of all previous activities is carried out which leads to a diversification of the thematic areas. From 1975 on: phase of consolidation of the activities . New projects are developed in the fields of fruit growing, agricultural mechanisation, forage seed, potato production, ecology/forestation , as well as rural education . Moreover, at the end of the 70s complementary activities such as the improvement of rural infrastructure (roads, bridges, irrigation works, warehouses) and health (from 1980/1983 on) are envisaged.		Focus when reinitiating the activities: • Strengthening of old projects , which are still in operation. • Resumption of negotiations and implementation of the rural infrastructure programme . • Revision of forestry and potato seed projects and resumption of activities on a different basis. • Establishment of a support programme for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) . • Collaboration in the preparation of a multi-sectoral project in Alto Beni. • Support for an organic agriculture project and strengthening of the planning capacity of a development corporation in the south of the country. Overall thematic focus still on agriculture: potato growing, (community) forestry (since 1984), fruit growing, agricultural technology, seeds production, also health. Livestock clearly loses significance. Since Bolivia's creditworthiness has been rated low for years and the debt situation of Bolivia's public sector has so far been assessed by Switzerland as less serious than in other developing countries, macroeconomic instruments such as mixed credits, balance-of-payments assistance and other trade policy measures are not yet envisaged in the early 80s.	1985: Focus of projects remains on support for agriculture and rural development (including agricultural education, rural infrastructure, agro-industrial processing), also forestry . Moreover craft and small-scale industry as well as health (actions to improve the drinking water supply, implementation of preventive and curative medical projects). Also, support of Bolivian NGOs . 1986: Beginning of macroeconomic support measures and support for state reforms : From 1986 on: Additionally to the project support mentioned above, for the first time in LAC, Switzerland is applying bilateral balance of payments assistance in Bolivia. From 1987 on, the Fondo Social de Emergencia is implemented, which should mitigate the social costs of the adjustment programme (co-financing with World Bank)(in 1991 it is further developed to the Fondo de Inversión Social). From 1988 on: Co-financing of the partial repurchase operation of Bolivia's private debt to commercial banks (Countervalue fund / Gegenwertfonds). From 1989 on: Co-financing with the World Bank of the Economic Management Strengthening Operation (EMSO) project to support the Bolivian government's efforts to improve its economic management and reform its public administration. Also support of the sectoral decentralisation efforts (health, education, roads, agriculture).
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles					
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Financial support to Swiss NGOs (no official development cooperation yet) Channelling of contributions through established mission stations.	Mainly bilateral technical cooperation at project level with strong presence of Swiss technical experts ; Financial aid (along with technical advice), especially for rural infrastructure projects, was envisaged already in the 70s, but only implemented after 1983.	The overall programme drastically reduced and financial aid suspended.	• Mainly technical cooperation/advice (as far as possible with local Bolivian experts, not only with Swiss); • Financial aid accompanied by technical cooperation (rural infrastructure); • Scholarships in connection with specific project functions; • Where possible, support of integrated self-help projects ; The first 15 years of Swiss DC in Bolivia are marked by a political-institutional climate that hardly justified concentrating efforts on (public) "institution building". Therefore the focus is rather still on micro technical cooperation projects . This changes from 1985 onwards. In the second half of the 80s: In many cases new engagements are not the result of long-sighted planning and analysis, but come up thanks to flexible and creative responses to opportunities that have arisen . SDC combines both approaches (long-term and adequate use of new opportunities).	1985: Four main implementation methods shall be continued: • Bilateral technical cooperation (as far as possible by using Bolivian resources and capacities) • Projects in cooperation with Swiss NGOs • Support of Bolivian NGO projects • Financial aid projects with technical assistance components. Also from 1985 on, co-financings with other donor institutions are increasingly envisaged (e.g. the engagement in the field of economic adjustment is to a large extent implemented as co-financing with the World Bank from 1986 on). From 1986 on: bilateral balance of payments assistance ; implementation of the Fondo Social de Emergencia, debt restructuring measures . 1987: Programmatic clarification advances, especially with regard to concentration and deepening of a few actions , reduction or omission of some areas, delegation to other Swiss implementing agencies , and better coordination with international development agencies. --> result was a mix of traditional project support and internationally coordinated programmes. At the end of the 80s/beginning of the 90s: Move away from small technical cooperation projects in just one sector (until then mainly agriculture); stronger focus on integrated cross-sectoral measures and interventions in other fields than agriculture. From 1988 on: Stronger focus is also placed on policy dialogue . Also in the second half of the 80s: Clear focus on the three levels macro, meso and micro as well as on the linkage between them.
Details on Humanitarian Support (only for differentiation purposes, <u>not</u> the focus of this study)			While the development cooperation activities were either suspended or drastically reduced, humanitarian aid was continued to be implemented after July 1980 .		
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)		Direct implementation by SDC	Direct implementation by SDC	Mainly direct implementation by SDC	Mainly direct implementation by SDC
Main partner organizations		Between 1969 and 1975 first contacts with different Bolivian institutions (the governmental " Corporación Boliviana de Fomento "(CBF, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agronomy Faculty of the University of Cochabamba) as well as with Swiss priests working in Bolivia. <u>After 1976</u> , along with the sectorial diversification, further expansion of partner contacts: • central and decentral governmental institutions , • semiautonomous technical ministerial sub-organisations , e.g. of the Ministry of Agriculture • the Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria (IBTA) • the University of Cochabamba • agricultural cooperatives • national companies etc. At this time: Still relatively few partner organisations.		Further diversification (also for risk spreading), increased focus on cooperations with private local development cooperation institutions (NGOs) . In the government sector: rather away from central government, towards de-centralised, semi-autonomous sub-organisations experienced as competent and possibly regional development bodies .	Further increased cooperation with Bolivian NGOs . In the government sector, the tendency is still to move away from central government institutions towards decentralised, semi-autonomous sub-organisations of ministries as well as the regional development bodies of the departments , which work largely autonomously.
Key beneficiaries		Farmers in the altiplano, valley belt (mainly Cochabamba) and (partly) the tropical lowlands.		Families of small farmers and farming communities in the inter-Andean valleys and highland areas of the country - with a focus on the south. This population, despite having benefited from the agrarian reform, remains marginalised from economic and social development in Bolivia.	Main beneficiaries still families of small farmers and farming communities . Regarding the Fondo Social de Emergencia : Supported candidates were municipalities, NGOs, ministries and other state institutions, non-profit organisations and any other institution capable of presenting a project within the FSE requirements.
Geographical/regional focus	Support for the Swiss and Elsaesser Redemptorist Province in Valle-grande and Reyes/Beni .	All three major regions of Bolivia: Altiplano, valley belt (mainly Cochabamba) and tropical lowlands		Selected regions of Bolivia with preference for neglected areas and areas known to from previous Swiss development cooperation actions --> altiplano, valley belt, lowlands . Swiss development cooperation engages almost exclusively in rural areas ; urban-marginal populations are considered as a second priority.	Focus on the higher rural zones of Bolivia (altiplano, Andeans) and on selected cities . The macroeconomic support measures have national relevance.
Total budget *)		At the end of the 70s: Between CHF 3 Mio. and CHF 5 Mio. per year	Reduction from CHF 5 Mio. in 1980 to CHF 1.5 Mio. at the beginning of 1982 .	In this period, increase from CHF 1.5 Mio. to approx. 9 Mio.	1986-1988: CHF 10 Mio. per year (+ additional financial resources for bilateral balance of payments assistance) Between 1989 and 1991: on average CHF 12 Mio. per year were dedicated to economic adjustment measures, i.e. approx. 50% of the total development cooperation.
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)		Before 1973 coordination of all activities from Lima, Peru In 1973, signing of a long-term cooperation agreement with Bolivia (the Convenio de Cooperación Técnica y Científica), which provided a broad contractual basis for all previous and new development activities of the Swiss government with Bolivia. It was ratified by the Bolivian government in 1975 by means of a Decreto Supremo. 1973: opening of a coordination office in Cochabamba 1974: Evaluation of all activities of the Swiss cooperation until then; beginning of efforts to establish a coherent country programme for Bolivia 1975: BOL, defined as priority country for Swiss development cooperation ; main coordination now from La Paz	Given the military coup in July 1980 and after thoroughly checking the possibilities of continuation of the development cooperation with Bolivia, in August 1980 Switzerland decides to gradually reduce all current activities . Swiss development cooperation is maintained at a low level. The deposition of General García Meza in August 1981 leads to a certain easing of the situation. The programme is thus stabilised again at the end of 1981 , after 1 1/2 years of crisis management. Overall, this period has had a major impact on the orientation of the Swiss development cooperation with Bolivia.	At the end of 1981, the Bolivia programme is reinitiated , though at a lower level (with less financial resources) as compared to 1980.	Since 1986 SECO is active in the country.
Relevant context factors (country)	Period of nationalist-oriented military governments ('64-'82)		July 1980 - August 1981: General García Meza's regime comes to power in a brutal coup in July 1980 --> it has not only attempted to destroy all democratic structures, caused much human suffering, led the economy into bankruptcy and allowed hitherto unknown levels of corruption, but has also subjected all development projects by foreign and national agencies to heavy burdens. Inauguration of a democratic government in August 1981.	Severe economic crisis in the country from 1982 to 1985. In 1984/85, Bolivia experienced a multiple crisis shock : hyperinflation, economic and political chaos. In September 1985, a radical structural adjustment programme began.	From 1985 on (until the end of the 90s): Comprehensive economic (neoliberal) and political reform processes lead to an economic recovery. Adoption of the Environmental Act in 1992.
Important hints / comments					The presentation in this column is based on the strategies developed in 1985, 1986, 1987. Due to the highly volatile political and economic Bolivian context, the strategies had to be revised and adapted at short intervals . The country programme 1986 was the first official multi-annual country programme for Bolivia.

*) The information in this line should be viewed with caution. Most of the data comes from the cooperation strategies of the respective period, but the SDC budget for bilateral cooperation cannot always be clearly distinguished from other Swiss instruments (SECO, global programmes, etc.). An overview of the official ODA flows for international cooperation to the eight countries is presented in chapter 3.7 of the report.

Timeline Bolivia

	1993-1997	1998-2003	2004-2008
Main / key objectives	The primary goal of Swiss development cooperation in Bolivia remains the better satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged parts of the population .	The primary goal of Swiss development cooperation in Bolivia remains the satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged sections of the population . SDC's vision: SDC promotes development towards a just, democratic and participatory society based on the principles of the rule of law, which seeks balance with groups within the country and equal relations with other states, and which enables women, men and children to realise their basic needs.	Overall goal: Contributing to the reduction of poverty and strengthening the position of the disadvantaged . Switzerland contributes to poverty reduction in Bolivia and promotes the integration of the rural population. It focuses on promoting poverty-relevant economic growth as well as strengthening good governance and democratisation from below. With the aim of promoting sustainable development and strengthening Bolivia's position in a globalised world, it participates in policy dialogue and the improvement of framework conditions.
Theory of change	If the macroeconomic and institutional adjustment process continues to succeed, if agricultural processes are further developed through training and improved production bases, thereby keeping in mind the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources; if urban traders are effectively supported through training and access to credit, and if civic participation is steadily improved, disadvantaged parts of the population will be supported in advancing their development by their own efforts, thereby achieving better satisfaction of their basic needs.	If small family farmers in the highlands and small and medium-sized enterprises in urban areas are effectively supported in exercising their civil rights and participating in social decision-making processes; if the investment climate and production conditions as well as access to financial services and vocational training are improved; and if the sustainable use of natural resources and the reduction of environmental pollution is further developed, the basic needs of the disadvantaged parts of the population will be better met, poverty reduced and the quality of life of the population improved.	
Thematic focus	In 1992, the following thematic focus areas are envisaged: 1) Support for the macroeconomic and institutional adjustment process 2) Agricultural development 3) Conservation and use of natural resources 4) Promotion of urban industry and 5) Rural development In this strategy period, SDC actively develops the new thematic areas of small-scale industry - and the associated urban development issues - as well as environment . The latter gains increasing importance following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro and the Adoption of the Bolivian Environmental Act in 1992. The many years of experience of Swiss development cooperation in the forestry sector and in adapted agriculture are now being actively incorporated into broader environment-related actions Overall, during this period, the thematic areas developed to the following: 1. Rural development and promotion of agricultural production (focus on production and marketing of equipment and seeds for Andean agriculture, development and dissemination of adapted technologies, as well as expansion of the productive infra-structure and promotion of the export of non-traditional agricultural products) 2. Promotion of small businesses in urban areas (focus on development of dual vocational training and development of financial institutions / microfinance) 3. Sustainable use of natural resources (focus on actions aimed at both the sustainable use of natural resources and improving the productivity of smallholder farms, as well as measures to conserve biodiversity and those aimed at reducing emissions) 4. Support for the modernisation of the state and the reforms (focus on modernising the legal system and promoting decentralisation, since 1995)	Focus on three main sectors: 1) Promotion of economic growth (productive rural development, and business promotion) 2) Sustainable use of natural resources (focus on renewable natural resources and preservation of biodiversity) 3) Reforms and democracy (focus on decentralisation/municipal autonomy and judicial system)	Focus on two lines of action: 1) Promoting poverty-relevant economic growth (focus on local sustainable economic development, development and implementation of innovative financing instruments as well as vocational education and training) 2) Strengthening good governance and democratisation from below (focus on strengthening local administrations and the participation of all stakeholders, consolidating and strengthening the rule of law, and platforms for alternative conflict resolution) --> thematic reorientation: Integration of the former "Productive Rural Development and Sustainable Natural Resources" sector largely in the "Poverty-Related Economic Growth" sector.
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	The topic of " women and development " is mentioned in a strategy document for the first time. It shall from now on be taken up more systematically in the planning, implementation and evaluation of projects, using the analytical instruments available at the head office.	It is acknowledged that there is a need to catch up in the systematic treatment of important transversal topics, such as gender, environment and empowerment . Transversal principles to be considered: • Environmental sustainability and economic efficiency • Improved access of the poor to know-how, productive resources, credit, markets ("empowerment") • Equal development of women and men • Promotion of democracy and good governance	The entire programme is oriented towards a transversal empowerment strategy , which aims to open up new opportunities for disadvantaged population groups - especially the indigenous population - to participate actively in political and economic processes on an equal footing and to benefit from this in order to improve their living situation.
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	• Bilateral technical cooperation / implementation of projects; increasingly also multilateral cooperation • Projects in cooperation with Swiss NGOs and support of Bolivian NGO projects • Economic/structural adjustment measures: bilateral balance of payments assistance; implementation of the Fondo Social de Emergencia, debt restructuring measures Relatively stable conditions between 1987-1992 allow Switzerland to think and act more in terms of overall sectors or institutions (→ more programmes, fewer projects), to focus more on discussions at the policy level, to better potentiate the complementarity between micro and macro and the interventions' sustainability, and generally to maintain a continuous, transparent and responsible dialogue with Bolivian interlocutors. Large integrated cross-sectoral projects in the field of rural development shall rather be reduced again (as their complexity partly proved to be too great and no longer manageable); emphasis shall rather be placed on a clear sectoral approach . Moreover, for SDC, the previous years were also a period of active continuation of its institutional outsourcing policy (cofinancings with international organisations; handing over of projects to Swiss NGOs and national Bolivian partner institutions).	Bilateral technical cooperation , also multilateral engagement	Bilateral technical cooperation , also multilateral engagement Policy dialogue with the Bolivian government, private sector and other bilateral agencies (the like-minded) becomes increasingly important. In this context, the Grupo de Desarrollo Rural (G-DRU) plays a major role. In this period, instruments like (sectoral) budget support and basket funds are also considered. Based on the Paris Declaration, more attention shall be paid to programmatic approaches and a clear impact orientation .
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, <u>not</u> the focus of this study)</i>		Humanitarian support was limited to regular deliveries of dairy products , which were delivered via Caritas and the Salvation Army. In May 1998, a strong earthquake caused major damage in the Cochabamba region. Switzerland will contribute to the reconstruction of 200 houses in rural areas .	In addition to supplying dairy products through Caritas and the Salvation Army, Humanitarian Aid was involved in a number of natural disasters such as cold waves, the hailstorm over La Paz in February 2002, and the landslide disaster in Chima (Yungas) in March 2003. More recently, funds have also flowed into smaller-scale prevention measures.
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	From now on increasingly more tenders to external institutions (NGOs, consulting) and less direct implementation by SDC.	Direct implementation by SDC with Bolivian partners and implementation through contractors (NGOs, consulting etc.)	Direct implementation by SDC with Bolivian partners and implementation through contractors (NGOs, consulting etc.)
Main partner organizations	• Main partners of the projects and programmes are governmental and semi-governmental bodies (central government, regional development agencies, universities). • Still direct cooperation with private Bolivian development organisations (NGOs) and networks of NGOs . • From the 90s on: increased contacts with small business associations and generally the private sector (e.g. in the field of vocational training). • Finally in the field of decentralisation law and species protection law: in consultation with other development cooperation agencies also direct support to the legislative in individual cases in recent months.	• Governmental and semi-governmental bodies • NGOs and networks of NGO • Private sector (e.g. in the field of vocational training)	• Governmental and semi-governmental bodies • National and international NGOs • Private sector (e.g. in the field of vocational training) • Cooperations with bi- and multilateral donor organisations
Key beneficiaries	The support is aimed in particular at small agricultural producers in the highlands and small traders in urban areas .	The programme is aimed in particular at small family farmers in the highlands and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in urban areas .	Focus on the poor, rural population of the Altiplano and the interandine valleys as well as on small and medium-sized entrepreneurs in urban areas .
Geographical/regional focus	Geographically, Swiss development cooperation continues to concentrate mainly on the higher rural zones of Bolivia (altiplano, Andeans) and on the cities . The tropical lowlands will be included in the programme where they play an essential role as part of overall Bolivian or global development, e.g. in environmental protection, the coca and migration problem, and in macroeconomic and social matters.	The focus on the highlands and the Andean valleys is maintained because this is where poverty is concentrated and where there is development potential and solid experience of cooperation. The tropical lowlands are included where they play an essential role as part of overall Bolivian or global development, such as in environmental issues, in macroeconomic matters or in questions of the rule of law and decentralisation. Furthermore, the multiplication of contents that have proven successful in the focus areas is promoted on a national level.	Altiplano and the interandine valleys: Value chain promotion, however, is not tied to place: rural producers mostly sell in urban or even international markets.
Total budget *)	CHF 15-18 Mio. per year	In this period, CHF 13.5 Mio. per year are dedicated to bilateral projects with Bolivia.	Roughly CHF 17 Mio. per year
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)		The 1998-2003 country programme is the first programme for Bolivia, which was jointly prepared by SDC and the BAWI . For the first time, there is a medium-term plan with general validity for all of Switzerland's public development cooperation with Bolivia.	SECO's activities in Bolivia come to an end in 2005 after roughly twenty years, in the run-up to an increased concentration of its activities in emerging countries (from 2017 on complementary measures taken up again). In 2006, the Bolivian Development Partners Group (Grupo de Socios para el Desarrollo de Bolivia - GruS) is created in La Paz by several members of the international cooperation present in the country. Its main objective is to strengthen coordination and harmonisation of international cooperation in order to improve its effectiveness and alignment with the objectives of the National Development Plan (NDP) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Relevant context factors (country)	Adoption of the People's Participation Act in 1994 Adoption of the Decentralisation Act in 1996.	The " Guerra del Agua " is happening in Cochabamba in 2020. Increasing social unrest and demand for extended democratisation from 2003 on; the so-called " Guerra del Gas " is happening in the second half of 2003.	Evo Morales becomes president in 2006; beginning of far-reaching reform processes in the country focusing on reducing inequalities and combatting poverty.
Important hints / comments	Due to the strongly changing context in Bolivia, a " rolling " analysis and planning is adopted. Whenever the need arises in the course of the following five years to take a closer look at an area and make fundamental decisions, this will be done by means of selective evaluations, workshops, studies, etc.	At the international level, the Millennium Development Goals and the United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000) provide a new guiding framework for the international community.	The country programme Bolivia 2004-2008 is a joint document of SDC and SECO . The Paris Declaration is adopted in 2005.

Timeline Bolivia

	2008-2012	2013-2017	2018-2021	2022-2024
Main / key objectives	SDC supports the fight against poverty and inequality through the creation of employment and income as well as the sustainable use of natural resources. It contributes to the deepening of democratic culture as well as to intercultural dialogue. In this way, the future vision is pursued that all Bolivians participate equally in the economic, political, social and cultural life of society and the country, that they participate self-determinedly and actively in its construction and that they derive direct benefit from the development of the country .	Overall objective: Switzerland contributes to ensuring that the change process and the rapidly growing public resources benefit the poorer population more than average , thereby significantly reducing poverty and inequalities .	The overall objective is to take advantage of the opportunities arising from the convergence of Bolivia's and Switzerland's poverty reduction goals. Switzerland's bilateral cooperation activities are principally aimed at: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• the promotion of Bolivia's sustainable development,• reducing poverty and inequality, and• increasing the resilience of the population and institutions.	Overall objective: Following the phasing out of Switzerland's bilateral cooperation, there are actors in a position to promote sustainable development and the reduction of poverty and inequality , forums for dialogue between a diverse range of stakeholders have been expanded, and the resilience of communities and institutions has been strengthened.
Theory of change	If the rule of law is further promoted, civil society strengthened and the provision of government services at the community level improved, if vocational training for disadvantaged groups as well as services for rural business development are further developed, and if planning and maintenance of systems for sustainable use of natural resources as well as the populations' resilience to negative effects of climate change are improved, then Bolivia's sustainable development will be promoted, poverty and inequalities will be reduced, and the resilience of the population and institutions will be increased.			If activities to ensure the continuity of work in the field of access to justice services and the campaign against violence against women are consolidated, if the country's economic and productive development is further supported, and if institutional capacities to adapt to climate change and solve environmental problems are effectively strengthened, then following the phasing out of Switzerland's bilateral cooperation, the resilience of communities and institutions will have been strengthened, forums for dialogue will have been expanded, and there will be actors in a position to promote sustainable development and the reduction of poverty and inequalities.
Thematic focus	With this cooperation strategy the focus becomes even more clearly programmatic (also following the Paris Declaration) with the following three focus areas: 1. Good governance and democracy (focus on citizen participation and strengthening democratic institutions (especially local governments)) 2. Sustainable use of natural resources (focus on planning and sustainable use of natural resources and reducing the risk of natural hazards) 3. Sustainable economic development (focus on business development services, qualified vocational training and technological innovations) These three thematic fields will remain relatively stable (though with some variation in their exact design) until the phasing out in 2022-2024.	The previous thematic orientation has succeeded in making a relevant contribution to Bolivia's central development goals and in bringing in the SDC's specific strengths. The general thematic orientation will therefore be maintained. At the same time, however, changes in the context require significant adjustments in order to (i) respond to the negative effects of climate change and (ii) accelerate the implementation of reforms in the justice sector, in decentralisation and in strengthening the rights of the disadvantaged. The focus areas are: 1. Decentralisation and human rights (focus on improving government services at the community level and strengthening the rights of vulnerable groups, also includes access to justice) 2. Mitigating the impacts of climate change (focus on climate change adaptation in rural areas and pollution reduction in urban areas) 3. Employment and income (focus on rural market development and vocational training)	The weights of the thematic areas are shifted only slightly. The thematic area of economic development is given greater weighting at the expense of the other two themes. The reason for this is, on the one hand, Bolivia's expected economic needs and the emerging opportunities, and on the other hand, the strategic importance for the SDC (Dispatch IC 2017-2020) and the stronger commitment of SECO. 1. Governance (focus on promoting the rule of law and strengthening civil society) 2. Climate change and environment (focus on food security, the right to water for all and strengthening resilience / better adaptation to the negative effects of climate change) 3. Economic development (focus on vocational training (SECO's focus on sustainable trade))	The three thematic priority areas for the period of the phasing out are: 1. Economic development 2. Governance 3. Climate change and the environment
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	In this cooperation strategy, the term " cross-cutting themes " appears for the first time. The main cross-cutting themes for the strategy period are: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Good governance• Gender• Youth	Mentioned cross-cutting themes in this period are: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Gender• Governance• Human Rights Based Approach applied in all projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The gender dimension is integrated transversally in all projects.• In the thematic areas, transversal governance issues are increasingly focused on accountability and the rule of law. The human rights-based approach is applied. Local governance is an important part of almost all projects. Citizens are strengthened in the exercise of their rights and duties, and state actors in the fulfilment of their obligations.• The working principle of DRR is integrated into projects according to needs and deepened where necessary.• The working principle of conflict-sensitive project management, which also takes intercultural aspects into account, is applied wherever specific problems exist.• In addition, issues of climate change and the environment are also included in the thematic area of economic development, while issues of vocational training are included in the thematic area of climate change and the environment.	In a context of greater fragility, the working principle of conflict-sensitive project management (CSPM) will be reinforced, and the cross-cutting themes of governance, gender and disaster risk reduction (DRR) continue to be relevant during the phasing out. In the current situation, with decreasing resources available, the scope of the work on these cross-cutting themes shall be narrowed down to focus on their most strategic aspects: knowledge management with systematisation of good practices, consolidation of competencies , and the transfer of methodologies and tools to partners and local counterparts.
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Bilateral technical cooperation , also multilateral engagement Working principles are innovation, interculturality, scaling-up and policy dialogue as well as the implementation of the Paris Declaration . Still, emphasis is placed on putting a stronger focus on programmes instead of projects. Bundling of different activities towards a common goal; thereby reduction of a beforehand relatively large number of projects. A balanced mix of different development instruments is implemented (Projects, SWAPs, basket funds, joint funds etc.) The choice of instruments depends on the specific objectives, the capacity of the implementing agencies and the national context. Basket funds were, for instance, used for the joint financing of the <i>Sistema Boliviano de Tecnologías Agropecuarias (SIBTA)</i> , a national instrument for promoting innovation in the agricultural sector.	Bilateral technical cooperation , also multilateral engagement Outsourcing of project implementation to third parties further increases and reduces the effort required for project management for the Cooperation Office. It will thus concentrate more on strategic steering, policy dialogue, the promotion of results-oriented implementation and the monitoring of results. Still, half of the programme is implemented directly by the Cooperation Office , with a correspondingly high effort for project management. The share of projects implemented directly by the Cooperation Office shall be reduced to 20 to max. 30% in the future. Regarding SDC's approaches, the focus lies on capacity building, conflict prevention and influencing policies in the environmental and economic sectors .	In this strategy period, the portfolio of Switzerland's cooperation with Bolivia generally comprises fewer projects . Governance: mixed-management projects: partly own project of SDC, partly on mandate basis Economic Development: Mandates; contributions to public institutions; contributions to private organisations; engagement with the private sector and trilateral cooperation Climate Change and Environment: Contributions to public academic institutions and ministries, mandates and trilateral cooperation • In considerations of Bolivia MIC status and SDC's decreasing budget, the exchange of knowledge and experience (including South-South, multilateral and trilateral co-operation as well as PPDPs) are (further) developed. • Wherever possible, additional international co-financing will be sought. However, given the dwindling number of bilateral donors active in Bolivia, there are limits to this. • Initiatives or cooperation that aim for stronger engagement with the private sector , i.e. primarily with Swiss companies based in Bolivia, are promoted. The latter primarily concerns the area of vocational training. • More attention should be paid to trilateral cooperation in areas of the cooperation strategy. Partners from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru will be considered first and foremost. • In addition to government policy, the country perspective is to be increasingly taken into account in the alignment , i.e. also the perspective of private sector actors and those of civil society.	The Swiss intra-governmental approach known as the Whole of Government Approach (WOGA) will be prioritised in the above-mentioned thematic areas. Governance: mandates and mixed administration (mandate and direct administration through the Project Implementation Unit) Economic Development: mandates; contributions to public institutions; delegation to other cooperation agencies; contributions to private organisations; alliances with the private sector and triangular cooperation. Climate Change and the Environment: contributions to ministries, public universities, mandates and triangular cooperation Attention will continue to be paid to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, especially young people and women. This work will be accompanied by strategic and responsible knowledge management , concentrating on those who will take forward the innovations supported by SDC in the future: the private sector and the state, decision-makers in municipal and departmental governments and ministries, and the development organisations and actors that remain in the country and its regions.
Details on Humanitarian Support (only for differentiation purposes, <u>not</u> the focus of this study)			SDC Humanitarian Aid activities in the field of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Bolivia will come to an end at the end of 2018 . A thematic backstopping of regional initiatives from the DRR hub in Lima will remain.	
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	Direct implementation by SDC with Bolivian partners and implementation through contractors (NGOs, consulting etc.)	Direct implementation by SDC with Bolivian partners and implementation through contractors (NGOs, consulting etc.)	Almost exclusively mandate projects, i.e. no self-executed projects.	Almost exclusively mandate projects, i.e. no self-executed projects.
Main partner organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Public sector (e.g. ministries, departmental governments, municipalities, universities)• Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social movements• Business organisations, producer organisations, public-private platforms. Switzerland plays an active role in the coordination body of the 20 most important bilateral and multilateral donors active in Bolivia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Public sector (e.g. ministries, departmental and municipal authorities, municipal associations, communities, defensor del pueblo, police, National Institute for Innovation in Agriculture and Forestry (INIAF), National Banking Authority)• NGOs (e.g. NGOs for Human Rights (CDC and CDH), Association of Women Local Councillors (ACOBOL))• Private partners (e.g. Foundation for Innovation in Finance (PROFIN); FAUTAPO Foundation)• Universities• Professional associations and producer organisations• International partners (e.g. Multilateral agencies (IDB, WB, UNDP), bilateral agencies (Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Spain), international NGOs, international foundations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Public sector (e.g. ministries, departmental and municipal authorities)• NGOs (e.g. Fundación PROFIN)• Private partners (e.g. business chambers, educational institutes, companies, financial companies and service providers, vocational training institutes)• Universities• International partners (e.g. Multilateral agencies (IDB, WB, UNDP), bilateral agencies (Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Spain))	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Public sector (e.g. ministries, departmental and municipal authorities, the judiciary, Public Prosecution Service, Plurinational School for Public Management (EGPP))• NGOs (e.g. Fundación PROFIN)• Private partners (e.g. chambers of commerce and industry, education and training institutes, companies, financial institutions and service providers)• Universities• International partners (e.g. Multilateral agencies (IDB, WB, UNDP, ILO), bilateral agencies (Sweden))
Key beneficiaries	The Swiss development programme primarily benefits poor, rural population groups . These are united in farmers' or indigenous organisations , in micro and small producers' organisations as well as in social or political organisations . In peri-urban areas of larger and medium-sized cities, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs are also supported.	Decentralisation: women and young people in rural municipalities and in currently poor urban neighbourhoods Human rights: women and indigenous people Climate change: currently poor farming families Employment and income: disadvantaged groups, especially women and young people	In all three thematic areas, poor and vulnerable groups - especially young people and women - shall be further empowered.	Focus lies on the needs of the most vulnerable groups (small-scale producers, micro-entrepreneurs, women, young people and indigenous people) in the Altiplano and valleys regions.
Geographical/regional focus	Switzerland focuses its activities on the highlands and interandine valleys , according to the distribution of poverty and our comparative advantages. In addition, there is support to national projects.	SDC's activities focus on the Andean highlands and the inter-Andean valleys . Due to rapid urbanisation in recent decades, the focus is increasingly also on poor urban neighbourhoods (mainly rapidly growing suburbs).	Areas where poverty is more widespread are a priority for programme implementation. This means a concentration in the mountainous areas of the Altiplano and the interandine valleys , but not in the lowlands. The programme also has a high urban relevance . Due to the ongoing urbanisation, SDC will place an even stronger focus on small and medium-sized towns, where poverty is more pronounced and which are linked to larger cities. Special attention should be paid to existing urban-rural linkages and ways to optimise them. SECO measures in the area of sustainable urban development, on the other hand, focus on medium-sized and larger cities throughout the country.	The focus continues to be on the Altiplano and valleys regions as well as on small and medium-sized towns .
Total budget *)	For the years 2008 to 2012, on average CHF 20 Mio. per year (increase from approx. 15 Mio. in 2008 to 22 Mio. in 2012)	On average CHF 28 Mio. per year. (according to official ODA data only CHF 23.6 Mio. of overall ODA)	The financial commitment of Swiss cooperation with Bolivia for 2018-2021 will amount to around CHF 83.3 (roughly 21 Mio. CHF per year) The yearly DLAC budget in Bolivia decreases from CHF 18 Mio. in 2017 to CHF 13.5 Mio. in 2020.	A total budget of CHF 15 Mio. is planned for the three years of this programme (decrease from CHF 9 Mio. in 2022 to CHF 1 Mio. in 2024).
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)		The Swiss Consulate is dissolved in mid-2013 and the Embassy transformed into an " Embassy Projects/Programmes ". The number of international staff at the Embassy (including the Cooperation Office) is reduced.		SDC will phase out its activities in Bolivia by 2024. The following Swiss instruments will remain active after 2024: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Global programmes in the Andean region (Water and Climate Change)• Humanitarian aid projects on DRR• SECO's work on specific projects (e.g. Better Gold Initiative) and global programmes, as well as complementary measures in the field of economic development.
Relevant context factors (country)	Evo Morales is re-elected for the first time in December 2009 and his party achieved a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament. Bolivia becomes associate member of MERCOSUR .		In 2016, Bolivia passes the Law on the Rights of Mother Earth . In 2017, the Constitutional Court establishes indefinite re-election of President and Vice-President , although 51% of the population has voted against it in the respective referendum. A serious political crisis follows the national election in October 2019. The political situation calmed down after transparent elections in October 2020/March 2021. The Covid 19 pandemic has a strong influence on the social and economic situation in the country.	The overall social and democratic situation remains fragile . Moreover, the negative consequences of the Covid 19 pandemic are still clearly visible in in the country. Still, Bolivia is expected to become an upper middle-income country in 2024.
Important hints / comments				

Timeline Peru

	1965-1978	1979 - 1981	1982 - 1986	1986 - 1990 (1994)*
Main / key objectives	after 1970: Main objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none">to support government efforts to combat extreme poverty;to support decentralisation processes;to preserve natural resources and ecological balance;to transfer techniques and know how;to act as bridge between the administration, universities and non-governmental organisations;to seek to influence sectoral policies;to contribute to the organisation of grassroots groups and their training.			Main objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none">to support government efforts to combat extreme poverty;to support decentralisation processes;to preserve natural resources and ecological balance;to transfer techniques and know how;to act as bridge between the administration, universities and non-governmental organisations;to seek to influence sectoral policies;to contribute to the organisation of grassroots groups and their training.
Theory of change	By supporting livestock projects in the country, one can assure better resilience , better production processes and the necessary support to the beneficiaries and consequently raise the income level of the poorest group within the country, namely farmers and the indigenous population .		If the institutional adjustment/decentralisation processes continue to succeed, if agricultural processes are further developed through training and direct support to the beneficiaries, if the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources and ecological balance is ensured, if the urban population is effectively supported in gaining a higher income through technical education, overall the scientific and technological development, the strengthening of the management capacities of the state and the fight against poverty will progress, thereby achieving better satisfaction of the population's basic needs.	
Thematic focus	<ul style="list-style-type: none">improving livestock farmingpromoting milk production	<ul style="list-style-type: none">improving livestock farmingpromoting milk productiondeveloping forestry However, also a diversification of the sectors of intervention (health, alpaca breeding, multisectoral support to native Amazonian communities) as well as the launch of an integrated rural development project (Ayacucho - Sierra)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">improving livestock farmingpromoting milk productiondeveloping forestry The diversification of sectors continues with the inclusion of small-scale fishing, audiovisual training and support for workers in the informal sector.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">agricultural productionforestry sector Building upon the experiences in the informal sector in La Victoria (Lima) with the NGO DESCO (Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo), establishment of a new programme in the informal urban sector to support revenue creation (through employment).
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles				
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	<ul style="list-style-type: none">technology and know-how transfer		<ul style="list-style-type: none">technology and know-how transferfinancial aid in the sector of: livestock, informal urban sector and fishery	<ul style="list-style-type: none">technology and know-how transferfinancial aid and co-financing
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)</i>				<ul style="list-style-type: none">between 1991 and 1994 mainly Humanitarian Aid (and SECO) active in the country
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)				<ul style="list-style-type: none">SWISSCONTACT in the area of technical training
Main partner organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Government/public institution		<ul style="list-style-type: none">Government/public institutionsUniversities & Research Centres <p>Since 1984: collaboration component with local NGOs did not go unnoticed by the Peruvian authorities, who recalled that the primary vocation of official aid agencies remains collaboration with public sector institutions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Government/public institutions (such as INIPA and INFOR), whereas noting that public institutions are gradually being deprived of their operational capacities at the expense of the corporations and micro-regions.Peruvian NGOs <p>No further cooperation with universities/research centres proposed, due to difficult cooperation practices.</p>
Key beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none">farmers			<ul style="list-style-type: none">farmers
Geographical/regional focus	Costa (including Lima), Sierra and Selva			Sierra, Selva and Costa (including Lima - Costa however with declining importance).
Total budget *)	According to the presented ODA: Between 1967 and 1976 and in 1978: 1 million - 3 million CHF. In 1977 more than 10 million CHF.	According to the presented ODA: overall approx. Between 4 and 6 million CHF per year for the period 1979 - 1981	Gradual increase, overall approx. 6 - 7 million CHF per year.	Gradual increase of up to 10 million CHF in 1990. After technical cooperation retracted from the country, strong Humanitarian Aid present with up to a yearly contribution of 5 million CHF (in 1991).
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	The 1972 evaluation of the programme criticised this approach, which focused too exclusively on technology transfer, and recommended that more attention be paid to the beneficiaries of the cooperation and their economic, social and organisational problems.			In 1991 , SECO financed the payment of Peru's arrears to international financing institutions with CHF 13.5 million
Relevant context factors (country)	General Velasco Alvarado declares in 1969 the Agrarian Reform, expropriating large estates and forming cooperatives	In 1980 , the military handed over power to President-elect Fernando Belaunde Terry, who tried to open up external markets for Peru.	Internal conflict, connected to high insecurity. 35-year-old Alan Garcia Perez succeeds Belaunde as President of Peru in 1985. With a populist-protectionist government programme, Garcia cuts off Peru's access to international credit and plunges the country into economic chaos. At the end of the 1980s, Peru experiences four-digit hyperinflation.	High political insecurity : Peru is being castigated by the increasingly growing guerrilla organisations "Sendero Luminoso" and MRTA, which dominated around 60% of the territory in 1990. The civil war, which lasted a decade, claimed 30.000 lives. In 1990 , Alberto Fujimori becomes the new President of Peru. The new government implemented a drastic stabilisation and austerity package as an answer to the ongoing hyperinflation and bad macroeconomic performance.
Important hints / comments	COTESU supported the agrarian reform launched by the military regime. Ironically, because of the time needed to prepare projects - particularly long in the case of financial aid - some of them were not started until the agrarian reform was no longer supported by the government. In 1975, in fact, General Morales Bermudez dismissed General Velasco Alvarado and gave a significant boost to the right.	The 1979-1981 phase was marked by a focus on "grassroots" development and the search for forms of cooperation that encourage the participation of those concerned.	From 1982 onwards, the extension of the armed struggle and the disinterest shown by the Belaunde government in the Sierra, put the Swiss programme at an impasse. No or little counterpart funding from the official partners, and the impossibility for security reasons of continuing projects carried out in direct collaboration with grassroots communities. With the handing over or closure of the projects in Jenaro Herrera, Puno Public Health and Ayacucho, a page has been turned and at the same time space has been created for new actions. The search for projects that comply with the priorities of our law on international development cooperation has led us to diversify our partners. Three projects are launched with Peruvian NGOs; Switzerland relies on the IDB for further financial support.	In 1990 , Swiss Bilateral Cooperation retracted from the country as a result to the internal conflict, leaving only one project coordinator behind. Subsequently SECO and Humanitarian Aid took over activities in the country, ongoing projects were phased out or given to the national partners.

Timeline Peru

	1995 - 2000 (initially until 1998, extended in 1998 until 2000)	2002-2007	2009-2011
Main / key objectives	Main objectives: Poverty reduction	Main objectives: Poverty reduction and alleviation as the main objectives of Swiss development cooperation activities in Peru.	Main objectives: Swiss cooperation shall contribute to socially balanced, democratic and sustainable development , in particular through a system-oriented co-design of policies that ensure social equity, access to justice and sustainable development. In this context, particular importance is attached to the promotion of economic growth aimed at improving the incomes of the poor (pro-poor growth).
Theory of change	Through economically improved and ecologically sustainable use of the production base, poverty is to be combatted, the income of the rural population increased, market-oriented production promoted and food security improved. Through a stronger competitiveness and productivity of small enterprises , (urban) poverty is directly combatted.	If all citizens have the opportunity to participate in private and public tasks, a broader civil society assumes personal responsibility and actively participates in public tasks. On the one hand an organised civil society exercises control and demands accountability, on the other hand this increases the legitimacy of the state and promotes the social integration of society . Furthermore, if sustainable economic development is socially and regionally balanced, the state and its institutions (executive, legislative and judiciary) regulate and create favourable framework conditions that are used creatively and productively by the private sector . A subsidiarity-based division of labour between the private sector and state institutions - at the appropriate level in each case - improves access to services and increases their coverage.	Stronger, democratic public institutions at all levels manage resources transparently, efficiently and enable equal citizen participation and access to basic services. A sound and stable monetary policy frameworks, improved access to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through the generation of innovative financing instruments and increased competitiveness of SMEs in the regions and in Lima enable the creation of stable jobs as well as an improvement in the income of the poorer population groups (Pro Poor Growth). A stronger and more efficient cooperation between local, regional and national actors work effectively together to reduce the vulnerability of the population to natural disasters and climate change and to promote sustainable use of natural resources (in particular water).
Thematic focus	1.) Water supply and sanitation 2.) Sustainable agriculture 3.) Handicraft and small industry promotion Furthermore after 1998: First innovative actions in the field of good governance .	Focus on the three thematic priority areas: 1.) good governance, 2.) sustainable economic growth and 3.) services for local development.	The three thematic focuses in the country are: 1) Strengthening of democratic institutions 2) Promoting sustainable economic growth 3) Reducing vulnerabilities against natural catastrophes and climate change, as well as strengthening a sustainable use of natural resources
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	<ul style="list-style-type: none">transversal theme of environment/ecology will be elaborated and implementedgender cross-cutting theme is being consolidated, especially in the area of concrete operational implementation (in 1998) Furthermore, in all Swiss development cooperation activities, particular emphasis is placed on politically and strategically important aspects such as respect for human rights, strengthening the democratisation process and promoting "good governance".	Transversal principles are Gender, Environment and Good Governance	In the three thematic priorities, the transversal principles are emphasised in planning, implementation and monitoring, and reinforced with targeted activities: gender and (economic) governance and climate, energy and environment
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Bilateral technical and financial cooperation;SECOS's economic and trade policy measures;Humanitarian Aid;"Counterpart" fund (debt forgiveness fund)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Bilateral technical and financial cooperation;SECOS's economic and trade policy measures;Institutional strengthening and capacity building;Co-financing (with multi and bilateral donors) Furthermore SDC follows the approach of: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Empowerment: Large parts of Peru's population lack opportunities to actively participate in solving social problems. This is particularly true of the poor sections of the population. Swiss development cooperation supports initiatives that improve equal opportunities and rights and give marginalised groups access to knowledge, organisation, resources and services. This should create more opportunities for them to participate in decision-making processes.Linking levels of intervention: Switzerland's activities aim to have a system-building effect. Activities at the micro level must be linked to the meso level from the outset, or their processing and dissemination must be ensured (scaling up).	Gradual switch from technical bilateral instruments to SECO instruments : <ul style="list-style-type: none">Concertation and alliances: Efficient services and policy-making require sustainable agreements <i>between</i> public, private and civil society actors. The programme is expanding concertation and networking in the three thematic priority areas, promoting and engaging more in alliances with national partners at the various levels of government (with increasing contributions from the partners themselves) and coordinating cooperation with other bilateral and multilateral donors.Support in efficiency in public investments (particularly public-private partnerships)Focuses on lose cooperation with various national partners, with bilateral partners (e.g. a so called basket fund of the national ombudsman's office with Belgium, Canada and Spain) as well as with multilateral donors (e.g. with the World Bank in the area of water)Support in policy-making (to strengthen citizen participation and empower grassroots organisations, as well as strengthen capacities of state institutions to deliver basic services and guarantee citizens' rights) Empowerment, interculturality and human rights : The programme empowers disadvantaged and poor population groups, especially indigenous people, women and youth, to represent their own interests, to demand access to justice and public services, to use their potentials and to develop economically, as well as to participate in political processes on an equal footing. The cultural understanding of the Andean population and rural communities is increasingly taken into account in the programme.
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)</i>	Humanitarian aid has "traditionally" consisted of milk deliveries and support for specific emergency aid programmes (e.g. "Vaso de leche") and was expanded at the beginning of the 1990s to a volume of at times more than SFr. 5 million per year. This growing humanitarian aid (e.g. drinking water projects to combat the cholera epidemic) was increasingly handled as direct actions via the coordination office. Particular attention was paid to possible complementarities with the remaining SDC projects Disaster relief has been used in three cases in Peru: after the "El Niño" of 1997/98 , after the floods around Lake Titicaca at the beginning of 2001 and during the earthquake of 23 June 2001 that shook southern Peru.	The Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Department in Peru with three instruments: Food aid, prevention and disaster relief . Peru received the equivalent of around CHF 2 million worth of milk and cheese products from Switzerland each year. The food was channelled via Caritas Switzerland to Peruvian children's homes and after-school care centres, where it provides an essential supplement to the usually inadequate nutrition of the children. Humanitarian aid participated in the risk assessment in the Cusco region. Based on this, further prevention activities were planned.	Prevention and management of natural disasters at local and national level, reduction of risks and vulnerabilities. Particularly through the project: Improving disaster risk reduction through preventive and preparatory measures (implemented by SDC, Humanitarian Aid and Querschnittsthema, was finalised in 2011)
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	The implementation of programmes and projects (at the micro level) under (SDC)'s own management will be limited to those areas where it is particularly important that direct experience from operational field work can be used directly for conceptual considerations and for policy dialogue at the national level. At the same time, more mechanisms were should be created that allow (SDC) to draw on know-how from implementing (government) organisations. The delegation or outsourcing of project implementation to Swiss and multilateral institutions is envisaged primarily in the Industry & SME (HIF) and sustainable agriculture (NL) sectors. (SDC) refrained from outsourcing the entire Water and Sanitation (W+S) sector in order to gain or maintain a certain degree of operational experience in this sector. In areas and regions where Swiss aid agencies can demonstrate know-how and show interest and willingness for conceptual further development of their programme work, they will be involved at an early stage (e.g. in the HIF sector SWISSCONTACT , in the sustainable agriculture sector INTERCOOPERATION, CIP). Where possible, the outsourcing of entire programmes will be sought, with (SDC) as the contracting authority having overall responsibility for outsourced programmes as well as the entire DC programme with Peru Directors primarily carry out activities at the meso and micro levels; however, specific sector policy tasks at the macro level can also be delegated to suitable organisations. Multilateral channels are used in the future (SDC) programme in Peru, on the one hand, to finance regional research programmes. On the other hand, cooperation possibilities with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) , the World Bank and UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF) in the various priority sectors are still to be examined. A bilateral approach (Swiss relief agencies, direct actions with Peruvian private and public institutions via the coordination office) or the route via multilateral organisations (UNDP, UNICEF) is chosen for humanitarian emergency and disaster relief . The presence of Swiss aid organisations in Peru is comparatively high. Over thirty Swiss private aid organisations have been active in Peru. They often work together with church partner organisations, their work is often characterised by proximity to the grassroots, their main goal is direct poverty reduction.	Two Swiss private organisations (Swisscontact and Intercooperation) implemented projects for the SDC in Peru as directors. Seven other NGOs are working in the country with SDC funding (almost CHF 1 million in 2001). Fédération Genevoise de Coopération (integrated rural development, education and training, community promotion, care for children affected by war), Fastenopfer (adult education, health, indigenous population), Brot für Alle / Basler Mission (promotion of small businesses, agricultural extension), Unité (deployment of volunteers), Stiftung Kinderdorf Pestalozzi (care for children affected by war) and, to a lesser extent, Swiss Welfare Organisation (community promotion) and Caritas (drinking water and sanitation).	The main implementing organisations were SDC and SECO themselves. In certain thematic areas (connected to SECO), Swiss partners such as HEID Genève, Swiss Finance Institute, Swiss Financial Analysts Association . Further synergies and alliances were established in particular with Swiss NGOs active in Peru and with Swiss companies that carry out self-financed development projects.
Main partner organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Shift from national to local organisations/institutions.Individual programme components can be implemented by public partner organisations, others by private ones. Depending on the programme concept, partner institutions may join and/or leave flexibly (e.g. Industry & SME concept).Support is given towards increased cooperation between public and private organisations and between private organisations and NGOs. Preference will be given to NGOs that are concerned about such networking.NGOs are often multi-sectoral in their activities ("general shop"); they react strongly to the diverse interests of donors. (SDC) works towards a certain specialisation and transformation of these organisations so that they can improve the quality of their products and know-how and broaden their "client base". Organisations with a willingness to increase specialisation are preferred.In general, it is assumed that partner institutions will raise their own funds for a project (exceptions will remain certain "socially-oriented" NGOs).Due to the limited financial resources of the individual organisations, the majority of the activities remain selective and tend to be project-oriented rather than programme-oriented (multilateral cooperation mainly in the area of research, further cooperation possibilities with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank and UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF).	Swiss development cooperation entered into partnerships with government institutions, non-governmental organisations and the private sector , and sought to strengthen and intensify their cooperation with each other wherever possible. A balance was sought between state and private partners at all levels. The trend led away from projects with a single partner towards multi-institutional alliances, with a role-based distribution of tasks. In the first instance, projects and programmes were supported by national partners and directors were commissioned to carry them out.	The existing harmonisation processes with other bilateral and multilateral donors (World Bank, UN, GTZ, CIDA) were to be intensified. New implementation modalities were mainly bilateral co-financing or institutional programme contributions together with several donors (basket funding). Cooperation with NGOs and private sector
Key beneficiaries	Small enterprises, vulnerable populations in the rural and urban area. Local and national institutions (e.g. in the sector of health, economy & finances, education).	Particular emphasis on the empowerment of the marginalised population .	<ul style="list-style-type: none">grassroots organisations so that they can better formulate their applications and requests to the authorities and organise themselves in networks.SMEnational/local institutionsstakeholders
Geographical/regional focus	The programme focuses largely on the existing priority regions of Cajamarca, Cusco and Apurimac and in Lima. It did however not return to the Amazonas .	The programme focused largely on the existing priority regions of Cajamarca, Cusco	The programme focused largely on the existing priority regions of Cajamarca, Cusco, Apurimac and the economic corridors linked to these regions, which connect producers and markets. Although SECO does not pursue an explicit approach of geographical concentration, and it strived to achieve synergies between traditional SDC and newly implemented SECO interventions.
Total budget *)	The programme for Peru should again reach the contribution level of a "normal" priority country and have a financial framework of approx. 10 million CHF per year for the development cooperation sector. Added to this are the funds of the BAWI, humanitarian aid, the environmental credit as well as the programme contributions to the Swiss relief organisations and their own donations. In addition, the Counterpart Fund Peru-Switzerland will finance programmes and projects totalling CHF 10-15 million per year on average over the next 3-5 years. This will temporarily massively strengthen the Swiss presence in Peru.	SDC bilateral cooperation : approx. CHF 11 million per year Humanitarian Aid: CHF 2.5 million Environmental programme: CHF 2.5 million SECO: CHF 3.0 million	SDC : 25 million CHF (<i>laut ODA jedoch 38m für die Periode 2009 - 2012</i>) SECO : 60 million CHF Humanitarian Aid: 7 million CHF Global programmes (water and climate change): 14 million CHF
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	"Consolidation phase" of the new SDC programm in Peru.	The cooperation strategy is based on: ⇒ Strategie 2010 der DEZA ⇒ seco - Strategie 2002 - 2006 ⇒ DEZA - Sektionsleitlinien für Lateinamerika (Peru_2002-2007_GER, S. 7)	The joint cooperation strategy is based on the Swiss Development Assistance Act of 1976, the Federal Council's Development Policy Strategy of 2008 , the Message on the "Financing of Economic and Trade Policy Measures in the Context of Development Cooperation" and the Dispatch on the "Continuation of Technical Cooperation and Financial Aid to Developing Countries", which were approved by Parliament in December 2008.
Relevant context factors (country)	Main problems in the country are: increasing impoverishment of broad sections of the population, an ethnically divided Peruvian society , the dismantling of the state apparatus , fragile democratisation process , political violence and human rights violations as well as the destruction of natural resources . The economic reform programme introduced by the Fujimori government has had some astonishing (macro-economic) successes ; however, the effects on distribution policy are (still) a long time coming.	Both state (health, education, justice, police) and private (political parties, committees, associations) institutions are seen as weakened from the decade of Fujimori's autocratic governance.	Ollanata Hulama become president in 2011, cementing the "pink tide" wave in Latin America.
Important hints / comments	SDC changed its name to COSUDE (from COTESU) in the late 1990s "to give the programme a clear profile". "The reputation that the institutions have built up over 30 years helps: small but serious, transparent, effective and flexible. Peru became (again) a priority country for SDC and BAWI (SECO).		SDC's bilateral cooperation in Peru phased out in 2012 . The Swiss cooperation stayed in the country and continues to implemente projects under SECO and the Global Programmes (Climate Change) in the country. In the area of Climate Change, Peru represent a regional hub for Climate Change and the environment.

Timeline Ecuador

	1969-1981	1982-1990	1991-1997
Main / key objectives	Support to agricultural production mainly through technological and knowledge transfer. Support to specific product-chains (corn, plantain), and delivery of trainings with local communities for the use and implementation of technology.	Intervention targeted to population in poverty situation, focused on indigenous communities in the Andean region. First supporting steps towards decentralisation, working together with local actors and NGO.	Continue to support rural development projects focusing on the irrigation-agriculture complex and environmental protection. The connections between the urban and the rural become relevant. Therefore, it is also important to strength urban productive capacities.
Theory of change	In a predominantly rural context, in which in spite of the rapid urban growth agriculture plays a key role, Swiss bilateral cooperation can support a better agricultural techniques through technological transfer and construction of (mainly, but not only irrigation) infrastructure, which allows higher levels of productivity in the production chains of the main export goods, and will consequently raise the income level of the poorest group within the country, the peasant and indigenous population.	In the absence of a national rural and local development strategy, Swiss bilateral cooperation can strengthen local development processes by providing technical assistance and trainings both on the supply (allowing access to water through irrigation and diversifying production) and demand side (fostering the growth of markets and improving commercialization mechanisms) of agricultural production, and throughout raising the income level of indigenous communities and improving their living conditions.	Based on a programmatic approach, in a context of growing socio-economic inequalities, weakened state capacities and low productive investment, SDC can contribute to territorial development by focusing on the urban-rural economic dynamics, by, on the one hand, raising agricultural productivity in a sustainable way and, on the other hand, supporting small urban enterprises, thus raising income levels in general but especially those of rural and indigenous population.
Thematic focus	Irrigation infrastructure and agriculture, moving from a subsistence agriculture towards a market agriculture. 8 projects in implementation.	While keeping focus on agriculture and irrigation, SDC starts working on parallel with small rural enterprises to complete the circle of agricultural production. First environmental projects, related to a sustained use of soil and water for agriculture and reforestation. 15 projects in implementation.	Agriculture, irrigation, environmental protection (reforestation and use of soil in agriculture), small urban enterprises. Humanitarian Help is focused to natural disasters response.
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	Swiss technical cooperation is exclusively focused on agriculture. Low participation of the local actors, close work with the central government.	Swiss technical cooperation is integrating a <i>demand</i> approach (focusing on market mechanisms and conditions to improve commercialisation) to the existent supply approach (focusing only on agricultural production). Transition from a merely rural development strategy towards a local development strategy.	Gender and environmental strategies appear for the first time. The program is now based on a comprehensive, programatic vision.
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Bilateral cooperation.	Bilateral cooperation.	Bilateral cooperation (including debt-relief mechanisms), humanitarian aid
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, <u>not</u> the focus of this study)</i>			
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	No information available.	Local NGO, rural communities.	When possible, the DDA coordinates certain actions with the projects of the 3 Swiss NGOs active in Ecuador - INTERCOOPERATION, SWISSAID and SWISSCONTACT
Main partner organizations	National counterparts at national level, no work with local governments and/or organizations		Ministries of Agriculture and Social Welfare, but coordination is rather weak
Key beneficiaries			
Geographical/regional focus	Dispersed technical assistance to several agricultural projects in the Coast and the Andean and Amazonic regions.	Andean region	Central Andean Region
Total budget *)	Information not available	50'595.000 CFH (Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009)	50'081.000 CFH (Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009)
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)			
Relevant context factors (country)	At the beginning of SDC's cooperation in Ecuador in 1969, the economy of the country is mainly sustained by agricultural production, and the population is mostly rural. With the start of the so-called oil boom in 1972, the country experiences a significant transition due to an accelerated economic growth, which has its most obvious effect in the rise of the urban population and the strong presence of public investment in infrastructure and services. The industrial and financial sector also emerge pushed by the flow of resources in the national economy. Between 1972 and 1979, the country is governed by different military governments.	Return to democracy with the presidency of Jaime Roldós and Oswaldo Hurtado (1979-1983). Period marked by the extensive growth of external debt in the public finances, and the correspondent payment of it. In 1983 the national government assumes the private financial system's debt, which aggravated the economic crisis. Public administration is leaded by a structural adjustment principle, which has its effect on the abandonment of public social services and capacities, absence of agrarian public policies. High inflation rates and first steps into the liberalisation of the financial sector.	High political instability and social crisis, in which the indigenous movements become very relevant on the political arena. Weakening of state institutions and capacities, lack of planning, growing poverty and inequality at national level but also between urban and rural areas, which causes a migratory exodus from the countryside to the cities. External debt grows rapidly and therefore a large part of the state budget was allocated to its payment, strong tendency towards financial deregulation encouraged by the political power, prelude to the 1999 crisis and the formalised dollarization of the economy.
Important hints / comments	1970: signing of the Framework cooperation agreement between the governments of Switzerland and Ecuador. Between the decade of the 70's and until 1984, the Swiss cooperation office reduced the budget in the country and close its office until 1984.		

Timeline Ecuador

	1998-2002	2003-2007	2007-2009
Main / key objectives	To support organised groups of the disadvantaged population and producer associations in the sustainable use of their development potentials; promoting equitable development of men and women. To contribute to the preservation of natural resources and the reduction of environmental overload.	To significantly contribute to reducing poverty and socio-economic inequalities. To support low-income population in the rural Andean region, so that they can make a better use of existing opportunities, defend their own democratic interests and demand their rights. Pro poor growth strategy, which also supports the access to and the sustainable management of natural resources.	To have a closure that is responsible, creative, it has to multiply the successful effects and have the highest levels of impact in terms of sustainability. Systematization of experiences (as part of knowledge management) seek to adequately transfer good practices to counterparts.
Theory of change	Surrounded by a marked political instability and in the middle of a complex socio-economic crisis, SDC can contribute to the empowerment of the most disadvantaged population in the country by improving local capacities through: the provision vocational training programs, support to small industry and agriculture, and by fostering the protection and sustainable use of their natural resources, allowing this disadvantaged population to become an agent of agent in their own development process.	In a context of marked socio-economic inequalities, SDC aims to promote empowerment of the vulnerable population - especially of indigenous communities - through the strengthening of organizational and economic capacities, and by supporting the promotion of equity between men and women, thus allowing access to resources and social services and enabling their participation in decision-making spaces, making a 'bottom-up' contribution to a better governance and to the fight against corruption.	In order to conduct a responsible exit of the country and to deliver the highest amount of benefits to the meta group, SDC finishes the co-financed projects in close coordination with the local beneficiaries, counterparts, and implementing organizations, placing efforts to multiply the effects of the Swiss cooperation and to assure the sustainability of the achieved results in the different thematic sectors.
Thematic focus	Agriculture, irrigation, forestry and environment, promotion and support to industry and vocational training.	Income and employment, decentralization and local development, environmental management	The selection of topics was difficult because SDC has been involved in more than 20 issues, but the selected topics were: agriculture and rural development, irrigation, environment, microfinance, governance and vocational training.
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	Empowerment, decentralization, gender, environmental protection, human and organisational development, improvement of institutional capacities	Empowerment, gender, institutional strengthening, improvement of institutional capacities	Empowerment, good governance and work with national institutions at micro-, meso- and macro level, gender
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Bilateral cooperation, humanitarian aid	Bilateral cooperation, humanitarian aid	
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, <u>not</u> the focus of this study)</i>			
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	Executing agencies from SDC: INTERCOOPERATION, SWISSCONTACT, SOFONIAS (with their own offices in Quito), PROJEKT-CONSULT, CIP y CIAT. Close work with producer organisations, local NGOs and technical advisors specialised in project planning and implementation. The participating organisations are represented in a "steering committee".	Swiss ONGs: Swisscontact, whose main topic is supporting enterprises and micro-finances; Swissaid, working in rural development, Swiss Red Cross, in the health area, and Terre des Hommes Lausana (in Ecuador, Fundación Niñez y Vida), working with children living at the streets; Intercooperation, working to protect with natural resources.	
Main partner organizations	Cooperation with national public institutions is becoming increasingly difficult, due staff reductions and capital losses, as well as increasing budget cuts.	While maintaining the broad spectrum of national and international counterpart organizations, with some emphasis on Ecuadorian NGOs, the aim is to involve state institutions more as allies of civil society actors in projects and programs, as well as to support them in their initiatives.	
Key beneficiaries			
Geographical/regional focus	Central Andean Region	Central and South Andean Region	
Total budget *)	74'041.000 CFH (Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009)		
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)			
Relevant context factors (country)	Large losses as a result of El Niño, marked social disparities, lack of legal certainty, high inequality of opportunities and increasing destruction of natural resources and the environment. Continuing budget deficits exacerbated by high debt and an inefficient tax system. Political, social and economic crisis that erupted in 1999 with the banking crisis and the official dollarization of the country at the beginning of 2000, which brought with it a migratory exodus and accelerated impoverishment. The indigenous movement and civil society organisations play a decisive role throughout the social crisis.	After the crisis of 1999, the country starts showing signs of improvement, although the poverty rates and socio-economic inequality remain at very high levels. One key element for recovery is the resources being sent to the country by migrants. The crisis has eroded the already weak credibility of public institutions, and the country is highly fragmented. State capacities and services still do not recover from the liberalization decades (80's and 90') and are therefore insufficient to respond to the population's needs. National economy is highly dependent on extractive and primary industries, neglecting productive investment in agriculture and the small and medium enterprises.	After several years of political and economic crisis, popular and citizens movements gained space in politics, a process that reached the highest point with the triumph of Rafael Correa in 2006 in the presidential elections. During his government in 2007, the government redefined several topics regarding its external policy, and elaborated its National Development Plan, and in 2008, the SECI (Sistema Ecuatoriano de Cooperación Internacional) was created. This entity allowed to structure and coordinate all kind of cooperation structures and sources.
Important hints / comments			

Timeline Honduras	Elements of a DOA Program in Honduras (Eléments d'un programme de la DOA au Honduras) 1982 - 1985 (?)	DEH's Development cooperation program with Honduras 1986 - 1992 (?)	Multilateral Regional Program Central America for 1993 - 1998	Regional Program Central America 1991 - 2005 Joint strategy from SDC and SECO	Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012 Joint strategy from SDC and SECO
Main / key objectives	Following the Swiss Law of 1976: "The overarching goal of our programme in Honduras is the integral development of the human being. This is to be achieved by promoting processes that enable the population to meet their basic needs by their own means."	Main objectives of the collaboration: "DEH, in accordance with the law, will prioritise efforts to empower the target population in Honduras, to better meet their basic needs through their own efforts and to emerge from their economic, social and cultural marginalisation."	The main objective of development cooperation in Central America remains the better satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged sectors of the population. The prerequisite for this is that the potential beneficiaries have a minimum development potential of their own and are enabled by the aid to advance their development in the longer term by their own efforts. The central concern of DEH is the best possible development of people in their natural, cultural and social environment.	The primary objective of Swiss development cooperation in Central America remains the satisfaction of the basic needs of disadvantaged sectors of the population.	Overall objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development.
Theory of change					
Thematic focus	Agricultural/vocational training Agrarian reform Smallholder support Rural water supply Dairy sector Agricultural technology Food security Integrated rural development	1) Agricultural sector: - In the agricultural sector, DEH gives priority to measures that help to improve deficient subsistence agriculture in terms of production, productivity, storage and marketing to the extent that at least sufficient self-sufficiency can be ensured. These measures, supplemented by organizational and entrepreneurial support, are intended to promote the gradual consolidation of agricultural production groups. 2) Forestry sector: DEH promotes activities in the forestry sector that generally contribute to the implementation of a forestry policy that preserves the ecological balance and leads to an improved integration of the forestry sector into the other economic sectors of the country, especially into the agricultural sector. The focus is on activities within the framework of industrial rural development projects. 3) Health sector: DEH supports efforts and processes in the health sector that aim at physical, mental and social health of the participating population. 4) Handicrafts and Small Industries: Under the current distribution and use of land and capital, the agricultural production sector will not be able to significantly reduce rural unemployment within a useful period of time, thus effectively slowing down migration to urban areas. However, urban unemployment and underemployment, especially in those sectors in which immigrants seek a livelihood (services, informal sector), are already extremely high. 5) Housing and settlement construction: Within the framework of its already existing cooperation program, DEH promotes housing and settlement construction insofar as it is part of a multifunctional action. Within the above-mentioned framework, DEH support may also aim at improving already existing houses and settlements. 6) Vocational training sector: Training occurs in any fully participatory process, such as the one DEH aims at. In this sense, education cannot be considered a separate sector.	1) Agriculture / rural development: The support of the rural population mainly in their productive activities will also be a main area of cooperation with Central America in the coming years. 2) Drinking water and sanitation: The drinking water sector is important in two ways: first, to improve health and prevent waterborne diseases and epidemics (e.g. cholera), but also, from a broader perspective as a starting point for education and strengthening the organization and management of communities, which women often play the leading role. DEH has a recognized name in this sector in Central America, thanks to the positive results of the corresponding projects in Honduras and Nicaragua, and is an active member in national bodies for the water sector in both countries. 3) Environment and use of natural resources: Reclamation of the need to protect and sustainably use natural resources is also becoming increasingly important in Central America. DEH should also take this into account in the future. 4) Business promotion and vocational training: The economic crisis and the resulting structural adjustments in the Central American economies have forced large numbers of wage earners out of the "formal" sectors of the labour market. Sectors of the labour economy, Environmental degradation, growing population pressure and violent conflicts are forcing rural residents to leave urban agglomerations, where there is no additional absorption of workers in the formal sectors of the private economy or in state administration. For the commercial and small-scale industrial sectors, however, the DEH Central America program is embarking on further sectoral opening.	1) Agricultural production: overall objective: to contribute to a transformation of smallholder subsistence agriculture towards market-oriented and ecologically sustainable agriculture. 2) Water and sanitation (WASUAN): Overall objective: To contribute to the acceleration of a comprehensive supply of water and sanitation in rural areas that remains sustainable and functional in the long term (approx. 20 years). 3) SME promotion: Overall objective: To promote the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and producers. 4) Economic policy framework, trade and investment promotion (SECO) 5) Humanitarian reconstruction assistance	1. Development of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME): Objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to the sustainable development of MSME and thereby to income and employment generation, through improved market access emphasizing local, regional and international chains of value addition, mainly of agricultural origin. 2) Governance and Public Finance: Objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to good governance, particularly with respect to public finance management, effectiveness of public spending, transparency and accountability, citizen participation, public control and social audit. 3) Infrastructure and local public basic Services: Objective: Swiss Cooperation enables poorer populations sustainable access to basic public services of good quality.
Cross cutting themes / strategic priorities	Not explicitly mentioned.	- Focus on the family as a whole. - Independent development - Actions whose priority and direct beneficiaries are the most disadvantaged - Maximum participation of all stakeholders - Do not create new unilateral dependencies - Contribute to a survival-securing resource management and thus to a restoration or preservation of the ecological balance - Strengthen the development effectiveness of these institutions for the benefit of the most disadvantaged. - Ensure that new actions fit within the framework of DEH's existing cooperation program in Honduras and strengthen or complement its components In the existing projects it has been shown again and again that we can not achieve optimal benefits (even understandingly term: namely create new dependencies), if we work unilaterally only through the man on the improvement of e.g. the rural subsistence and infrastructure economy. There is a tendency not to work in isolation, but to work increasingly with women's groups, for example in the DRH and in the CNG sector; this is certainly necessary and important. However, there is a great risk that such "women's special projects" will have an inhibitory function as long as they have to negatively mark "the other one-sidedness" of a project framework and cooperation concept structured one-sidedly by men. Only when the views, needs and priorities of women can determine the concept and structure to the same extent as those of men will there be a chance to achieve synergies rather than new dependencies.	General guidelines Economic and government self-reliance Supporting the poor Supporting the management of environmental problems Improvement of production conditions Health and education Transversal policy priorities Empowerment Training Environment Networking Sustainability	Guiding principles Promotion of potential Good governance Health and education Transversal priority Empowerment Environmental sustainability Human and institutional development (HD)	Strategic dimensions 1. The Poverty Orientation is central and implies alignment with PRS, focus on poorest countries, emphasis on pro-poor policies. 2. All interventions incorporate Gender and Governance as mandatory cross-cutting themes. 3. Strategic principles guide interventions in the framework of the national cooperation systems: ownership, harmonization, alignment, local capacity development, micro-meso-macro linkages. Strategic priorities - Ownership, Alignment and Harmonization - Capacity Development - Empowerment - Environmental compatibility - Prevention - Micro-meso-macro Cross-cutting themes Governance Gender
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Bilateral governmental cooperation, but it is emphasized that public and private partners can also be an interesting alternative. DEH follows a needs-based approach.	The only criterion for the choice of instruments for a DEH action is the functionality of the instrument with respect to the action.	Measures in the economic sector should complement the DEH program in a meaningful way, with which coordination with the BAWI is actively promoted within the Swiss federal administration. For Honduras, considerable funds for counterpart funds (CHF 10 - 15 million) are expected from the debt relief action, which must be used exclusively with the regional program. Through program contributions, DEH supports the activities of Swiss ONGs, which in many cases complement its own program at a grassroots level.	Technical development cooperation Honduras-Switzerland counterpart fund (created as a result of the bilateral debt relief agreement with the country in 1993, available balance: approx. CHF 5 million). (Economic and Trade Measures - Humanitarian Aid and SHK)	Capacity development, SNAP, Joint project-financing (bankaid)
Details on Humanitarian Support (only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)			Humanitarian cooperation in favour of Central America has been channelled primarily through specialized international organizations and Swiss private organizations. To date, this aid has been provided on an ad hoc basis, mostly following natural events (hurricanes Fifi and Joan, floods and droughts). In the last two years, however, when DEH have been spent by IICA, through UNHCR/UNHCR and UNDP, in the framework of CIRECA (Conférence Internationale sobre Relaciónes en Centroamérica) for the resettlement of war displaced persons. The Swiss Disaster Relief Corps (SDRC) also provided emergency and reconstruction assistance in the region in the aftermath of earthquakes and floods. As before, a bilateral approach is chosen for emergency aid (such as disaster relief in some cases), and other bilateral (Swiss relief organizations) or multilateral executing agencies are chosen for other measures of a humanitarian nature.	Swissaid. In the 1990s, humanitarian aid focused on the resettlement of people displaced by civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador. In addition, there are support measures in the area of disaster prevention (volcanology). Considerable disaster aid was provided in response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch, and a temporary multi-million reconstruction program was launched at the beginning of 1999.	About 1.3 Mio CHF per year for the region. After finishing direct humanitarian post-Mitch work, SDC Humanitarian Aid moved from a "reconstruction" approach in a humanitarian and integrated risk and disaster management" approach.
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	DEH and Honduran government are the implementers. The Swiss Strategy foresees Swiss experts to act more as advisors than as implementers.	In view of the goal of independent development, DEH handles the use of external permanent experts as restrictively as possible. However, where projects in Honduras have been implemented without any experts at all (e.g. construction, first phase of the public seed project), it has been shown that that effectiveness beyond the purely technical aspects (seed production) is in fact lower or that the quality of initiatives is not optimal at all (poor construction) where a drastic turnaround then began with the use of experts - the project is now one of the DRH's showpieces). In case of doubt, the DEH in Honduras therefore prefers the use of a permanent external specialist to an expertise project. As present, only two of a total of 20 DEH experts deployed in Honduras are Latin American origin. The positive experiences confirm DEH's intention to continue deploying Latin American experts wherever possible.	In the current program in Central America, DEH itself is in charge of the implementation of the majority of projects. Some cooperation involves budgetary constraints to various multilateral agencies and development banks may be useful and complementary. The choice of partner institutions presents DEH with a dilemma. On the one hand, concentrating on a few national institutions contributes to more intensive relations and to a greater weight of the Swiss contribution. On the other hand, unacceptable risks arise for the overall program from a too one-sided institutional anchoring. Absorption capacity as well as institutional solidity and conceptual conformity with the DEH mission statement on the part of governmental and private partners are therefore important criteria in the selection of program sponsors.	In Central America, the SDC generally enters into partnerships with government bodies, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, and seeks to link them as far as possible. At present, however, there is a certain preponderance of cooperation with the state. Greater identification of partner organizations, and that a broader distribution of risk is desirable. The choice of partners is based on task-related criteria. State institutions are to be supported in the performance of their core tasks, i.e., primarily the level of standards and framework conditions for implementation and execution. However, there is to be increasing cooperation with private organizations. In the spirit of promoting decentralization, the SDC will in future also increasingly enter into partnerships at the interface between the state and civil society, i.e. at the level of municipal authorities. The main thrusts of future program management include: For new projects, outsourcing of project implementation will be sought wherever possible.	
Main partner organizations	Not specified, but the idea of institutions independent of politics, preferably small, decentralized and target group-oriented organizations. When working with government institutions, the Strategy specifies that flexibility has to be possible.	With the exception of the NGO program (currently 5 projects), which began in 1981, all DEH projects in Honduras are carried out in cooperation with government institutions, most of them with the Ministry of Agriculture (SEH), which is also the lead agency for the two multilateral projects. Guidelines regarding the choice of cooperation partners: DEH selects as cooperation partners, in principle, those institutions that offer the best conditions for the planned efforts to be carried out effectively for the benefit of the participating population. Possible partners in principle: government institutions, ONGs, multilateral institutions.	Mainly government, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning Multilateral channels are mainly used to fund regional research projects in the current DEH-Central America program. Some cooperation involves budgetary constraints to various multilateral agencies and development banks may be useful and complementary. The choice of partner institutions presents DEH with a dilemma. On the one hand, concentrating on a few national institutions contributes to more intensive relations and to a greater weight of the Swiss contribution. On the other hand, unacceptable risks arise for the overall program from a too one-sided institutional anchoring. Absorption capacity as well as institutional solidity and conceptual conformity with the DEH mission statement on the part of governmental and private partners are therefore important criteria in the selection of program sponsors.	Water supply & sanitation: Ministerio de Salud, INAA, ANDAMIRSA/ONG, INACON, UNICEF, Network Agricultural production: MAGAP, ONGs. National agricultural research institutes, CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP Natural resources & environment: CATIE, municipalities, ministries, WWF, universities.	Note HIC Team: While the strategy contains a chapter on "Cooperation Partnerships, Strategic Principles and Modalities", the main partner organizations are not specifically mentioned, only in general form: public sector partners, bilateral development partners, Swiss NGOs.
Key beneficiaries	The main beneficiaries will be the most disadvantaged population groups, primarily in rural areas.	Target population: In accordance with the priorities set out in the Swiss Law on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid: "Those approximately 50% of the population whose daily food intake does not meet the minimum levels established by FAO/WHO" when it comes to calories and protein. "Those 20% of the population who are totally unemployed." "Those segments of the population who are underemployed, especially in the agrarian sector, those rural populations that, when the aforementioned priority target groups, have significant development potential due to their preconditions."	The support is aimed in particular at small farmers and, more recently, at the inhabitants of the poor districts in the target agglomerations, which have grown rapidly in recent years, taking into account the fact that about one third of the heads of families in Central America are women.	The program is aimed particularly at families and small farms in rural areas, as well as at small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in urban areas.	Thematic Financial Services: Urban and rural MSMEs/Farmers with limited access to services but potential to generate income above subsistence level Thematic Business Development Services: MSME (mostly informal) and agricultural producers with limited access to services but with potential to make economic use of services; employees of MSME Thematic Business Climate: MSME as above - emphasis on enabling conditions for MSME Thematic Water & Sanitation: Rural and semi-urban populations without access to safe water and to sanitation Thematic Disaster Risk Reduction: Population living in rural and semi-urban high-risk zones.
Geographical/regional focus	Marcala-Gozoacán and Yoro, because they are especially disadvantaged regions.	Marcala-Gozoacán and Yoro, because they are especially disadvantaged regions.	The widespread settlement of military conflicts in the region in recent years has slowed an increase in trade and cooperation among Central American countries. In view of the increasing formation of political and economic blocs worldwide (NAFTA, MERCOSUR, EU), the need for joint action is gradually spreading among Central American countries as well. Even though the ongoing integration is primarily a political and economic process, which the donor community can only influence to a limited extent, it also opens up new opportunities for interregional cooperation. Since the framework conditions and problems in the individual countries, despite all their differences, are very similar in many areas, increased cooperation and intensive coordination and exchange of experience are urgently needed. In the future, DEH will therefore concentrate its cooperation on two levels of action: At the regional level, regional activities (e.g. research programs, networks) will fulfil tasks for which capacities are lacking in the national level, where, thanks to synergies between countries, work can be done more efficiently or better results can be achieved. The problems addressed at this level are relevant to several countries in the region. At the national level, DEH will focus on one priority country where a program with a certain critical mass should be achieved, allowing for an active Policy Dialogue. Based on past experience, Honduras has been selected as the new focal country, which will require a continuous shift of activities from Nicaragua to Nicaragua for the next few years."	Based on the largely positive experience to date and in line with Message 88 on the SDC's framework credit for development cooperation, which provides for a strengthening of regional efforts, the regional concept in Central America will be systematically pursued and expanded. It allows for the cross-country use of synergies. In thematic areas, the regional approach allows the promotion of effectiveness, without claiming to contribute to a systematic regional negotiation process.	The Cooperation Strategy for Central America has a regional focus and concentrates country-level interventions on the two poorest countries in the region (i.e. Nicaragua and Honduras). Note HIC Team: This is not further specified with view to locations in the countries.
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	Until the beginning of the 1970s, DEH's activities in Latin America were concentrated on South America, mainly on the Andean countries. In Central America, only Costa Rica (received limited cooperation from DEH in the area of educational training. Various factors were to lead to a revision of this policy. On the one hand, the DEH tried to focus its aid more and more on the poorest countries, in accordance with the goals of the federal law on development cooperation that was in the making. In addition, the DEH paid more attention to the conditions of intervention. The socio-political structures of the recipient country should allow us to reach the most disadvantaged population groups. Finally, the crisis of 1973 seriously affected the economy of a number of Third World countries, prompting us to devote an increased share of our aid to them. The review of DEH's policy in the light of the above criteria led DEH to take a closer look at Honduras as a potential focus for cooperation: per capita GNP was around 100 in Latin America, it was on the list of countries most seriously affected by the oil crisis, and its military government had a relatively open social policy, which made it possible to carry out a program that met our criteria. DEH now considers that the phase of rapid expansion of their program in Honduras is coming to an end and on the one hand, the growth of resources available to DEH has slowed significantly, and on the other hand, the growing (though substantial) difficulties encountered in the execution of the program in Honduras indicate that the limits of the absorption capacity of the Honduran partners are reached. The phase of project implementation and volume expansion will therefore be followed by a phase of depth work, of program development within a slowly growing financial framework, in short, a phase in which the emphasis on quality will be further reinforced. This requires a lot of thought on the part of the Central Office and the Coordination Office.	About 1.3 Mio CHF per year. There are several reasons for not providing for an increase in this financial ceiling for Honduras in the short and medium term. Honduras is not one of those countries that have particularly difficulty in obtaining external development funds. Above all, its geopolitical position, but also its democratic attempts to walk well in all probability continue to secure for it a Western, above all American public interest, and compensation for the fact that the private-sector international investment interest for Honduras is not exactly great at the moment. The Honduran capacity to absorb development funds is widely appreciated by its limits, both because of a lack of financial resources and because of a lack of operational capacity on the part of the state apparatus. Even if the poverty of a large part of the Honduran population is unmistakably great and a DEH intervention is therefore justifiable, this intervention cannot achieve to its potential effectiveness as long as it cannot build on a clearly prioritizing national development policy that specifically addresses the structural problems underlying poverty. Honduras is only one of DEH's three priority countries in Latin America, an overly one-sided distribution of the resources available to the continent must be avoided.	About 19 Mio CHF for Honduras over the years 1990-1996.	18-20 million CHF / year for the region, breakdown by country not available.	The cooperation with Honduras will be increased from currently 3.5 to approx. 5.0 Million Swiss Francs per annum.
Relevant context factors (country)	Expansion not possible due to absorption difficulties in Honduras. Focus therefore on quality, not quantity.	The DEH decision to establish a priority program in Honduras was based primarily on a country-specific justification. When the fall of Somalia brought about a social opening in Honduras, DEH intervention there also became possible in terms of volume. Two accounts for about half of that in Honduras. The poverty situation in El Salvador and Guatemala would also justify DEH mission as soon as the security risk were reduced and social opening became manifest. If we assume political stability as a pre-condition for the effectiveness of long-term development actions, Costa Rica would be the first country in the Central American region to be considered for DEH. Basically, the socio-economic crisis in Central America (as in all of Latin America) is endemic. For the time being, each state alone is small and too unilaterally dependent for an autonomous overcoming of the crisis, only regional cooperation can bring the momentum needed to overcome the crisis. (34) What does DEH want? DEH wants an annual budget of 25-30 million, contribute to fulfilling under these circumstances? Two things first, we need to settle up other social cooperation bodies, as has been done in DEH's regional projects (where, for example, the question of rationalizing the Proceps can also become a question of its survival, but rather to support existing existing regional programs and institutions (CAEEL, agricultural and health programs, etc.).	Based on past experience, Nicaragua was selected as the new focus country, which will require a continuous shift of activities from Honduras to Nicaragua for the next years. The shift of focus from Honduras to Nicaragua also involves a shift in the Coordination Office responsible for operational support of the program. With the arrival of the new coordinator for Central America at the end of May 1993, the previous team office (OCEMIC) in Nicaragua will be upgraded to a regional coordination office (COHAN), and at the same time the office in Tegucigalpa will be transformed into a liaison office for Honduras (CEHON).	The present program takes into account in particular the principles of the SDC's Latin America Strategy (Sector Guidelines for Latin America 1995 - 2005) as well as the messages for development cooperation, for economic and trade policy measures and for humanitarian aid of the Swiss Confederation. The main features of the current Central America program can be summarised as follows: SDC is particularly well anchored in Nicaragua and Honduras. Thanks in part to a long-standing presence in the agriculture and water supply sectors, the reorganisation of programs is progressing steadily (currently 40% regional program). Nicaragua is a priority country with a low weight in volume terms in favour of El Salvador. In sectoral terms, traditional areas of intervention (agriculture, water supply stand side by side with more recent areas of action (business promotion, promotion of "good governance").	Swiss Cooperation has a 25-year trajectory in Central America, and accumulated an important capital of experience and partnerships, creating goodwill not only in-country but also in multilateral fora. Living up to the global MDG commitments by investing in poor countries were and trade credit of Swiss Cooperation enables Swiss Swiss Business Development Effectiveness perspective. Deepening the partnership with Nicaragua and Honduras, and indirectly with the whole region, because of the increased regional integration dynamics, lies in the long-term interest of Swiss foreign policy, although in the short-term, other interests with respect to trade, migration or security may appear of more importance of Switzerland.
		Great US dominance. Quote "Where cooperation is so unilaterally tied to a geopolitical interest, and to financial underpinnings or donations, CAN cooperation must be over a broad-based effort of states." (34) What does DEH want? DEH wants an annual budget of 25-30 million, contribute to fulfilling under these circumstances? Two things first, we need to settle up other social cooperation bodies, as has been done in DEH's regional projects (where, for example, the question of rationalizing the Proceps can also become a question of its survival, but rather to support existing existing regional programs and institutions (CAEEL, agricultural and health programs, etc.).	As a consequence of the historical and geopolitical peculiarities outlined so far, Central American international cooperation is also dominated (and despite tendencies toward an increased role for multilateral agencies and above all - development banks) by the close proximity of the USA. Equitable donor coordination in Central America is hampered by the predominance of the United States, which, through its political and financial weight, is able to conduct a direct, bilateral and very binding policy dialogue with the respective governments. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that in areas with solid experience of the aid, a coordinated approach with USAID may also make sense for a smaller donor agency. Structural adjustment programs: While the inevitability of structural adjustment in the region is hardly in dispute, the specific design of the measures and the existing resistance between the devastating social costs and the limited (at best) for macroeconomic successes are increasingly criticized. The current DEH program in Central America emerged progressively in the 1980s. The Costa conflict from which both Nicaragua, as a recent priority country, and as well as our priority country Honduras, brought great economic and political benefits to the region. The development of the DEH program was noticeably affected by the resulting distortions and security problems. In Honduras, the state became less visible through each passing year. This means USAID's aid flow of the confrontation period created artificial structures in the state apparatus that supported (including in the military and civil sectors). The end of the war (1990) brought Honduras a loss of importance in its relations with the United States, which was reflected almost immediately in a very tangible reduction in North American economic and military aid. Since then, the debate about the necessary structural adjustment has been correspondingly difficult.	Honduras: In the bastion of the U.S. anti-communist interventions in the civil war states and the supply base for the Comra, there had been no specific warfare except for isolated terrorist actions. The military used the threat situation to strengthen its position of power with systematic violations of human rights. A strong alliance between the oligarchy and the military continues to function today, and a rapid and fundamental change in this situation is not in sight. Accordingly, the middle class for the time being is not a target for the program. The prospects for a continuation of economic growth are basically good, with the exception of the temporary pricing setbacks in the state apparatus. The increased foreign loans and donations due to the peace and stabilization process and as a result of "Mitch" should help boost economic growth in the medium and long term.	Conditions to enhance development effectiveness are favourable in Nicaragua and Honduras, because of the existing PRS processes, alignment and harmonization action are as well as the established donor coordination and dialogue mechanisms. Both governments are interested in better harmonization and alignment because of the unsatisfactory overall effectiveness of aid, to fragmentation and because its only partial coherence with national priorities.
Important hints / comments	The intergovernmental framework agreement on development cooperation signed on December 7, 1978, underscored the possibility of a broader commitment. After some delay, the Tegucigalpa Coordination Office (COCTEG), responsible for the Central American area, was also able to take up full functions in March 1981. Note HIC Team: The duration of the Program is unclear: we suppose it is from 1982 (date mentioned in the document) to 1993 (year before the new strategy).	In terms of the accumulation of this experience, DEH in Honduras is still relatively in its infancy compared with its practice in Peru and Bolivia, which goes back more than twenty years. In addition, as already mentioned, the program is not sufficiently quickly, especially with regard to sectoral projects. Both circumstances reinforced the tendency to derive sectoral project objectives from an abstract, mostly macroeconomic needs analysis, accordingly, the target definitions turned out to be production-oriented, not target population-oriented, even if it was naturally (and explicitly) assumed that the poorer population was to be targeted. This created the risk that the target population would become an object, a means to an end. The Margate DRI is a decisive step in this direction. It can be reduced to the short document that Jacques Duvigneault (referring to the carpenter) as the target population of the project already formulated in the first basic document of the DEH: "The carpenter is the subject of development". A systematic external overall evaluation of DEH's Honduras program has not been undertaken to date. However, there have been several individual project evaluations. Statement of the Program Committee (revised): "The HONDURAS country program must not at the same time serve to establish guidelines for our cooperation with other countries; the relevant passages on Nicaragua and Costa Rica therefore do not belong in this document." Note HIC Team: - Historical background analysis is profound and similar to a publishable article. - Brief account of the Honduras Development Plan 1982-1986. - Detailed and in-depth reflection on program formation. - The foundation for a regional concept is established in the strategy. - The duration of the Program is unclear, we suppose it is from 1985 (date mentioned in the document) to 1993 (year before the new strategy).	Note HIC TEAM: The strategy still focuses heavily on individual projects. This project focus diminishes in subsequent regional documents.	Joint strategy from SDC and SECO In view of the diminishing significance of the focal country principle with increasing regionalization, but also in view of the experience gained with the focal country Nicaragua in 1997/1998 with regard to political risk, the priority of the focal country in Central America is to be targeted population to be expanded to the concept of a core region (in contrast of the country Nicaragua (goal of the coordination office), Honduras and El Salvador). This implies a certain strengthening of Nicaragua's priority priority. Program development to date has shown that it is useful to have a clear definition of the geographic focus for the intended interventions. This definition is derived from a combination of a priority model and a matrix model. The priority model refers first and foremost to the financial size of the programs per country. 1st priority core region: Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. 2nd priority, wider catchment area: Guatemala, Costa Rica and Panama. The matrix model refers above all to the necessity of intervention.	Joint strategy from SDC and SECO The Cooperation Strategy for Central America has a regional focus and concentrates country level interventions on the two poorest countries in the region (i.e. Nicaragua and Honduras). The strategy links the country focus with a regional program component that is thematically coherent with national imperatives and that facilitates knowledge-sharing among countries. The regional concept is defined in the following way: "Contributes to the solution of supra-national problems Contributes to the strengthening of regional institutions Facilitates access to regional markets and investment opportunities. Regional program support has to be thematically congruent with the country programs in Nicaragua and/or Honduras. Experiences and results of regional cooperation should benefit primarily those two countries. b) A regional Program-Management characterized by: - Regional knowledge sharing (networking, regional meetings) - Regionalization of the Cooperation Office Team primarily by thematic responsibilities. - The main interventions will be implemented in Nicaragua and Honduras. Currently, the Nicaragua program is thematically broader and much larger in financial terms. The Honduras program will be gradually expanded and shall include sector program support (SWAN) in two thematic priorities, a stronger engagement in private sector development (MSME development), and a stronger, albeit only selective involvement in general policy dialogue and donor coordination (G-16). In short, partial balancing of country priorities in favour of Honduras is envisaged, without reductions in the Nicaragua program.

Timeline Honduras			
	Swiss Cooperation Strategy in Central America 2013-2017	Swiss Cooperation Strategy in Central America 2019-2021	Cooperation Programme for Central America, Exit Programme 2022-2024
Main / key objectives	Overall objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development.	Development Goal 2019-2021: Switzerland promotes sustainable and equitable development in Central America by contributing to strengthen governance processes and human rights, mitigating conflicts and climate risks, and advancing the social and economic inclusion of vulnerable groups.	With its 2022-2024 regional cooperation programme, Switzerland will a) Implement the gradual and responsible withdrawal of Switzerland's bilateral development cooperation with Central America in line with Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy Guidelines and b) Foster sustainable and equitable development in Central America by strengthening participatory governance and human rights, the socio-economic inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups, sustainable natural resource management, and disaster risk reduction in priority territories. Global Goal 2022-2024: Switzerland fosters sustainable and equitable development in Central America by strengthening participatory governance and human rights, socio-economic inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups, sustainable management of natural resources, and climate and disaster resilience in priority territories.
	Inclusive economic development Outcome 1.1: Disadvantaged groups have improved their income through participation in value chain and local economic development in a sustainable manner. Impact Hypothesis: Strengthening value chains and local economic development with a proper focus promotes the employability of disadvantaged groups and the creation of decent work. Outcome 2: Micro and small enterprises have benefited from improved framework conditions for inclusive economic development. Impact Hypothesis: Strengthening justice organizations in selected value chains in policy work enables them to better engage in policy dialogue and improve framework conditions. Disaster risk reduction and promoting inclusive governance Outcome 1.1: Violence and crime in three selected large urban municipalities are reduced. Outcome 1.2: The performance of the police in investigating homicides and serious HR violations and referring them to the Public Prosecutor has improved. Impact Hypothesis: The strengthening and reforming of security institutions reduce the homicide and crime rates and the number of HR violations. The state helps promoting a culture of prevention and more peaceful coexistence. Reforms in the normative and legal framework (e.g. new law for the national police) are an effective implementation provide a good basis for better enforcement of the law. Outcome 2: State institutions are more responsive and effective in meeting peoples' needs for basic services. Impact Hypothesis: Strengthening investment management leads to improved response capacity regarding the population's needs. Citizens' participation in planning and implementation leads to more transparent and sustainable investments and service delivery. Environmental vulnerability and climate change Outcome 1: People in situations of vulnerability have adapted their land, forest and water use practices to the effects of climate change in selected territories. Impact Hypothesis: Effective strategies promoted by SDC are progressively incorporated into national and local plans and implemented. Emerges promoted by SDC facilitate the implementation of national and sectoral development plans. Outcome 2: Public and private actors have managed resources for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in an effective manner. Impact Hypothesis: Managing resources for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in an effective manner provides inputs and sets examples to further develop regional, national and local strategies. Countries contribute to the implementation of regional strategies and make contributions via good practices on the issues of DRR and CC.	Governance and the Rule of Law Outcome 1.1: Security operations apply an effective system based on institutional integrity, improve their coordination with justice operators and contribute to a reduction in impunity at the national level and in Region 13 (Gulf of Fonseca) and Region 10 (La Mosquitia). Impact Hypothesis: SDC supports the development of the National Police, strengthening institutional integrity and security response based on the community model and respect for human rights. SDC contributes to the systemic construction of the chain of justice (Police, Prosecutor, Judicial Branch), focusing on the Gulf of Fonseca and La Mosquitia regions. The systemic work includes social prevention at the regional and municipal levels through the development and implementation of Local Security Plans. SDC contributes to and incorporates the OHCHR and MACCH by strengthening their mandates and the construction of a system to combat corruption, impunity and HR violations. Outcome 1.2: Human rights defenders freely advocate and defend the rights of freedom of expression, access to information, access to natural resources, and access to justice before the State and private enterprises at the national level and in Region 13 (Gulf of Fonseca) and Region 10 (La Mosquitia). Impact Hypothesis: SDC promotes and supports the empowerment and development of civil society organizations and networks with a common approach and the construction of sustained and inclusive dialogue at the national level and in Region 13 (Gulf of Fonseca) and Region 10 (La Mosquitia). The territorial-national approach allows it to link up with international and regional systems (OHCHR, MACCH), as well as build capacities and processes at a territorial level. In addition, SDC promotes dialogue among donors, state agencies, OHCHR and civil society (G-16: formal and semi-formal alliances). Employment and inclusive economic development Outcome 2.1: Vulnerable groups improve their income and employment and become integrated in sustainable and inclusive economic processes in which economic, social and cultural rights are respected. Impact Hypothesis: SDC contributes to the government's giving priority to vulnerable groups in the Gulf of Fonseca and La Mosquitia regions. Incentives and mechanisms are created so that public and private stakeholders address the causes of conflicts and territorial fragilities from the angle of territorial socio-economic inclusion. SDC supports the government in strengthening territorial governance and regulating public-private investment. This facilitates changes in the economic model, at least in the territories of the southern zone and La Mosquitia, by making it more transparent and inclusive. SDC strengthens the enforcement of ILO Convention 169. Outcome 2.2: Public and private stakeholders integrate youth into the labour force, enhance their competitive capacity, and promote changes in the framework conditions at the national and territorial levels (policy, regulations and incentives). Impact Hypothesis: SDC helps the government and territorial public and private stakeholders seek joint solutions that are adapted to the reality of farm families and address the causes of conflicts such as lack of access to land or water, gender- or ethnicity-based exclusion, lack of governance, and lack of technical and financial services. This contributes to Honduras generating more decent jobs that respect international standards and help mitigate the causes of migration. Climate Change, DRR and natural resources Outcome 3.1: Vulnerable and excluded populations, particularly women and youth, adopt sustainable practices of water, soil and forest management in selected territories. Impact Hypothesis: SDC supports rural and semi-rural families and private companies in the use of technologies and works that improve both their standards of living and the sustainable use of natural resources. SDC facilitates the incorporation of DRR and CCA in the value chains. Switzerland contributes to the strengthening and enforcement of the legal frameworks (including ILO Convention 169) in water, forests and soil favoring vulnerable groups. Outcome 3.2: Public, social and private stakeholders reduce disaster risk and manage natural resources and resource-related conflicts through the strengthening of territorial governance. Impact Hypothesis: SDC facilitates the coordination and application of legal frameworks/international agreements through the selected countries, which are spaces for convergence among community, private, donor, and public sectors to address the main causes of environmental vulnerability and conflicts in compliance with ILO Convention 169 governance and capacity building.	Governance and the Rule of Law Expected Impact: Strengthen the rule of law with a focus on inclusive governance and respect for political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights. Outcome Honduras 1.1: Security agencies in the Gulf of Fonseca, La Mosquitia and nationwide implement a management system based on institutional integrity, improve coordination with justice operators and reduce impunity. Outcome Honduras 1.2: Human rights defenders advocate freely and in a coordinated manner for access to information, freedom of expression, the right to natural resources and access to justice before the State and private companies at the national level, in the Gulf of Fonseca and Mosquitia regions. Employment and inclusive economic development Expected Impact: Insert vulnerable and excluded groups in territorial economic development with shared governance and respecting economic, social and cultural rights. Outcome Honduras 2.1: Vulnerable groups implement business models with stable commercial relationships that allow them to improve their income and employment, integrating into sustainable and inclusive economic. Outcome Honduras 2.2: Strengthened business environment through multi-stakeholder platforms and multi-sectoral roundtables, so that public and private actors carry out economic activities that integrate young people and women into the labour market, improve their competitive capacities and promote changes in the framework conditions at the national and territorial level (policies, regulations, incentives). Climate change, DRR and natural resources Expected Impact: Contribute to resilience to climate change and disasters by strengthening governance in the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources. Common Outcome IHON and MIO 3.1: Population in situation of vulnerability and exclusion, particularly women and youth, adopt sustainable water, soil and forest management practices in selected territories. Common Outcome Honduras and Nicaragua 3.2: Public, community and private actors reduce disaster risks, manage natural resources and associated conflicts, by strengthening territorial governance (water in Honduras) and developing their capacities.
Theory of change			
Thematic focus	1) Inclusive economic development: Domain goal: To enhance inclusive economic development focusing on employment and income. 2) Reducing state fragility and promoting inclusive governance: Domain goal: To contribute to reduced state fragility and more inclusive governance. 3) Environmental vulnerability and climate change: Domain goal: To reduce the environmental vulnerability and to strengthen the resilience among poor populations to the effects of climate change and other natural hazards.	1) Governance and Rule of Law: Impact Goal: Switzerland contributes to strengthening the Rule of Law and advances the economic, social, political, civil and cultural rights of vulnerable groups, particularly of women and youth who are threatened by violence, as well as ethnic and racial minorities. 2) Employment and inclusive economic development: Impact Goal: Switzerland promotes the economic inclusion of disadvantaged groups and regions by strengthening value chains and fostering employment and income through inclusive governance processes. 3) Climate change, DRR and natural resources: Impact Goal: Switzerland contributes to strengthening vulnerable groups' resilience to the risks associated with climate change and other natural threats, fosters the sustainable management of natural resources and facilitates the resolution of resource-related conflicts.	1. Governance and the rule of law. Expected impact: Switzerland contributes to strengthening the rule of law with a focus on inclusive governance and respect for political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights. 2. Employment and inclusive economic development. Expected impact: Switzerland contributes to the strengthening of multi-stakeholder governance and multi-sectoral roundtables, leading processes that articulate actions that facilitate territorial economic development under shared governance respecting economic, social and cultural rights and the socio-economic inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups. 3. Climate change, DRR and natural resources. Expected impact: Vulnerable populations increase their resilience to climate change and disasters by strengthening governance in the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources. In Honduras, Swiss Cooperation will help consolidate the rule of law, strengthening the coordinated participation of civil society organizations, in particular in social auditing and accountability with a human rights focus. It will strengthen the institutional governance of the public force with a rights and gender equality focus, and continue to support providers in the justice chain, in social audits 10, particularly in the Gulf of Fonseca region and La Mosquitia with the aim of institutionalising the coordinated approach.
Cross-cutting themes / strategic principles	Cross-cutting themes: Gender Governance In addition to reinforcing the regional and policy dialogue profile of the program, the Strategy 2019-2021 emphasizes the following themes and processes: - Promote an agenda of inclusion - Strengthen cooperation with the private sector - Connect urban and rural spaces - Mitigate negative effects of migration - From water and sanitation to integrated water management - Promote culture and memory as a driving force for change	Cross-cutting themes: Inclusive governance Gender equity In addition to reinforcing the regional and policy dialogue profile of the program, the Strategy 2019-2021 emphasizes the following themes and processes: - Promote an agenda of inclusion - Strengthen cooperation with the private sector - Connect urban and rural spaces - Mitigate negative effects of migration - From water and sanitation to integrated water management - Promote culture and memory as a driving force for change	Transversal themes: Inclusive governance Disaster risk reduction Gender equality Phasing-out: closure because targets have been or cannot be achieved. Phasing-down: gradually winding down a programme's activities, giving priority to strengthening local organisations in order to sustain benefits. Phasing-over: transferring some activities to another organisation for it to achieve its objectives and reinforce sustainability.
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	The strategy will continue using a balanced mix of modalities and partners. However, for reasons of scaling-up, mitigating political risks, improving policy impact, building sustainable capacities and reducing management burden the following will be envisaged: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Increase the currently low proportion of contributions to local governments and Civil Society organizations- Increase contributions to UN-institutions and specialized organizations with thematic mandates. Likewise, co-financing with IFIs will be increased as a means for scaling-up and because of their policy leverage.- Decrease direct implementation from currently 40% of the total portfolio to a maximum of 20%.- Use country systems where possible, particularly at the local level- Maximize the possible to engage at micro, institutional and policy levels, but relate national policy work more explicitly to regional and global levels (e.g. climate change)- Proactively seek opportunities for PPOs in all domains and preferably integrated in programs rather than design them as separate projects.- Concentrate civil society support on capacity building Given the new donor landscape with fewer bilaterals, stronger alliances will be sought with UN, World Bank and selectively with UN organizations where there is convergence between their core mandates and Swiss priorities. Collaborations with the global programs of climate change and water will be strengthened via the respective networks and through direct collaboration with the Andean program. Collaboration with SECO would include bilateral interventions (economic development, public financial and seek synergies with global projects with presence in Central America. Regarding violence prevention and human rights, knowledge sharing with the Human Security Division will be sought.	Approaches: Territorial concentration Out of fragility Psychosocial approach Communication for empowerment Risk reduction and disaster adaptation Modalities: Whole of Government approach Contributions and mandates Consolidation of initiatives/South-South cooperation Combine technical with political	Approaches: Territorial concentration Out of fragility Psychosocial approach Modalities: Integrated WCCA work
Details on Humanitarian Support (only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)	The humanitarian aid will continue its presence in the Maragua Office, maintaining its quick response capacity for crisis situations.	Mitigate negative effects of migration: increasingly more Central Americans are migrating - mainly to the United States - to seek employment and escape violence. Many migrants are adolescents and children who are exposed to sexual abuse and exploitation of kind. Swiss Humanitarian aid contributes to the protection of migrant children and adolescents with financial grants and human resources (secondments) to the United Nations and civil society organizations in line with the Regional Protection and Solutions Framework. To prevent and mitigate the humanitarian consequences of migration in a cross-cutting manner, young people at risk and young women are considered as a target group in all the programs. In terms of budget: 11.8% of Swiss support in the period of the strategy are for Humanitarian aid.	Beyond 2024, Switzerland's priorities in the region will focus on humanitarian aid, peace, security, human rights, prosperity and sustainability as set out in the 2022-2025 Strategy for the Americas. Swiss humanitarian aid will remain in Central America beyond 2024, based on its universal mandate.
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)		Contributions and mandates: the portfolio is executed with a mix of modalities, including contributions to public and private institutions and cooperation mandates that are awarded through international tenders.	Swiss Cooperation is using a pragmatic mix of contributions and mandates, and making greater use of contributions to facilitate the handover to other development agencies or, better still, to its projects to regional or multilateral entities.
Main partner organizations	Domain 1: ministries of agriculture and industry, IADB, the World Bank, private sector (e.g. MSME and producer associations), and national as well as international NGOs. Domain 2: national and international NGOs, UNDP, ministries of finance, sectoral institutions, mayor's office, security institutions and human rights organizations. Domain 3: United Nations System (UNDP, FAO), governmental institutions (disaster prevention, agriculture, energy, natural resources), local governments, national and international NGOs, universities, development banks (WB, ADB); regional research and innovation centres; private sector.	Work with multiple stakeholders: SDC cooperates with a variety of partners including the State, civil society, the private sector and universities. In Honduras, the multi-stakeholder approach is well established. Forge alliances with multilateral actors: SDC consolidates cooperation with multilateral players to enhance successful Swiss experiences, leverage funds, and scale up effects. Along with the development banks, institutions of the UN and OAS are becoming increasingly important in Central America. In prioritized areas of its strategy, Switzerland contributes to international efforts in support of reforms led by national authorities and promotes decisions, based on the principles of Rule of Law and respect for human rights. Regional actors: at the regional level, SDC cooperates with public and private institutions, including civil society networks. The dialogue is maintained with the SICA through its sectoral institutions such as CEPREDENAC, OSUACA, SE-CAIC (Executive Secretariat of the Central American Agriculture and Livestock Council) and CCAD (Central American Commission of the Environment and Development). Public-private partnerships: SDC explores opportunities to strengthen cooperation with the private sector in line with the Swiss Policy for International Cooperation 2017-2020. Private-public partnerships include all thematic pillars and are not limited to the domain of employment and inclusive economic development. Include the perspective of Global Programs: the Cooperation Office reinforces the dialogue with SDC's Global Programs on issues of climate change, water and migration, especially in the regional components of the Strategy. The bilateral programs take into account global policies, policies and the knowledge produced by global networks.	Swiss Cooperation is consolidating the multi-actor approach . It continues to promote forums for coordination in Honduras. In Nicaragua, it is consolidating direct partnerships with the private sector and coordinates with other donors, in particular the European Union. In the spirit of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 17), Swiss Cooperation creates alliances with international partners and multilateral agencies. At regional level, Swiss Cooperation bases with regional public and private institutions, including civil society networks and think tanks (CAIET) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). It also works with the Central American Integration System (SICA), through its agencies, in particular the Coordinator Centre for Disaster Prevention in Central America (CEPREDEAC), the Central American Council of Finance Ministers (COSEFIN) and the Central American Commission for Environment and Development (CCAD). It aims to strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights System and contribute to the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). A public-private partnerships . Swiss Cooperation is consolidating and evaluating options for scaling up with the private sector, with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Centre of Excellence for Private Sector Engagement (KEP). SDC Global Programmes . Cooperation with these programmes is being strengthened to include their perspective particularly on the issues of climate change, food security and migration, and especially cooperation with the global Water programme and the re4U, aimed at capitalising on and disseminating SDC's expertise in water and sanitation and integrated water and sanitation management in the region.
Key beneficiaries	Poor, disadvantaged groups (e.g. women, youth), businesses, municipal governments, state institutions	Poor, excluded, vulnerable groups, especially women, adolescents, migrants, indigenous people and Afro-descendants, smallholder families with limited access to natural resources (land, water, forest, among others), infrastructure, credit, and those highly vulnerable to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, Grassroot leaders and HR defenders, LGBTI, persons living with HIV/AIDS, persons with special needs	Poor, excluded, vulnerable groups, especially women, adolescents, migrants, indigenous people and Afro-descendants, smallholder families with limited access to natural resources (land, water, forest, among others), infrastructure, credit, and those highly vulnerable to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, Grassroot leaders and HR defenders, LGBTI, persons living with HIV/AIDS, persons with special needs
Geographical/regional focus	The Central America strategy 2013-17 will comprise a mix of geographically defined programs (context sensitive interventions) and thematically defined - national or regional programs. Within countries, greater geographic concentration will be sought by clustering interventions in selected territories or sub-regions.	Mosquitia region and the Gulf of Fonseca	Mosquitia region and the Gulf of Fonseca
Total budget *)	Note H20_T20: No country-level budget is included in the strategy Between 2013-2017, Swiss cooperation (i.e. SDC including Humanitarian Aid and some SECO support) will commit >200 Million Swiss Francs (191 CHF / Regional & bilateral funds, 12.2 Mio CHF / Humanitarian Aid) and disburse annually about 40 Million of which the bulk of funding goes to programs and projects in Nicaragua and Honduras. Up to 10% of funding will be used for supporting regional initiatives focused on cross-country learning, policy development and innovation.	Honduras: 64.6 Mio CHF in bilateral projects plus around 10 Mio CHF in regional projects.	The Swiss Cooperation Programme in Central America 2022-2024 will be implemented with a budget of CHF 58.8 million. The resources come from South Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid. In Honduras: 15.3 Mio CHF in 2022, 10.4 Mio CHF in 2023, 3.1 Mio CHF in 2024.
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	The Swiss cooperation strategy 2007-2012 was designed as a joint SDC-SECO strategy. Half way, SECO programs in economic development and public finance were reduced as a consequence of the parliamentary 08/2009-2012 that no longer included Nicaragua as a SECO priority country and because governance conditions in Nicaragua led to the discontinuation of the general budget support. The strategy requires new thematic competencies in the areas of <i>disaster security</i> , human rights, conflict prevention and climate change. The presence will be strengthened in Honduras to ensure context-sensitive supervision of geographically defined programs and to ensure stronger engagement in policy dialogue and donor coordination. Moreover, security management, particularly in Honduras, will receive greater attention, for example by periodically reviewing and updating local security plans. The current thematic organization of staff will change to a more geographic distribution of responsibilities, particularly for those themes that are particularly context-specific and politically sensitive, such as security or governance. As a consequence, the capacity of the office in Honduras will be enhanced, whereas operational staffing in Nicaragua will remain constant despite important increases in financial value.	Swiss civil society has also shown a long and solid commitment with Central America. Small and large private organizations support rural development, advance health and education, and promote human rights. The role of these institutions is critical for both their presence on the ground and their advocacy work in Switzerland. Switzerland maintains contacts with all the key actors in the region. This includes dialogue with the United States, which plays a dominant role both in the political and the economic spheres of the region. Switzerland is associated with the Joint Programming process of the European Union in Nicaragua and Honduras and is in tune with European donors. With the emergence of new aid programs from the South (Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Chile and Argentina), from Asia (South Korea, Taiwan and Viet) as well as Russia, the bilateral panorama is more heterogeneous and makes donor coordination more complex. To expand its network of contacts and diversify its alliances, Switzerland seeks to establish a dialogue with emerging donors. Whenever appropriate, work lines are established, for example in the framework of bilateral cooperation.	Phasing out of Swiss South Cooperation
Relevant context factors (country)	Honduras will have elections in 2013. In the past, the change of government led to a large staff turn-over resulting in a loss of institutional capacity and continuity. Honduras remains a "fragile state" with high levels of conflictivity, sluggish investment and growth affected by the poor "country image" and high security costs, limited social progress and a generalized distrust of the people in state institutions. The development cooperation context has changed over the last years: - The poverty reduction strategies that provided a framework for aligning cooperation to country efforts ceased to exist and were replaced by a multitude of national, sectoral and local plans creating a more complex framework to anchor aid programs. - Many bilaterals have moved down the hill (Norwegian countries, Ireland, Great Britain), mainly because of shifting geographic priorities to the poorest regions of the world. The main bilaterals are USA, EU, Germany, Canada, Spain, Japan and Switzerland. - New "donors" like Venezuela in Nicaragua, or Brazil and Taiwan in both Honduras and Nicaragua play a larger but quite different role. In Nicaragua, Venezuela's assistance is valued at about 500 million USD, which equals the total official ODA. - The relative importance of multilateral institutions - in particular the World Bank, IDB and the Central American Bank (CABEI), but also the UN organizations - increased. About 2/3 of assistance co-comes from the multilaterals. The multilaterals set the tone, whereas the coordination of the bilaterals leaves room for improvement. - Aid dependency persists but has declined. Traditional aid to Nicaragua and Honduras amounts to USD 500 Million in Nicaragua and USD 750 Million in Honduras, representing 3% and 20% of the respective national budgets. - Donor strategies continue aiming at poverty reduction. Touting on economics and MDGs. However, human security and climate change have become more important. - Donor coordination has weakened in Nicaragua, whereas the so-called G-16 in Honduras continues to be effective at both the political and operational levels. - Civil society organizations receive less support as a result of the declining presence of bilaterals.	In Honduras, where socio-economic and political conflicts are constant, building stable institutions and including vulnerable groups in realization processes are key challenges. The action of SDC is guided by the four principles of the OECD for work in fragile states. The psychosocial approach is inserted into the programs in order to address the structural causes of the culture of violence and its traumatic effects. Political dialogue at the national level is combined with territorial programs in two areas of concentration: the Gulf of Fonseca and La Mosquitia. The most probable scenario for 2019-2021, is a State with a fragile Rule of Law, with high insecurity and constant violations of human rights. However, public and private institutions are undertaking reforms with the support of international organizations, international cooperation and civil society.	During the implementation of the 2018-2021 Strategy, it became clear that Swiss Cooperation had to adapt to the changes arising from the conflict in Nicaragua and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Important hints / comments	Switzerland ranks in the middle field of the remaining bilateral donors and is big and competent enough to make a difference. However, alliance building and effective coordination became more challenging and the importance of dialog and cooperation with multilaterals increased because of their financial capacity and policy leverage. Note H20_T20: This seems to be a strategy where lessons learned led to quite a number of changes. Out of at least it was documented in way that is different to other strategies.	In Honduras, SDC is among the five most important donors. The relevance of Switzerland lies not only in constant funding but also in its impartial positions and an agenda based on human rights' and values: the inclusion of the vulnerable and poor, equality between women and men, human rights and democratic governance have been promoted consistently over four decades. In financial terms, the importance of bilateral donors has diminished in Central America. Most of the financing for basic infrastructure comes from development banks, led by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). In partnership with multilaterals, bilateral donors continue to play a key role in public policy dialogue and as process catalysts in the field of human rights, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), established in 2016 in Honduras, emerged from a joint initiative of Switzerland and the United States.	Switzerland has two embassies in Central America, one in San Jose and one in Guatemala City, and two cooperation offices, one in Managua and one in Tegucigalpa. The exit process will culminate in the closure of the cooperation offices in Nicaragua and Honduras and the opening of honorary consulates. While cooperation in Switzerland's priority in bilateral relations with the OAS countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), it is increasing economic exchanges, starting from relatively modest amounts. Beyond 2024, Switzerland's priorities in the region will focus on humanitarian aid, peace, security, human rights, prosperity and sustainability as set out in the 2022-2025 Strategy for the Americas. Swiss Humanitarian Aid will remain in Central America beyond 2024, based on its universal mandate. The distribution of responsibilities established in the 2018-2021 regional programme strategy is maintained for monitoring the regional programme: the Managua office will assume the leadership of the regional programme Climate Change, Disaster Risk Reduction and Natural Resources, while the Tegucigalpa office will be responsible for the regional Governance and Human Rights programme. The Humanitarian Aid representative in Managua will assume regional responsibility for all Humanitarian Aid interventions in the region in coordination and with the support of the office in Tegucigalpa as appropriate.

Timeline Nicaragua

	Elements of a DDA Program in Honduras (Elements d'un programme de la DDA au Honduras) 1982-1985 (?)	DEH's Development cooperation program with Honduras 1986 - 1992 (?)	Multianual Regional Program Central America for 1993 - 1998	Regional Program Central America 1999 - 2005 Joint strategy from SDC and SECO
Main / key objectives			<p>The main objective of development cooperation in Central America remains the better satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged sections of the population.</p> <p>The prerequisite for this is that the potential beneficiaries have a minimum development potential of their own and are enabled by the aid to advance their development in the longer term by their own efforts.</p> <p>The central concern of DEH is the best possible development of people in their natural, cultural and social environment.</p>	<p>The primary objective of Swiss development cooperation in Central America remains the satisfaction of the basic needs of disadvantaged sections of the population.</p>
Theory of change				
Thematic focus	In Nicaragua, immediately after the end of the civil war (July 1979), DEH became involved with a reconstruction project in the form of direct state aid. It was later transformed into cooperative support (indirect aid). In addition, there was a drinking water project and (1983) also a DRI with financial aid. Through its program credits to Swiss NGOs, DEH also supports various small projects in Nicaragua.		<p>1) Agriculture / rural development: The support of the rural population mainly in their productive activities will also be a main area of cooperation with Central America in the coming years.</p> <p>2) Drinking water and sanitation: The drinking water sector is important in two ways: first, to improve health and prevent waterborne diseases and epidemics (e.g. cholera), but also, from a broader perspective, as a starting point for education and strengthening the organization and management of communities, where women often play the leading role. DEH has a recognized name in this sector in Central America, thanks to the positive results of the corresponding projects in Honduras and Nicaragua, and is an active member in national bodies for the water sector in both countries.</p> <p>3) Environment and use of natural resources: Recognition of the need to protect and sustainably use natural resources is also becoming increasingly important in Central America. DEH should also take this into account in the future.</p> <p>4) Business promotion and vocational training: The economic crisis and the resulting structural adjustments in the Central American economies have forced large numbers of wage earners out of the "normal" sectors of the labour market. Sectors of the labour economy, Environmental degradation, growing population pressure and violent conflicts are forcing rural residents en masse into urban agglomerations, where there is no additional absorption of workers in the formal sectors of the private economy or in state administration. For the commercial and small-scale industrial sectors, therefore, the DEH Central America program is embarking on further sectoral opening</p>	<p>1) Agricultural production: overall objective: to contribute to a transformation of smallholder subsistence agriculture towards market-oriented and ecologically sustainable agriculture.</p> <p>2) Water and sanitation (=AGUASAN): Overall objective: To contribute to the acceleration of a comprehensive supply of water and sanitation in rural areas that remains sustainable and functional in the long term (approx. 20 years).</p> <p>3) SME promotion: Overall objective: To promote the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and producers.</p> <p>4) <i>Economic policy framework, trade and investment promotion (SECO)</i></p> <p>5) <i>Humanitarian reconstruction assistance</i></p>
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles			<p>General guidelines</p> <p>Economic and government self-reliance</p> <p>Supporting the poor</p> <p>Supporting the management of environmental problems</p> <p>Improvement of production conditions</p> <p>Health and education</p> <p>Transversal guiding principles</p> <p>Empowerment</p> <p>Training</p> <p>Environment</p> <p>Networking</p> <p>Sustainability</p>	<p>Guiding principles:</p> <p>Promotion of potential</p> <p>Good governance</p> <p>Direct poverty alleviation</p> <p>Transversal:</p> <p>Gender</p> <p>Environmental sustainability</p> <p>Human and Institutional Development (HID)</p>
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments			<p>Delegation of project implementation to Swiss and multilateral third-party institutions (government contracts, co-financing).</p> <p>Measures in the economic sector should complement the DEH program in a meaningful way, for which coordination with the BAWI is actively promoted within the Swiss federal administration. For Honduras, considerable funds for counterpart funds (SFR: 10 -15 million) are expected from the debt relief action, which must be used coherently with the regional program.</p> <p>Through its program contributions, DEH supports the activities of Swiss NGOs, which in many cases complement its own program at a grassroots level work.</p>	<p>Technical development cooperation</p> <p>Development fund "Chiricote" in Nicaragua (available balance: approx. CHF 1 million) and the counterpart fund in the electricity sector in Nicaragua (available balance: approx. CHF 4 million).</p> <p>(Economic and Trade Measures + Humanitarian Aid and SKH)</p>
Details on Humanitarian Support (only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)			<p>Humanitarian cooperation in favor of Central America has been channeled primarily through specialized international organizations and Swiss private organizations. To date, this aid has been provided on an ad hoc basis, mostly following natural events (hurricanes Fifi and Joan, floods and droughts). In the last two years, several million SFR have been spent by HZA, through UNHCR/ACNUR and UNDP, in the framework of CIRECA (Conférence Internationale sobre Refugiados en Centroamérica) for the resettlement of war displaced persons. The Swiss Disaster Relief Corps (SDRC) also provided emergency and reconstruction assistance in the region in the aftermath of earthquakes and floods.</p> <p>As before, a bilateral approach is chosen for emergency aid (such as disaster relief in some cases), and either bilateral (Swiss relief organizations) or multilateral executing agencies are chosen for other measures of a humanitarian nature.</p>	<p>Review: In the 1990s, humanitarian aid focused on the resettlement of people displaced by civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador. In addition, there are support measures in the area of disaster prevention (volcanology). Considerable disaster aid was provided in response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch, and a temporary multi-million reconstruction program was launched at the beginning of 1999.</p>
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)			<p>In the current program in Central America, DEH itself is in charge of the implementation of the majority of projects. In the future, directly supported projects will continue to be an important pillar of DEH's work in this region, thus allowing the direct experience of operational field work to be used for conceptual considerations and policy dialogue at the national and regional levels.</p> <p>On the other hand, the possibility of delegating project implementation to Swiss and multilateral third party institutions (government contracts, co-financing) should be increasingly used. This includes in particular the involvement of Swiss aid organizations, where they show a corresponding potential and interest (e.g. PASOLAC and P-ONG with IC, exhaust emissions with SWISSCONTACT).</p>	<p>In Central America, the SDC generally enters into partnerships with government bodies, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, and seeks to link them as far as possible. At present, however, there is a certain preponderance of cooperation with the state (cf. Supplement 3). Greater diversification of partner organizations, and thus a broader distribution of risk, is desirable. The choice of partners is based on task-related criteria: State institutions are to be supported in the performance of their core tasks, i.e., primarily at the level of standards and framework conditions, for implementation and execution; however, there is to be increasing cooperation with private organizations. In the spirit of promoting decentralization, the SDC will in future also increasingly enter into partnerships at the interface between the state and civil society, i.e. at the level of municipal authorities.</p> <p>The main thrusts of future program management include: For new projects, outsourcing of project implementation will be sought wherever possible.</p>
Main partner organizations			<p>Mainly government, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning.</p> <p>Multilateral channels are mainly used to fund regional research projects in the current DEH-Central America program. Some expansion (within budgetary constraints) to various multilateral agencies and development banks may be useful and complementary.</p> <p>The choice of partner institutions presents DEH with a dilemma. On the one hand, concentrating on a few national interlocutors contributes to more intensive relations and to a greater weight of the Swiss contribution; on the other hand, unacceptable risks may arise for the overall program from a too one-sided institutional anchoring. Absorption capacity as well as institutional solidity and conceptual conformity with the DEH mission statement on the part of governmental and private partners are therefore important criteria in the selection of program sponsors.</p>	<p>Water supply & sanitation: Ministerio de Salud, INAA, ANDAMinSal/ONG, INAA/ONG, UNICEF, Network</p> <p>Agricultural production: MinAgr, ONGs, National agricultural research institutes, CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP</p> <p>Natural resources & environment: CATIE, municipalities, ministries, WWF, universities.</p>
Key beneficiaries			<p>The support is aimed in particular at small farmers and, more recently, at the inhabitants of the poor districts in the larger agglomerations, which have grown rapidly in recent years, taking into account the fact that about one third of the heads of families in Central America are women.</p>	<p>The program is aimed particularly at families and small farms in rural areas, as well as at small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in urban areas.</p>
Geographical/regional focus			<p>The widespread settlement of military conflicts in the region in recent years has allowed an increase in trade and cooperation among Central American countries. In view of the increasing formation of political and economic blocs worldwide (NAFTA, MERCOSUR, EC), the need for joint action is gradually spreading among Central American countries as well. Even though the ongoing integration is primarily a political and economic process, which the donor community can only influence to a limited extent, it also opens up new opportunities for intraregional cooperation. Since the framework conditions and problems in the individual countries, despite all their differences, are very similar in many areas, increased cooperation and intensive coordination and exchange of experience are urgently needed. In the future, DEH will therefore concentrate its cooperation on two levels of action:</p> <p>At the regional level, regional activities (e.g. research programs, networks) will fulfil tasks for which capacities are lacking at the national level, where, thanks to synergies between countries, work can be done more efficiently or better results can be achieved. The problems addressed at this level are relevant to several countries in the region.</p> <p>At the national level, DEH will focus on one priority country where a program with a certain critical mass should be achieved, allowing for an active Policy Dialogue. Based on past experience, Nicaragua has been selected as the new focal country, which will require a continuous shift of activities from Honduras to Nicaragua for the next few years. "</p>	<p>Based on the largely positive experience to date and in line with Message 98 on the SDC's framework credit for development cooperation, which provides for a strengthening of regional efforts, the regional concept in Central America will be systematically pursued and expanded. It allows for the cross-country use of synergies. In thematic areas, the regional approach allows the promotion of networking, without claiming to contribute to a systematic regional integration promotion.</p>
Total budget *)			24 Mio CHF for Nicaragua between 1993-1998	19-20 million CHF / year for the region, breakdown by country not available.
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	DEH's decision to set up a priority program in Honduras was based primarily on a country-specific justification. When the fall of Somoza brought about a social opening in Nicaragua, DEH involvement there also became possible (in terms of volume, it now accounts for about half of that in Honduras).		<p>Based on past experience, Nicaragua was selected as the new focus country, which will require a continuous shift of activities from Honduras to Nicaragua for the next years. The shift of focus from Honduras to Nicaragua also necessitates a shift in the Coordination Office responsible for operational support of the program. With the arrival of the new coordinator for Central America at the end of May 1993, the previous liaison office (ODG/IC) in Managua will be upgraded to a regional coordination office (COR/IAN), and at the same time the office in Tegucigalpa will be transformed into a liaison office for Honduras (ODE/HON).</p>	<p>The present program takes into account in particular the principles of the SDC's Latin America Strategy (Section Guidelines for Latin America 1995 - 2005) as well as the messages for development cooperation, for economic and trade policy measures and for humanitarian aid of the Swiss Confederation.</p> <p>The main features of the current Central America program can be summarized as follows: SDC is particularly well anchored in Nicaragua and Honduras, thanks in part to a long-standing presence in the agriculture and water supply sectors. The regionalization of programs is progressing steadily (currently 40% regional programs); Nicaragua as a priority country tends to lose weight in volume terms in favor of El Salvador. In sectoral terms, traditional areas of intervention (agriculture, water supply) stand side by side with more recent areas of action (business promotion, promotion of "good governance").</p> <p>Just how delicate development policy work can be in the Central American environment is illustrated by the expulsion of the then SDC coordinator by the President of Nicaragua in December 1997. The cause of the incident was the question of compliance with intergovernmental agreements concerning personnel issues. The clear protest by Switzerland and international donors prompted the Nicaraguan government to commit itself increasingly to compliance with "good governance" principles.</p>
Relevant context factors (country)	Shortly before the Honduran return to civilian rule, the decades-old Somoza dictatorship had been overthrown in Nicaragua (July 79); the second time after Cuba that a heavily U.S.-backed regime had been brought down by a guerrilla movement.		<p>In Nicaragua, domestic political considerations on the Swiss side prevented the growth of the cooperation program beyond the volume achieved in 1985, although the Nicaraguan government expressed great interest and much willingness to further expand the program. The comparatively positive experiences of DEH from its cooperation with Nicaragua in the course of the 1980s (good motivation of counterparts, high degree of respect for contractual agreements; timely announcement of emerging problems; relatively rapid response to inquiries) were due in particular to the specific situation of the internationally contested and partly isolated FSUN government. Even after the 1990 elections, the priorities of the new government in Nicaragua are more in line with those of the DEH than in the case of Honduras. Here, too, however, the reliability of the state apparatus, which is in a restructuring phase, is causing increasing difficulties.</p>	<p>Nicaragua: The great imbalance between the two opponents (Washington's interests vs. the Sandinista regime) had prevented detailed peace negotiations; all that was agreed upon was the dissolution of the Contra and the holding of free elections. In the meantime, the Sandinistas have lost considerable opposition power. Society is likely to remain deeply divided in the coming years. Comparatively unstable and difficult-to-predict political developments must be expected in the coming years.</p>
Important hints / comments		<p>Statement of the Program Committee (excerpt):</p> <p>"The HONDURAS country program must not at the same time serve to establish guidelines for our cooperation with other countries: the relevant passages on Nicaragua and Costa Rica (pages 25 and 26) therefore do not belong in this document."</p>	<p>Note HIC TEAM: The strategy still focuses heavily on individual projects. This project focus diminishes in subsequent regional strategies.</p> <p>Nicaragua becomes the new priority country in the region.</p>	<p>Joint strategy from SDC and SECO</p> <p>In view of the diminishing significance of the focal country principle with increasing regionalization, but also in view of the experience gained with the focal country Nicaragua in 1997/1998 with regard to political risk, the primacy of the focal country in Central America is to be relativized. The previous focus country concept will be expanded to the concept of a core region. It consists of the countries Nicaragua (seat of the coordination office), Honduras and El Salvador. This implies a certain downgrading of Nicaragua's previous priority. Program development to date has shown that it is useful to have a clear definition of the geographic focus for the intended interventions. This definition is derived from a combination of a priority model and a matrix model. The priority model refers first of all to the (financial) size of the programs per country:</p> <p>1st priority, core region: Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.</p> <p>2nd priority, wider catchment area: Guatemala, Costa Rica and Panama.</p> <p>The matrix model refers in advance to the modality of intervention</p>

Timeline Nicaragua

	Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012 Joint strategy from SDC and SECO	Swiss Cooperation Strategy in Central America 2013-2017	Swiss Cooperation Strategy in Central America 2018-2021
Main / key objectives	Overall objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development	Overall objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development	Development Goal 2015-2021: Switzerland promotes sustainable and equitable development in Central America by contributing to strengthen governance processes and human rights, mitigating conflicts and climate risks, and advancing the social and economic inclusion of vulnerable groups.
Theory of change		Inclusive economic development Outcome 1: Disadvantaged groups have improved their income through participation in value chain and local economic development in a sustainable manner. Impact Hypothesis: Strengthening value chains and local economic development with a pro-poor focus promotes the employability of disadvantaged groups and the creation of decent work. Outcome 2: Micro and small enterprises have benefited from improved framework conditions for inclusive economic development. Impact Hypothesis: Strengthening partner organizations in selected value chains in policy work enables them to better engage in policy dialogue and improve framework conditions. Reducing state fragility and promoting inclusive governance Outcome 1.1: Violence and crime in three selected large urban municipalities are reduced. Outcome 1.2: The performance of the police in investigating homicides and severe HR violations and referring them to the Public Prosecutor has improved. Impact Hypothesis: The strengthening and reforming of security institutions reduces the homicide and crime rates and the number of HR violations. This also helps promoting a culture of prevention and more peaceful coexistence. Reforms in the normative and legal framework (e.g. new law for the national police) and its effective implementation provides a good basis for better enforcement of the law. Outcome 2: State institutions are more responsive and effective in meeting peoples' needs for basic services. Impact Hypothesis: Strengthening investment management leads to improved response capacity regarding the population's needs. Citizens' participation in planning and implementation leads to more transparent and sustainable Environmental vulnerability and climate change Outcome 1: People in situations of vulnerability have adapted their land, forest and water use practices to the effects of climate change in selected territories. Impact Hypothesis: Effective strategies promoted by SDC are progressively incorporated into national and local plans and implemented. Synergies promoted by SDC facilitate the implementation of national and sectoral development plans. Outcome 2: Public and private actors have managed resources for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in an effective manner. Impact Hypothesis: Managing resources for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in an effective manner provides inputs and sets examples to further develop regional, national and local strategies. Countries contribute to the implementation of regional strategies and make contributions via good practices on the issues of DRR and CC.	Governance and the Rule of Law Outcome 1.1: Security operators apply an effective system based on institutional integrity, improve their coordination with justice operators and contribute to a reduction in impunity at the national level and in Region 13 (Gulf of Fonseca) and Region 10 (La Mosquitia). Impact hypothesis: SDC supports the development of the National Police, strengthening institutional integrity and security response based on the community model and respect for human rights. SDC contributes to the systemic construction of the chain of justice (Police, Prosecutor, Judicial Branch), focusing on the Gulf of Fonseca and La Mosquitia regions. The systemic work includes social prevention at the regional and municipal levels through the development and implementation of Local Security Plans. SDC contributes to and accompanies the ONCHR and MACCIR by strengthening their mandates and the construction of a system to combat corruption, impunity and HR violations. Outcome 1.2: Human rights defenders freely advocate and defend the rights of freedom of expression, access to information, access to natural resources, and access to justice before the State and private enterprises at the national level and in Region 13 (Gulf of Fonseca) and Region 10 (La Mosquitia). Impact hypothesis: SDC promotes and supports the empowerment and development of civil society organizations and networks with a common approach and the construction of sustained and inclusive dialogues at the national and territorial levels. The territorial-national approach allows it to link up with international and regional systems (ONCHR, MACCIR), as well as build capacities and processes at a territorial level. In addition, SDC promotes dialogue among donors, state agencies, ONCHR and civil society (G-16; formal and semi-formal alliances). Employment and inclusive economic development Outcome 2.1: Vulnerable groups improve their income and employment and become integrated in sustainable and inclusive economic processes in which economic, social and cultural rights are respected. Impact hypothesis: SDC contributes to the government's giving priority to vulnerable groups in the Gulf of Fonseca and La Mosquitia regions. Incentives and mechanisms are created so that public and private stakeholders address the causes of conflicts and territorial fragilities from the angle of territorial socio-economic inclusion. SDC supports the government in strengthening territorial governance and regulating public-private investment. This facilitates changes in the economic model, at least in the territories of the southern zone and La Mosquitia, by making it more transparent and inclusive. SDC strengthens the enforcement of ILO Convention 169. Outcome 2.2: Public and private stakeholders integrate youth into the labour force, enhance their competitive capacity, and promote changes in the framework conditions at the national and territorial levels (policy, regulations and incentives). Impact hypothesis: SDC helps the government and territorial public and private stakeholders seek joint solutions that are adapted to the reality of farm families and address the causes of conflicts such as lack of access to land or water, gender- or ethnic-based exclusion, lack of governance, and lack of technical and financial services. This contributes to Honduras generating more decent jobs that respect international standards and help mitigate the causes of migration. Climate Change, DRR and natural resources Outcome 3.1: Vulnerable and excluded populations, particularly women and youth, adopt sustainable practices of water, soil and forest management in selected territories. Impact hypothesis: SDC promotes and supports the empowerment and development of civil society organizations and networks with a common approach and the construction of sustained and inclusive dialogues at the national and territorial levels. The territorial-national approach allows it to link up with international and regional systems (ONCHR, MACCIR), as well as build capacities and processes at a territorial level. In addition, SDC promotes dialogue among donors, state agencies, ONCHR and civil society (G-16; formal and semi-formal alliances). Outcome 3.2: Public, social and private stakeholders reduce disaster risks and manage natural resources and resource-related conflicts through the strengthening of territorial Impact hypothesis: SDC facilitates the coordination and application of legal frameworks/International agreements through the watershed councils, which are spaces for convergence among community, private, donor, and public sectors to address the main causes of environmental vulnerability and conflicts in compliance with ILO Convention 169 governance and capacity building.
Thematic focus	1. Development of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME): Objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to the sustainable development of MSME and thereby to income and employment generation, through improved market access emphasizing local, regional and international chains of value addition, mainly of agricultural origin. 2) Governance and Public Finance: Objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to good governance, particularly with respect public finance management, effectiveness of public spending, transparency and accountability, citizen participation, public control and social audit. 3) Infrastructure and local public basic Services: Objective: Swiss Cooperation enables poorer populations sustainable access to basic public services of good quality.	1) Inclusive economic development: Domain goal: To enhance inclusive economic development focusing on employment and income 2) Reducing state fragility and promoting inclusive governance: Domain goal: To contribute to reduced state fragility and more inclusive governance 3) Environmental vulnerability and climate change: Domain goal: To reduce the environmental vulnerability and to strengthen the resilience among poor populations to the effects of climate change and other natural hazards	1) Governance and Rule of Law: Impact Goal: Switzerland contributes to strengthening the Rule of Law and advances the economic, social, political, civil and cultural rights of vulnerable groups, particularly of women and youth who are threatened by violence, as well as ethnic and cultural minorities. 2) Employment and inclusive economic development: Impact Goal: Switzerland promotes the economic inclusion of disadvantaged groups and regions by strengthening value chains and fostering employment and income through inclusive governance processes. 3) Climate change, DRR and natural resources: Impact Goal: Switzerland contributes to strengthening vulnerable groups' resilience to the risks associated with climate change and other natural threats, fosters the sustainable management of natural resources and facilitates the resolution of resource-related conflicts.
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	Strategic Dimensions 1. The Poverty Orientation is central and implies alignment with PRS, focus on poorest countries, emphasis on pro-poor policies 2. All interventions incorporate Gender and Governance as mandatory cross-cutting themes 3. Strategic principles guide interventions in the framework of the national cooperation systems: ownership, harmonization, alignment, local capacity development, micro-meso-macro linkages. Strategic principles - Ownership, Alignment and Harmonization - Capacity Development - Empowerment - Environmental compatibility - Prevention - Micro-meso-macro Cross-cutting themes Governance Gender	Cross-cutting themes Gender Governance	Cross-cutting themes Inclusive governance Gender equity In addition to reinforcing the regional and policy dialogue profile of the program, the Strategy 2018-2021 emphasizes the following themes and processes: - Promote an agenda of inclusion - Strengthen cooperation with the private sector - Connect urban and rural spaces - Mitigate negative effects of migration - From water and sanitation to integrated water management - Promote culture and memory as a driving force for change
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Capacity development, budget support, SWAP, Joint project-financing (baskets)	The strategy will continue using a balanced mix of modalities and partners. However, for reasons of scaling-up, mitigating political risks, improving policy impact, building sustainable capacities and managing management burden the following will be strengthened: - Increase the currently low proportion of contributions to local governments and Civil Society organizations - Increase contributions to UN-institutions and specialized organizations with thematic mandates. Likewise, co-financing with IFIs will be increased as a means for scaling-up and because of their policy leverage. - Decrease direct implementation from currently 40% of the total portfolio to a maximum of 20%. - Use country systems where possible, particularly at the local level - Maintain the principle to engage at micro, institutional and policy levels, but relate national policy work more explicitly to regional and global levels (e.g. climate change). - Proactively seek opportunities for PPPs in all domains and preferably integrated in programs rather than design them as separate projects; - Concentrate civil society support on capacity building Given the new donor landscape with fewer bilaterals, stronger alliances will be sought with IDB, World Bank and selectively with UN organizations where there is congruence between their core mandate and Swiss priorities. Collaboration with the global programs of climate change and water will be strengthened via the respective networks and through direct collaboration with the Andean program. Collaboration with SECO would include bilateral interventions (economic development, public finance) and seek synergies with global projects with presence in Central America. Regarding violence prevention and human rights, knowledge sharing with the Human Security Division will be sought.	Approaches Territorial concentration Out of fragility Psychosocial approach Communication for empowerment Risk reduction and climate adaptation Modalities Whole of Government approach Contributions and mandates Consolidation of bilateral/South-South cooperation Combine technical with political
Details on Humanitarian Support (only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)	About 1.3 Mio CHF per year for the region. After finishing direct humanitarian post-Mitch work, SDC Humanitarian Aid moved from a "reconstruction" approach to a "prevention and integrated risk and disaster management" approach.	The humanitarian aid will continue its presence in the Managua Office, maintaining its quick response capacity for crisis situations.	Mitigate negative effects of migration: increasingly more Central Americans are migrating - mainly to the United States - to seek employment and escape violence. Many migrants are adolescents and children who are exposed to sexual abuse and exploitation of all kinds. Swiss Humanitarian Aid contributes to the protection of migrant children and adolescents with financial grants and human resources (secondments) to the United Nations and civil society organizations in line with the Regional Protection and Solutions Framework. To prevent and mitigate the humanitarian consequences of migration in a cross-cutting manner, young people at risk and young returnees are considered as a target group in all the programs. In terms of budget: 11.8% of Swiss support in the period of the strategy are for Humanitarian aid.
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)			Consulting In Nicaragua, directly implemented projects are closed by mid-2019.
Main partner organizations	Note HIC Team: While the strategy contains a chapter on "Cooperation Partnerships, Strategic Principles and Modalities", the main partner organizations are not specifically mentioned, only in general form: public sector partners, bilateral development partners, Swiss NGOs.	Domain 1: ministries of agriculture and industry, IADB, the World Bank, private sector (e.g. MSME and producer associations), and national as well as international NGOs. Domain 2: national and international NGOs, UNDP, ministries of finance, sectoral institutions, mayor's offices, security institutions and human rights organizations. Domain 3: United Nations System (UNDP, FAO); governmental institutions (disaster prevention, agriculture, energy, natural resources); local governments; national and international NGOs; universities; development banks (WB, IADB); regional research and innovation centres; private sector.	Work with multiple stakeholders: SDC cooperates with a variety of partners including the State, civil society, the private sector and universities. In Honduras, the multi-stakeholder approach is well established. Forge alliances with multilateral actors: SDC consolidates cooperation with multilateral players to enhance successful Swiss experiences, leverage funds, and scale up effects. Along with the development banks, institutions of the UN and OAS are becoming increasingly important in Central America. In prioritized areas of its strategy, Switzerland contributes to international efforts in support of reforms led by national authorities and promotes decisions, based on the principles of Rule of Law and respect for human rights. Regional actors: at the regional level, SDC cooperates with public and private institutions, including civil society networks. The dialogue is maintained with the SICA through its sectoral institutions such as CEPREDENAC, CSUCA, SE-CAO (Executive Secretariat of the Central American Agriculture and Livestock Council) and CCAD (Central American Commission of the Environment and Development). Public-private partnerships: SDC explores opportunities to strengthen cooperation with the private sector in line with the Swiss Policy for International Cooperation 2017-2020. Private-public partnerships include all thematic pillars and are not limited to the domain of employment and inclusive economic development. Include the perspective of Global Programs: the Cooperation Office reinforces the dialogue with SDC's Global Programs on issues of climate change, water and migration, especially in the regional components of the Strategy. The bilateral programs take into account global norms, policies and the knowledge produced by global networks.
Key beneficiaries	Theme Financial Services: Urban and rural MSMEs/Farmers with limited access to services but potential to generate income above subsistence level Theme Business Development Services: MSME (mostly informal) and agricultural producers with limited access to services but with potential to make economic use of services; employees of MSME Theme Business Climate: MSME as above - emphasis on equitable conditions for MSME Theme Water & Sanitation: Rural and semi-urban populations without access to safe water and to sanitation Theme Disaster Risk Reduction: Population living in rural and semi-urban high risk zones Theme Vocational Training: Youth, 16-30 years old, un- or under-employed, completed basic education Theme Public Finance Governance: Population classified as poor, i.e. 45% of total	Poor, disadvantaged groups (e.g. women, youth), businesses, municipal governments, state institutions	Poor, excluded, vulnerable groups, especially women, adolescents, migrants, indigenous people and Afro-descendants, smallholder families with limited access to natural resources (land, water, forest, among others), infrastructure, credit, and those highly vulnerable to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, Grassroot leaders and HR defenders, LGBTI, persons living with HIV/AIDS, persons with special needs
Geographical/regional focus	The Cooperation Strategy for Central America has a regional focus and concentrates country-level interventions on the two poorest countries in the region (i.e. Nicaragua and Honduras). Note HIC Team: This is not further specified with view to locations in the countries.	The Central America strategy 2013-17 will comprise a mix of geographically defined programs (context sensitive interventions) and thematically defined bi-national or regional programs. Within countries, greater geographic concentration will be sought by clustering interventions in selected territories or sub-regions.	Central North region (Las Segovias)
Total budget *)	Nicaragua: approx. 11 Million Swiss Francs per annum.	Note HIC Team: No country-level budget is included in the strategy. Between 2013-2017, Swiss cooperation (i.e. SDC including Humanitarian Aid and some SECO support) will commit > 200 Million Swiss Francs (191 CHF Regional & Bilateral funds; 12.5 Mio CHF Humanitarian Aid) and disburse annually about 40 Million of which the bulk of funding goes to programs and projects in Nicaragua and Honduras. Up to 10% of funding will be used for supporting regional initiatives focused on cross-country learning, policy development and innovation.	Nicaragua: 70.8 Mio CHF in bilateral projects plus around 10 Mio CHF in regional projects.
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	Swiss Cooperation has a 25 year trajectory in Central America, and accumulated an important capital of experience and partnerships, creating goodwill not only in-country but also in multilateral fora. Living-up to the global MDG commitments by investing in poor countries were such track record of Swiss Cooperation exists makes sense from a development effectiveness perspective. Deepening the partnership with Nicaragua and Honduras, and indirectly with the whole region, because of the increased regional integration dynamics, lies in the long-term interest of Swiss foreign policy, although in the short-term, other interests with regard to trade, migration or security may appear of minor importance of Switzerland.	The Swiss cooperation strategy 2007-2012 was designed as a joint SDC-SECO strategy. Half way, SECO programs in economic development and public finance were reduced as a consequence of the parliamentary bill 2009-2012 that no longer included Nicaragua as a SECO priority country and because governance conditions in Nicaragua led to the discontinuation of the general budget support. The current thematic organization of staff will change to a more geographic distribution of responsibilities, particularly for those themes that are particularly context-specific and politically sensitive, such as security or governance. As a consequence, the capacity of the office in Honduras will be enhanced, whereas operational staffing in Nicaragua will remain constant despite important increases in financial volume.	Swiss civil society has also shown a long and solid commitment with Central America. Small and large private organizations support rural development, advance health and education, and promote human rights. The role of these institutions is critical for both their presence on the ground and their advocacy work in Switzerland. Switzerland maintains contacts with all the key actors in the region. This includes dialogue with the United States, which plays a dominant role both in the political and the economic spheres of the region. Switzerland is associated with the Joint Programming process of the European Union in Nicaragua and Honduras and is in tune with European donors. With the emergence of new aid programs from the South (Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Chile and Argentina), from Asia (South Korea, Taiwan and Iran) as well as Russia, the bilateral panorama is more heterogeneous and makes donor coordination more complex. To expand its network of contacts and diversify its alliances, Switzerland seeks to establish a dialogue with emerging donors. Wherever appropriate, work links are established, for example in the framework of trilateral cooperation.
Relevant context factors (country)	Conditions to enhance development effectiveness are favourable in Nicaragua and Honduras, because of the evolving PRS processes, alignment and harmonization action plans as well as the established donor coordination and dialogue mechanisms. Both governments are interested in better harmonization and alignment because of the unsatisfactory overall effectiveness of aid, its fragmentation and because its only partial coherence with national priorities.	In Nicaragua, President Ortega has been re-elected for the period 2012-16. Consolidation of his power and further strengthening the dominance of the ruling party (Frente Sandinista) in all state institutions at central and municipal levels is expected. Critical views voice concern about a gradual loss of institutionally weakening of democratic governance and a general tendency towards authoritarian rule. With the continued strong support of Venezuela, the support of international financial institutions, continued prudent macro-economic management, and convergence of interests between the economic interest groups and the Government, the country will see relative stability. Moderate but steady economic growth, relatively high FDI, sufficient capacity and resources for social programs allow modest progress regarding MDGs and acceptable levels of people satisfaction. It is generally expected that the opposition will remain weak, the space for exercising political rights will be limited and levels of political conflictivity will be moderate. The development cooperation context has changed quite significantly in Nicaragua and Honduras over the last years: - The poverty reduction strategies that provided a framework for aligning cooperation to country efforts ceased to exist and were replaced by a multitude of national, sectoral and local plans creating a more complex framework to anchor aid programs. - Many bilateral like-minded donors left (Nordic countries, Holland, Great Britain), mainly because of shifting geographic priorities to the poorest regions of the world. The main bilaterals are USA, EU, Germany, Canada, Spain, Japan and Switzerland. - New "sponsors" like Venezuela in Nicaragua, or Brazil and Taiwan in both Honduras and Nicaragua play a larger but quite different role. In Nicaragua, Venezuela's assistance is valued at about 500 million USD, which equals the total official ODA. - The relative importance of multilateral institutions – in particular the World Bank, IDB and the Central American Bank (CABE), but also the UN organizations – increased. About 2/3 of assistance comes from the multilaterals. The multilaterals set the tone, whereas the coordination of the bilaterals leaves room for improvement. - Aid dependency persists but has declined. Traditional aid to Nicaragua and Honduras amounts to USD 500 Million in Nicaragua and USD 750 Million in Honduras, representing 31% and 20% of the respective national budgets. - Donor strategies continue aiming at poverty reduction, focusing on economics and MDGs. However, human security and climate change have become more important. - Aid modalities changed and the general budget support provided by bilaterals in Nicaragua has been suspended. - Donor coordination has weakened in Nicaragua, whereas the so-called G-16 in Honduras continues to be effective at both the political and operational levels. - Civil society organizations receive less support as a result of the declining presence of Bilaterals.	Switzerland concentrates its bilateral cooperation in Honduras and Nicaragua: they are the two countries with the lowest income in the region. In the international rankings on the Rule of Law, they hold some of the lowest positions. Although their contexts have developed differently, they share the challenge of facing multiple forms of fragility: their governance systems are exclusive, their economies vulnerable to external shocks and their environment subject to disasters and extreme weather events. In the political-social sphere, the fragilities of Honduras and Nicaragua are markedly different: In Honduras, the rates of violence are high and impunity for serious crimes is alarming. Despite reforms in the areas of justice and security, the capacity of state institutions to combat the causes of violence remains limited. Citizens live in an environment of insecurity that affects the realization of their rights and development aspirations. In Nicaragua, citizen security is one of the best in Latin America thanks to effective prevention work. The country, nevertheless, faces challenges in democratic governance, the reform of its electoral system and the balance of powers. Added to this, are threats to its economic stability stemming from the crisis of its ally Venezuela and the NICAA-Act, a law promoted by U.S. congresspersons, that would place conditions on loans from development banks subject to the progress of democratic reforms.
Important hints / comments	Joint strategy from SDC and SECO The Cooperation Strategy for Central America has a regional focus and concentrates country-level interventions on the two poorest countries in the region (i.e. Nicaragua and Honduras). The strategy links the country focus with a regional program component that is thematically coherent with national interventions and that facilitates knowledge sharing among countries. The regional concept is defined in the following way: a) A regional program component that: - Contributes to the solution of supra-national problems - Contributes to the strengthening of regional institutions - Facilitates access to regional markets and investment opportunities. Regional program support has to be thematically congruent with the country programs in Nicaragua and/or Honduras. Experiences and results of regional cooperation shall benefit primarily those two countries. b) A Regional Program-Management characterized by: - Regional knowledge sharing (networking, regional learning) - Organization of the Cooperation Office Team primarily by thematic responsibilities. Country level interventions will concentrate on Nicaragua and Honduras. Currently, the Nicaragua program is thematically broader and much larger in financial terms. The Honduras program will be gradually expanded and shall include sector program support (SVIAP) in two thematic priorities, a stronger engagement in private sector development (MSME development), and a stronger, albeit only selective involvement in general policy dialogue and donor coordination (G-16). In short, partial balancing of country priorities in favour of Honduras is envisaged, without reductions in the Nicaragua program.	Switzerland ranks in the middle field of the remaining bilateral donors and is by a long and complete enough to make a difference. However, alliance building and effective coordination become more challenging and the importance of dialog and cooperation with multilaterals increased because of their financial capacity and policy leverage. Note HIC Team: This seems to be a strategy where lessons learned led to quite a number of changes. Or, at least it was documented in way that is different to other strategies.	In Nicaragua, Switzerland is among the four most important donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), together with the European Union, the USA and Spain. In Honduras, SDC holds the fifth place. The relevance of Switzerland lies not only in constant funding but also in its impartial positions and an agenda based on human rights- and values: the inclusion of the vulnerable and poor, equality between women and men, human rights and democratic governance have been promoted consistently over four decades. Mentioning of Switzerland's foreign policy goals Combine technical with political: in the Strategy 2013-2017, the transformation began from a technical program into a more political program that focuses on the systemic causes of poverty and exclusion. These processes are deepened and consolidated in 2018 - 2021.

Timeline Nicaragua

	Cooperation Programme for Central America, Exit Programme 2022-2024
Main / key objectives	<p>With its 2022-2024 regional cooperation programme, Switzerland will a) Implement the gradual and responsible withdrawal of Switzerland's bilateral development cooperation with Central America in line with Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy guidelines and b) Foster sustainable and equitable development in Central America by strengthening participatory governance and human rights, the socio-economic inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups, sustainable natural resource management, and climate and disaster resilience in priority territories.</p> <p>Global Goal 2022-2024: Switzerland fosters sustainable and equitable development in Central America by strengthening participatory governance and human rights, socio-economic inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups, sustainable management of natural resources, and climate and disaster resilience in priority territories.</p>
Theory of change	<p><u>Governance and the Rule of Law</u> Expected impact: Strengthen the rule of law with a focus on inclusive governance and respect for political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights. Outcome Nicaragua 1.1: State and civil society institutions with expanded capacities to promote respect for human rights in accordance with international standards, propose and conduct reforms to the national legal framework. Outcome Nicaragua 1.2: Increased number and variety of civil society organisations improve their effectiveness in preventing violence and strengthening social cohesion for the benefit of vulnerable groups.</p> <p><u>Employment and inclusive economic development</u> Expected impact: Insert vulnerable and excluded groups in territorial economic development with shared governance and respecting economic, social and cultural rights. Outcome Nicaragua 2.1: Vulnerable groups improve their income and employment, are integrated into sustainable and inclusive economic processes where economic, social and cultural rights are respected. Outcome Nicaragua 2.2: Public and private actors integrate young people into the labour market, improve their competitive capacities and promote changes in the framework conditions at national and territorial level (policies, regulations, incentives). <u>Climate change, DRR and natural resources</u> Expected impact: Contribute to resilience to climate change and disasters by strengthening governance in the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources. Common Outcome (HON and NIC) 3.1: Population in situation of vulnerability and exclusion, particularly women and youth, adopt sustainable water, soil and forest management practices in selected territories. Common Outcome (Honduras and Nicaragua) 3.2: Public, community and private actors reduce disaster risks, manage natural resources and associated conflicts, by strengthening territorial governance (water in Honduras) and developing their capacities.</p>
Thematic focus	<p>1) Governance and the rule of law. Expected impact: Switzerland contributes to strengthening the rule of law with a focus on inclusive governance and respect for political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights. 2) Employment and inclusive economic development. Expected impact: Switzerland contributes to the strengthening of multi-stakeholder platforms and multi-sector roundtables. leading processes that articulate actions that facilitate territorial economic development under shared governance respecting economic, social and cultural rights and the socio-economic inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups. 3) Climate change, DRR and natural resources. Expected impact: Vulnerable populations increase their resilience to climate change and disasters by strengthening governance in the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources.</p> <p>In Nicaragua, Switzerland will focus on contributing to strengthening the multi-stakeholder approach, promoting spaces for private sector and civil society participation in development and poverty reduction. Switzerland will in particular support think tanks that generate analyses and proposals for long-term reforms. Finally, Switzerland will lead a humanitarian policy dialogue and strengthen the coordination and action of the humanitarian organisation ecosystem.</p>
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	<p><u>Transversal themes</u> Inclusive governance Disaster risk reduction Gender equality</p> <p>Phasing-out: closure because targets have been or cannot be achieved. Phasing-down: gradually winding down a programme's activities, giving priority to strengthening local organisations in order to sustain benefits. Phasing-over: transferring some activities to another organisation for it to achieve its objectives and reinforce sustainability.</p>
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	<p><u>Approaches</u> Territorial concentration Out of fragility Psychosocial approach</p> <p><u>Modalities</u> Integrated WOGA work</p>
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)</i>	<p>Beyond 2024, Switzerland's priorities in the region will focus on humanitarian aid, peace, security, human rights, prosperity and sustainability as set out in the 2022-2025 Strategy for the Americas. Swiss Humanitarian Aid will remain in Central America beyond 2024, based on its universal mandate.</p>
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	
Main partner organizations	<p>Swiss Cooperation is consolidating the multi-actor approach. In Nicaragua, it is consolidating direct partnerships with the private sector and coordinates with other donors, in particular the European Union. In the spirit of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 17), Swiss Cooperation creates alliances with international partners and multilateral agencies.</p> <p>At regional level Swiss Cooperation liaises with regional public and private institutions, including civil society networks and think tanks (CATE) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). It also works with the Central American Integration System (SICA), through its agencies, in particular the Coordination Centre for Disaster Prevention in Central America (CEPREDENA), the Central American Council of Finance Ministers (COSEFIN) and the Central American Commission for Environment and Development (CCAD). It aims to strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights System and contribute to the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).</p> <p>A public-private partnerships: Swiss Cooperation is consolidating and evaluating options for scaling up with the private sector, with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Centre of Excellence for Private Sector Engagement (KEP).</p> <p>SDC Global Programmes. Cooperation with these programmes is being strengthened to include their perspective particularly on the issues of climate change, food security and migration, and especially cooperation with the global Water programme and the resEAU, aimed at capitalising on and disseminating SDC's expertise in water and sanitation and integrated water and sanitation management in the region.</p>
Key beneficiaries	<p>Poor, excluded, vulnerable groups, especially women, adolescents, migrants, indigenous people and Afro-descendants, smallholder families with limited access to natural resources (land, water, forest, among others), infrastructure, credit, and those highly vulnerable to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, Grassroot leaders and HR defenders, LGBTI, persons living with HIV/AIDS, persons with special needs</p>
Geographical/regional focus	<p>Central North</p>
Total budget *)	<p>The Swiss Cooperation Programme in Central America 2022-2024 will be implemented with a budget of CHF 58.8 million. The resources come from South Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid. In Nicaragua: 17.2 Mio CHF in 2022, 12.1 Mio CHF in 2023, 7.0 Mio CHF in 2024.</p>
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	<p>Phasing out of Swiss South Cooperation</p>
Relevant context factors (country)	<p>During the implementation of the 2018-2021 Strategy it became clear that Swiss Cooperation had to adapt to the changes arising from the conflict in Nicaragua and the COVID-19 pandemic.</p> <p>In Nicaragua, the breakdown of institutions and the spiral of human rights violations in 2018 stimulated critical reflection and a thoroughgoing realignment of the strategy.</p>
Important hints / comments	<p>Switzerland has two embassies in Central America, one in San José and one in Guatemala City, and two cooperation offices, one in Managua and one in Tegucigalpa. The exit process will culminate in the closure of the cooperation offices in Nicaragua and Honduras and the opening of honorary consulates. While cooperation is Switzerland's priority in bilateral relations with the CA-4 countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), it is increasing economic exchanges, starting from relatively modest amounts.</p> <p>Beyond 2024, Switzerland's priorities in the region will focus on humanitarian aid, peace, security, human rights, prosperity and sustainability as set out in the 2022-2025 Strategy for the Americas. Swiss Humanitarian Aid will remain in Central America beyond 2024, based on its universal mandate.</p> <p>The distribution of responsibilities established in the 2018-2021 regional programme strategy is maintained for monitoring the regional programmes: the Managua office will assume the leadership of the regional programme Climate Change, Disaster Risk Reduction and Natural Resources, while the Tegucigalpa office will be responsible for the regional Governance and Human Rights programme. The Humanitarian Aid representative in Managua will assume regional responsibility for all Humanitarian Aid interventions in the region in coordination and with the support of the office in Tegucigalpa as appropriate.</p>

Timeline El Salvador

General information: Bilateral cooperation with El Salvador only in the framework of regional cooperation programmes for Central America. El Salvador was never one of the focus countries of the region. Cooperation started in 1982 and ended in 2008. The allocated budget to El Salvador throughout the years were 19 Mio USD (COSUDE en El Salvador: Aportes durante 21 años)

Period	Mehrfähriges Regionalprogramm der DEH für Zentralamerika 1993-1998	Regionalprogramm 1999-2005 Zentralamerika
Main / Key objectives	<p>The main objective of development cooperation in Central America remains the better satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged sections of the population. The prerequisite for this is that the potential beneficiaries have a minimum development potential of their own and are enabled by the aid to advance their development in the longer term by their own efforts.</p> <p>The central concern of DEH is the best possible development of people in their natural, cultural and social environment.</p>	<p>The primary objective of Swiss development cooperation in Central America remains the satisfaction of the basic needs of disadvantaged sections of the population. The program is aimed in particular at families and small farms in rural areas and at small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in urban areas.</p> <p>This 1999-2005 regional program is the second medium-term development cooperation program for Central America with an explicitly regional or transnational approach program approach.</p>
Thematic interventions	<p>Four thematic focus areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Agriculture2. Drinking water and settlement hygiene3. Environmental protection and sustainable natural resources4. Trade promotion and vocational education	<p>Thematic focus areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Agricultural production2. Water and settlement hygiene3. Private sector development <p>--> reconstruction after destructions of Hurricane Mitch; more focus on humanitarian aid</p>
Cross cutting issues/thematic principles	<p><u>General guidelines:</u></p> <p>Economic and government self-reliance: at the macro level, efforts will be made to strengthen the government in improving the economic, political and institutional environment. At the micro level, efforts are being made to support self-organization (COFIDA SAP, DRI's, credit system).</p> <p>Supporting the poor: The basic needs of the poorer population continue to guide the overall program. This includes both immediate improvement of living conditions (e.g., drinking water, FISE) and a medium-term increase in food production and storage to improve the nutritional situation (sectoral agriculture projects).</p> <p>Supporting the management of environmental problems: This issue is also gaining importance in Central America and it will be increasingly addressed in the future program, both in the sustainable use of resources and in their protection. Experience has been gained at regional level in the forestry sector (CATIE) and in Honduras in the control and collection of pollutants (CESCCO). Other projects are underway or planned (exhaust emissions, solar energy, natural forest management).</p> <p>Improvement of production conditions: As an issue that has a central impact on a wide variety of sectors, this continues to receive significant attention in the program. All projects in the agricultural sector, as well as the area of trade promotion, work directly or indirectly to improve production conditions.</p> <p>Health and education: Improving the health of mainly the rural population is a major aspect of the water program. In view of the threat of cholera in Central America, this takes on added importance. Improving the education of the population also forms part of a large part of the water projects, which are primarily aimed at promoting production.</p> <p><u>Transversal guiding principles</u></p> <p>Empowerment: Supporting and strengthening organizations and groups in defending their interests and overcoming social, ethnic and gender discrimination; promoting the participation of disadvantaged classes in economic and political processes.</p> <p>Training: Promotion and training of 'human resources', in particular also by means of vocational training, for better integration into the economic process and to increase their own level of organization.</p> <p>Environment: Measures and sensitization for the environmentally friendly management and improvement of the production basis as well as consistent consideration of environmental aspects in all actions.</p> <p>Networking: Incorporation of macroeconomic and political developments into activities at the micro level and vice versa, as well as stronger links between regional and local projects. and local projects.</p> <p>Sustainability: Promotion of organizations, development of self-supporting structures, search for economic independence.</p>	<p><u>Guiding principles:</u></p> <p>Promotion of potential: Not only the neediness, but also the development potential of target population and partner institutions should be decisive for our cooperation. This presupposes a certain development-relevant readiness for change on the part of those concerned, requires a careful and conscious selection of the beneficiaries of our actions, and calls for a conscious promotion of entrepreneurial thinking and a higher weighting of own performance, competition, and integration into the world market.</p> <p>Good governance: All partners (private and public) should place greater emphasis on good governance, in particular transparency, accountability and compliance with contractual obligations. In addition, greater emphasis will be placed on aspects of the rule of law, decentralization, pluralism and respect for human rights. New, specific projects will also be launched to this end. Based on an analysis of the field, an entry strategy and priority starting points are to be laid down in a concept paper. In order to reach a certain "critical mass" of experience and activities, between 5 and 10% of the funds of the Central America program will be used in the area of good governance by the end of the validity period of the present regional program.</p> <p>Direct poverty alleviation: Certain targeted measures for direct poverty alleviation will be deliberately pursued - also as a compensation for the promotion of potential - e.g. through projects for area-wide drinking water supply. As a result of the profound destruction caused by hurricane "Mitch", this leitmotif will be of great importance, especially during the next 2-3 years, and is likely to diminish thereafter. The additional hardship and poverty caused by Mitch is to be countered in a humanitarian sense with temporary reconstruction measures. Special emphasis will be placed on a comparatively quick impact of the support.</p> <p><u>Transversal:</u></p> <p>Gender: The approach of equal development has been promoted so far with various training and monitoring efforts. Gender awareness in the projects has increased significantly, as has corresponding action. The basic problem that the gender approach is in most cases to be brought into the existing program as something additional, after the fact, rather than as a key issue that determined the program definition in the first place, is difficult to address. Further deepening the gender approach is a process that will continue in the future. Special attention will be given to the development of sectoral gender strategies.</p> <p>Environmental sustainability: A large proportion of ongoing projects already explicitly address the sustainable use of natural resources. However, environmental sustainability will be considered as a cross-sectoral, transversal priority in the future program.</p> <p>Human and Institutional Development (HID): The development and promotion of technical and methodological knowledge relevant to development among institutions and individuals has been a backbone in the previous Central America program and will continue to be of great importance in the future. As elements or lines of action of HID, institutional strengthening and support for executing agencies will be pursued in addition to direct training.</p>
Main implementation modalities/methods/instruments	<p>Technical development cooperation</p> <p>Delegation of project implementation to Swiss and multilateral third-party institutions (government contracts, co-financing).</p> <p>Measures in the economic sector should complement the DEH program in a meaningful way, for which coordination with the BAWI is actively promoted within the Swiss federal administration.</p> <p>Multilateral channels in DEH Central America Programme mostly for financing regional research projects</p>	<p>Technical development cooperation: It concentrates on the three priority areas of "agricultural production", "water and sanitation" and "business promotion".</p> <p>Economic + Trade Measure Humanitarian Aid</p> <p>In order to support the continuation of economic growth in Central America, it is particularly important to use market-based and entrepreneurial development and trade policy promotion instruments. Structural adjustment policy must, however, be coupled with accompanying social measures in order to cushion negative effects and not endanger political stability.</p>
Implementing organizations	<p>DEH is leading in most of the projects in Central America</p> <p>Through its program contributions, DEH supports the activities of Swiss ONGs, which in many cases complement its own program at a grassroots level work.</p>	<p>In Central America, SDC generally enters into partnerships with government bodies, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, and seeks to link them as far as possible. At present, however, there is a certain preponderance of cooperation with the state (cf. Supplement 3). Greater diversification of partner organizations, and thus a broader distribution of risk, is desirable. The choice of partners is based on task-related criteria: State institutions are to be supported in the performance of their core tasks, i.e., primarily at the level of standards and framework conditions; for implementation and execution, however, there is to be increasing cooperation with private organizations. In the spirit of promoting decentralization, the SDC will in future also increasingly enter into partnerships at the interface between the state and civil society, i.e. at the level of municipal authorities.</p> <p>The main thrusts of future program management include:</p> <p>- For new projects, outsourcing of project implementation will be sought wherever possible.</p>
Main partner organizations	<p>Stronger participatory focus and less on institutional partners -->more responsibility for rural population. One of the few approaches for sustainable development of marginalised rural regions</p>	<p>In Central America, SDC generally enters into partnerships with governmental bodies, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and seeks to link them as far as possible. At present, however, there is a certain preponderance of cooperation with the state. A greater diversification of partner organizations, and thus a broader distribution of risk, is desirable. The choice of partners is based on task-related criteria: State institutions should be supported in the performance of their core tasks, i.e., primarily at the level of standards and framework conditions; for implementation and execution, however, there should be increasing cooperation with private organizations. In the spirit of promoting decentralization, SDC will in future also increasingly enter into partnerships at the interface between the state and civil society, i.e. at the level of municipal authorities.</p>
Key beneficiaries	<p>The support is aimed in particular at small farmers and, more recently, at the inhabitants of the poor districts in the larger agglomerations, which have grown rapidly in recent years, taking into account the fact that about one third of the heads of families in Central America are women.</p>	<p>Programme especially focussed on families and small scale farmers in rural areas, as well as small and medium enterprises.</p>
Geographical/regional focus	<p>The support is aimed in particular at small farmers and, more recently, at the inhabitants of the poor districts in the larger agglomerations, which have grown rapidly in recent years, taking into account the fact that about one third of the heads of families in Central America are women. The widespread settlement of military conflicts in the region in recent years has allowed an increase in trade and cooperation among Central American countries. In view of the increasing formation of political and economic blocs worldwide (NAFTA, MERCOSUR, EC), the need for joint action is gradually spreading among Central American countries as well. Even though the ongoing integration is primarily a political and economic process, which the donor community can only influence to a limited extent, it also opens up new opportunities for intraregional cooperation. Since the framework conditions and problems in the individual countries, despite all their differences, are very similar in many areas, increased cooperation and intensive coordination and exchange of experience are urgently needed.</p> <p>In the future, DEH will therefore concentrate its cooperation on two levels of action:</p> <p>At the regional level, regional activities (e.g. research programs, networks) will fulfill tasks for which capacities are lacking at the national level, where, thanks to synergies between countries, work can be done more efficiently or better results can be achieved. The problems addressed at this level are relevant to several countries in the region.</p> <p>At the national level, DEH will focus on one priority country where a program with a certain critical mass should be achieved, allowing for an active Policy Dialogue. Based on past experience, Nicaragua has been selected as the new focal country, which will require a continuous shift of activities from Honduras to Nicaragua for the next few years.</p> <p>--> El Salvador not a focus country</p>	<p>Based on the largely positive experience to date and in line with Message 98 on the SDC's framework credit for development cooperation, which provides for a strengthening of regional efforts, the regional concept in Central America will be systematically pursued and expanded. It allows for the cross-country use of synergies. In thematic areas, the regional approach allows the promotion of networking, without claiming to contribute to a systematic regional integration promotion.</p>
Total budget *)	<p>18-20 Mio CHF per year for the whole region, breakdown by country not available</p>	<p>18-20 million CHF / year for the region, breakdown by country not available.</p>
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	<p>Based on past experience, Nicaragua was selected as the new focus country, which will require a continuous shift of activities from Honduras to Nicaragua for the next years. The shift of focus from Honduras to Nicaragua also necessitates a shift in the Coordination Office responsible for operational support of the program. With the arrival of the new coordinator for Central America at the end of May 1993, the previous liaison office (ODENIC) in Managua will be upgraded to a regional coordination office (CORMAN), and at the same time the office in Tegucigalpa will be transformed into a liaison office for Honduras (ODEHON).</p>	<p>The present program takes into account in particular the principles of the SDC's Latin America Strategy (Section Guidelines for Latin America 1995 - 2005) as well as the messages for development cooperation, for economic and trade policy measures and for humanitarian aid of the Swiss Confederation.</p> <p>The main features of the current Central America program can be summarized as follows:</p> <p>SDC is particularly well anchored in Nicaragua and Honduras, thanks in part to a long-standing presence in the agriculture and water supply sectors.</p> <p>The regionalization of programs is progressing steadily (currently 40% regional programs); Nicaragua as a priority country tends to lose weight in volume terms in favour of El Salvador.</p> <p>In sectoral terms, traditional areas of intervention (agriculture, water supply) stand side by side with more recent areas of action (business promotion, promotion of "good governance").</p>
Relevant context factors (country)	<p>Peace process in El Salvador. Elections in 1994 and afterwards site assessment. In case of positive assessment, the desing of a bilateral programme in the framework of the regional programme is possible. Peace process is developing very slowly.</p> <p>Structural adjustment programmes led to a stabilisation of the economy on Central America. Still risk that this growth lead to more inequalities in society.</p>	<p>Structural adjustment programmes are continuing</p> <p>Hurricane Mitch 1998</p> <p>Peace Agreement 1992</p> <p>The military patt situation in El Salvador has led to the fact that the FMLN Guerilla could negotiate in return for their demobilisation a comprehensive reform package. FMLN developed as political party and with that new signs for a modern democratic two party system</p> <p>Reduction of the army and El Salvadors now belongs to one of the countries worldwide with very few military spendings</p> <p>At least formal peacebuilding as one of the main context factors of the 90s</p> <p>It will be now important to counteract the growing caudillismo with strengthening the civil society and good governance</p> <p>Rising crime rates in El Salvador</p>
Important hints/comments		<p>Three national programs in Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador are prolonged until 2005.</p>

Timeline El Salvador

Period	Schweizer Kooperationsstrategie Zentralamerika 2007-2012
Main / Key objectives	<p>Overall objective: Swiss Cooperation contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development</p> <p><u>Strategic Dimensions</u></p> <p>1. The Poverty Orientation is central and implies alignment with PRS, focus on poorest countries, emphasis on pro poor policies</p> <p>2. All interventions incorporate Gender and Governance as mandatory cross-cutting themes</p> <p>3. Strategic principles guide interventions in the framework of the national cooperation systems: ownership, harmonization, alignment; local capacity development; micro-meso-macro linkages.</p>
Thematic interventions	<p>Thematic focus areas:</p> <p>1. MSME Development</p> <p>2. Governance and Public Finance</p> <p>3. Infrastructure and local basic services</p>
Cross cutting issues/thematic principles	<p>1. Governance: Particular emphasis is put on transparency and accountability in the public sector management and in public services delivery. Strengthening stakeholder and more inclusive citizen participation are emphasized, including at the local level, since municipalities and locally operating institutions are expected to assume a larger role in public services delivery and in providing favourable conditions for economic development as a result of the decentralization process.</p> <p>2. Gender: In order to promote equal opportunities and access to resources and services for both woman and men and in order to reduce existing gender discrepancies, woman shall benefit especially from development interventions.</p> <p>Strategic principles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Ownership, Alignment and Harmonization- Capacity Development- Empowerment- Environmental compatibility- Prevention- Micro-meso-macro
Main implementation modalities/methods/instruments	Capacity development, budget support, SWAP, Joint project-financing (baskets)
Implementing organizations	Cooperation with public sector institutions deepend and expanded as a result of growing confidence in governments, because their efforts in developing PRS and other conditions that facilitate alignment and aim at greater aid effectiveness.
Main partner organizations	While the strategy contains a chapter on "Cooperation Partnerships, Strategic Principles and Modalities", the main partner organizations are not specifically mentioned, only in general form: public sector partners, bilateral development partners, Swiss NGOs.
Key beneficiaries	<p>Theme Financial Services: Urban and rural MSMEs/Farmers with limited access to services but potential to generate income above subsistence level</p> <p>Theme Business Development Services: MSME (mostly informal) and agricultural producers with limited access to services but with potential to make economic use of services; employees of MSME</p> <p>Theme Business Climate: MSME as above - emphasis on equitable conditions for MSME</p> <p>Theme Water & Sanitation: Rural and semi-urban populations without access to safe water and to sanitation</p> <p>Theme Disaster Risk Reduction: Population living in rural and semi-urban high risk zones.</p> <p>Theme Vocational Training: Youth, 16-30 years old, un- or under-employed, completed basic education</p> <p>Theme Public Finance/ Governance: Population classified as poor, i.e. 45% of total</p>
Geographical/regional focus	Bilateral operations gradually concentrated on Nicaragua and Honduras in order to deepen the poverty focus, because or more favourable aid policies and framework conditions (i.e. PRS, harmonization and alignment) to optimize limited financial and human resources of Swiss Cooperation.
Total budget *)	About 1.3 Mio CHF per year for the region. After finishing direct humanitarian post Mitch work, SDC Humanitarian Aid moved from a "reconstruction" approach to a "prevention and integrated risk and disaster management" approach.
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	The Cooperation Strategy for Central America has a regional focus which has to be thematically congruent with the country programs in Nicaragua and Honduras. Experiences and results of regional cooperation shall benefit primarily those two countries --> less focus on El Salvador as other country of the region (closure of cooperation in 2008)
Relevant context factors (country)	<p>Advancing Central American integration (free trade agreements, reduced border controls), but political integration is lagging behind</p> <p>Recurrent natural disasters, acceleration of natural resources, violence related to social exclusion, drugs and migration, emerging problem of youth gangs</p>
Important hints/comments	End of bilateral cooperation with El Salvador in 2008

Timeline Cuba

	1998-2000 (Exploratory pilot phase)	2000-2003 (Pilot phase)
Main / key objectives	Explore opportunities for a possible launch of a special programme in Cuba that can help deepen relations with the Cuban government: "A stronger commitment to engage in development cooperation with Cuba is likely to be beneficial to Switzerland's image both in Cuba itself today and among other donors active there. (1998 Clarification Mission Report Cuba, p. 4)"; "...the motives for Switzerland's greater involvement in promoting Cuba's development are not primarily to be found in the actual need for aid, but rather arise from our general foreign policy goals and interests... (1998 Clarification Mission Report Cuba, p. 6)	1. To acquire a better knowledge of the current context in order to be better prepared for a possible Special Programme if conditions permit. 2. To contribute to the support of the population through humanitarian aid, in the areas of food and health, and through economic development projects focused on food security, such as post-harvest grain preservation. 3. To contribute to the strengthening of civil society through support to institutions working in local development and economic development (1999-11-18 Mission Report Pilot Special Programme Cuba, p. 11, & 2004 Strategic Orientation 2004-2006, p.3)
Theory of change		In the face of the possible economic and political opening, Switzerland can, by launching a pilot programme with Cuba, play a constructive role in the transition process. It can effectively bring relevant own experience in modern agriculture, local governance and local (economic) development to the table, and thereby further deepen existing trustful bilateral relations and strengthen its role as international partner for political dialogue.
Thematic focus	Activities centered on local initiatives in agriculture, food security, and local development	Local economic and social development has proven to be relevant. Swiss co-operation today has a network of contacts and a good understanding of risks and opportunities that allow for long-term strategic orientations, taking into account the limited resources and influence that Switzerland can claim (2003 Strategische Orientierung Kuba_2004-2006_final, p. 5)
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles		Bottom-up approach, focus on local initiatives in the areas of governance, economic development and culture, non-state actor involvement supported to the degree possible (private, NGO), important strategic goal to engage in dialogue with national government
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Involvement of Cuban partners in regional SDC programmes Examples: Co-financed agricultural networks, such as PRECODEPA (potatoes), PROFRIJOL (beans), PRM (maize) and ISNAR (agricultural research management) (1999-11-18 Missionsbericht Pilot Spezialprogramm Kuba, p. 7) Humanitarian Aid	Small-scale bilateral cooperation, mainly pilot measures, co-financing, direct consultancy - humanitarian aid
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)</i>	Existed prior to exploratory phase, at times involving substantial budget: focus food security and natural disaster relief (especially hurricanes); set to continue as needed	Continued - focus on food security, natural disaster relief (hurricanes)
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	No bilateral cooperation. Humanitarian aid implemented to national and international organisation, e.g. MediCuba and the World Food Programme	SDC experts, mainly through government (national, regional, local) and NGOs, UN organisations (e.g. UNDP)
Main partner organizations	National, regional and local government authorities, national NGOs, international organisations	Ministry of Foreign Investment and Cooperation (MINVEC); , other national, regional and local government authorities, incl. agricultural cooperatives, national NGOs, university institutes, international organisations
Key beneficiaries	Farmers/agricultural cooperatives/special agencies for agriculture development, local NGOs, local communities	National government staff, staff of municipalities and regional authorities, farmers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, members vulnerable groups, citizens
Geographical/regional focus	Country-wide	Country-wide
Total budget *)	1998: 1.6 m CHF (of which 1.4 m CHF humanitarian aid) 1999: 2.2 m CHF (of which 2.1 m CHF humanitarian aid)	2000: 1.1. m CHF (of which 0.7 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2001: 0.8 m CHF (of which 0.23 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2002: 2 m CHF (of which 0.7 m CHF humanitarian aid)
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	Longstanding special relationship between Cuba and Switzerland which acted as protective power from 1961 - 2015 (representation of US interests in Cuba); on the occasion of the 700th anniversary of Switzerland, additional 700 million CHF made available for development cooperation; SDC Pilot Programme favoured by SDC Directorate Committee;	2000: SDC establishes Cooperation Office in La Habana In 2002, Switzerland becomes member of the United Nations; the requested credit of 4,400 million Swiss francs fits into the Federal Council's repeatedly reaffirmed goal of increasing the funds for official development assistance to 0.4 per cent of gross national income by 2010 (2003, Parliamentary Legislative Review, p.163).
Relevant context factors (country)	Cuba's economy severely affected by collapse of Soviet Union, incl. loss of substantial Soviet subventions led to deep recession since 1990; socio-economic polarisation increasing, incl. because of dollarisation, yet social welfare and health sector of high standard, well educated workforce but underused because of economic restrictions; PCC under pressure to allow for liberalisation and pockets of private economic activity; papal visit ("May Cuba, with all its magnificent possibilities, open itself to the world,") and easing of US political/economic sanctions at a moment of visible liberal change - but did not result in systemic change. Continued antagonism between central planning and timidly introduced market mechanism; real market reform however opposed. Claim to power by PCC and military unaltered. Market transformation overall assessed to be more likely than political transformation	EU imposes sanctions after crackdown on Cuban dissidents (2003), incl. freezing of planned development cooperation programmes "While the programme has succeeded in strengthening the capacity and autonomy of local groups, the pilot phase of the programme has also provided an insight into the limitations and obstacles typical of the local context. The space for institutional development of NGOs remains limited in terms of visibility, size and public articulation; policy dialogue at the level of central government is often limited to considerations of principle without openness for innovative and concrete solutions (2003 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2004-2006_final, p. 5).
Important hints / comments	Joint Scoping Mission of PA II/HH/LA-Section, then specific Planning Mission in 1999; Concrete appraisal for POSTCOESECHA project, i.e. replication of successful SDC projects in Central America (reduction of crop failures through novel type of silos) [...] development policy approaches of Canada and Sweden. Both countries have comprehensive cooperation concepts agreed with the Cuban government, which are geared in the longer term to enabling or facilitating economic and political change and also explicitly aim, among other things, to promote human rights and improve governance in Cuba. (1998 Clarification Mission Report Cuba, p. 4)	

Timeline Cuba

	2004-2006 (Special programme)	2007-10 (Special Programme)
Main / key objectives	<p>To support Cuban society in its ongoing fundamental reforms, which are characterised by the search for a new link between the political, economic and social spheres.</p> <p>In order to contribute to the peaceful implementation of this development process, the programme aims to support the indispensable participation of the Cuban citizens. This in turn requires the creation of spaces for dialogue and collective negotiation, involving public and private actors at the local level. (2004 Strategic Orientation 2004-2006, p.4)</p> <p>"to accompany Cuban society in a process of transformation and peaceful, participatory and equitable development, mainly supporting 1) local actors' initiatives that allow them to build their own capacities and find concrete solutions to improve their living conditions, and 2) initiatives of civil society and state actors to help overcome the country's isolation through meetings, exchanges and access to new knowledge. (2006 Review of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba report o, p. 5).</p>	<p>To support the Cuban society in a peaceful and socially balanced development process. In doing so, it supports initiatives by local and regional actors to strengthen their capacity and improve the living conditions of the Cuban population. Based on the experience gained, the programme is building a dialogue on sector policies. To contribute to the further opening of the country, the programme facilitates contacts, exchange and access to new knowledge at the international level. (Strategic Orientation Cuba 2007-2010, p.5)</p>
Theory of change	<p>By supporting initiatives of local actors that lead to both their empowerment and concrete solutions for improved living conditions, Switzerland contributes to a development process that, as a result, is more peaceful, participatory and just. By facilitating encounters and providing access to knowledge at the international level, a contribution is made to help Cuba overcome its isolation. At the same time, the Swiss engagement allows for new room for political dialogue between both countries (compare 2003 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2004-2006_final, p. 6)</p>	<p>Against the background of a immanent transition of power, by supporting local and regional actors to improve their capacities and the living conditions of the Cuban population, Switzerland is contributing to a peaceful and socially balanced development process. As Cuban authorities remain generally sceptical of international partners, trustful relations between both countries are further deepened, putting Switzerland into a position that makes increasingly open political dialogue possible.</p>
Thematic focus	<p>1) Sustainable economic development: New management models Main objective: Income and employment generation through the application of new reformist models of sustainable economic development management, access to new technologies and increased productivity - Access to new technologies, management methods, business credit, market know-how - Food security - Environmental management and improvement of production processes</p> <p>2) Local development: Main objective: Promotion of dialogue spaces for the articulation and participation of the population in partnership with local organisations and initiatives, including representatives of the local government and the central state. - Community development, local management (services, projects) - Access and quality of basic health services - Exchange of experience and knowledge dissemination (local, multi-stakeholder forums, CH)</p>	<p>Two thematic focal points: Local development and sustainable economic development:</p> <p><u>Objective Local development:</u> Creating spaces for dialogue and strengthening the participation of the population in community development by supporting local initiatives, especially in solving concrete housing problems and creating local meeting centres. Partners: Citizens' initiatives, municipal administrations, provincial administrations, university institutes, NGOs, line ministries.</p> <p><u>Objective Sustainable economic development:</u> Increase productivity through the introduction of innovative and sustainable management methods and access to new technologies in the areas of cooperative agriculture, local production of building materials, energy efficiency and environmental management.</p> <p>(2007 Strategic Orientation Cuba 2007-2010, p.5)</p>
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	<p>At the end of 2005, the Programme started mainstreaming the gender approach, based on a three-year strategy (2006 Review of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba report, p. 20).</p> <p>Particular attention is given to projects that contain technical skills training and income-generating activities for women and to strengthening the visibility of women as project leaders. Currently, this sensitisation and training process has reached nine projects and 19 gender focal points have been created within the projects. In order to broaden the approach, according to the strategy, the empowerment of women and support for specific projects and actions aimed at strengthening gender equality within society, the family and the community are planned (2006 Review of the SDC's special programme in Cuba report o, p. 20).</p> <p>Strategic principles: 1. Starting from the ongoing processes; 2. Continuous observation of a changing context; 3. Flexibility and availability; 4. Strategic alliances with other donors; 5. Focus on tangible short-term results; 6. Conflict prevention and management; 7. Knowledge management, exchange and use of ICT4D (2003 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2004-2006_final, p. 7)</p>	<p>"Strategic profile": Against the backdrop of current developments, the strategic concept consists of three orientations: (i) Continuity in the two thematic priorities and special emphasis on the transversal theme of gender. (ii) Sector policy dialogue, based on concrete experiences, in order to anchor innovations that have been tested in practice in state institutions in a broadly effective manner. (iii) Monitoring of transitions and changes in power in order to react to changes and the associated risks and opportunities at an early stage. (2007 Strategische Orientierung Kuba_2007-2010, p. 4)</p> <p>In addition: 1) Alignment with local dynamics, 2) flexibility, 3) Mult-level approach, 4) Setting up larger projects, 5) Connecting participatory processes with innovative solutions, 6) Networks / Communities of Practice; 7) Harmonisation with other donors; 8) Continued impact monitoring (2007 Strategische Orientierung Kuba_2007-2010, p. 9)</p> <p>The transversal theme of gender will be expanded and deepened on the basis of previous experience through: (i) Working with effective local and national partner institutions to increase the broad impact of the theme and to support the programme's projects. (ii) Embedding the theme in planning, implementation and monitoring in the two focal areas. Cuban society is marked by a generational conflict between an older generation that identifies with the Cuban development path and a young globalised generation. Despite the above-average integration of the Afro-Cuban population, there are increasing signs of latent discrimination (e.g. share of remittances). Objective: Equal access to resources and services is promoted by mainstreaming gender in the programme and additionally through specific projects in cooperation with strong local partner institutions. The aspects of living together in a pluricultural society and the fragile contract between generations are taken into account in the thematic priorities. Partners: Local and national partner institutions, NGOs, university institutes, line ministries. (2007 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2007-2010, p. 8)</p>
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	<p>Bilateral cooperation, humanitarian aid</p> <p>Direct consultancy for government entities, co-financing of international and local implementing partners, above all CSOs, for human capacity development, institutional development support, dialogue and network support with Cuba and internationally, access to technology and credits for small enterprises</p>	<p>Bilateral cooperation, humanitarian aid</p> <p>Direct consultancy for government entities, co-financing of international and local implementing partners, above all CSOs, for human capacity development, institutional development support, dialogue and network support with Cuba and internationally, access to technology and credits for small enterprises</p>
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)</i>	<p>Humanitarian support focusing on recovery after natural disasters (especially hurricanes) and food security, ex. food power donations through World Food Programme and MediClub Cuba/Suiza support in areas such as production of medical drugs, modernisation of hospitals, psychotherapy, HIV prevention and more.</p>	<p>Humanitarian aid In view of the inadequate supply situation in the areas of health and nutrition, humanitarian aid humanitarian aid supports selective initiatives to improve the living conditions of the Cuban population. Due to the risk of natural hazards (hurricanes), it is also regularly involved in selective actions in the areas of emergency aid and reconstruction. and reconstruction. Humanitarian Aid also has expertise in the field of disaster risk reduction, which the SDC could incorporate into its special programme.</p>
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	<p>SDC experts, mainly through government (national, regional, local), incl. ANAP (529.000 USD); MINBAS (401.000); PDHL Oficina del Historiador (397.000); CIERIC (243.000); Escuela de Cine (220.000); CIDEM (203.000), UNDP (PDHL Project) and other NGOs (importantly, e.g. Centro Felix Varela) (2006 Revisión del programa especial de COSUDE en Cuba informe, p. 12)</p>	<p>SDC experts, mainly through government (national, regional, local), local (e.g. Centro Felix Varela, CIERIC) and international/Swiss (e.g. MediCuba) NGOs, international organisation (e.g. UNDP), cultural institutes, local cooperatives (UBPC), Cooperativa de Producción Agropecuaria (CPA) credit and service cooperatives (CCS), Asociación Cubana de Producción Animal (ACPA), La Asociación Cubana de Técnicos Agrícolas y Forestales (ACTAF), Asociación de Técnicos Azucareros de Cuba (ATAC), local construction companies, and others</p>
Main partner organizations	<p>Ministry of Foreign Investment and Cooperation (MINVEC), other national, regional and local government authorities, incl. agricultural cooperatives and other state enterprises, national NGOs, university institutes, international organisations, private entrepreneurs</p>	<p>Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (MINCEX)*, other national, regional and local government authorities, incl. agricultural cooperatives and other state enterprises, national NGOs, university institutes, international organisations, private entrepreneurs</p> <p>*new Ministry formed as a result of a merger between MINCEX and MINVEC</p>
Key beneficiaries	<p>National government staff, staff of municipalities and regional authorities, farmers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, members vulnerable groups, citizens</p>	<p>National government staff, staff of municipalities and regional authorities, farmers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, members vulnerable groups, citizens</p>
Geographical/regional focus	<p>Country-wide</p>	<p>Country-wide</p>
Total budget *)	<p>2004: 3.3 m CHF(of which 1 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2005: 6.8 m CHF (of which 4.8 m CHF in humanitarian aid) 2006: 4.4 m CHF (of which 2 m CHF in humanitarian aid)</p>	<p>2007: 5 m CHF (of which 1.4 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2008: 5.2 m CHF (of which 0.6 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2009: 4.6 m CHF (of which 1 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2010: 5.2 m CHF (no humanitarian aid)</p>
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)		<p>2007: Beginning of regular political dialogue between the Cuban Foreign Ministry and the DFA; 2008: For the first time, Switzerland has a development cooperation strategy that applies to all federal agencies; Special Programme Cuba one of 6 of the kind implemented by SDC worldwide 2008: Martin Dahinden becomes new head of SDC, replacing Walter Fust who had led the agency since 1993</p>
Relevant context factors (country)	<p>EU suspends sanctions (2005), Cuba joins OHCHR (2006), trend towards left/centre-left governments in Latin America create more favourable international environment, economic indicators show positive trend (5% GDP growth rate, new agreements with Venezuela, China and other countries). Impact of the US embargo against Cuba remains severe, relations between the two countries poor. Economic recory has strengthened the political authority of the central state and led to a gradual re-centralisation in both the political and economic spheres. On human rights, restrictions on freedom of expression, association and movement have not improved, while Cuba was elected as a member of the Human Rights Council. The Cuban government demonstrates a willingness and responsibility to address social inequalities with programmes. Indications in favour of a peaceful succession of power and an orderly, institutionally ratified transition to a new generation of leaders (compare 2006 Review of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba report o, p. 2).</p>	<p>Spain reestablished development cooperation; EU lifts sanctions (2008)</p> <p>Cuban government states "2008 most difficult year for the economy since the fall of the U.S.S.R"</p> <p>"Despite the political stagnation, a lot has changed on a small scale in the past four years. A more open culture of discussion has developed. Criticism of the conditions in the country and the regime is openly voiced. There are numerous forums and blogs on the internet where more democratic alternatives to the system are discussed. Words like human rights, decentralisation, homophobia, racism were only said behind closed doors four years ago. Today they are part of the public debate (2009 Final Report Herbert Schmidt 2005-2009, p. 2).</p>
Important hints / comments	<p>Largest projects by financial contribution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">· RECIC (401.000 USD)· NRU (387.300)· PDHL (332.000)· Postcosecha (307.000)· CIERIC (223.000)· Escuela Internacional de Cine (220.000)· Producción de piensos (220.000)· PDHL Habana vieja (215.000)	<p>social conflicts), the special programme will be evaluated in two years.</p> <p>The political, social and economic environment monitoring is carried out annually annual planning with the MERV (Monitoring of Changes Relevant to Development). changes). The MERV comprises 7 fields of observation. The analysis is carried out both carried out by the Cooperation Office as well as by a consultant.</p>

Timeline Cuba

	2011-14 (-16)	2017-21
Main / key objectives	To support the Cuban reform process aimed at improving participation in local development at the municipal level, using and consolidating the existing trust to contribute to lasting good relations between the two countries (<i>Stratégie de coopération avec Cuba pour 2011–2014</i>)	To contribute constructively to Cuba's further development by supporting the ongoing reform process to promote participatory and inclusive local development.
Theory of change	By means of development cooperation, which continues to focus on local participatory governance, Switzerland is contributing to ongoing reforms in Cuba. In doing so, already strong relations between the two countries are further deepened, thus creating a constructive and fraternal discussion climate that allows for difficult topics to be addressed as part of bilateral political dialogue and/or in multilateral frameworks. Specific support in the areas of participatory local governance (e.g. integrated municipal development strategies, modernised agricultural production, housing) as well as transversal themes, above all, the role of men and women, set concrete positive examples that the Cuban government integrates into the wider reform efforts to assure systemic effects.	By contributing to ongoing reforms and the strengthening of local initiatives, focusing on participatory and inclusive local governance (municipal management, sustainable local economic development, agriculture), Switzerland is contributing constructively to the development of Cuba. As a result, trustful relations between both countries are further strengthened, making constructive dialogue - increasingly also on highly sensitive topics - possible.
Thematic focus	<u>Participatory development strategy at municipal level:</u> 1) Increased welfare of families in the 35 municipalities where municipal governments, capable of managing local development in a participatory and economically viable manner, successfully implement the production projects envisaged in their local development strategies. 2) Strengthened active participation of the population in formal and/or informal community management spaces, and consideration of their demands by higher authorities; periodic and transparent accountability of the Municipal Board to the Municipal Assembly on the progress made in the implementation of the development strategy. (2011 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2011-2014, p. 13) - Improving the quality and quantity of the population's access to mostly locally produced food through the transformation of the local agricultural production, distribution and management system; - Increased satisfaction of housing needs, through new construction and rehabilitation of existing housing, by strengthening local production capacities (2011 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2011-2014, p. 13) 1. Capacities are established for the formulation and implementation of participatory EDM Municipal Development Strategies. 2. Increased access of the population to agricultural products in ten municipalities. 3. Increased satisfaction of the needs of the population in terms of construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of housing in ten municipalities. 4. Increased and strengthened participation of the population in the management of local development. 5. Changes in the roles of women and men in the family, work and public spheres in the areas of intervention. (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy, p. 4).	1) Participatory management of local development: Strengthening municipalities so that they are better able to manage their territory in a participatory manner, promote local initiatives and provide services. Develop and disseminate participatory tools to increase citizen participation in local processes. Support is provided to municipalities for the implementation, further development and dissemination of community development strategies (EDM), horizontal knowledge exchange among local authorities is promoted and "good practices" in local governance are documented and disseminated. (40 %); 2) Access to food: Promotion of sustainable and responsive agriculture; promotion of value chains with emphasis on: Innovation, diversification, processing and commercialisation. Increase sustainability of agriculture through organic production and use of renewable energy sources. Service cooperatives for agricultural innovation, diversification and climate adaptation (25%); 3) Sustainable local economic development: Promoting local economic development based on sustainable use of local resources within local development strategies. The capacities of communities to implement productive initiatives are strengthened, and training and advice (e.g. in business management, legal advice, etc.) is offered to private actors. Promote new forms of cooperation between local authorities and private actors (e.g. in housing, waste, transport, catering, etc.). To reduce post-harvest losses, the establishment of small processing enterprises is promoted (25%). <u>In addition, Switzerland wants to contribute to strengthening a practice-oriented vocational training system. (new!)</u>
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	Expected results: 1) In line with the national objective of having more women at all levels of government and public institutions, there is a positive change in the role of men and women in the family, work and community in the programme areas; 2) The family code is amended in favour of women (2011 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2011-2014, p. 13)	Gender sowie die Reduktion und Vermeidung von Diskriminierungen jeglicher Art wird weiterhin sowohl als Transversalthema in allen Projekten behandelt, als auch mit spezifischen Aktivitäten gefördert. Jedes Projekt trägt zur Inklusion von benachteiligten Bevölkerungsgruppen bei, unabhängig von Geschlecht, Rasse, Alter oder anderen Unterschieden.
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Bilateral cooperation, humanitarian aid (single waste treatment project for energy production in Havana) Direct consultancy for government entities, co-financing of international and local implementing partners, above all CSOs, for human capacity development, institutional development support, dialogue and network support with Cuba and internationally	Bilateral cooperation, humanitarian aid Direct consultancy for government entities, co-financing of international and local implementing partners, above all CSOs, for human capacity development, institutional development support, dialogue and network support with Cuba and internationally
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)</i>	Continued humanitarian aid (food security, e.g. milk powder, as well as natural disaster relief - especially 2012 and 2016 in the aftermath of the hurricanes Sandy and Matthew)	Continues to be focused on disaster emergency response (especially hurricanes), milk power donations end in 2017
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	SDC experts, mainly through government (national, regional, local), local (e.g. Centro Felix Varela, CIERIC) and international/Swiss (e.g. HIVOS, MediCuba) NGOs, international organisation (e.g. UNDP), cultural institutes, local cooperatives (UBPC), CPA, CCS, ACPA, ACTAF, ATAC, local construction companies, and others	SDC experts, mainly through government (national, regional, local) and non-governmental organisations, local (e.g. Centro Felix Varela, CIERIC, Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, Proyecto Palomas) and international/Swiss (e.g. HIVOS, Oxfam, MediCuba) NGOs, international organisation (e.g. UNDP), cultural institutes, local cooperatives (UBPC), national bodies such as CENESEX, Red Iberoamericana y Africana de Masculinidades RIAM and many more
Main partner organizations	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (MINCEX), other national, regional and local government authorities, incl. agricultural cooperatives and other state enterprises, national NGOs, university institutes, international organisations, private entrepreneurs	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (MINCEX), other national, regional and local government authorities, incl. agricultural cooperatives and other state enterprises, national NGOs, university institutes, international organisations, private entrepreneurs, TVET institutions
Key beneficiaries	National government staff, staff of municipalities and regional authorities, farmers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, members vulnerable groups, citizens	National government staff, staff of municipalities and regional authorities, farmers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, members vulnerable groups, citizens
Geographical/regional focus	Country-wide	Country-wide
Total budget *)	2011: 3.5 m CHF (of which 0.3 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2012: 5.8 m CHF (of which 0.5 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2013: 8.2 m CHF (of which 0.2 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2014: 10 m CHF (of which 0.6 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2015: 10.7 m CHF (of which 1.4 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2016: 13.7 m CHF (of which 0.6 m CHF humanitarian aid)	2018: 10.5 m CHF (of which 0.02 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2019: 12.2 m CHF (no humanitarian aid) 2020: 12.7 m CHF (of which 0.5 m CHF humanitarian aid) 2021: 10.9 m CHF (of which 0.5 m CHF humanitarian aid)
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	2013: Cuba is selected as SDC priority country for development cooperation 2014: Manuel Sager replaces Martin Dahinden as head of SDC 2014: Vice Ambassador from now on also acting as Head of Cooperation 2015: Integration of SDC Cooperation Office and Embassy The Swiss Federal Council publicly welcomes the announcement by the Presidents of the USA and Cuba on 17 December 2014 that they intend to gradually normalise bilateral relations; Parliamentary motion to negotiate wider economic partnership agreement is turned down by government due to low level of economic relations (0,01 per cent of Swiss foreign trade);	2020: Patricia Danzi becomes new head of SDC, replacing Manuel Sager (2014 - 2020)
Relevant context factors (country)	PCC reform package adopted to boost the economy (2011), adoption of Five-Year-Plan 2011-2015 based on a collection of 313 principles, goals and measures for Cuba's economic and social development; normalisation of C-US relations under Obama (12/2014); Cuba abolishes "Exit Permits" removing crucial barriers for travel of Cubans and foreigners (2013); foreign direct investment remains restricted; Miguel Diaz-Canel elected Vice president (2013)	2018: Diaz-Canel becomes new President 2019: New constitution adopted Tropical Storm Laura (late 2020), Protests "largest since the Revolution" (7/2021)
Important hints / comments		2016: SDC Office operating with 9 staff, incl. two internationals and 3 national programme staff - "smallest office in DLAC"

Timeline Cuba

	2022-24 (exit)
Main / key objectives	To contribute constructively to Cuba's development, and - as part of the process of a responsible exit from bilateral cooperation - will focus on supporting ongoing reform processes and strengthening initiatives in its portfolio with high potential, focusing on participatory and inclusive management of local development. (2022 Exit Programme 2022-2024, p. 12)
Theory of change	As part of its exit strategy, Switzerland supports the Cuban government in harnessing existing innovative approaches among municipalities, local producers, and representatives of civil society, by effectively using upscaling potentials and contribute to systemic change. Together with greater alignment of legislation, policies, programmes and services, this will result in more democratic government, greater social inclusion, and an improved environment for sustainable economic development.
Thematic focus	1) Participatory management of local development: strengthening the capacities of municipal governments for the decentralised management of local development, with an emphasis on citizen participation, contributes to the implementation of local policies, programmes and projects that increase the availability and quality of goods and services and make it possible to address the priorities of disadvantaged groups. 2) Access to food: Promote sustainable agriculture geared to the population's demand: strengthening value chains, encouraging innovation, diversification of production, processing and marketing. Expand sustainability through organic production and the use of renewable energy. 3) Sustainable local economic development: Fostering local productive activity and services, as well as strengthening the capacities of municipal governments to encourage state and private actors in the local economy, contributes to generating new jobs, raising incomes and improving the access of women and disadvantaged groups to these benefits.
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	Treated as crosscutting but mentioned as thematic priority #4: Gender and social inclusion: Cross-cutting theme aimed at providing local management with approaches, tools and resources for the implementation of projects that promote social and gender equity. Strengthen the capacities of specialists, local and national authorities as well as the collaboration with cultural institutions for the implementation of inclusion policies, as well as citizen information on gender rights and equality, contributing to reduce gender and social gaps.
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Bilateral cooperation, humanitarian aid Direct consultancy for government entities, co-financing of international and local implementing partners, above all CSOs, for human capacity development, institutional development support, dialogue and network support with Cuba and internationally
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, not the focus of this study)</i>	Continues to be focused on disaster emergency response (especially hurricanes)
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	SDC experts, mainly through government (national, regional, local) and non-governmental organisations, local (e.g. Centro Felix Varela, CIERIC, Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, Proyecto Palomas) and international/Swiss (e.g. HIVOS, Oxfam, MediCuba) NGOs, international organisation (e.g. UNDP), cultural institutes, local cooperatives (UBPC), national bodies such as CENESEX, Red Iberoamericana y Africana de Masculinidades RIAM and many more
Main partner organizations	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (MINCEX), other national, regional and local government authorities, incl. agricultural cooperatives and other state enterprises, national NGOs, university institutes, international organisations, private entrepreneurs, TVET institutions
Key beneficiaries	National government staff, staff of municipalities and regional authorities, farmers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, members vulnerable groups, citizens
Geographical/regional focus	Country-wide
Total budget *)	(allocated) 2022: 7 mln CHF (+0.5 mln. CHF humanitarian aid), 2023: 4 mln CHF (+0.5 mln. CHF), 2024: 2 mln CHF (+0.5 mln. CHF)
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	With the International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024, the Swiss Parliament decided to phase out (until 2024) its bilateral cooperation in Latin America in order to focus its efforts on other regions such as the Middle East and North and Sub-Saharan Africa (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024, p. 5).
Relevant context factors (country)	Most severe recession since the 1990s. State and government weakened internally by a highly centralised system of governance and externally by the collapse of an essential supplier and ally - Venezuela - which, combined with the pandemic and the tightening of the US embargo (2019-2020), seriously compromised the country's monetary reserves and the supply of goods and energy. Working macroeconomic indicators. Transition of executive power that began in 2018 continues to consolidate, with a new president who oscillates between ideological orthodoxy and pragmatic action. In the legal sphere, the new Constitution of 2019 allowed for important improvements in territorial planning, with legal advances for democratisation, decentralisation and economic development (e.g. legal recognition of private property). The persistence of important restrictions on civil and political rights, in particular the rights to peaceful assembly and association, freedom of expression, as well as the absence of independent legislative and judicial powers, have marked the daily life of Cubans and their relationship with the State for several decades. (compare 2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024, p. 7)
Important hints / comments	

Timeline Haiti

	2006-2008	2011-2013
Main / key objectives	The main objective is to minimise the suffering and improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable men, women and children through concrete projects in the three defined action lines (cf. thematic focus).	The main objective is to support Haiti's efforts to rebuild and promote its economic performance and to make measurable contribution to improving the economic and social living conditions of the Haitian population.
Theory of change	<p>By contributing to an improvement of the nutritional status of especially vulnerable people (women and children), to a reduction to the spread of HIV/AIDS and to an improvement of living conditions of affected men, women and children, and to an improvement of basic services through the rehabilitation of social infrastructures, SDC reduces the suffering and improves the living conditions of the most vulnerable men, women and children.</p> <p>(derived, not explicitly mentioned in strategy document)</p>	<p>By investing in the sustainability of public infrastructure, income generation and the sustainable use of natural resources, and by systematically strengthening institutions wherever possible, SDC shall make a measurable contribution to the improvement of the economic and social living situation of the poor population of Haiti.</p> <p>(derived, not explicitly mentioned in strategy document)</p>
Thematic focus	Three focus areas: 1. Improved food security 2. Reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS 3. Rehabilitation of social infrastructure	Three focus areas: 1. Sustainable and secure social infrastructure 2. Improvement of the living conditions of the population 3. Sustainable management of natural resources, and protection against natural hazards
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	<p>Strategic principles that are based on lessons learned from other actors and that SDC-HA wants to consider for its future approach:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Coordination and Cooperation;- Emergency Preparedness;- Human Insecurity;- Institutional Strengthening;- Mix of instruments,- Participatory Work;- Gender;- Contribution to Stability	<p>Key working principles and transversal themes are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Empowerment of the target population, taking into account the power relations between social groups;- Integration of the population in planning and decision-making processes;- Policy dialogue based on practical experience and knowledge and in alliance with other donors. The aim is to increase system-relevant impacts (added value);- Institutional capacity building of state actors at all levels;- Reduction of vulnerability to natural disasters (Disaster Risk Reduction/DRR);- Equal opportunities between women and men,
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Ad-hoc projects, covering most urgent needs (mixed instruments)	High degree of flexibility in the mix of instruments to be able to react quickly and efficiently to changing situations - integrative cooperation approach ("comprehensive aid"). Human and financial resources and implementation modalities of humanitarian aid and regional development cooperation are bundled to create synergies; use of "Sustainable Livelihood Approach"
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, <u>not</u> the focus of this study)</i> us)	<p>Main focus lies on humanitarian support.</p> <p>From 2007 onwards, ties through bilateral development cooperation were created.</p> <p>The humanitarian program has an office in same building as Consulate General in Pétion-Ville, sharing certain infrastructures and services.</p>	<p>From 2010 onwards, increased DC engagement and first medium-term program;</p> <p>Humanitarian Aid concentrates its actions thematically.</p>
	Ongoing urgent needs are blurring the line between humanitarian	
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	Collaboration with (Swiss) aid agencies and charitable organisations who have been active in Haiti since the 1950s, use of existing structures and local knowledge also because SDC did not have a permanent base in Haiti. Multilateral: CICR, PAM, IFRC; Bilateral: Action Aid, AMI, CAP, Caritas, HSB, PAM	Continuous cooperation with Swiss NGOs, ICRC, WFP. On-going development programs continue to be implemented by Helvetas; some projects put out to public tender (local partners are also considered); Bilateral program support through multilateral organizations remains main implementation modality in emergency sector.
Main partner organizations	(Partnership with Haitian, Swiss and/or international organizations) No political partners are mentioned in strategy documents	(Partnership with Haitian, Swiss and/or international organizations) No political partners are mentioned in strategy documents
Key beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- women and children,- victims of the 2004 natural disaster- support to mainstreaming programmes of WFP and its NGO partners- decentralised clinics	Poorest of Haitian population
Geographical/regional focus	The North (North-West and North Departments), Artibonite and Port-au-Prince and its surroundings (West Department).	In the center and south of the country, Humanitarian Aid activities focus on peri-urban and rural areas affected by the earthquake southwest of Port-au-Prince; regional cooperation mainly targets rural areas.
Total budget *) *	Total: 10.0 Humanitarian presence Port-au-Prince (Office, coordination, project monitoring (HAS), emergency preparedness, protection): 2.4 1. Improved food security: 3.0 2. Reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS: 1.7 3. Rehabilitation of social infrastructure: 2.5 Other, reserves: 0.4	Total: 36.000 (in thousands of CHF)* 1. Sustainable and secure social infrastructure: 19.500 2. Improvement of the living conditions of the population: 12.000 3. Sustainable management of natural resources, and protection against natural hazards: 4.500
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- SDC Portfolio analysis and declaration of special humanitarian aid (HA) programme and openig of HA program office in Haiti (2005)- C15Swiss honorary consulate became consulate general (2006), converted into embassy (2007) and integrated embassy in 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- New York Donor Conference "Towards a New Future for Haiti" (2010)- Integration of SDC's program office into the Swiss Embassy (2011)- Switzerland expresses interest to be part of the coordination group of G12 (2012) and joins G12+ Group (2013)- Federal Council's message on international cooperation (2013-2016) includes Haiti as a new priority country for cooperation (Switzerland's commitment in fragile contexts)
Relevant context factors (country)	Elections (2006); Several severe tropical storms and hurricanes, Food riots (2008)	Earthquake (2010); Cholera outbreak (2010); Elections (2010); Hurricane Sandy (2012); Protests against high costs of living (2012)
Important hints / comments	2006-2008: Swiss Humanitarian Program for Haiti Haiti is not seen as priority country for bilateral cooperation	2011 - 2013: Medium-term programme, jointly implemented by HA and Regional Cooperation (RC). Switzerland is now an active component of aid coordination forums and is recognized as reliable actor and donor, ready to commit itself in the long term. Haiti is seen as priority country since 2013

*Remarks Budget:
The contribution for safe and sustainable social infrastructure also includes the costs of the Port-au-Prince Program Office
In 2011, humanitarian aid projects will also be financed with 1 million Swiss francs from third-party funds (Principality of Liechtenstein, La Roche, Chaîne du bonheur)
Program contributions to Swiss NGOs are not included

Timeline Haiti

	2014-2017	2018-2021
Main / key objectives	The general objective is to contribute to improving the living conditions of the poorest populations (primarily rural) and to strengthening the rule of law, by improving the resilience of the populations and the environment as well as by consolidating institutions.	Contribution to the construction of the autonomy of Haitian public and private institutions as well as institutions of the population, particularly the most vulnerable, in order to move towards a more resilient and equitable society and with greater well-being for all.
Theory of change	<p>By strengthening the capacities of civil society, institutional actors and individuals, as well as by improving the provision of basic services that take into account the needs of the most vulnerable populations, SDC contributes to the construction of a collective management and the promotion of a fairer social contract.</p> <p>(derived, not explicitly mentioned in strategy document)</p>	By contributing to local governments (local authorities and civil society) becoming actors in the development, reconstruction and resilience building of their communities, by contributing to improving the resilience to natural hazards and food security of family farms through increased productivity, profitability of their agricultural production and marketing systems, and improved governance of the agricultural sector, by contributing to Haitians participating in and benefiting more equitably from economic development in their territories, thereby improving economic and social inclusion and resilience, including for the poorest households, SDC works towards building the autonomy of Haitian public and private institutions as well as that of the population, especially the most vulnerable, to move towards a more resilient, equitable society, and with greater well-being for all.
Thematic focus	Three focus areas: 1. Rule of law and governance, 2. Agriculture and food security 3. Reconstruction and disaster risk reduction.	Three focus areas: 1. Local governance 2. Agriculture and food security 3. Employment and economic development
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	All actions will take into account the cross-cutting themes: - Gender and - Governance.	<p>Cross-cutting themes: The strategy maintains two cross-cutting themes:</p> <p>- Governance, where it aims to improve the management of public affairs by following the principles of good governance (representation, efficiency/effectiveness, transparency and accountability, non-discrimination), and</p> <p>- Gender, where it encourages and supports the participation, empowerment and equal access of women to social, economic and political life in Haiti.</p> <p>In order to take into account the extreme environmental vulnerability of the country, all programmes will include a risk reduction/resilience building component</p> <p>Additionally, three working principles are at the centre of this strategy:</p> <p>- Putting actors at the center; - Nexus humanitarian aid/development cooperation; - Starting from the local level as a driver of change.</p>
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Complementarity and alignment between approaches and tools of Humanitarian Aid and Regional Cooperation as well as Global Cooperation; see "details on humanitarian support" below	<p>Flexible and coherent approach around the three main themes; Haitians in the center of the own development, using humanitarian and development aid instruments in an articulated and integrated manner; building development from the local level; (strengthening of) consultation/coordination platforms</p> <p>Plus: see "details on humanitarian support" below</p>
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, <u>not</u> the focus of this study)</i> us)	<p>Complementarity between Humanitarian Aid and Regional Cooperation (RC) approaches are pursued and strengthened ("Comprehensive Approach").</p> <p>Mix of implementation modalities: HA concentrates 80% of its budget in direct projects, the rest in contributions to multilateral organizations. The RC favours the logic of contributions and mandates while seeking to promote public private partnerships (with the Swiss and Haitian private sectors).</p>	<p>The complexity of the Haitian context and the diversity of humanitarian aid instruments and South Cooperation continue to require flexible adaptation of implementation modalities. Most HA programmes are implemented directly.</p>
	n and development aid. Up to today, the commitment of Swiss cooperation is characterized by close collaboration between the development and humanitarian aid departments.	
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	<p>Embassy and Cooperation Office ensure implementation, monitoring and steering of strategy.</p> <p>Direct projects, contribution to national and international partners and mandates while seeking to promote public-private partnerships and trilateral cooperation.</p>	<p>Overall responsibility for steering and implementing the strategy lies with Swiss Embassy in Port-au-Prince.</p> <p>Implementation of South Cooperation programs promotes mandates and contribution to programs by national actors. Mandates are selected through calls for tender on the basis of the three strategic cross-cutting themes.</p>
Main partner organizations	<p>Main national partners: sector ministries, local authorities and civil society; Stronger direct strategic partnerships with multilateral agencies (IDB, UN organizations, UNDP, World Bank, WFP, ICRC, CIDA, AECID, plus strategic partnerships and trilateral cooperation with emerging countries</p>	<p>The 2018-21 strategy prioritizes strengthening partnerships with national authorities and stakeholders and opportunities to contribute to the programs of sectoral ministries and national partners are exploited.</p> <p>IDB is a major strategic partner.</p> <p>Continuous active involvement in coordination between governments and donors, sectoral consultation forums, strengthened partnership with inter-NGO consultation forums</p>
Key beneficiaries	<p>Most vulnerable population Civil Society Institutional actors and individuals State authorities, sectoral governance structures Farmers</p>	<p>Citizens, Users of public services Farmers Informal sector employees Young people</p>
Geographical/regional focus	Southern Region (West, Nippes, South, Southeast)	Great South with its four departments. The strategy concentrates its activities on the south coast in the South department and in the district of Jacmel (South East department). By focusing on these areas, Switzerland is moving towards a territorial approach that supports development dynamics in functional territorial spaces that link medium-sized cities with peri-urban and rural territories. Activities remain largely rural-oriented
Total budget *) *	<p>Total: 79 million CHF Regional Cooperation: 45 million Humanitarian Aid 34 million</p> <p>1. Rule of law and governance: RC: 24.925.000, HA: 2.000.000 2. Agriculture and food security: RC: 10.620.000, HA: 6.800.000 3. Reconstruction and disaster risk reduction.: RC: 2.000.000, HA: 21.350.000 Others: RC: 1.120.000, HA: 660.000 Management: RC: 6.575.000, HA: 3.181.000</p>	<p>Total Budget: 73.9 million CHF Financed 65% by Cooperation South and 35% by HA</p> <p>1. Local governance: 30.6 2. Agriculture and food security: 27.3 3. Employment and economic development: 12.4 Other: 3.5</p>
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	<p>First strategy of Swiss Cooperation</p> <p>Haiti is seen as new priority country for cooperation as part of the strengthening of Switzerland's commitment in fragile contexts. Switzerland presents itself as a new actor with a long-term commitment and a participatory and inclusive approach that priorities institution building.</p>	
Relevant context factors (country)	Anti-government protests (2014); Elections (2015-16); Hurricane Matthew (2016)	Anti-corruption protests (2019); Covid (starting 2020); Earthquake (2021), Assassination Moïse (2021); Protests (2021)
Important hints / comments	<p>2014-2017 cooperation strategy moves from mainly post-earthquake commitment to reconstruction to a medium-and long-term sustainable development orientation with a reinforced focus on fragility reduction</p> <p>Creation of Swiss foundation "Chaine du Bonheur" after Hurricane Matthew (2016)</p>	<p>Committee of CICR ended its mission in June 2017 (after 23 years in Haiti), as well as MINUSTAH, both were relevant actors that left</p> <p>Switzerland ranks 9th in principal (donor) partner for Haiti</p>



Timeline Haiti

	2022-2024
Main / key objectives	Main objective is to alleviate the fragility and vulnerability of Haitian society and to respond to the needs of the most precarious populations in order to move towards a more resilient, just and equitable society.
Theory of change	If citizen participation and good governance of local communities and agricultural value chains are strengthened, if the risk and disaster management system and the capacity of institutions at local and national levels are strengthened, then the delivery of public services and agricultural advice will continue to improve, institutions will be more resilient, disaster risks can be identified and assessed, and urban and rural populations will adopt disaster prevention measures. Then, the delivery of public and agricultural advisory services will continue to improve, institutions will be more resilient, disaster risks can be identified and assessed, and urban and rural populations will adopt effective prevention measures. Because local authorities and civil society will have initiated a dynamic of social cohesion and the government will have put in place functional departmental structures that support local structures.
Thematic focus	Two focus areas: 1. Local governance and strengthening the resilience of people and institutions 2. Shock-resilient economic development
Cross cutting themes / strategic principles	Cross-cutting themes: the promotion of human rights and gender equality, conflict sensitivity (CSPM) and disaster risk reduction will continue to be themes in all of Switzerland's activities in Haiti. The role of women in sectional bodies (local level at the communal section level) will be promoted to strengthen their financial autonomy. The economic resilience of the most vulnerable populations will be increased. In the event that disasters strike Haiti again, whether natural or man-made, and regardless of the geographical area, Switzerland will respond according to the nature of the needs. Through the nexus approach, it will be possible to adapt quickly and provide emergency aid for recovery and reconstruction. In addition, Switzerland will continue its commitment to the promotion of culture and the arts in Haiti. It will demonstrate the added value of Swiss co-operation that values diversity, dialogue and inclusion
Main implementation modalities / methods / instruments	Four main working principles: 1. Consolidation of achievements; 2. Institutionalisation of programs or their takeover by partners (phasing over); 3. Strengthening the triple nexus of humanitarian/development/peace 4. keeping actors at the center of the transfer and learning process
Details on Humanitarian Support <i>(only for differentiation purposes, <u>not</u> the focus of this study)us</i>	Strategy increasingly oriented towards most urgent humanitarian needs and sustainable reconstruction. Areas of intervention of 2018-21 strategy are reformulated to foster synergies between existing humanitarian aid and development cooperation programs through the two thematic priorities of 22-24 with a Humanitarian Program Office beyond the withdrawal of bilateral cooperation in Latin America. Switzerland stays present in Haiti after 2024 with a Humanitarian Program Office. Closure of bilateral cooperation program requires responsible exit strategy with a reorientation towards humanitarian aid.
Implementing organizations (SDC itself / consulting / NGO)	Programmes are implemented by contractors/consortia of contractors or by direct implementation (e.g. cocoa sector with IDB, vocational training framework with AFD/EU, creative industries with IDB) HA: financial and technical contributions to the WFP
Main partner organizations	
Key beneficiaries	Local authorities, civil society organisations, family farms, farmers' organisations, cooperatives, also Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectives, departmental administrations, Federation of Mayors, Professional training actors; Micro-entrepreneurs, extremely vulnerable women, artists from disadvantaged neighbourhoods, craftsmen's associations, vocational training centres, women's organisations, the National Institute for Vocational Training (INFP), the Ministry for Women's Affairs (MCFDF), and the authorities (national and local) in charge of helping the most vulnerable,, microfinance institutions and the ministries in charge of agriculture and the environment
Geographical/regional focus	The Grand Sud, i.e. the departments of the South, the South-East and the Grand'Anse
Total budget *) *	Total Budget 43.5 Mio CHF South Cooperation: 24.0 HA: 19.5
Relevant context factors (Switzerland/SDC)	Phasing out of bilateral DC and strengthening of Humanitarian Programme Office The current bilateral program will end at the end of 2023. Switzerland's commitment in Haiti will continue, including with Swiss NGOs, multilateral cooperation at regional and international level, as well as humanitarian aid programs with focus on emergency response, risk reduction, strengthening resilience to natural disasters, peace and security, human rights, prosperity and sustainability. The planning for the responsible exit from bilateral cooperation in Haiti is the main challenge of the 2022-24 cooperation program
Relevant context factors (country)	Covid-19 and increase of gangs and resurgence of kidnappings and assassinations
Important hints / comments	Switzerland ranks 6th in principal (donor) partner for Haiti and benefits from a good image in Haiti

SDC's Engagement in Ecuador

Summary of Key Indicators, Events and Theories of Change

■ GDP per capita growth (annual %) ■ HDI x 10 ■ ODA (% of GDP)



ToC 1969-1981

In a predominantly rural context, in which in spite of the rapid urban growth agriculture plays a key role, Swiss technical cooperation can support a better agricultural techniques through technological transfer and construction of (main-ly, but not only irrigation) infra-structure, which allows higher levels of productivity in the production chains of the main export goods, and will consequently raise the income level of the poorest group within the country, the peasant and indigenous population.

ToC 1982-1990

In the absence of a national rural and local development strategy, Swiss technical cooperation can strengthen local development processes by providing technical assistance and trainings both on the supply (allowing access to water through irrigation and diversifying production) and demand side (fostering the growth of markets and improving commercialization mechanisms) of agricultural production, and throughout raising the income level of indigenous communities and improving their living conditions.

ToC 1991-1997

Based on a programmatic approach, in a context of growing socio-economic inequalities, weakened state capacities and low productive investment, SDC can contribute to the territorial development by focusing on the urban-rural economic dynamics, by, on the one hand, raising agricultural productivity in a sustainable way and, on the other hand, supporting small urban enterprises, thus raising income levels in general but especially those of rural and indigenous population.

ToC 1998-2002

Surrounded by a marked political instability and in the middle of a complex socio-economic crisis, SDC can contribute to the empowerment of the most disadvantaged population in the country by improving local capacities through: the provision vocational training programs, support to small industry and agriculture, and by fostering the protection and sustainable use of their natural resources, allowing this disadvantaged population to become an agent in their own development process.

ToC 2002-2006


In a context of marked socio-economic inequalities, SDC aims to promote empowerment of the vulnerable population -especially of indigenous communities- through the strengthening of organizational and economic capacities, and by supporting the promotion of equity between men and women, thus allowing access to resources and social services and enabling their participation in decision-making spaces, making a 'bottom-up' contribution to a better governance and to the fight against corruption.

ToC 2007-2009

In order to conduct a responsible exit of the country and to deliver the highest amount of benefits to the meta group, SDC finishes the co-financed projects in close coordination with the local beneficiaries, counterparts, and implement-ing organizations, placing efforts to multiply the effects of the Swiss cooperation and to assure the sustainability of the achieved results in the different thematic sectors.

SDC's Engagement in Honduras

Summary of Key Indicators, Events and Theories of Change



ToC 1982-1985

The DEH promotes processes in the area of agricultural vocational training, agrarian reform, smallholder support, rural water supply, dairy sector, agricultural technology, food security and integrated rural development that enable the population to meet their basic needs by their own means. The type of assistance and projects are determined by the priority needs of the beneficiaries in a participatory manner. Altogether, this supports the integral development of the human being.

ToC 1986-1992

DEH supports the agricultural sector to improve deficient subsistence agriculture in terms of production, productivity, storage and marketing. In the forestry sector, DEH promotes activities that generally contribute to the implementation of a forestry policy that preserves the ecological balance and leads to an improved integration of the forestry sector into the other economic sectors. In the health sector, DEH supports efforts that aim at physical, mental and social health of the population. DEH promotes measures aimed at creating jobs in the artisanal and small-scale industries sector. DEH promotes housing and settlement construction. Altogether, this supports the target population in Honduras to better meet their basic needs.

ToC 1993-1998

On macro-level, the Swiss Cooperation strengthens the government in improving the economic, political and institutional framework. On sector level, the Swiss Cooperation support the rural population in their productive activities (agriculture and rural development), supports the water and sanitation sector to improve health and prevent waterborne diseases, as well as a starting point for education and strengthening the organization and management of communities, contributes to the protection and sustainable use of natural resources, and support business promotion and vocational training. Altogether, this supports the better satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged sections of the population and the best possible development of people in their natural, cultural and social environment.

ToC 1999-2005

The Swiss Cooperation contributes to a transformation of smallholder subsistence agriculture towards market-oriented and ecologically sustainable agriculture. The Swiss Cooperation contributes to the acceleration of a comprehensive supply of water and sanitation in rural areas that remains sustainable and functional in the long term (approx. 20 years). The Swiss Cooperation promotes the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and producers. SECO specifically contributes to the improvement of the economic policy framework, trade and investment promotion. Swiss humanitarian aid contributes to a rapid and visible reconstruction in selected zones and topics. Altogether, this contributes to the satisfaction of the basic needs of disadvantaged sections of the population.

ToC 2007-2012

The Swiss Cooperation contributes to the sustainable development of MSME and thereby to income and employment generation, through improved market access emphasizing local, regional and international chains of value addition, mainly of agricultural origin. The Swiss Cooperation contributes to good governance, particularly with respect public finance management, effectiveness of public spending, transparency and accountability, citizen participation, public control and social audit. The Swiss Cooperation enables poorer population's sustainable access to basic public services of good quality. SDC Humanitarian Aid moves to a "prevention and integrated risk and disaster management" approach. Altogether, this contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development.

ToC 2013-2017

SDC strengthens value chains and local economic development with a pro-poor focus, strengthens partner organizations in selected value chains in policy work to better engage in policy dialogue and improve framework conditions, facilitates the incorporation of DRR and CCA in the value chains and supports the coordination and application of legal frameworks/international agreements through the watershed councils. Altogether, this contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development.

ToC 2018-2021


SDC contributes to the systemic construction of the chain of justice, promotes and supports the empowerment and development of civil society organizations and networks, creates incentives and mechanisms so that public and private stakeholders address the causes of conflicts and territorial fragilities, supports the government and territorial public and private stakeholders and address the causes of conflicts, supports rural and semi urban families and private companies in the use of technologies and works, facilitates the incorporation of DRR and CCA in the value chains and supports the coordination and application of legal frameworks/international agreements through the watershed councils. Altogether, this promotes sustainable and equitable development in Central America.

ToC 2022-2024

SDC contributes to strengthening the rule of law with a focus on inclusive governance and respect for political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights, supports the inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups in territorial economic development with shared governance and respecting economic, social and cultural rights, and contributes to resilience to climate change and disasters by strengthening governance in the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources. This leads to fostered sustainable and equitable development in Central America.

SDC's Engagement in Nicaragua

Summary of Key Indicators, Events and Theories of Change



ToC 1993-1998

On macro-level, the Swiss Cooperation strengthens the government in improving the economic, political and institutional framework. On sector level, the Swiss Cooperation support the rural population in their productive activities (agriculture and rural development), supports the water and sanitation sector to improve health and prevent waterborne diseases, as well as a starting point for education and strengthening the organization and management of communities, contributes to the protection and sustainable use of natural resources, and support business promotion and vocational training. Altogether, this supports the better satisfaction of the basic needs of the disadvantaged sections of the population and the best possible development of people in their natural, cultural and social environment.

ToC 1999-2005

The Swiss Cooperation contributes to a transformation of smallholder subsistence agriculture towards market-oriented and ecologically sustainable agriculture. The Swiss Cooperation contributes to the acceleration of a comprehensive supply of water and sanitation in rural areas that remains sustainable and functional in the long term (approx. 20 years). The Swiss Cooperation promotes the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and producers. SECO specifically contributes to the improvement of the economic policy framework, trade and investment promotion. Swiss humanitarian aid contributes to a rapid and visible reconstruction in selected zones and topics. Altogether, this contributes to the satisfaction of the basic needs of disadvantaged sections of the population.

ToC 2007-2012

The Swiss Cooperation contributes to the sustainable development of MSME and thereby to income and employment generation, through improved market access emphasizing local, regional and international chains of value addition, mainly of agricultural origin. The Swiss Cooperation contributes to good governance, particularly with respect public finance management, effectiveness of public spending, transparency and accountability, citizen participation, public control and social audit. The Swiss Cooperation enables poorer population's sustainable access to basic public services of good quality. SDC Humanitarian Aid moves to a "prevention and integrated risk and disaster management" approach. Altogether, this contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development.

ToC 2013 - 2017

SDC strengthens value chains and local economic development with a pro-poor focus, strengthens partner organizations in selected value chains in policy work to better engage in policy dialogue and improve framework conditions, strengthens and supports reforming security institutions, strengthens investment management, supports citizens' participation, promotes synergies to facilitate the implementation of national and sectoral development plans, supports disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation and provides inputs and sets examples to further develop regional, national and local strategies. Altogether, this contributes to poverty reduction and promotes an equitable and sustainable development.

ToC 2018 - 2021

SDC contributes to the systemic construction of the chain of justice, promotes and supports the empowerment and development of civil society organizations and networks, creates incentives and mechanisms so that public and private stakeholders address the causes of conflicts and territorial fragilities, supports the government and territorial public and private stakeholders and address the causes of conflicts, supports rural and semi urban families and private companies in the use of technologies and works, facilitates the incorporation of DRR and CCA in the value chains and supports the coordination and application of legal frameworks/international agreements through the watershed councils. Altogether, this promotes sustainable and equitable development in Central America.


ToC 2022 - 2024

SDC contributes to strengthening the rule of law with a focus on inclusive governance and respect for political, civic, economic, social and cultural rights, supports the inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups in territorial economic development with shared governance and respecting economic, social and cultural rights, and contributes to resilience to climate change and disasters by strengthening governance in the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources. This leads to fostered sustainable and equitable development in Central America.

SDC's Engagement in Bolivia

Summary of Key Indicators, Events and Theories of Change

■ GDP per capita growth (annual %) ■ HDI x 10 ■ Net ODA received (% of GNI)



Period of nationalist-oriented military governments ('64-'82)

Foundation of the Ministry of Planning

Brutal coup d'état of General García Meza

Inauguration of a democratic government

Severe economic crisis

Swiss development cooperation activities drastically reduced for approx. two years

Bolivia becomes a priority country for Swiss development cooperation; opening of a cooperation office in La Paz

Comprehensive economic (neoliberal) and political reform processes

Beginning of radical structural adjustment measures

For the first time in LAC, Switzerland is applying bilateral balance of payments assistance

Development of the first multi-annual country programme for Bolivia

BAWI (later SECO) initiates bilateral cooperation activities in the country

Period of economic recovery

Adoption of the Environmental Act

Adoption of the People's Participation Act

Privatisation of the six large state-owned companies

Adoption of the Decentralisation Act

Social unrest, demand for extended democratisation

1998-2003: First jointly prepared multi-annual country programme between SDC and BAWI (later SECO).

Presidency of Evo Morales ('05-'19)

Beginning of far-reaching reform processes in the country focusing on reducing inequalities and combatting poverty

The Grupo de Socios para el Desarrollo de Bolivia (GruS) is created.

End of SECO's bilateral cooperation activities (from 2017 on complementary measures taken up again)

Bolivia becomes associate member of MERCOSUR

Constitutional Court establishes indefinite re-election of President and Vice-President

COVID-19

Post-electoral political and human rights crisis

Bolivia is expected to become an upper middle-income country in 2024

Phasing out of SDC's bilateral cooperation

ToC 1969-1980

If targeted technical advice to agricultural producers in the areas of livestock, fodder seeds and agricultural mechanisation is implemented, through entry points at the local level, at the Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Cochabamba, a contribution can be made to the further development of overall agricultural production and thus to poverty reduction in the country.

ToC 1982-1992

If in addition to project-level technical support, the country's stabilization at macro level is supported, projects will have a better chance to achieve a sustained impact. If the agricultural sector is further strengthened, production efficiency increased and rural infrastructure improved, if micro-entrepreneurs in urban areas are supported in their activities and if the overall social costs of the economic adjustment process can be mitigated by internationally-financed targeted actions, not only the country's economic development, but also the democratic and social development will be effectively fostered, thereby in the long-run improving the satisfaction of the population's basic needs.

ToC 1993-1997

If the macroeconomic and institutional adjustment process continues to succeed, if agricultural processes are further developed through training and improved production bases, thereby keeping in mind the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources; if urban traders are effectively supported through training and access to credit, and if civic participation is steadily improved, disadvantaged parts of the population will be supported in advancing their development by their own efforts, thereby achieving better satisfaction of their basic needs.

ToC 1998 - 2008

If small family farmers in the highlands and small and medium-sized enterprises in urban areas are effectively supported in exercising their civil rights and participating in social decision-making processes; if the investment climate and production conditions as well as access to financial services and vocational training are improved; and if the sustainable use of natural resources and the reduction of environmental pollution is further developed, the basic needs of the disadvantaged parts of the population will be better met, poverty reduced and the quality of life of the population improved.

ToC 2008 - 2021


If the rule of law is further promoted, civil society strengthened and the provision of government services at the community level improved, if vocational training for disadvantaged groups as well as services for rural business development are further developed, and if planning and maintenance of systems for sustainable use of natural resources as well as the populations' resilience to negative effects of climate change are improved, then Bolivia's sustainable development will be promoted, poverty and inequalities will be reduced, and the resilience of the population and institutions will be increased.

ToC 2022-2024

If actions to ensure the continuity of work in the field of access to justice services and the campaign against violence against women are consolidated, if the country's economic and productive development is further supported, and if institutional capacities to adapt to climate change and solve environmental problems are effectively strengthened, then following the phasing out of Switzerland's bilateral cooperation, the resilience of communities and institutions will have been strengthened, forums for dialogue will have been expanded, and there will be actors in a position to promote sustainable development and the reduction of poverty and inequalities.

SDC's Engagement in Peru

Summary of Key Indicators, Events and Theories of Change



ToC 1965 - 1981

By supporting livestock projects in the country, one can assure better resilience, better production processes and the necessary support to the beneficiaries and consequently raise the income level of the poorest group within the country, namely farmers and the indigenous population.

ToC 1982 - 1991

If the institutional adjustment/decentralisation processes continue to succeed, if agricultural processes are further developed through training and direct support to the beneficiaries, if the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources and ecological balance is ensured, if the urban population is effectively supported in gaining a higher income through technical education, overall the scientific and technological development, the strengthening of the management capacities of the state and the fight against poverty will progress, thereby achieving better satisfaction of the population's basic needs.

ToC 1995 - 2002

Through economically improved and ecologically sustainable use of the production base, poverty is to be combated, the income of the rural population increased, market-oriented production promoted and food security improved. Through a stronger competitiveness and productivity of small enterprises, (urban) poverty is directly combated.

ToC 2002 - 2007


If all citizens have the opportunity to participate in private and public tasks, a broader civil society assumes personal responsibility and actively participates in public tasks. On the one hand an organised civil society exercises control and demands accountability, on the other hand this increases the legitimacy of the state and promotes the social integration of society. Furthermore, if sustainable economic development is socially and regionally balanced, the state and its institutions (executive, legislative and judiciary) regulate and create favourable framework conditions that are used creatively and productively by the private sector. A subsidiarity-based division of labour between the private sector and state institutions - at the appropriate level in each case - improves access to services and increases their coverage.

ToC 2007 - 2012

Stronger, democratic public institutions at all levels manage resources transparently, efficiently and enable equal citizen participation and access to basic services. A sound and stable monetary policy frameworks, improved access to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through the generation of innovative financing instruments and increased competitiveness of SMEs in the regions and in Lima enable the creation of stable jobs as well as an improvement in the income of the poorer population groups (Pro Poor Growth). A stronger and more efficient cooperation between local, regional and national actors work effectively together to reduce the vulnerability of the population to natural disasters and climate change and to promote sustainable use of natural resources (in particular water).

SDC's Engagement in Haiti

Summary of Key Indicators, Events and Theories of Change



ToC 2006-2008

By contributing to an improvement of the nutritional status of especially vulnerable people (women and children), to a reduction to the spread of HIV/AIDS and to an improvement of living conditions of affected men, women and children, and to an improvement of basic services through the rehabilitation of social infrastructures, SDC reduces the suffering and improves the living conditions of the most vulnerable men, women and children.

ToC 2011-2013

By investing in the sustainability of public infrastructure, income generation and the sustainable use of natural resources, and by systematically strengthening institutions wherever possible, SDC shall make a measurable contribution to the improvement of the economic and social living situation of the poor population of Haiti.

ToC 2014 - 2017

By strengthening the capacities of civil society, institutional actors and individuals, as well as by improving the provision of basic services that take into account the needs of the most vulnerable populations, SDC contributes to the construction of a collective management and the promotion of a fairer social contract.

ToC 2018 - 2021



By contributing to local governments (local authorities and civil society) becoming actors in the development, reconstruction and resilience building of their communities, by contributing to improving the resilience to natural hazards and food security of family farms through increased productivity, profitability of their agricultural production and marketing systems, and improved governance of the agricultural sector, by contributing to Haitians participating in and benefiting more equitably from economic development in their territories, thereby improving economic and social inclusion and resilience, including for the poorest households, SDC works towards building the autonomy of Haitian public and private institutions as well as that of the population, especially the most vulnerable, to move towards a more resilient, equitable society, and with greater well-being for all.

ToC 2022 - 2024

If citizen participation and good governance of local communities and agricultural value chains are strengthened, if the risk and disaster management system and the capacity of institutions at local and national levels are strengthened, then the delivery of public services and agricultural advice will continue to improve, institutions will be more resilient, disaster risks can be identified and assessed, and urban and rural populations will adopt disaster prevention measures. Then, the delivery of public and agricultural advisory services will continue to improve, institutions will be more resilient, disaster risks can be identified and assessed, and urban and rural populations will adopt effective prevention measures. Because local authorities and civil society will have initiated a dynamic of social cohesion and the government will have put in place functional departmental structures that support local structures.

SDC's Engagement in Cuba

Summary of Key Indicators, Events and Theories of Change



ToC 2000-2003 (pilot)	ToC 2004-2006	ToC 2007-2011	ToC 2011-2014/(-16)	ToC 2017-2021	ToC 2022-2024
In the face of the possible economic and political opening, Switzerland can, by launching a pilot programme with Cuba, play a constructive role in the transition process. It can effectively bring relevant own experience in modern agriculture, local governance and local (economic) development to the table, and thereby further deepen existing trustful bilateral relations and strengthen its role as international partner for political dialogue.	By supporting initiatives of local actors that lead to both their empowerment and concrete solutions for improved living conditions, Switzerland contributes to a development process that, as a result, is more peaceful, participatory and just. By facilitating encounters and providing access to knowledge at the international level, a contribution is made to help Cuba overcome its isolation. At the same time, the Swiss engagement allows for new room for political dialogue between both countries.	Against the background of a immanent transition of power, by supporting local and regional actors to improve their capacities and the living conditions of the Cuban population, Switzerland is contributing to a peaceful and socially balanced development process. As Cuban authorities remain generally sceptical of international partners, trustful relations between both countries are further deepened, putting Switzerland into a position that makes increasingly open political dialogue possible.	By means of development cooperation, which continues to focus on local participatory governance, Switzerland is contributing to ongoing reforms in Cuba. In doing so, already strong relations between the two countries are further deepened, thus creating a constructive and fraternal discussion climate that allows for difficult topics to be addressed as part of bilateral political dialogue and/or in multilateral frameworks. Specific support in the areas of participatory local governance (e.g. integrated municipal development strategies, modernised agricultural production, housing) as well as transversal themes, above all, the role of men and women, set concrete positive examples that the Cuban government integrates into the wider reform efforts to assure systemic effects.	By contributing to ongoing reforms and the strengthening of local initiatives, focusing on participatory and inclusive local governance (municipal management, sustainable local economic development, agriculture), Switzerland is contributing constructively to the development of Cuba. As a result, trustful relations between both countries are further strengthened, making constructive dialogue - increasingly also on highly sensitive topics - possible.	As part of its exit strategy, Switzerland supports the Cuban government in harnessing existing innovative approaches among municipalities, local producers, and representatives of civil society, by effectively using upscaling potentials and contribute to systemic change. Together with greater alignment of legislation, policies, programmes and services, this will result in more democratic government, greater social inclusion, and an improved environment for sustainable economic development.

Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix - Bolivia

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
1) Relevance		
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC's aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs ? Were the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The relevance of SDC's actions for Bolivia's most important development needs is confirmed in many of the analysed documents, though the underlying analyses partly seem to be methodologically thin <i>[e.g. Mid-term review der Kooperationsstrategie 2008-2012; 2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien; 2013-2016_Revisión de Medio Término de la Estrategia de Cooperación; 2018_Memoria 2013-2017 de la coop Suiza en Bolivia; and others]</i>.• At project level, the relevance of the interventions is also confirmed in several project evaluations in the different fields <i>[e.g. 2018_Bolivia_Proyecto_biocultura_y_cambio_climatico_eval medio término; 2011_Informe final revision externa PROCAP, 2020_Evaluación de medio término proeyecto mercados inclusivos]</i>.• Interview partners and documents confirm SDC's proven flexibility and openness to the partners' and beneficiaries' needs as important success factor of the interventions, which may have further increased the activities' relevance. <i>[INT 10, 11, 15, 17]</i>• From 1997 on, Bolivia developed its first National Development Plan, which laid the basis for a further increased cooperation among the donors (including SDC), who aligned their activities with the Bolivian priorities stipulated in the Plan. Thus from the late 1990s on, SDC's strategy documents refer more explicitly to Bolivia's National Development Plan and Bolivia's Poverty Reduction Strategies. From the 2000s on, reference in also made to the Millennium Development Goals within the framework of global UN efforts, which were defined to be most relevant for the country by the Bolivian government <i>[e.g. 2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i>.
1.2 In how far was SDC's engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities ?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Some of the country strategy papers make reference to the overall Swiss development policy and defined priorities. Some explicitly mention decisions by the Federal council or refer to IZA strategies <i>[e.g. 1987_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der DEH in Bolivien; 2013-2016_Revisión de Medio Término de la Estrategia de Cooperación; 2018_Bolivia_Proyecto_de_investigacion_aplicada_para_la_Adaptación al CC; e.g. 2008-2012_Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie für Bolivien]</i>. A number of country strategies, however, does not refer to overall Swiss priorities at all.• The priorities at country level seem to be in line with the overall IZA priorities for LAC, however, the latter are in most cases relatively broad. Among the analysed documents there was none, which mentioned that priorities defined for Bolivia contradicted overall Swiss development objectives or SDC's priorities for LAC.• An early capitalisation report makes reference to the Swiss Federal Law on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of 1976, to which the cooperation priorities and approaches in the 1970s and 1980s were aligned; later documents do not mention the law. <i>[1989_Cotesu Bolivia 1989]</i>• Among the analysed documents, there are only very few references to SDC's regional strategies or regional guidelines for LAC <i>[one example is 2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien regarding the implementation of transversal topics]</i>.
2) Coherence		
2.1 Was the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<p>Among the bilateral SDC activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Over the decades, the references to cooperation among the different SDC projects and SDC expert teams in the country are positive. There were regular meetings among all SDC experts in the country and potentials for synergies were used as good as possible. <i>[1984_Geschichte der schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; 1992 (1993-1997)_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i> <p>SDC's bilateral cooperation and SDC's humanitarian aid:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• In Bolivia, humanitarian aid was only applied in a very targeted manner in cases of crisis or natural disasters. Coordination with the bilateral activities was thus only necessary to a very limited extent and worked well. <i>[INT 4]</i> <p>SDC's bilateral cooperation and SDC's global programmes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• In the case of Bolivia, the bilateral programmes and projects particularly cooperate with the global programmes on climate change, water and food security. The coordination works well, but is not very intensive. <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien; INT 16]</i>• The bilateral programmes in Bolivia partly work with the same implementing organisations as the global programmes. After 2024, the global programme on climate change, based in Lima, will most likely take over some of the bilateral activities. <i>[INT 16]</i> <p>Between SDC and SECO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• In 1998, SDC and BAWI (later SECO) elaborated their first joint country strategy for Bolivia --> For the first time, there was medium-term plan with general validity for all of Switzerland's public development cooperation with Bolivia.• Strategic documents make reference to a "close coordination" between both institutions. Swiss activities in the field of economic development seem to be well aligned and complementary. <i>[e.g. 2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i>• Also, there was geographical complementarity: SDC focused on rural areas as well as small/medium cities; SECO on medium/large cities.• The interviews, however, provide a somehow more critical picture. Some even refer to a "constant struggle and rivalry" between both institutions. Especially the period before the clear division of countries between SDC and SECO (SECO from then on focus on emerging economies) in 2005 is depicted rather conflictive (not BOL-specific, overall for LAC). <i>[INT 4, 17]</i>• In recent years, an SDC colleague in La Paz focussing on the economic development programme dedicates 20% of her working time to SECO projects, which proves to be very useful. <i>[INT 14]</i>
2.2 Was the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors ?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activites of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The interviews held generally shed a positive light on donor coordination in Bolivia over the decades. Detailed donor mappings helped to achieve a good complementarity. The leadership regarding donor coordination had generally not been with the Bolivian Government, but with individual proactive bilateral donors <i>[INT 9, 10, 22, 31]</i>.• In the early years (before 1985) there was clearly a lack of coordination between the different donors. Documents for the early years also state that there was a lack of effective coordination and decisive orientation on the part of Bolivia, which led to a high cost-benefit ratio of international cooperation and to it playing a rather marginal role for Bolivia's development. From the mid-1980s on, SDC was envisaging to support local Bolivian authorities in their task of increasing the efficiency of the use of development cooperation funds with targeted planning projects and to increase transparency for all bi- and multilateral activities in the country <i>[1982_Die Schweizerische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Bolivien; 1985_DEH - Landesprogramm Bolivien]</i>.• In 1983, the 1st Round Table for Cooperation on Natural Disasters was held under the leadership of the Ministry of Planning and UNDP. <i>[2009_40 anos_se hace camino al sembrar revista anual 2008 - 2009]</i>• From 1986 on and along with the upcoming macroeconomic support measures for Bolivia, coordination among the bi- and multilateral donors increased and improved a lot. Along with the support for structural reforms, Consultative Groups among the different bi- and multilateral donors began to be held periodically until 2003. <i>[1992 (1993-1997)_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; 2009_40 anos_se hace camino al sembrar revista anual 2008 - 2009]</i>. Moreover, the informal group of the so-called "like-minded" bilateral donors (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Canada), which was set up in 1990 on a Swiss initiative, has contributed significantly to a better coordination of bilateral efforts <i>[1992 (1993-1997)_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i>.• Bolivia's efforts to establish a National Development Plan (from 1998 onwards) further increased and improved international donor coordination in order to reach the best possible donor harmonisation and alignment with Bolivian objectives. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i>• Over the years, SDC increasingly had an active role in shaping donor coordination and policy dialogue due to their recognition as a flexible, innovative and reliable agency. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; INT 4]</i>• In 2006, the Bolivian Development Partners Group (Grupo de Socios para el Desarrollo de Bolivia - GruS) was created in La Paz by several members of the international cooperation present in the country. Its main objective is to strengthen coordination and harmonisation of international cooperation in order to improve its effectiveness and alignment with the objectives of the National Development Plan (NDP) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).• Approximately from 2013 on, the number of staff in the SDC cooperation office was decreased, implying that SDC increased delegation in project implementation and expanded co-financing with multilateral institutions, especially World Bank, IDB and UN agencies. Increased cooperation with multilateral actors also allowed for the scaling-up of proven approaches. <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i>• The development of the Joint European Strategy 2017-2020 (EU and Switzerland) was a positive process and further fostered cooperation among stakeholders. <i>[2018-2021_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i>.• Switzerland has also promoted the trilateral cooperation approach in Latin America for decades, with some notable results. <i>[2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia]</i>.

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
3) Effectiveness		
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors were achieved?	descriptive/illustrative	<p>The development results achieved in Bolivia in the different sectors and themes over the decades were very diverse and broad. The depiction here must therefore necessarily be <u>exemplary and partly anecdotal</u>.</p> <p>A) Rural development with a focus on agriculture: livestock breeding, innovation and mechanisation of agriculture, (fodder) seed production:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livestock breeding: The early experiences between 1969 and 1982 were assessed as a highly productive assessment by an evaluation in 1982. Particularly the technical training of the local staff by the Swiss experts was highlighted as very successful. <i>[1982_Die Schweizerische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Bolivien]</i> • Seed production: Particularly successful was also the adaptation of (potatoe) seeds to local Bolivian conditions. Higher-yielding and more resistant seeds have been developed and marketed for potato cultivation. Research in potato cultivation has a high quality standard and has been transferred into an institutionally sustainable form (foundation). Methods of integrated pest management have been developed for the most important diseases and greenhouses have been built for the safe production of seed (3000 by 1998); three projects for the production and marketing of adjuvants have been transferred to private sector companies. <i>[1998-2003_Landesprogramm Bolivien; INT 26]</i> • The cooperations with the University of Cochabamba and also with the semi-autonomous technical sub-organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture (IBTA) in the fields of livestock, (fodder) seed production and agricultural technology were in many documents highlighted as very fruitful and purposeful. In this context, education and training for lecturers and students in agricultural topics specifically tailored to the agro-ecological conditions of the Andes was supported. <i>[1984_Geschichte der schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; 1985_DEH - Landesprogramm Bolivien; 1998-2003_Landesprogramm Bolivien]</i> <p>B) Decentralisation, citizen participation, municipal democracy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From the mid-1980s onwards, SDC worked to improve citizen participation at regional and local level. The experience gained in this process was incorporated into national efforts to decentralise the Bolivian state from 1995 onwards (Ley de Participación Popular). Since then, Switzerland has supported the training of thousands of promoters, grassroots organisations and municipal authorities in the appropriation and more effective implementation of decentralisation measures. In the 1990s, various communities drew up their own development plans; territories of indigenous communities were surveyed and registered; model training materials and methods for informing and training grassroots organisations in aspects of community governance were developed and introduced in communities <i>[1998-2003_Landesprogramm Bolivien; 2008-2012_Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie für Bolivien]</i> • The Swiss experience with federalism played an important role for the targeted and successful support in the field of decentralisation and citizen participation. <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien; INT 31]</i> • "Star project": With Swiss support an atlas of all Bolivian communities was created. <i>[INT 26]</i> • In the 1990s and first half of the 2000s, training of farmers to strengthen local democracy and civil society; development of community economic development strategies (productive community) --> The concepts promoted by SDC were recognised and applied by municipalities and the relevant ministries. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i> • By strengthening municipal administrations and, above all, promoting the participation of the civilian population, school and health services were improved in one third of all municipalities. <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i> • Moreover, over the last decade, SDC successfully supported the establishment and strengthening of counselling centres for victims of domestic violence. <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i> • SDC's contribution to the process is also highly recognised among Bolivian partners. Until today, the established diaogue between local and regional authorities, the private sector and further stakeholders stands out positively as a result of the Swiss long-term engagement <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; Bolivia, annual report 2021]</i> <p>C) Promotion of vocational education and training:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the early 1990s, several hundred people were brought into newly developed vocational training; a previously state-run vocational training institute was transferred to a foundation and has since been successfully run by private entrepreneurs <i>[1998-2003_Landesprogramm Bolivien]</i> • In the early 2000s, SDC has successfully contributed to anchoring the dual education system in the relevant national institution. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i> <p>D) Financial services / microfinance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the early 1990s, with SDC's support NGOs specialising in the credit business were successfully transformed into bank-like institutions; bank branches specialising in the granting of small loans (in urban and rural areas) were opened; by 1996 around 82,000 clients had outstanding loans with SDC-supported financial institutions. <i>[1998-2003_Landesprogramm Bolivien; INT 22]</i> • The expansion of rural savings and the development of innovative financial services, such as support for venture capital instruments or the promotion of strategic alliances, have helped rural families and small entrepreneurs to have easier access to financial services that are also better suited to their needs. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i> <p>Until today, there were significant contributions to the design of public policies, institution-building, and access to credit and other financial services by small-scale producers. Consolidation of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and their inclusion in the legislation governing the financial system. <i>[2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia]</i></p> <p>E) Strengthening the rule of law / the judicial system, including improving access to justice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the 1990s, people involved in criminal trials in rural areas have benefited from a fair trial and several thousand people have been informed of their rights; human rights monitoring centres were installed <i>[1998-2003_Landesprogramm Bolivien]</i> • In recent years (since 2013), significant achievements could be made in the field of access to justice like the expansion of coverage, increasing the number of cases handled, increasing counterpart resources for the recruitment of conciliators and speeding up judicial processes, which led to savings in costs for vulnerable citizens and the state. <i>[INT 22, 23; Regional Guidelines DLAC 2018-2021]</i> At the same time, some of these advances were achieved after several delays and the results are at risk due to tensions between the judiciary and the executive, internal conflicts within the judicial system, the stagnation of reforms, the conflicting interests of the different actors, institutional weakness, changes in authorities, or the politicisation of the Justice Summit. <i>[2013-2016_Revisión de Medio Término de la Estrategia de Cooperación]</i> <p>F) Natural resource management / biodiversity conservation / forestry / integrated water(shed) management and climate change adaptation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Swiss were among the first donors to successfully support reforestation in Bolivia (from 1984 on). In this process, communities have acquired the corresponding know-how. <i>[1992 (1993-1997)_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, p. 10; 1998-2003_Landesprogramm Bolivien]</i> • Since the mid-1990s, SDC and GEF effectively supported the establishment of a national system of protected areas. <i>[2009_40 anos_se hace camino al sembrar revista anual 2008 - 2009]</i> • Community associations were supported in the development and implementation of watershed management plans. 40,000 families were able to improve their income and food security. The watershed management concept developed and tested with Swiss support forms the basis for the Plan Nacional de Cuencas, which is now co-financed by several donors and the World Bank. <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i> SDC made contributions to governance through the development of regulations and the incorporation of social actors in integrated watershed management. <i>[2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia]</i> • Successful implementation of the resilience approach to the effects of climate change at the territorial level. <i>[2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia]</i> • For recent projects on climate change adaptation, the participatory approach should be highlighted, which achieved the motivation and commitment of the producers, their organisations and their municipal authorities, as well as the replication of actions on their own initiative and with their own resources. <i>[e.g. 2014_Adaptación comunitaria al cambio climático – scaling up CC]</i>
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes were (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the 1980s, the Fondo Social de Emergencia proved to be an adequate and very successful instrument to mitigate the soial costs of the Bolivian structural adjustment programme. <i>[1987_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der DEH in Bolivien; INT 4-7]</i> • Cooperations with universities and research institutes in the field of agriculture proved to be very effective. • Focus on empowerment and support of Bolivian NGOs: In Bolivia in particular, SDC helped to successfully establish NGOs, which then actively engaged in governance issues. SDC often focused on supporting critical-constructive civil society organisations to contribute to alternative conflict resolution. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; INT 9]</i> • Multi-stakeholder approach, policy dialogue and bringing together several actors of different government levels, civil society, academia and private sector as well as international donors has proven to be very effective in Bolivia (e.g. G-DRU). <i>[2008-2012_Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie für Bolivien; 2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien; INT 16]</i> • Technical advice and capacity building were in many documents and interviews highlighted as the most important and successful approach of SDC; SDC as a as a knowledge facilitator in a multi-stakeholder environment. <i>[1982_Die Schweizerische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Bolivien; 2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia]</i> • Long-term deployment of technical advisory staff in SDC projects (in some cases longer than 10 years), i.e. strong consistency and the possibility to build long-term relationships with project partners. <i>[1985_DEH - Landesprogramm Bolivien]</i> • Especially the projects in the agricultural sector were characterised by a continuous and pragmatic set-up, long-term partnerships, good embedding in the social and economic environment and the development of relevant technologies. These aspects (except for the latter) also proved to be relevant success factors in other thematic fields. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i> <p>--> Relevant hallmarks of SDC's cooperation: flexibility, process orientation, targeted promotion of innovation and bringing together different development actors. <i>[2008-2012_Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie für Bolivien]</i></p> <p>--> Intervention at the local level combined with strategies to influence at the system level has proven to be an effective driver for change for the benefit of the disadvantaged in the Bolivian environment. <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i></p> <p>Challenging aspects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SDC also focused on co-financings with other donors, thematically oriented towards long-term Bolivian state policies, in order to effectively contribute to increasing donor coordination and the effectiveness of international development cooperation. In many cases, this proved to be a successful approach, also regarding an effective scaling up of previous successful experiences. In some cases, however, the experience with joint implementation (especially in the case of basket funding) has been mixed. The leadership of the Bolivian government was often too weak and the conditions of individual donors too rigid. The best impact could then be achieved when participations in national initiatives could continue to be enriched with field experience from bilateral projects. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i> • SDC partly implemented too many differently oriented projects. The thematic breadth and lack of focus of SDC's engagement was also criticised in an evaluation of the OECD DAC in the year 2000. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; 2013-2016_Revisión de Medio Término de la Estrategia de Cooperación; INT 9, 10, 15]</i> • Targeted scaling-up of successful approaches has for several years been a challenge and was still high on the agenda of potential improvements in the 2000s. <i>[2008-2012_Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie für Bolivien]</i>

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
3.3 Which stakeholders were reached and how - and which were excluded and why? Which capacities were changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In Bolivia, SDC managed to reach a wide range of institutions at different government levels, civil society, academia and private sector, thereby focussing on the local level and on rural areas.• First mainly cooperation with government institutions, from the mid-1980s on, increasing support of NGOs, from the 1990s on, increasingly also the private sector was reached <i>[1998-2003_Landesprogramm Bolivien; 1992 (1993-1997)_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i>.• SDC succeeded in anchoring knowledge in the institutions. Through people who have remained with the institutions a good local anchoring of Swiss innovations was possible. However, personnel changes - particularly in centralized government institutions, have always been a major challenge for SDC in Bolivia. Personnel in decentralised institutions with continuity in higher batches was often more easy to be reached. <i>[1985_DEH - Landesprogramm Bolivien; 2010_Bolivia MTR de la Estrategia; INT 16, 22, 23]</i>• For the work on democratisation and decentralisation, anchoring in civil society turned out to be an important success factor. Work with civil society organisations (CSOs) has led to increasing demands for accountability and a more effective response to specific problems, more and better services, transparency and participation. Moreover, the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders at the territorial level has enabled local financing to be managed more effectively. Taking local knowledge into account likewise promotes shared responsibility among participants. <i>[2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia]</i>• Regarding beneficiaries,• In the agricultural sector: initially nearly exclusively men, in the course of the time women were increasingly also recognized as target group. In the microfinance field: mainly women (engaged in trade, not production). <i>[INT 22]</i>• In recent years, focus was primarily on the most vulnerable groups (small-scale producers, micro-entrepreneurs, women, young people and indigenous people) in the Altiplano and valleys regions. <i>[2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia]</i>
4) Impact		
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security. 4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Since its beginning, the Swiss cooperation with Bolivia had an overall focus on reducing poverty in the Bolivia. However, comprehensive impact analyses for SDC's interventions are very scarce, which clearly limits the analysis of the HIC team regarding this question.• Available project evaluations in many cases do not include impact analyses either, but focus exclusively on the achievement of project outputs. Some cooperation strategies make reference to such project evaluations and thereby confirm SDC's contribution to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities in the country. Methodologically this seems questionable. <i>[e.g. 2018-2021_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i>• Several interview partners confirmed that there is a lack of well-founded impact analyses for SDC's interventions in LAC <i>[e.g. INT 10, 17]</i>. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Poverty rates in Bolivia improved significantly in the course of the time. Bolivia will be an upper middle income country by 2024. Inequality continues to be a major issue.• Especially for the early years of the Swiss cooperation with Bolivia (before 1985), retrospectively international cooperation was found to be playing a rather marginal role for Bolivia's development <i>[1985_DEH - Landesprogramm Bolivien]</i>.• In general, several interview partners mentioned that the Swiss influence on overall poverty reduction was clearly limited, mainly due to the very limited financial resources (also relatively in comparison to other bi- and multilateral donors). Where SDC has had an impact on policies and institutions, it has always been in long-term projects, where partners and their institutions could convince themselves of, and accustom themselves to a specific intervention. <i>[INT 15, 25, 31]</i>• A number of bilateral donors have withdrawn approx. since 2010, which left noticeable gaps in individual sectors, such that the relative importance of Swiss development cooperation in certain fields has been increasing. The importance of Swiss development cooperation is growing in the general policy dialogue and especially in individual sectors, such as vocational training or watershed management <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i>.• At the same time, some interview partners question the overall influence of international cooperation in Bolivia (not SDC-specific). Major impulses often came either from the private sector or from the Bolivian government itself. <i>[INT 15, 16]</i>• SDC's main contributions to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities are seen via the technical know-how of project teams, thus long-term technical advice and capacity building <i>[INT 4, 15, 17]</i>. SDC as a well appreciated, long-term present partner for Bolivian institutions. <p>For some of the thematic areas hints to achieved positive impacts can be found:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Seed production: Since the mid-1970s, Switzerland has promoted the production of high-quality seeds (fodder, forestry, beans, potatoes, Andean cereals). Still today, several thousand seed producers earn a substantial part of their income from it. A capitalisation from 2009 further emphasizes the positive impact on overall productivity as well as production and income of the farmers, on employment, consumption, the creation of value chains, and overall food security; all of which implying a better quality of life. <i>[2008-2012_Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie für Bolivien; 2009_40 anos_se hace camino al sembrar revista anual 2008 - 2009]</i>• Technical vocational education and training: Sustainable impact achieved via capacity building and the creation of sustainable education and training structures. <i>[INT 15]</i>• Decentralisation: The Swiss long-term interventions significantly contributed to the development of a civic culture and a democratic institutional framework in Bolivia that is capable of contributing to an effective reduction of poverty and the consolidation of a democratic society. <i>[2009_40 anos_se hace camino al sembrar revista anual 2008 - 2009]</i>• Climate Change: As a result of the different projects, local authorities and the rural target population are sensitised and better trained in relation to climate change, which will allow them to better adapt and thereby increase their resilience. <i>[2014_Adaptación comunitaria al cambio climático – scaling up CC]</i>• Rural development / rural inclusive markets: An external quantitative impact-evaluation of the project "Mercados Inclusivos" could confirm a contribution of the project to the reduction of poverty among the target group from a multidimensional approach - despite the difficult socio-economic context of the COVID-19 pandemic. <i>[2021_Evaluacion Final Mercados Inclusivos_Bolivia]</i>
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today (<i>intended or un-intended</i>)? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion). 4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts. 4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In the mid 1990s, the SDC LAC department in Berne itself judged SDC's actual influence on the Bolivian framework conditions and on the formation of the system to be limited. <i>[Lateinamerika Sektionsleitlinien 1995-2005 (1)]</i>• However, for later years, there are some positive examples, some of which have already been mentioned above. E.g. structural changes could be achieved through the support to the decentralization process, the creation of stable institutions, norms and laws. <i>[INT 17]</i> <p>Moreover, policy dialogue at the level of the municipalities, the departments and the central government has helped to shape and implement laws, policies, plans and finances in a way that is more conducive to development. Systemic support also contributed to strengthening institutions and promoting the capacities of staff and beneficiaries in many places. <i>[2018-2021_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien]</i></p>

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
5) Sustainability		
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (<i>for closed programmes</i> : did the benefits actually continue?)? What were/are the successes and hindering factors ?	6.1.1 Exit strategies were defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets were reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures). 6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements. 6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) were closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a perceived insufficient orientation during project implementation towards local staff taking over project responsibility as soon as possible. Until the mid-1980s there weren't really any positive examples of the Swiss cooperation making itself redundant after bringing about positive change. From 1985 on, this topic began to be higher on the agenda. <i>[1982_Die Schweizerische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Bolivien; 1984_Geschichte der schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; 1986_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der DEH in Bol]</i>• In general, most interview partners confirmed that, although there are definitely some positive examples of thematic fields, in which sustainable results were achieved, sustainability of project successes and the handing-over to local partner has over the decades been a challenging topic for SDC. <i>[INT 10, 16]</i>• The most important obstacles regarding sustainability over the decades were the following: political instability, frequent changes of personnel in partner institutions (very little continuity after changes in government), also in some cases heavy bureaucracy and a lack of adequate competences in the partner institutions. Already in the 1970s and 1980s, in a somehow different way, the political and administrative insecurity on the Bolivian side was the main hindering factor for sustainability of project results. <i>[1982_Die Schweizerische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Bolivien; 2010_Bolivia MTR de la Estrategia; INT 16, 22, 23]</i>• What definitely remains, are the capacities built and the achieved technical know-how of the reached beneficiaries. <i>[2018_Bolivia_Proyecto_de_investigacion_aplicada_para_la_Adaptación al CC; INT 4]</i>• In many cases project results had higher chances to persist, when the private sector was involved as cooperation partner. <i>[INT 16, 22]</i> <u>Positive examples of certain thematic fields:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Decentralisation and citizen participation: The achieved positive development cannot be stopped anymore. Relevant topics and examples are anchored in law; structures remain, municipalities have the necessary capacities. An important role in this context played inter-institutional networks, such as the Grupo de Desarrollo Ruralfactor (G-DRU), which has managed to bring together all the actors involved in the decentralisation and popular participation process at a technical table: public-private, intersectoral and multidisciplinary. Particularly in the 1990s, the G-DRU helped to make the positive development of the decentralisation irreversible. <i>[2009_40 anos_se hace camino al sembrar revista anual 2008 - 2009; INT 16, INT 22]</i>• Agriculture and sustainable forestry (e.g. seed production improvement (particularly potato and fodder seeds), sustainable land use and erosion control): Projects were characterised by a continuous and pragmatic approach, long-term partnerships, good integration into the social and economic environment and the development of relevant technologies. Over the years, this has resulted in a large number of programmes which have in some cases become independent in the form of their own companies or foundations. In addition, the Sistema Boliviano de Tecnologías Agropecuarias (SIBTA), supported by the SDC through a basket fund, a national instrument for promoting innovation in agriculture, still exists today. In many cases, successful approaches in this field have thus been maintained until today. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; INT 4, 10, 16]</i> Moreover, approaches for an ecologically oriented agriculture in the highlands and partly also in the lowlands are also clearly anchored and will be unstoppable. There is a Bolivian responsibility on these topics. <i>[INT 22]</i>• There were mixed responses regarding the dairy production of the 1970s: It was mentioned by some interview partners as a positive example (dairies still active today) and by others as a rather unsustainable example <i>[INT 10; 22]</i>.• Microfinance: SDC contributed effectively to building sustainable structures in this area. Today, comprehensive microfinance structures in the country <i>[INT 22]</i>.• Vocational education and training: Sustainable impacts could be achieved <i>[INT 15, 22]</i>• Projects with Bolivian NGOs could in many cases be handed over to them and continued without Swiss resources. <i>[INT 4]</i> <u>Challenging examples:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Environment and management of natural resources: In the 1990s, environmental topics were not yet prioritized as compared to other politically rather "prestigious" fields; later on external project evaluations in this area from 2014 and 2018 confirmed high interest from partners at the national level, the target group as well as from international programmes and agencies and well-elaborated territorial strategies for adaptation to CC; all of which may imply good prospects for the sustainability; however, a number of interview partners confirmed that until today institutions in the area are still very fragile and people change a lot, which clearly challenges the sustainability of project successes. <i>[1992 (1993-1997)_Programm für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; 2014_Adaptación comunitaria al cambio climático – scaling up CC; 2018_Bolivia_Proyecto_biocultura_y_cambio_climatico_eval medio término; INT 22]</i> For the field of applied research in the field of adaptation to climate change an external project evaluation confirms that the research is in most cases highly dependent on external subsidies. <i>[2018_Bolivia_Proyecto_de_investigacion_aplicada_para_la_Adaptación al CC]</i> <u>For the phasing out 2022-2024, SDC will:</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. ensure that the projects are further implemented appropriately by the Bolivian government and/or other (international or national) partners; some of the current projects will be handed over to other bilateral donors (e.g. Sweden for Vida sin Violencia; DAC project);2. forge links between the bilateral cooperation projects and SECO or SDC global programmes3. intensify knowledge management, e.g. by using innovative approaches like interactive platforms. <i>[2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia; INT 16, 23]</i>
5.2 Did SDC's bilateral cooperation interventions lead to scalable or replicable results (<i>for closed interventions</i> : Were those actually up-scaled or replicated?)?	6.2.1 Project approaches were scaled-up in the priority regions. 6.2.2 Project approaches were replicated outside the priority regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SDC's LAC programme (not Bolivia-specific) contained numerous projects with model character, which should be replicated by national partners. From a cost/benefit perspective, this type of project was often a very expensive investment that only pays off, if the action became self-sustaining and/or served as an example for imitation from outside without substantial new investment. <i>[Latin America Section Guidelines 1995-2005 (1)]</i>• According to some interview partners, scaling up of good approaches did not go very well for a long time, but improved at some point. In some thematic areas - such as watershed management or financial services - it was possible to incorporate experience into sector policies and thus achieve the desired scaling-up. Some successful project approaches were taken up by other donors as well (e.g. SIDA). Also, there was regional scaling-up in LAC by SDC itself, e.g. in the fields of forestry, microfinance etc. <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien; INT 15, 17]</i>.• In recent years, there were also increasing co-financings with multilaterals, which should allow for further upscaling (World Bank, IDB). <i>[2013-2016_Kooperationsstrategie Bolivien; INT 10]</i>.
6) Lessons Learned		
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In many various thematic fields, SDC managed to achieve results with a positive and sustainable effect on Bolivia's further development (see notes on effectiveness, impact, sustainability above).• Particularly over the last two decades, policy dialogue turned out to be an important and effective and very successful instrument for the cooperation with Bolivia.• SDC played an important role for the donor coordination in the country.• Most challenging seems to be to ensure the sustainability of project results in a partly fragile institutional environment - particularly in fields like justice and natural resource management / climate change.• Moreover, the long-term impact of many of SDC's interventions can hardly be rated due to a lack of adequate studies.
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	Success factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Flexibility/openness with regard to the definition of project objectives, project management and the allocation of funds; also speed of reaction to developments on the ground. In many cases, objectives were clearly set, but the path to reach them was left rather open; no one-size-fits-all-approach. It was possible to release new funds relatively quickly at the project level as well as at a higher level for new topics identified on the ground. Great flexibility also with regard to the approaches and the selection of partners; for example, cooperation with governments from the left as well as from the right. The flexible approach also allowed SDC to react relatively quickly to changes in the political framework conditions in the country. <i>[Lateinamerika Sektionsleitlinien 1995-2005; INT 10, 11, 15, 17]</i>• Relatively early (approx. from 1990 on) work with local Bolivian staff instead of with only external international staff. <i>[1982_Die Schweizerische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Bolivien; INT 15]</i>• Bureaucratic burden at SDC is lower than with other donors, which is perceived as a strong advantage by partners and SDC staff (but of course implemented resources are also much lower). <i>[Lateinamerika Sektionsleitlinien 1995-2005; INT 15]</i>• Long-term commitment of SDC; multi-year / multi-phase projects; continuity in the cooperation with stakeholders and in certain territories. "SDC gives it the time it needs." Some of the programmes lasted 20 years and more. Then changes can really be perceived. Gradually, money from the state is also added when it becomes clear that things have proven successful. <i>[INT 16, 17, 22]</i>.• Focus at local level and territorial approach: SDC has always worked very locally and in many cases with a territorial approach. In this context, SDC had a clear geographical focus within the country, which was in many cases maintained for a very long time. <i>[INT 3, 10, 16]</i> At the same time, the link to policy dialogue at national level is highly important <i>[INT 17]</i>.• SDC's cooperation seems less exposed than those of other agencies to the pressures of (domestic) political interests. <i>[Lateinamerika Sektionsleitlinien 1995-2005; INT 4]</i>• The technical expertise of SDC project staff is perceived as a strong and important success factor by local partners <i>[Lateinamerika Sektionsleitlinien 1995-2005]</i>.• Technical exchange between the different countries in LAC was a key success factor, e.g. on forestry in the Andean countries. Already from early on, programmes were set up that were active in more than one country. <i>[INT 15]</i>• For the work on democratisation and decentralisation, anchoring in civil society turned out to be an important success factor. Work with CSOs has led to increasing demands for accountability and a more effective response to specific problems, more and better services, transparency and participation. Moreover, the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders at the territorial level has enabled local financing to be managed more effectively. Taking local knowledge into account likewise promotes shared responsibility among participants <i>[2022-24_Cooperation Programme_Phasing Out Programme Bolivia]</i> Hindering factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lack of focus: too many differently oriented projects. According to iterview partners, in some topics, SDC was therefore unable to demonstrate sufficient know-how. Often, the topics were simply relabelled (example forestry --> NRM --> climate change adaptation) and many individual topics were combined under relatively broad topics. Topic delimitation was often a difficult issue. <i>[INT 9, 10, 15]</i> The thematic breadth of SDC's engagement was also criticised in an evaluation of the OECD DAC in the year 2000. <i>[2004-2008_Landesprogramm der Schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit]</i>• Especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, the SDC projects turned out to be too ambitious; objectives were in many cases too challenging and partly contradictory, which emphasized the need of (self-) evaluations. Interviewees of the meta-analysis also highlighted that some of the more recent projects still had too ambitious goals are were designed too broadly to really make a difference <i>[Lateinamerika Sektionsleitlinien 1995-2005; INT 16]</i>.• Some interview partners perceived a lack of a clear overall LAC strategy, a clearer classification into least developed, low developed countries with accordingly chosen development instruments and approaches. Decisions seemed to be made more as a reaction and not as a strategic action by SDC. Moreover, connected to the long-term engagement (generally perceived as positive), the conditions (until) when certain support structures should be maintained, partly seemed to be unclear. <i>[INT 10]</i>
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	

Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix - Peru

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
1) Relevance		
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC's aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs ? Were the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In terms of development needs, the programme contributed significantly to poverty reduction of discriminated groups and focuses on relevant issues and regions. Coherence with national development priorities was ensured. <i>(Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie mit Peru, 2009 - 2011, 2009)</i>• Pure technical assistance lasted for 15 years until its limits became apparent. In order for the aid to give a tangible impetus to development, the SDC also began to intervene at the social and societal level and in production structures <i>(Revue du programm de coopération technique et financière au Pérou, 1989; 50 Jahre DEZA - Mehr als Hilfe, 2011)</i>• Being classified as a Middle Income Country a gradual transition of SDC instruments to those of SECO seemed reasonable in order to implement the cooperation strategy within the framework of the thematic and geographical priorities agreed with the Peruvian government <i>(Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie mit Peru, 2009 - 2011, 2009)</i> <p><i>Example:</i> SDC's programmes and projects in the area of micro and small enterprise development and in the area of vocational training and job placement were well positioned. They reflected the need of the country to create more productive and remunerative employment, and they indeed had the potential to increase employment and incomes, and to reduce poverty. Moreover, these programmes and projects were compatible with the country's priorities of economic policy in various areas and they had (mostly) established close and sound links with the responsible line ministries <i>(Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013 and INT 26)</i></p>
1.2 In how far was SDC's engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities ?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Implementation of activities Peru followed the priorities of the Peruvian government than to Swiss Development Priorities, although some programmes, such as technical education were a "Swiss" interest <i>(INT 26)</i>• Swiss Cooperation in Peru was in harmony with the Dispatch for International Cooperation (IZA) strategies, focusing on topics such as support to poverty reduction strategies, support for selected regions with fragile statehood, conflicts and security risks, contribution to shaping a globalisation that promotes development. <i>(Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie mit Peru, 2009 - 2011, 2009)</i>
2) Coherence		
2.1 Was the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SECO and SDC both active in the country for more than 15 years: common strategic cooperation programmes. However, generellay speaking only superficial coordination: it was coordinated which project was given to whom but no (strategic) cooperation during project implementation. <i>(INT 26)</i><i>Example:</i> SECO's assistance to SME-development would have complemented SDC's efforts to support the development of micro and small enterprises. <i>(Report on the Economic Analysis for the Country Programme Peru, 2001)</i>• Humanitarian Aid sees as an "own actor" <i>(INT 27)</i>
2.2 Was the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors ?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activites of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Until the 1980s no significant cooperation with other international development actors - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) seen as en exemption, where SDC relied on financial support in the fisheries sector <i>(Perou: Programme de cooperation technique et financière 1986 - 1990, 1987)</i>• Since 1990's stronger collaboration, among others with european donors and Canada: implementation of joint baskets and more co-financing projects. <i>(Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie mit Peru, 2009 - 2011, 2009)</i>• Exchange formats established already in the 1980s, later facilitated by the <i>Hacienda de Vivienda</i> . Development sectors with own donor "leadership": Swiss Cooperation leading the water governance sector. <i>(INT 27)</i>• Overall, cooperation formats rather loose - stronger cooperation between multilateral donors often hindered by own political agenda (e.g. US and Japan) <i>(INT 27)</i>• SDC could have paid more attention to the many possible synergies that the programmes and projects offer, and that are offered by similar activities of other donors <i>(INT 27)</i>• Complementarity with national development priorities is ensured - this was mentioned in the cooperation strategies, (e.g. 1986 - 1990, 2007-2011) which followed priorities set by the government, resp. peruvian national guidelines for international cooperation <i>(Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie für Peru 2009 – 2011, 2009)</i>
3) Effectiveness		
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors were achieved?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The overall balance is positive with concrete results at the policy level, such as legislation for vocational training, for environmental protection and for decentralisation (e.g. two regional governments have policies and standards on water and sanitation). Other results and impacts: around 24,000 youth with vocational training and better employment, 60 small businesses exporting products worth around USD 20 million, civic participation and economic promotion in 50 communities, and over 150,000 people with access to drinking water. The national ombudsman's office has informed more than 100,000 people in rural areas about their rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state.• Production of dairy products/Agriculture: genetic improvement of livestock, new processes for processing dairy products or the introduction of adapted tools for smallholders as part of the HERRANDINA project - above all animal-drawn ploughs. <i>(Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013)</i>• Governance: Succesful integration of the rural population into the state as a whole and the respect for human rights. Thanks to a broad-based project in the rural areas, marginalised people can claim their rights without bureaucratic hurdles. It is estimated that the strengthening of jurisdiction at the community level has led to 80% of disputes being settled locally rather than being sent to the overburdened courts in the cities. Justices of the peace are now a recognised part of Peru's judicial system. Hundreds of thousands of rural dwellers are among the potential beneficiaries of the strengthened local judiciary. <i>(Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013)</i>• Technical Education: After small scaled projects, SDC, especially in the rural areas, implemented programmes that aimed to have an impact on the "masses" in the area of metal mechanics, precision mechanics, watchmakers and food technology. In 2013, around 30,000 students were trained annually in courses lasting several months - without direct involvement of the SDC. Two-thirds find a job, and a quarter use the skills they have learned to set up their own business. It was however noted that due to lower transaction costs, there is a tendency towards short term employment (job centres) <i>(Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013)</i>• Economic Development: Various SDC projects - such as APOMIE, which sought to support micro and small enterprises - have succeeded in opening up access to local and regional markets for poor farmers in the regions of Cajamarca, Cusco and La Libertad. Value chains milk, agricultural products, fruit, poultry and carpentry were created. Within four years, the small farmers in the APOMIPE programme have doubled their incomes. <i>(Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013)</i>• Water Management: It is estimated that 700,000 rural and urban residents benefitted from such projects. They are mainly found in the Andean regions of Cusco and Cajamarca, where the water project AGUASAN has been active since 1997. In the Cusco region, more than half of the population now has access to drinking water (In 2007, only one third had access.) <i>(Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013)</i>
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes were (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	Swiss cooperation in Peru represents a unique case, as it uses a mix of instruments (also SECO) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• know how transfer and technology transfer• financial aid as well as joint ventures (SECO instrument)• humanitarian aid• capacity building and training• environmental protection• political dialogue
3.3 Which stakeholders were reached and how - and which were excluded and why? Which capacities were changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Engagement with the government was overall good and successful throughout the years (e.g. with the Ministry of Agriculture in the agriculture sector) <i>(INT 26)</i>• In the 1990s, the national government rather with a passive role (neoliberalism paradigm) --> stronger cooperation with NGOs: at the beginning desirable, however later problematic in coordination due to the high number of actors involved <i>(Programm der schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Peru 1995-1997, 1995)</i>• Overall, capacity building topics were partially successfully transferred (e.g. environmmetal topics) <i>(INT 28)</i>• Excluded stakeholders: actors at local level were not always reached due to the strong centralist system <i>(INT 26)</i>
4) Impact		
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security. 4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Punctually, in the regions where SDC worked, results have been achieved <i>(INT 26, 27)</i> <p><u>Example:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Marketing initiatives with the national potato centre led to a higher consumption of Peruvian potatoes and hence a direct contribution to poverty reduction. <i>(Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013)</i>• PYMAGROS attempted to strengthen micro and small enterprises in an environment characterised by a high incidence of extreme poverty. Compared to many other activities to reduce poverty in the Sierra the project was not intended to cure symptoms but the underlying causes. <i>(Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013)</i>• Overall, poverty reduction too much of a complex topic to be tackled by one donor such as the SDC <i>(INT 26)</i>• Additionally, the Peruvian economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks, and the economic basis of large parts of the population is fragile. Recessions illustrated that past successes of poverty reduction can be eradicated in a short time. <i>(Report on the Economic Analysis for the Country Programme Peru, 2001)</i>
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today <i>(intended or un-intended)</i> ? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion). 4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts. 4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To a certain degree institutionalisation of national and regional counterparts was seen as a successful example of Swiss Cooperation in the country <i>(INT 26)</i>, however impact not strong enough to change significantly institutions in the country <i>(Report on the Economic Analysis for the Country Programme Peru, 2001)</i>• In relation to the size of the country and the dimension of the problems, the available Swiss development cooperation funds in Peru are small. However, Switzerland can have an impact where it concentrates its resources on prioritised themes in a transparent manner and builds up a profile as a continuous, reliable institution in specific niches <i>(Report on the Economic Analysis for the Country Programme Peru, 2001)</i>• Governance: previously excluded population has access to legal disoute solving framework <i>(Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie für Peru 2009 – 2011, 2009)</i>• Water Governance: Project initiatives were incorporated into new legislation for the water sector at national level, as well as into the concrete plans for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. <i>(INT 27)</i>
5) Sustainability		

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (<i>for closed programmes</i> : did the benefits actually continue?); What were/are the successes and hindering factors ?	<p>6.1.1 Exit strategies were defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets were reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures).</p> <p>6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements.</p> <p>6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) were closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After the phasing out of technical bilateral cooperation, SDC continued implementing its Global Programmes in the country, furthermore Peru did not cease to be a priority country for SECO. There was however a exiting strategy that secured that all bilateral projects were closed ina proper way resp. transferred to the counterpart. (<i>INT 28</i>) • Project goals seemed sometimes as too high for the actual situation in the country (<i>INT 26</i>) • Problem: constant changes in the government and in national institutions, as well as missing vision often a hindering factor for a succesful continuation of programmes. In the 1990s, the high number of NGO actors that weren't specialised in specific topics led to rather dispersed actions. (<i>Report on the Economic Analysis for the Country Programme Peru, 2001; Programm der schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Peru 1995-1997, 1995</i>) • Governance: Although sufficient financial resources were available, goals were were not fully achieved, on the one hand due to the still existing major (national) deficits in the area of good governance and on the other hand due to weak sub-national implementation capacities. (<i>Report on the Economic Analysis for the Country Programme Peru, 2001</i>) <p><u>Success stories:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water managment: After the Peruvian government took over, the experiences from both projects continued to be implemented in the country. It is seen up until today as the most sucesful programm in Peru and benfitted indirectly up to 2 million people by establishing a efficient amnagement system that continues to run until today. (<i>INT 27</i>) • SMEs: In 1993, SDC developed its own strategy in Peru, agreed with a large number of local partners, to provide advice and assistance to the SME sector. Improving the quality of products and opening up the market at the same time is seen as the key to the success in sustainability of SDC projects dedicated to small producers (<i>Vom Käse zum Klima Innovation als Markenzeichen einer langjährigen Partnerschaft in Peru, 2013</i>) • In a constant dialogue with the government and other donors, Switzerland has made a decisive contribution to Peru's adherence to the Paris Declaration on Harmonisation and to the adoption by the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI) of a new policy for international cooperation in 2007 (<i>Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie mit Peru, 2009 - 2011, 2009</i>)
6) Lessons Learned		
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development cooperation is an essential part of Swiss foreign policy in Peru and is appreciated for its quality, innovative strength and active participation in the harmonisation process. (<i>Peru 2002 - 2007: Landesprogramm der schweizerischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, 2002</i>) • No substantial "failures", however unrealistic expectations on what the impact of programmes could change in the country (<i>INT 26</i>) • Interests and opinions of the beneficiaries as an important methodological and operational tool to strengthen the sense of social ownership. Stronger cooperation with other local actors (such as academia or private business) would have helped as the government not always a reliable partner due to the many changes in the past years (<i>INT 28; Report on the Economic Analysis for the Country Programme Peru, 2001</i>)
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The programme works in the defined themes at different levels of intervention (micro, meso, macro) and brings the operational results into the policy dialogue. The availability of national funding enables a broader impact when models tested in the projects are continued with partner funds (scaling-up). In cooperation with government partners, the focus is on improving the efficiency of public investments. When selecting partners, public-private partnerships are particularly encouraged. Cooperation with the private sector could be further strengthened. The partner mix and the work at different levels have led to close cooperation with various national partners, with bilateral partners (e.g. a so-called basket fund of the national ombudsman's office with Belgium, Canada and Spain) as well as with multilateral donors (e.g. with the World Bank in the area of water). Especially in cooperation with multilateral donors, the potential for strategic partnerships has not yet been exhausted. (<i>Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie mit Peru, 2009 - 2011, 2009</i>) • Switzerland can have an impact where it concentrates its resources on prioritised themes in a transparent manner and builds up a profile as a continuous, reliable institution in specific niches. (<i>Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie mit Peru, 2009 - 2011, 2009</i>) • works in a targeted manner where there is identified potential for independent development. • relies on proven partners with compatible goals and values, who have institutional strengths and a credible profile. • contribute to ongoing reforms with locally and regionally acquired experience in specific issues and participate in the relevant policy dialogue at the central level, without overestimating the possibilities therein. • continuously seeks and develops exchange, coordination and cooperation with other donors. Existing restrictions due to Switzerland's non-membership in the UN and EU can be overcome locally. • where it seeks strategic alliances with larger multi- and bilateral actors and deploys its resources with flexibility. • promotes local forces and supports them in their own efforts. • acts as a catalyst between the various state and private actors, helping them to increasingly cooperate and complement each other.
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<p>The programme has made a name for itself in two fields of work in particular: empowerment of disadvantaged population groups and contributions to policy-making in poverty-relevant reforms. Increased communication activities could contribute to a higher profile of the Swiss presence in Peru and to the effectiveness of the policy dialogue. (<i>Schweizerische Kooperationsstrategie mit Peru, 2009 - 2011, 2009</i>)</p>

Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix - Ecuador

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
1) Relevance		
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC's aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs? are the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SDC's overall strategy aims to support a new economic model and development paradigm, which understands the heterogeneity of the urban/rural world and the marked inequalities between these two. To this end, Swiss cooperation fosters a new vision of the rural -a side of the country that is, until that moment, forgotten-, and seeks to change the top-down approach based on a centralist management. Concrete actions are taken to support the National Plan for decentralization, especially during the last 20 years of cooperation.• Understanding the importance of agriculture production for the country as a whole and for the rural and indigenous in particular, SDC formulates objectives aiming to raise agricultural productivity by different means, thus raising the income level of these groups.• Irrigation as topic and as a project plays a key role, since it is in line with the identified needs as it determined the possibilities of a sustainable agricultural development, it is necessary for self-management (autogestión) and it contributes to fighting structural poverty. Cross-cultural approach: this involves promoting the unity of common interests based on the recognition of the diversity of cultural practices and worldviews.• The context evolves throughout the 40 years of Swiss cooperation presence, and so do the thematic priorities in Ecuador. Towards the end of SDC's presence in Ecuador, the identified priorities -namely food sovereignty and environmental management- are identified as relevant for the target groups, and to the national strategic development priorities. <p>(Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009)</p>
1.2 In how far is SDC's engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In general, Swiss cooperation is aligned with the international agreements signed by both countries, as well as with the evolution of cross-cutting issues around the world. In the strategic documents for Ecuador there is no specific mention to Swiss development strategies and its alignment with the programm in the country. <p>(Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009)</p>
2) Coherence		
2.1 Is the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials are used and duplication is avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Since its beginning in 1978, SWISSAID has identified itself with the most marginalised people groups in Ecuador; hence, it initially promoted initiatives for indigenous groups who are fighting for recognition of their land and their rights. SWISSAID supported them in strengthening their organisations, their access to water, credit and markets, and later on their political agenda (they are involved in uprisings in 1990 and 1994). (Country Program, 1998-2002)• From 1998 onwards, the executing agencies of SDC in Ecuador are INTERCOOPERATION, SWISSCONTACT, SOFONIAS (all with their own offices in Quito), as well as PROJEKT-CONSULT, CIP and CIAT. Swiss support organizations with contribution programs are SWISSAID, SWISSCONTACT, SRK, BROT FUER ALLE and PARA LOS INDIOS. Most of them work directly with local grassroots organizations, specializing technically, and the larger ones are program-oriented. (Country Program, 1998-2002)• SECO has no specific program in Ecuador, but it is part of the regional program SIPPO. Their main activities are around the financial sector, environmental protection and trade promotion (Country Program, 2003-2007).
2.2 Is the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activities of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials are used and duplication is avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Multiple partnerships and collaborations with other bilateral donors (especially Germany and the Netherlands) lead to synergies and thus to efficiency gains, especially in the provision of financial services and commercialization of agricultural products, but also in many other topics. Towards the phasing out, there is also a prospect of an even broader cooperation among these development agencies to better address the problem of small industry development in the country. (Country Program, 2003-2007).• Coordination with local NGOs and other bilateral donors is done independently, with very few participation of the state. It is not clear which are the main goals in this regard, and the different agencies had to work by its own. (Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009)
3) Effectiveness		
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors are achieved?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Social construction of irrigation: with an investment of 14 million Swiss francs (10 M US dollars) over a period of 12 years - financed 2/3 by the SDC and 1/3 by government agencies - it is possible to build an irrigation canal 26 km long, which allowed the strengthening of communal relations around it. Integration of the perspective and interests of small farmers and their communities.• Working both with the demand and supply of agriculture: improvement of productivity levels of certain products, access to technology, new management models for commercialization, which leads to a reduction of rural-urban migration and higher income levels for indigenous and rural populations.• Vocational training programs: Institutionalization of the vocational training model in rural areas, considering the needs of the local population and with the appropriate methodologies to reach them.• Natural resources management: new ways of interpreting and valuing native knowledge. Reflections about the rural/peasant knowledge and approach towards resources vs. a technocratic approach, especially regarding biodiversity.• Design and creation of environmental policies, which leads to establish procedures and regulations for the long-term. Reduction of emissions from industrial activities in the main cities, programs to dispose toxic hospital waste.• Good governance: focus on a meso-level, fostering a more participatory public management (dealing with stakeholders, regulation, participatory budgets, monitoring, etc.) for local governments.• Microfinances: changes to financial regulatory policy to allow small enterprises and rural communities access to credit. Increase in the amount of members of the The Savings and Credit Cooperatives (COACs) grow by 130% between 1999 and 2008.• Gender-related achievements: COACs intentionally promoted women's access to savings and credit and have meant a change in power relations between men and women in the field. Positive discrimination in training programs, recognition of woman's work as equal to man's work in agricultural activities. In terms of monitoring: disaggregated indicators in projects. <p>(Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009; Cuadernos de Efectos/impactos, lecciones aprendidas y particularidades de COSUDE en Ecuador, 2009)</p>
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes are (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• FOES: debt-relief mechanisms, <i>opening the door not only</i> for new resources, but also to alternative paradigms in a context in which the public finances are managed under a orthodox, neoliberal view. (INT18)• Social construction of irrigation: infrastructure as a mean to create bonds within the community, to improve self-organization, to foster empowerment and ownership of projects. (INT18)• Cofinancing (between SDC and COACs) of Capacity Development initiatives (including, among others, the improvement of entrepreneurial skills), motivating COACs' members to demand these services as well as to provide them and to extend their benefits.• Vocational trainings targeted to the local population needs (considering their time availability, their interests and their context).• Work at a micro- and meso level. This implies a direct work with local communities, fostering a bottom-up approach where the local actors are the leading actors and can therefore contribute to the sustainability of the projects in the long-term.• Knowledge exchange "intercambio de saberes" among different stakeholders, giving relevance to historically neglected traditional indigenous knowledge.• Environmental protection and biodiversity: in the case of projects/programmes that do not have biodiversity or integrated and sustainable resource management as their central objective, the inclusion of the biodiversity results might be done to some extent at the expense of the central poverty alleviation related outcomes. <p>(Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009; Cuadernos de Efectos/impactos, lecciones aprendidas y particularidades de COSUDE en Ecuador, 2009)</p>
3.3 Which stakeholders are reached and how - and which are excluded and why? Which capacities are changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Indigenous organizations and populations are stronger and more confident after the joint work with Swiss cooperation. Thanks to this strengthening, they start occupying other decision-level spaces and face less discrimination in this process.• Rural and peasant population: the relevance of their contribution to the national context is recognized, their ancestral and native knowledge and techniques are seen and taken into account.• More recognition and spaces for women: women's work becomes highly relevant in key SDC projects (such as irrigation in Licto) and their work is recognized as equal to man's work. They have better access to credit and more spaces in the vocational training programs.• Within the different sectors, individual, collective and institutional capacities of the target population are developed through innovative methodologies (training of farmer managers, training based on knowledge sharing, learning from peers). As a result, technical skills -especially in agriculture and cattle- have increased, which in turn results in higher productivity levels, better use of resources and of the soil, better negotiation skills, production of goods with an added value (such as the cheese factories), increased awareness of the value of local resources. <p>(Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009; Cuadernos de Efectos/impactos, lecciones aprendidas y particularidades de COSUDE en Ecuador, 2009)</p>
4) Impact		
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security. 4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Through the creation of new economic activities (e.g. cheese and fabric factories), rural families broaden their income sources, which makes them more resilient and less dependant on agricultural production (INT18).• In different towns and cities, especially there where family income relies heavily on agriculture, income levels increased: for example, in the province of Azuay, the increase in family income went from USD 1,596 in 2001 to USD 3,456 in 2009. The position of the agricultural income of the families has improved (from 36% to 54%), in relation to the income from migration (from 60% to 23%).• The increase allows the families to raise their savings capacity: 25% of the COACs' members allocate around 30% of their income to savings.• Reduction of rural migration from 80% (during 1999 crisis) to 35% in the following years in the area of SDC's geographical concentration.• Thanks to irrigation, families working in agriculture increase the productivity of their production and become additional income (going from survival agriculture to market agriculture). This allows children to attend school more regularly, buy clothes and carry out home repairs. It is possible to purchase livestock and improve food security and quality and thus health.• Irrigation becomes an element of individual and community motivation that contributes to the rural and indigenous organizations' cohesion, generating a favourable environment for the development of other initiatives linked to production and the provision of services. The provision of this service to 15,977 families in the Andean region has allowed for a 150% increase in employment between 1995 and 2005. <p>(Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009; Cuadernos de Efectos/impactos, lecciones aprendidas y particularidades de COSUDE en Ecuador, 2009)</p>
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today (<i>intended or un-intended</i>)? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion). 4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts. 4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Vision and role of women at agricultural work: changes in the patterns of access to and control of resources and benefits within the peasant families, whereby women gained access to irrigation, land, technical knowledge, microcredit, etc. The evaluation of several projects showed that another achievement is that inthe production of certain products (such as cocoa, coffee, etc) have now the whole family involved in the process, whereas before the programme, women looked for work elsewhere.• Institutionalization of environmental regulation, especially at municipal/provincial level: development of plans to strength environmental management (including biodiversity), norms and public policy for reduction of environmental pollution from toxic substances/iste and emissions.• Institutionalization of tailored vocational training programmes.• Contribution to empowerment: irrigation and agricultural development projects motivated the local population, who started to participate more actively in assemblies, defending their own interests and raising their self-trust. Recognition of the value of their knowledge, world view, skills and techniques. <p>(Rendición de Cuentas de 40 Años, 2009; Cuadernos de Efectos/impactos, lecciones aprendidas y particularidades de COSUDE en Ecuador, 2009)</p>

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
5) Sustainability		
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (for closed programmes: did the benefits actually continue?)? What are/are the successes and hindering factors?	6.1.1 Exit strategies are defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets are reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures). 6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements. 6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) are closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exit strategies and processes are clearly communicated both internally and externally. This allowed to have a smoother phasing out phase, and to understand who could be accountable for the continuation of the results (INT10). 'Local' technicians/experts: the different capacity develop initiatives (vocational trainings, agricultural production and biodiversity programs, among others) are carried out from the inside, allowing a Trainer of Trainers (ToT) effect. The learned techniques and skills remain within the communities, and some of the projects (such as the cheese factories) are still operational nowadays. Mixed picture on sustainability of the results achieved: One of the strength of SDC's approach has been its long term approach and broadly maintaining the same working areas. This allows for a strong and maintained focus on organisational capacity strengthening, and to sustained policy dialogue at different levels (in particular the Municipal and National level). During the phasing out it, SDC's team at place discusses who should take over of the projects: some of them are in charge of the communities, some are taken over by the government. In both cases there are economic and financial considerations. There are also strong considerations to sustain the bonds and trust relations created throughout the years of Swiss cooperation among different stakeholders. In all cases, the biggest challenge is in terms of financial sustainability after projects/programmes end, either in terms of institutional financing, and/or maintained access to quality markets for the products or technological development promoted. Other factors, such as the fast changing political context, are also posing challenges to sustainability. <p>(Paso a paso se construyen grandes historias, 2009; Zusammenfassung Wirkungsbericht und Lessons Learned Phasing Out, 2010, Rendición de Cuentas 40 anos, 2009)</p>
5.2 Did SDC's bilateral cooperation interventions lead to scalable or replicable results (for closed interventions: are those actually up-scaled or replicated?)?	6.2.1 Project approaches are scaled-up in the priority regions. 6.2.2 Project approaches are replicated outside the priority regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The institutionalization of the vocational training model developed is successful during the phasing out years. In 2008 a system of vocational education and empowerment of vulnerable populations is established by the Ecuadorian state (co-financed by the IDB); and its scope extended to 9 regions by 2009 and the range of courses/vocational trainings offered has been broaden from 9 (in 2008) to 14 (in 2009). While successful for around a decade, the educational system in general has become weaker, especially during the pandemic. Environmental policies and regulations are also scaled-up across different cities. Support for COACs has a positive outcome. It is possible to reactivate local and regional potential for savings and credit and to support the redefinition of a better regulation for this financial segment. Some cooperatives remained strong and (supported by the corresponding normative) are still growing nowadays. They still are an entry point to financial services for numerous groups who are structurally excluded from the traditional financial system. <p>(Paso a paso se construyen grandes historias, 2009; Zusammenfassung Wirkungsbericht und Lessons Learned Phasing Out, 2010)</p>
6) Lessons Learned		
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taking into account the interests and opinions of the beneficiaries has proven to be an important methodological and operational tool to strengthen the sense of social ownership. Rather than formulating highly novel interventions, it is important to support the consolidation of ongoing initiatives. This means, on the one hand, the recognition and valorization of the knowledge and practices generated by a particular community to pursue its development. On the other hand, it means designing and executing projects that respond to the demands of the target group and local requirements based on their capacities and resources. This will allow to avoid parallel structures. Placing empowerment as one of the guiding principles of SDC's work in Ecuador has played a key role for the communities. However, empowerment is not only related to cultural values. It requires access to and decentralization of power. In this context, SDC had a role as dialogue facilitator, but it gave local stakeholders the leading role. A proper understanding of power relations is key to conduct the joint work. (INT18) The case of Ecuador demonstrates that any development process takes time and evolves at its own pace. The continuous adaptation of strategies and approaches has played a crucial role in the success achieved. Careful and close monitoring gives relevant inputs to adapt in a changing environment. Flexibility: programmatic planning is successful as a work frame, but being able of creating and adapting is a very relevant added value. Sharing information allows people to get involved in the problem - when designing environmental regulation, information campaigns in Quito regarding car contamination allowed the population to identify "the responsables" of air contamination, and hence to demand changes about it. <p>LESSONS OF PHASING OUT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A closure decision (in this case, leaving the country) should be sovereign but well-argued for the local workers and partners. The project portfolio should be analysed with the executing institutions, seeking common and/or complementary objectives and actions; plans should be drawn up for synergies and coordination; and possibilities should be sought for merging projects to increase coverage and make greater effects/impacts feasible. systematization of experiences should be more targeted to the audience, and knowledge sharing should start at an early phase. Evaluations can serve as a very important knowledge management tool, but they need to overcome several limitations: it is common to find that there are no baselines, no information available (from local institutions, from former SDC's projects), no statistics (INT10). There is a direct relationship between partner strength and measures to promote sustainability. A deep analysis of the partners' capacities should be conducted when leaving. Countries can learn a lot from previous phasing out experiences. The exchange of these experiences has not been used at is full potential. <p>(Phasing out de l'Equateur 2006 - 2009; Evaluation SWISSAID Global Strategy 2010; Paso a paso se construyen grandes historias, 2009; Equateur: les leçons de 40 années de coopération, 2010)</p>
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decentralization: the concept itself does not means democratization of power structures or local development. To be comprehensive, decentralization demands citizen participation, it has to be articulated to local capacities and the transformation of local government institutions. Natural resources management: as long as elementary and basic needs cannot be covered, natural resources and environmental agendas will only have a limited scope. Hence, it is fundamental to understand the rationality of all stakeholders. In the case of Ecuador, the indigenous population had its own view and connection to the use of natural resources, which is decisive for the sustainability agenda of SDC. Environmental sustainability must be considered in a context of poverty alleviation. It should not be assumed that by approving new laws and policies, strengthening of biodiversity-related institutions, and the generation of participatory management plans, biodiversity conservation will necessarily follow. Many other factors, such as political considerations and conflicts of interests must be taken into account. Gender equality: a gender perspective must also take into consideration and be sensitive to the local cultural roles. Social dynamics should be taken into account in order to obtain specific data in regards to gender-specific needs and actions. It is fundamental to start working with 'masculine' attitudes. While it is men who are reproduce violence, it is also very relevant to work closely with women who continue to pass such believes of machismo to their children. <p>(Phasing out de l'Equateur 2006 - 2009; Evaluation SWISSAID Global Strategy 2010; Paso a paso se construyen grandes historias, 2009; Equateur: les leçons de 40 années de coopération, 2010)</p>
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity development is more effective when it is designed as a mean to an end, as a response to an identified need. Demand and supply of skills should match, so that the carried out efforts can deliver ist purpose. Natural resources protection and management: Global challenges (climate change, etc.) bring global opportunities but also risks (intellectual property, extensive demand over natural resources). Both risks and opportunities need to be carefully analysed, as in the context of biodiversity, seeds, and sustainable agriculture in Ecuador. (Evaluation SWISSAID Global Strategy 2010) Social/citizen participation in a context of poverty: In the absence or insufficiency of means of subsistence and minimum conditions for a dignified life, it is unlikely that individuals, families and communities will be able to commit themselves to participate in the development of their territory. acquire a more active participation in local processes or demand more information for decision-making. As long as basic needs cannot be covered, the demands will continue to prevail over a vision of co-responsibility. The experience of SDC in Ecuador merged poverty reduction goals with sectoral/thematic development, recognising that both 'requirements' must be fulfilled simultaneously. Agricultural/agro-ecological development: it is necessary to be honest of the real local markets and the farmers production conditions. The purpose of this recommendation is to try to achieve a name that is transparent given that the word "Agro-ecological" does not describe the actual production conditions and could lead to confusion among consumers, as well as to create more difficulties than benefits to producers in the short-term. This means confronting the reality on the actual use of pesticides. It is not realistic to think that agro-ecosystems will achieve an ecological balance in the short-term or that pesticides will be eliminated with just one order <p>(Evaluation SWISSAID Global Strategy 2010, Phasing out de l'Equateur 2006 - 2009; Evaluation SWISSAID Global Strategy 2010; Paso a paso se construyen grandes historias, 2009; Equateur: les leçons de 40 années de coopération, 2010).</p>

Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix - Honduras

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
1) Relevance		
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC's aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs ? Were the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners confirm that SDC's aid over time in the respective sectors in Honduras responded to development needs and priorities.• SDC Strategies for Honduras (1982-1992) and Regional Strategies for Central America (1993-2024) usually conduct an in-depth country background analysis, including a brief description of poverty reduction strategies or national development plans (if available). For example, the Regional Strategy 2018-2021 explicitly refers to Honduras National Vision 2010-2038, Public Policy and the National Action Plan on Human Rights, Public Policy against Racism and Racial Discrimination for the Comprehensive Development of Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Hondurans, etc. in SDC's results framework.• SDC's instruments, methods and chosen thematic foci in Honduras evolve over time, however in the HIC Team's opinion can be said to be in line with SDC's overarching objectives in the country.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): The Regional Programme is relevant in terms of addressing problems, needs and considering capabilities of target groups. The sectors attended are coherent with existing SDA guiding principles and are well aligned with prioritized actions of the national PRS and other national / sector development plans in Honduras and Nicaragua.--> Internal Mid-Term Review of SDC Regional Program 2007-2012 (2010): The main goals and thematic areas proof to be relevant.• Of the very view critical comments the HIC Team found, the below is possibly the strongest: --> Multiannual Regional Program Central America for 1993-1998 (1993):: The multisectoral DRI approach as the main development strategy for (marginalized) rural regions has proven problematic, despite overlap with the national development strategy.
1.2 In how far was SDC's engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities ?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners confirm that SDC's engagement in Honduras was in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities. Interestingly, however, one interview partner mentions that the heads of cooperation have too much autonomy and often deviate from agreements or directions given by Bern (the interviewee illustrated that at the example of Honduras and Nicaragua in the early 2000s).• The two available Country Strategies for Honduras (1982 & 1986) link the justification of their interventions to the Swiss Federal Law on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of 18 March 1976. Other Regional Strategies, e.g. the Regional Strategy 1999-2005, refer to the principles of the Latin America Strategy of the SDC (Section Guidelines for Latin America 1995 - 2005) as well as the messages for development cooperation, for economic and trade policy measures and for humanitarian aid of the Swiss Confederation.• In the HIC Team's opinion, the objectives as formulated in Honduran or Regional Strategies are in line with Swiss development priorities as described in Swiss IZA strategies.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): The sectors attended are coherent with existing SDA guiding principles (DEZA Strategy 2010; SECO Strategy 2006) [...].
2) Coherence		
2.1 Was the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners provide a mixed response to the question regarding coherence of SDC south cooperation with other SDC and Swiss activities in Honduras. The fairest formulation as suggested by one interview partner is probably: "There were no important contradictions".• The Regional Strategies for the periods 1999-2005 and 2007-2012 are developed jointly by SDC and SECO.• The two available Country Strategies for Honduras (1982 & 1986) and SDC Regional Strategies all refer to or report on humanitarian interventions.• According to the HIC Team, there is limited information with regard to whether synergy potentials were fully exploited and duplications avoided. It seems reasonable to suggest that while certainly not all synergies were realized, there was no noteworthy competition with regards to partners and target groups between SDC, SECO and other Swiss actors and programs.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> SDC's Regional Program for Central America 1999-2005 (1999) states that program was developed in collaboration with a large number of Swiss entities. It sets out the main strategies and implementation instruments of Swiss development cooperation in Central America, with the aim of ensuring the greatest possible coherence of development cooperation activities in Central America. It forms an important frame of reference for the activities of other Swiss institutions (e.g. FDFA/political departments II, III, IV, Swiss aid organizations).
2.2 Was the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors ?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activities of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• As above, interview partners provide a mixed response, and the fairest formulation as suggested by one interview partner is probably: "There were no important contradictions". In addition, interview partners suggest that the number of bilateral donors became smaller over the years, therewith reducing the coherence / complementarity necessity.• While SDC's Bilateral or Regional Strategies at time mentioned other donors (mainly multilaterals), they geneally do not refer to any specific project or program implemented by other donors.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Internal Strategy Revision Honduras (1987): The coordination of external assistance is making very little progress, except for assistance in planning on the part of the PNUD, a planning that is a sine qua non for better coordination.--> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): SDA, through its two agencies SDC and SECO is implementing different projects promoting small and medium scale enterprises with different approaches / instruments at different levels of interventions with different stakeholders, which, at least in theoretical aspects, cover a wide spectrum of needs and demands of the sector. In this sense there is great coherence, complementary as well as synergy between SDC and SECO approaches. Being SDA only one actor among many others and having only scarce information about effectiveness and real impacts created by all of them, it is recommended to improve the coordination and discussion with other donor agencies, to monitor and jointly evaluate experiences made so far, identify best practices, and scale them up with a common strategy ("Antenna strategy").--> Swiss cooperation strategy for Central America 2013-2017 (2013): Alignment became more complex. The PRS were replaced by national plans, sector policies and strategies of variable owner-ship. The donor landscape changed significantly, requiring building of new alliances and seeking ways for achieving comple-mentarity and coordination.--> External Evaluation of the Program for the Strengthening of Human Rights and Social Audits (FDHAS) (2019): The Program did not propose specific or operative coordination and articulation schemes with other projects and programs with thematic and territorial approaches beyond those of the Swiss Cooperation.
3) Effectiveness		
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors were achieved?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners agree that development results were achieved in various sectors, however that the evidence-base beyond output-level is scarce. According to the interview partners, SDC flagship projects in Honduras (and the region) include POSTCOSECHA and AGUASAN. Other sectors with positive results in Honduras include local development and TVET.• According to the HIC Team, based on the available documentation and key informant interviews, it is practically impossible to judge the effectiveness of SDC Regional Strategies or sectoral engagement in Honduras.• SDC's Regional Strategies generally reflect on the results of previous strategies, however in most cases without specifically naming individual countries.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> The external evaluation for the Program period 1999-2005 states that the overall balance is positive with concrete results at the policy level (e.g. national water and sanitation strategy; MSME promotion policy; environmentally sustainable agricultural technology policy; public finance and budget policy), demonstrated adoption of methods and models at the implementation level (e.g. disaster prevention, agricultural technology transfer), success in capacity development and concrete, measurable development effects (e.g. food security and income improvements resulting from the adoption of 300'000 post harvest silos). However, the evaluation also criticises that a lack of a systematic monitoring system at Program level did not allow outcome and impact measurement above the project level.--> Positive results are mentioned in external and internal evaluations of programs such as Nuestra Cuenca Goascoran, Local Governance and Municipal Investments (PGLIM), Capacity Building in Integrated Risk Management, Strengthening of Human Rights and Social Audits (FDHAS), Water Governance (PGHT), PYMERURAL.
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes were (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SDC's approaches and instruments in Honduras evolved over time, according to the Bilateral and Regional Strategies: --> 1978-1992: The main implementation modality was direct management in cooperation with government agen-cies, but preferably with small, decentralized and target group-oriented organizations, independent of politics.--> 1993-2005: The implementation modalities include direct management through bilateral technical cooperation (majority), delegation of project implementation to Swiss and multilateral third-party institutions, and the Honduras-Switzerland counterpart fund (Gegenwertfonds), which was created as a result of bi-lateral debt relief in 1993.--> 2007-2017: The main implementation modalities direct and indirect implementation (with a tendency towards indirect implementation), sector-wide approaches and joint project-financing (baskets)--> 2018-2024: The portfolio is executed with a mix of modalities, including contributions/grants to public and pri-vate institutions and cooperation mandates that are awarded through international tenders. As of 2018, approaches and modalities such as Territorial concentration, Out of fragility, Psychosocial approach, Communication for empowerment, Risk reduction and climate adaptation, Whole of Government approach, Contributions and mandates, Consolidation of trilateral/South-South cooperation and Combine technical with political are mentioned.
3.3 Which stakeholders were reached and how - and which were excluded and why? Which capacities were changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The stakeholders reached by SDC in Honduras are government institutions (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning), national and international NGOs, multilateral agencies (IADB, World Bank, UNDP), resources institutions (e.g. CATIE, CIAT, CIMMYT, etc.), regional institutions (e.g. SICA) and private sector actors (Bilateral and Regional Strategies, 1982-2024).• The main beneficiaries are poor, excluded, vulnerable groups, smallholder families, SMEs, and lately also those highly vulnerable to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, Grassroot leaders and HR defenders, LGBTI, persons living with HIV/AIDS, persons with special needs (Bilateral and Regional Strategies, 1982-2024).• The available documentation does not contain information about stakeholders that were excluded.
4) Impact		
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security. 4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners generally agree that SDC's engagement in Honduras over the years surely had a (non-measurable) impact, mainly through the numerous capacity building activities that were undertaken and the policies that were influenced.• A Theory of Change, including impact hypothesis, is introduced into the Regional Strategies only as of 2013.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Regional Program 1993-1998 (1993): The orientation of the DEH-Central America program to the needs of poorer populations has allowed the mobilization of considerable national resources for the development of neglected regions over the past five years.--> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): There have been major achievements of SDA at various levels of intervention in different sectors. At macro level a series of ruling policies or strategic papers have been elaborated and are being implemented nationwide (e.g. Water Sector Strategy in Honduras). [...] The absence of a clear results framework at the programme and sector level - with objectives, baseline and indicators (site specific, time horizon, scope, quantity, quality) - and the non availability of a consistent impact monitoring system made it difficult to identify changes and impacts.--> Regional Strategy 2018-2021 (2018): The balance of the Cooperation Strategy 2013-2017 is positive: the inclusion of vulnerable groups, especially of women, youth, and indigenous and Afrodescendent groups, has been systematically promoted. With the support of Switzerland, thousands of Central Americans increased their resilience to climate change, improved their income and gained access to water and sanitation and basic infrastructure in participatory processes.--> External evaluation of SDC's engagement in the water sector (2020): Despite the difficulties in documenting impacts, there is evidence that SDC WASH and IWRM interventions contrib-uted to SDGs achievements (SDGs 1, 4 and 6), led to significant improvements in the lives of poor and marginalised people. In the countries analysed (Colombia, Honduras, Bolivia, Niger, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, and Ethiopia) evidence was found of longer-term expected and sometimes unexpected benefits.• It is the opinion of the HIC Team that while SDC's bilateral cooperation surely contributed to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities in Honduras, it is not possible to quantify the contribution based on the available documentation.

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today (<i>intended or un-intended</i>)? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion). 4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts. 4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> According to the available Strategy documents, gender became officially a cross-cutting issue in the programic period 1999-2005. However, the 1986 Bilateral Strategy already reflects gender aspects, in the sense that it was put forth that optimal results cannot be achieved if working only with / through men e.g. on the improvement of the rural subsistence economy. According to the HIC Team, it is not possible to ascertain to what extend SDC projects contributed to aggravating or improving conflicts in Honduras. Only few documents elaborate on the matter, for example: --> DDLGN/CHR Learning Journey on Governance and Conflict, Case study report Honduras (2018): After few years or even months of program implementation, it is difficult to make a statement about the impact of the two programs on water governance. However, we can still make some observations where we would expect some impact in the future. [Both programs brought] key actors together to exchange information and views about a key issue of conflict. ¶ A contribution to the resilience of individuals and communities has also be noted [as has] a growing awareness of the importance of social inclusion. --> Regional Strategy 2022-2024 (2022): In Honduras, in the Gulf of Fonseca and La Mosquitia, civil society networks supported the work of human rights defenders by lobbying the State System for the Protection of Defenders and bringing their cases before the Universal and Inter-American Human Rights Systems, providing greater protection for them. Switzerland helped establish and strength the Police Disciplinary Department, contributing to the disciplinary investigation of the police officers and of members of the security forces, and to a culture of no impunity.
5) Sustainability		
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (<i>for closed programmes</i> : did the benefits actually continue?)? What were/are the successes and hindering factors ?	6.1.1 Exit strategies were defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets were reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures). 6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements. 6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) were closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> According the the interview partners it was at times possible to "phase over" projects to other development partners. Also, in certain sectors results were institutionalized, e.g. in the area of water governance, local development, TVET. According to the HIC Team, the available documentation shows that projects concepts generally consider national capacities to be essential for implementation, and Honduran governmental and non-governmental actors were closely involved in the projects, suggesting a high level of ownership. The exit strategy is defined in SDC's Regional Strategy / Exit Program 2022-2024. Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of the Program Capacity Building in Integrated Risk Management (2017): The evaluation has found evidence of institutional changes in DRR, with the adoption of a systemic approach, based on the development of several processes that have interacted with each other, such as: advocacy in public policies; the development of public management models; the development of methodologies and tools for their application; the development and strengthening of capacities of public officials, professionals, and social agents; and the implementation of local experiences in RM and CCA. The project has made significant pro-gress in supporting the mainstreaming of the DRR approach in development processes, through conceptual and methodological development; and its practical application in different strategic development sectors, and at different territorial levels (national and local). --> The mid-term external evaluation of the Program to Support Reforms in the Justice and Security Sector in Honduras (2017) sees on a high potential for sustainability. The external evalua-tion of the Program for the Strengthening of Human Rights and Social Audits (2019) speak of a "unique opportunity" for sustainability. The external evaluation of SDC's engagement in the water sector (2020) states that an explicit strategy for scaling was adopted early on, where SDC's support at project and sub-national level led to improved local governance with a participative approach that was able to mobilise funds and replicate the approach with less and less external support.
5.2 Did SDC's bilateral cooperation interventions lead to scalable or replicable results (<i>for closed interventions</i> : Were those actually up-scaled or replicated?)?	6.2.1 Project approaches were scaled-up in the priority regions. 6.2.2 Project approaches were replicated outside the priority regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both interview partners and the available documentation refer to POSTCOSECHA as the most prominently up-scaled SDC project. According to the HIC Team, the available documentation often mentions the potential for a given project to be scaled-up, but usually does not refer to a concrete example that it was really scaled-up. Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External Evaluation of the Program for the Strengthening of Human Rights and Social Audits (FDHAS) (2019): In terms of sustainability of results and processes, the strategy implemented by FDHAS represents a unique opportunity to generate a multiplier effect for the empowerment of organizations and social movements from a Human Rights Based Approach. --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): Up-Scaling: The integration of bilateral project and pilot experiences into broader national programs was too often only addressed at a late stage, as part of the phasing-out process. --> Evaluation SDCs Engagement in the Water Sector 2010-2017 (2020): An example of where an explicit strategy for scaling was adopted early on and is being consolidated is in Honduras, where the SDC's support at project and sub-national level led to improved local governance with a participative approach that was able to mobilise funds and replicate the approach with less and less external support.
6) Lessons Learned		
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> According to interview partners, SDC's major assets include the following (relevant for Honduras and elsewhere): flexibility in program design, long-term programs (usually 12 years), and the establishment of a well-founded trust-relationship with the partners. Greatest failures in Honduras were not specifically mentioned, however some interview partners opine that the security sector reform is not working well, and that whole "regional approach" was misguided. Selected positive examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): some of the most successful experiences and strategies of SDA cooperation, which should be capitalized by the Swiss Cooperation for a further systematization (how it was done and how it works): policy dialogue, particularly through direct advisors assigned to specific institutions, human capital building, generation of "products", "models" or "services" like water and sanitation systems, IRDM, etc., articulation of specific projects (f.e. PROMIPAC generation of know how and technical assistance to PTA for assistance of Escuelas de Campo; PTA promoted the combination of Escuelas de Campo with formal education of adults), modalities of co-financing (competitive funds) with partners and target groups (enterprises, agriculture) to promote sustainability and ownership of actions, co-financing in "basket funding" which enable to support sector wide programmes, but needs strong advisory services to counter-parts in project cycle, administrative and financial management. --> Internal Mid-Term Evaluation of the Regional Program 2007-2012 (2010): The Swiss Central America Program is carried out by a wide range of partner organizations, from governmental organizations to multilateral organizations, national and international NGOs, and direct implementation by KoBü. This diversity is a strength and a feature of the program. Other features are the consistent multi-stakeholder approach, also within the individual programs, and the end-to-end focus on promoting local capacities, institutions and policies. --> External Evaluation of SDC's Engagement in the Water Sector 2010-2017 (2020): SDC was often the preferred partner by the government, in general because of the trusted relationships based on long continuity of stable and flexible support. In Honduras, a key ingredient of success was that the experience of SDC in the sector was recognized by national, regional and bi / multi-lateral actors. Selected critical examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): Knowledge management activities and support should be envisaged more in the future. There is a need for a systematic organization and re-feeding of information systems about best practices, "state of the art" or trends of the above mentioned topics.
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Regional Program 1999-2005 (1999): The targeted promotion of the regional approach has proven its worth. It is a consistent response to the fact that the countries of the region are relatively small, have comparable characteristics and, in view of globalization trends, are as far as possible dependent on common solutions to problems. --> Internal Mid-Term Evaluation of the Regional Program 2007-2012 (2010): Deterioration in governance requires increased monitoring, robust programs, and the development of fall-back-options. Increased policy dialogue on human rights and democracy in coordination with other donors, policy directorate / embassies Alignment must be realistic and differentiated in each sector.
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Final Workshop / Peer Review Local Governance (2008): The role of municipalities is vital in local development, decentralization and citizen participation, as well as in the fight against poverty, given that they contribute to strengthening governance and institutionality in the countries. --> Internal Mid-Term Evaluation of the Regional Program 2007-2012 (2010): The mid-term review still considers the portfolio of the Central America program to be too broad. The portfolio was therefore subjected to an analysis that starts from the existing one and proposes pragmatic ways for a gradual thematic concentration and bundling. The core of the transformation is a merging of different actions into more coherent and larger programs. --> DDLGN/CHR Learning Journey on Governance and Conflict, Case study report Honduras (2018): Addressing governance concerns in the water sector in a "transversal" way, is a promising approach in fragile contexts such as Honduras. It can help strengthen institutions and processes that are needed to manage and transform conflicts.

Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix - Nicaragua

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
1) Relevance		
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC's aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs ? Were the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners confirm that SDC's aid over time in the respective sectors in Nicaragua responded to development needs and priorities.• Regional Strategies for Central America (1993-2024) usually conduct an in-depth country background analysis, including a brief description of poverty reduction strategies or national development plans (if available). Prior to 1993, no stand-alone or Regional Strategy is available for Nicaragua.• SDC's instruments, methods and chose thematic foci in Nicaragua evolve over time, however in the HIC Team's opinion can be said to be in line with SDC's overarching objectives in the country.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Regional Strategy 1993-1998 (1993): Even after the 1990 elections, the priorities of the new government in Nicaragua are more in line with those of the DEH than in the case of Honduras.--> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): The Regional Programme is relevant in terms of addressing problems, needs and considering capabilities of target groups. The sectors attended are coherent with existing SDA guiding principles and are well aligned with prioritized actions of the national PRS and other national / sector development plans in Honduras and Nicaragua.--> Internal Mid-Term Review of SDC Regional Program 2007-2012 (2010): The main goals and thematic areas proof to be relevant.• Of the very few critical comments the HIC Team found, the below is possibly the strongest: --> Multiannual Regional Program Central America for 1993-1998 (1993):: The multisectoral DRI approach as the main development strategy for (marginalized) rural regions has proven problematic, despite overlap with the national development strategy.
1.2 In how far was SDC's engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities ?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners confirm that SDC's engagement in Nicaragua was in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities. Interestingly, however, one interview partner mentions that the heads of cooperation have too much autonomy and often deviate from agreements or directions given by Bern (the interviewee illustrated that at the example of Honduras and Nicaragua in the early 2000s).• The Regional Strategy 1999-2005, refer to the principles of the Latin America Strategy of the SDC (Section Guidelines for Latin America 1995 - 2005) as well as the messages for development cooperation, for economic and trade policy measures and for humanitarian aid of the Swiss Confederation.• In the HIC Team's opinion, the objectives as formulated in the Regional Strategies are in line with Swiss development priorities as described in Swiss IZA strategies.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): The sectors attended are coherent with existing SDA guiding principles (DEZA Strategy 2010; SECO Strategy 2006) [...].
2) Coherence		
2.1 Was the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners provide a mixed response to the question regarding coherence of SDC south cooperation with other SDC and Swiss activities in Nicaragua The fairest formulation as suggested by one interview partner is probably: "There were no important contradictions".• The Regional Strategies for the periods 1999-2005 and 2007-2012 are developed jointly by SDC and SECO.• SDC Regional Strategies all refer to or report on humanitarian interventions.• According to the HIC Team, there is limited information with regard to whether synergy potentials were fully exploited and duplications avoided. It seems reasonable to suggest that while certainly not all synergies were realized, there was no noteworthy competition with regards to partners and target groups between SDC, SECO and other Swiss actors and programs.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> SDC's Regional Program for Central America 1999-2005 (1999) states that program was developed in collaboration with a large number of Swiss entities. It sets out the main strategies and implementation instruments of Swiss development cooperation in Central America, with the aim of ensuring the greatest possible coherence of development cooperation activities in Central America. It forms an important frame of reference for the activities of other Swiss institutions (e.g. FDFA/political departments II, III, IV, Swiss aid organizations).
2.2 Was the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors ?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activites of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• As above, interview partners provide a mixed response, and the fairest formulation as suggested by one interview partner is probably: "There were no important contradictions". In addition, interview partners suggest that the number of bilateral donors became smaller over the years, therewith reducing the coherence / complementarity necessity.• While SDC's Bilateral or Regional Strategies at time mentioned other donors (mainly multilaterals), they geneally do not refer to any specific project or program implemented by other donors.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Regional Strategy 1993-1998 (1993): Equal donor coordination in Central America is hampered by the predominance of the United States, whose political and financial clout enables it to conduct a direct, bilateral and very binding policy dialogue with the respective governments. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that in areas with solid experience of their own, a concerted approach with USAID may also make sense for a smaller donor agency.--> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): SDA, through its two agencies SDC and SECO is implementing different projects promoting small and medium scale enterprises with different approaches / instruments at different levels of interventions with different stakeholders, which, at least in theoretical aspects, cover a wide spectrum of needs and demands of the sector. In this sense there is great coherence, complementary as well as synergy between SDC and SECO approaches. Being SDA only one actor among many others and having only scarce information about effectiveness and real impacts created by all of them, it is recommended to improve the coordination and discussion with other donor agencies, to monitor and jointly evaluate experiences made so far, identify best practices, and scale them up with a common strategy ("Antenna strategy").--> Swiss cooperation strategy for Central America 2013-2017 (2013): Alignment became more complex. The PRS were replaced by national plans, sector policies and strategies of variable owner-ship. The donor landscape changed significantly, requiring building of new alliances and seeking ways for achieving comple-mentarity and coordination.
3) Effectiveness		
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors were achieved?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interview partners agree that development results were achieved in various sectors, however that the evidence-base beyond output-level is scarce. According to the interview partners, SDC flagship projects in Nicaragua (and the region) include POSTCOSECHA and AGUASAN. Other sectors with positive results in Nicaragua include local (economic) development and TVET.• According to the HIC Team, based on the available documentation and key informant interviews, it is practically impossible to judge the effectiveness of SDC Regional Strategies or sectoral engagement in Nicaragua• SDC's Regional Strategies generally reflect on the results of previous strategies, however in most cases without specifically naming individual countries.• Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation for the Program period 1999-2005 (2006): The overall balance with regard to effects of PRAC implementation is positive with concrete results at the policy level (e.g. national water and sanitation strategy; MSME promotion policy; environmentally sustainable agricultural technology policy; public finance and budget policy), demonstrated adoption of methods and models at the implementation level (e.g. disaster prevention, agricultural technology transfer), success in capacity development and concrete, measurable development effects (e.g. food security and income improvements resulting from the adoption of 300'000 post harvest silos; access to safe drinking water for 45'000 families in rural Nicaragua). However, the lack of a systematic monitoring system at PRAC level did not allow outcome and impact measurement above the project level.--> The short booklet "30 years of Swiss cooperation in Nicaragua" (2009) mentions AGUASAN, PASOLAC, RRD and buget support as programs / modalities with relevant results.--> External evaluation of Local Governance IV Program (2012): Program effectiveness: PGL IV reveals high effectiveness, given that it has achieved all outcomes very close to plan and in several cases above planned targets.--> External evaluation of the Dipilto River Basin Program (2019): The effectiveness of the Program is rated as very good. An analysis of compliance with the Logical Framework indicators reveals that almost all the indicators were met and over complied with.
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes were (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SDC's approaches and instruments in Nicaragua evolved over time, according to the Bilateral and Regional Strategies: --> 1978-1992: The main implementation modality was direct management from the Honduras Office.--> 1993-2005: The implementation modalities include direct management through bilateral technical cooperation (majority), delegation of project implementation to Swiss and multilateral third-party institutions, and the Development fund "Chinorte" and the counterpart fund in the electricity sector, which was created as a result of bi-lateral debt relief.--> 2007-2017: The main implementation modalities direct and indirect implementation (with a tendency towards indirect implementation), sector-wide approaches and joint project-financing (baskets) and budget support.--> 2018-2024: The portfolio is executed with a mix of modalities, including contributions/grants to public and pri-vate institutions and cooperation mandates that are awarded through international tenders. As of 2018, approaches and modalities such as Territorial concentration, Out of fragility, Psychosocial approach, Communication for empowerment, Risk reduction and climate adaptation, Whole of Government approach, Contributions and mandates, Consolidation of trilateral/South-South cooperation and Combine technical with political are mentioned.
3.3 Which stakeholders were reached and how - and which were excluded and why? Which capacities were changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The stakeholders reached by SDC in Nicaragua are government institutions (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning), national and international NGOs, multilateral agencies (IADB, World Bank, UNDP), resources institutions (e.g. CATIE, CIAT, CIMMYT, etc.), regional institutions (e.g. SICA) and private sector actors (Bilateral and Regional Strategies, 1982-2024).• The main beneficiaries are poor, excluded, vulnerable groups, smallholder families, SMEs, and lately also those highly vulnerable to disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, Grassroot leaders and HR defenders, LGBTI, persons living with HIV/AIDS, persons with special needs (Bilateral and Regional Strategies, 1982-2024).• The available documentation does not contain information about stakeholders that were excluded.

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
4) Impact		
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security. 4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview partners generally agree that SDC's engagement in Nicaragua over the years surely had a (non-measurable) impact, mainly through the numerous capacity building activities that were undertaken and the policies that were influenced. • A Theory of Change, including impact hypothesis, is introduced into the Regional Strategies only as of 2013. • Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Regional Program 1993-1998 (1993): The orientation of the DEH-Central America program to the needs of poorer populations has allowed the mobilization of considerable national resources for the development of neglected regions over the past five years. --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): There have been major achievements of SDA at various levels of intervention in different sectors. At macro level a series of ruling policies or strategic papers have been elaborated and are being implemented nation wide such as the Techno-logical Policy in the agricultural sector in Nicaragua, , Water sector strategy in Nicaragua and Honduras, the proposal of policy for microfinance and earning cooperative Policy, the Policy for the Medium and Small Enterprises promotion - with public-private policy dialogue- in Nicaragua and, the Citizen participation law in Nicaragua.. Activities in macroeconomic support (general budget support) led to strengthening policy dialogue between government and donors and improving do-nor coordination. Support to the elaboration and release of the National Operational Development Plan (PNDO-Nicaragua) provided the basis for the elaboration and approval of the Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM) to monitor the progress of the different indicators by the donors involved in the Joint Facility Agreement. --> Regional Strategy 2018-2021 (2018): The balance of the Cooperation Strategy 2013-2017 is positive: the inclusion of vulnerable groups, especially of women, youth, and indigenous and Afrodescendent groups, has been systematically promoted. With the support of Switzerland, thousands of Central Americans increased their resilience to climate change, improved their income and gained access to water and sanitation and basic infrastructure in participatory processes. --> External impact evaluation of the Environmental Program for Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change (PAGRICC) (2018): The impact of the Program was positive and statistically significant. • It is the opinion of the HIC Team that while SDC's bilateral cooperation surely contributed to poverty reduction and the reduction of inequalities in Nicaragua it is not possible to quantify the contribution based on the available documentation.
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today (<i>intended or un-intended</i>)? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion). 4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts. 4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to the available Strategy documents, gender became officially a cross-cutting issue in the programic period 1999-2005. • According to the HIC Team, it is not possible to ascertain to what extend SDC projects contributed to aggravating or improving conflicts in Nicaragua. Only few documents elaborate on the matter, for example: --> Regional Strategy 2022-2024 (2022): During the implementation of the 2018-2021 Strategy it became clear that Swiss Cooperation had to adapt to the changes arising from the conflict in Nicaragua and the COVID-19 pandemic. In Nicaragua, the breakdown of institutions and the spiral of human rights violations in 2018 stimulated critical reflection and a thoroughgoing realignment of the strategy. Consequently, it replaced the local governance approach and now emphasises conflict transformation, the strengthening of social cohesion, and the promotion and defence of human rights. --> Regional Strategy 2022-2024 (2022): Noteworthy results of the 2018-2021 strategy: In Nicaragua, the contributions planned by Swiss Cooperation to promote the electoral reforms agreed by the government with the OAS and the human rights sector with OHCHR did not progress. At the same time, Swiss Cooperation supported over 100 organisations in their work to prevent conflict and promote social cohesion at local level. In 2020, over one million people participated in cultural activities for promoting a culture of peace. Finally, Swiss Cooperation managed to improve coordination with national stakeholders that provide protection and assistance services to migrants, and helped 300 women victims of sexual violence to receive psychosocial and legal assistance and shelter.
5) Sustainability		
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (<i>for closed programmes</i> : did the benefits actually continue?)? What were/are the successes and hindering factors ?	6.1.1 Exit strategies were defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets were reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures). 6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements. 6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) were closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According the the interview partners it was at times possible to "phase over" projects to other development partners. Also, in certain sectors results were institutionalized, e.g. in the area of water governance, local development, TVET. • According to the HIC Team, the available documentation shows that projects concepts generally consider national capacities to be essential for implementation, and Nicaraguan governmental and non-governmental actors were closely involved in the projects, suggesting a high level of ownership. • The exit strategy is defined in SDC's Regional Strategy / Exit Program 2022-2024. • Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Report on effectiveness Swiss international cooperation in the field of employment 2005 - 2014 (2017): The project supported 45 vocational training centres through the National Institute for Technology (INATEC) Nicaragua as well as other private and public vocational training institutions. Activities included the modernization of curricula, training of instructors, and development of training modules. --> External evaluation of the Dipilto River Basin Program (2019): MARENA has taken good leadership in institutional cooperation and coordination, both at the level of national entities and at the level of local authorities. Institutional sustainability is substantially improved since both Local Governments and entities such as the New Fund for Social Investment for Emergency (New FISE) and National Authority for Water (ANA) have assumed commitments before the Basin Committee (CdC) at the end of the first phase.
5.2 Did SDC's bilateral cooperation interventions lead to scalable or replicable results (<i>for closed interventions</i> : Were those actually up-scaled or replicated?)?	6.2.1 Project approaches were scaled-up in the priority regions. 6.2.2 Project approaches were replicated outside the priority regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both interview partners and the available documentation refer to POSTCOSECHA as the most prominently up-scaled SDC project. • According to the HIC Team, the available documentation often mentions the potential for a given project to be scaled-up, but usually does not to refer to a concrete example that it was really scaled-up. • Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): Up-Scaling: The integration of bilateral project and pilot experiences into broader national programs was too often only addressed at a late stage, as part of the phasing-out process. --> Internal mid term review of the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Program for Central America 2008-2012 (2010): Since 2002, and in a more systematic way since 2007, the PRRD has been developing a process of mainstreaming DRR in the AGUASAN program as an element of sustainability, with concrete products (Guide for vulnerability reduction in drinking water systems). --> External evaluation of "Integration of IWRM and CCA in curricula and in university research and extension" (2013-2016) (2017): The project has a wide potential to be scaled up / replicated within each university and/or in other public as well as private universities.
6) Lessons Learned		
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to interview partners, SDC's major assets include the following (relevant for Nicaragua and elsewhere): flexibility in program design, long-term programs (usually 12 years), and the establishment of a well-founded trust-relationship with the partners. Greatest failures in Nicaragua were not specifically mentioned, however some interview partners opine that the security sector reform is not working well, and that whole "regional approach" was misguided. • Selected positive examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): some of the most successful experiences and strategies of SDA cooperation, which should be capitalized by the Swiss Cooperation for a further systematization (how it was done and how it works): policy dialogue, particularly through direct advisors assigned to specific institutions, human capital building, generation of "products", "models" or "services" like water and sanitation systems, IRDM, etc., articulation of specific projects (f.e. PROMIPAC generation of know how and technical assistance to PTA for assistance of Escuelas de Campo; PTA promoted the combination of Escuelas de Campo with formal education of adults), modalities of co-financing (competitive funds) with partners and target groups (enterprises, agriculture) to promote sustainability and ownership of actions, co-financing in "basket funding" which enable to support sector wide programmes, but needs strong advisory services to counter-parts in project cycle, administrative and financial management. --> Internal Mid-Term Evaluation of the Regional Program 2007-2012 (2010): The Swiss Central America Program is carried out by a wide range of partner organizations, from governmental organizations to multilateral organizations, national and international NGOs, and direct implementation by KoBü. This diversity is a strength and a feature of the program. Other features are the consistent multi-stakeholder approach, also within the individual programs, and the end-to-end focus on promoting local capacities, institutions and policies. • Selected critical examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of SDC Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): Knowledge management activities and support should be envisaged more in the future. There is a need for a systematic organization and re-feeding of information systems about best practices, "state of the art" or trends of the above mentioned topics.
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> Regional Program 1999-2005 (1999): The targeted promotion of the regional approach has proven its worth. It is a consistent response to the fact that the countries of the region are relatively small, have comparable characteristics and, in view of globalization trends, are as far as possible dependent on common solutions to problems. --> Regional Program 1999-2005 (1999): Just how delicate development policy work can be in the Central American environment is shown by the ostracism of the then SDC coordinator by the President of Nicaragua in December 1997. --> Internal Mid-Term Evaluation of the Regional Program 2007-2012 (2010): Deterioration in governance requires increased monitoring, robust programs, and the development of fall-back-options. Increased policy dialogue on human rights and democracy in coordination with other donors, policy directorate / embassies Alignment must be realistic and differentiated in each sector.
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selected examples from external / internal evaluations or other documents: --> External evaluation of the Regional Program 1999-2005 (2006): General budget support (Nicaragua) is a powerful instrument to promote and steer necessary policy reforms for economic growth and development. In particular, it orients and addresses cooperation efforts toward critical issues and fields of in-terest (competitiveness, development of private sector, public finance management among others). The evaluators rec-ommend to continue with the foreseen implementation and to put special attention to the performance monitoring. --> Internal Mid-Term Evaluation of the Regional Program 2007-2012 (2010): The mid-term review still considers the portfolio of the Central America program to be too broad. The portfolio was therefore subjected to an analysis that starts from the existing one and proposes pragmatic ways for a gradual thematic concentration and bundling. The core of the transformation is a merging of different actions into more coherent and larger programs.

Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix - El Salvador

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC’s bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
1) Relevance		
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC’s aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs ? Were the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Central America: the basis for for sectoral projects were macro-economic needs analyses and priorities of partner governments (Cooperation Strategy Central America 1993-1998)• Central America: The five priority sectors 1999-2005 with their altogether 14 themes are relevant and coherent with the respective national PRS. However, with the given financial and human resources the program is too broad and warrants a stronger thematic focus to enhance effectiveness (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012)• Central America: In general, the Regional Programme 1999-2005 is relevant in terms of its orientation, addressing problems, needs and considering capabilities of target groups, use of adequate instruments, forms and levels of interventions. Most of the projects intervene on all three levels, the micro, meso (main focus!) and macro level, which guarantees that local needs are considered at policy level and vice versa. So, the degree of real ownership and appropriation of projects by national institutions differs and, in some cases, is quite low. Development and use of instruments (mainly training, capacity building, technical assistance, politics dialogue, competitive funds, development of technologies, diagnosis and sector studies etc.), in general terms, are relevant as they match with identified demands and needs for capacity strengthening of the target groups and / or intermediate organizations. Most of developed techniques and introduced innovations are relatively easy to apply and to adopt by target groups. But, some technologies seemed to be not economically affordable by poor target groups (“silos” (POSTCOSECHA and tools generated by RELATA), water systems (AGUASAN) and had to be subsidized (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012)
1.2 In how far was SDC’s engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities ?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Central America: The sectors attended 1999-2005 are coherent with existing SDA guiding principles (DEZA Strategy 2010; SECO Strategy 2006) and address prioritized actions of the national PRS as well as other relevant national / sector development plans in Honduras and Nicaragua (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012)
2) Coherence		
2.1 Was the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Central America: complementation of SDC programmes with economic measures (Cooperation Strategy Central America 1993-1998)• Central America: Transformation of the portfolio Central America to summarize different actions and achieve bigger and more coherent programmes (Mid-term review Cooperation Strategy Central America)• Central America: Connection to SECO engagement in the 80s in the framework of mixed credits and structural adjustment programmes (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005)• Concrete debt relief programmes in El Salvador by SECO in the 1980s (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005)• Humanitarian aid in El Salvador in the 90s for the return of internal refugees after the civil war. Additionally measures in the area of disaster risk prevention and reconstruction after Hurricane Mitch (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005)• Central America: Groundlaying conditions --> assure complementarity and compatibility of existing EZA programmes; application of different instruments (humanitarian aid, EZA, SECO, etc.) in a concentrated manner (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005)
2.2 Was the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors ?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activities of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Strong presence of international donor community in Central America which makes donor coordination especially necessary (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005)• Central America: Coordination with other donors especially in the area of good governance --> regular meetings of bilateral donors. Making use of experiences of other donors (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005)• Central America 1999-2005: high number of donors led to fragmentation and inefficiencies, especially in relation to capacity constraints of national governments (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012)

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
3) Effectiveness		
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors were achieved?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central America: Important results of the AGUASAN programme. Highly complex programme but with high rates of coherence and integrated on different vertical and horizontal levels (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) • Central America: very good results in the water and hygiene sector despite the limited available budget --> one of the most prominent donor agencies (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) • Central America: Thematic area of natural ressources and environment is thematically too broad and does not have a clear profile (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) • Central America: Not much effectiveness achieved in the results of environmental programmes (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) • Agriculture Sector Central America 1993-1998: Approximately 15,000 small producers were trained in soil conservation methods. In the target regions, the use of these methods among the target group of farmers was increased from 8% to 24%, and at the same time an increase in staple food production of 30-100% was achieved in some cases. Improved farming methods or more effective (biological) pest control methods were introduced to a further 100,000 small producers. Around 5,000 agricultural advisors were trained for this purpose. To reduce post-harvest losses, the dissemination rate of an effective storage technology for small producers (the Postcosecha silo) has tripled compared to the 1980s. More than 150,000 silos are now available in the homes of smallholder women farmers. Support for agricultural research, especially on the staple crops of maize, beans and potatoes, has contributed to the development of improved varieties and the training of national research capacities (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) • Water and Hyiene Sector Central America 1993-1998: Around 140,000 people in rural areas of Nicaragua and El Salvador were given access to clean drinking water and hygienic sanitation.. The population was trained in the administration and maintenance of the systems to ensure the sustainability of the project work. The national water utilities in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador were advised and trained in the development of new policies, technologies and instruments regarding drinking water and wastewater supply for poor rural areas, and their cooperation and exchange of experience was promoted in networks (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) • Environment and natural resources sector Central America 1993-1998: The development and dissemination of new methods for the sustainable management of tropical natural forests were promoted. The focus was on the training of students and small producers as well as on the networking of about 50 local organisations in this field. In the area of air pollution control, the complete elimination of leaded petrol in road traffic was accelerated in 5 Central American countries. In addition, impressive publicity campaigns were carried out to reduce exhaust emissions from motor vehicles, and around 5000 car mechanics were trained in this area (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) • Central America 1999-2005: achieved results at policy level and implementation level, capacity development and measureable effects: The overall balance with regard to effects of PRAC implementation is positive with concrete results at the policy level (e.g. national water and sanitation strategy; MSME promotion policy; environmentally sustainable agricultural technology policy; public finance and budget policy), demonstrated adoption of methods and models at the implementation level (e.g. disaster prevention, agricultural technology transfer), success in capacity development and concrete, measurable development effects (e.g. food security and income improvements resulting from the adoption of 300'000 post harvest silos; access to safe drinking water for 45'000 families in rural Nicaragua). However, the lack of a systematic monitoring system at PRAC level did not allow outcome and impact measurement above the project level. The only exception is the meta-impact study in the agricultural sector showing an economic benefit to farmers of 4 Francs for every Franc invested (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012) • Between 2001 and 2004, projects aiming at the municipal level ("Apoyo Local para el Análisis y Manejo de los Riesgos Naturales, ALARN" in Nicaragua and "Conocimiento de Riesgos y Reducción de Desastres, CORRES" in El Salvador) provided 37 municipalities with hazard maps, risk analysis and trained technicians; awareness raising was practiced at the community level; and results at the national level include appropriate methodologies and specialists for hazard assessment and local risk management (Swiss Disaster Risk Reduction Programme Central America 2005-2007)
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes were (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central America: portfolio for Central America is described as too broad (Mid-term review Cooperation Strategy Central America) • Central America: Continuation of regional programme along two dimensions (support of the regional agenda with regional partner organizations; implementation of the same programme in several countries) --> leads to better efficiency and knowledge management (Mid-term review Cooperation Strategy Central America) • Central America: Regional approach has been successful as being and answer to the rather small size of countries in the region. Reduction of development costs through replication of best practices. Higher efficiency and impact with limited budget (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) • Central America 1999-2005: correct decision to focus on Nicaragua and Honduras. Mixed results of regional interventions: The decision to focus on Nicaragua and Honduras proved to be correct and allowed stronger engagement in policy dialogue and concentration of instruments. The cooperation strategy for Central America should further strengthen the country context analysis and the country program focus. The record of results of regional interventions is mixed. Explanations relate in some cases to capacity limitations of regional partners and the lacking or weak synergies with national program components. However, in other cases regional interventions or program components contributed to efficient knowledge sharing and to the solution of regional problems (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012) • Central America 1999-2005: general approaches: The effectiveness of SDA was measured in terms of achieved intended results and created impacts as far as they have been stated in logical frameworks. The absence of a clear results framework at the programme and sector level - with objectives, baseline and indicators (site specific, time horizon, scope, quantity, quality) - and the non availability of a consistent impact monitoring system made it difficult to identify changes and impacts. Thus, project and programme execution seemed more activity and result related than impact oriented. Expected changes in the performance of target groups were not formulated with clear indicators in the project or programme planning frameworks. How precisely to assess the envisaged multidimensional aspects of poverty has not been addressed either. However, at the end of 2004, actions started to improve the horizontal and vertical logic of planning matrices and, specially regarding projects of the enterprise sector, to establish necessary baseline information and to formulate monitoring needs as well as indicators for future intended changes and expected impacts (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012)
3.3 Which stakeholders were reached and how - and which were excluded and why? Which capacities were changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central America: not enough focus of the DRR actions on the involvement and capacity development of the organized population (Cooperation Strategy Central America 1993-1998) • Central America: very broad variety of partners and actors (multi-stakeholder approach) --> described as strength of the Central America Programme (Mid-term review Cooperation Strategy Central America) • Central America: More than 100.000 families, mostly in poor rural areas, have been reached throug the project from 1993-1998 (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005)

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
4) Impact		
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security. 4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central America 1999-2005: impact level, difficult to measure as a systematic monitoring system was missing. One meta-impact study in the agricultural sector that showed success (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012) Central America 1999-2005: impacts especially in the water and sanitation and in the agricultural sector (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012)
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today (<i>intended or un-intended</i>)? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion). 4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts. 4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central America: The multi-sectoral DRI approach as the main development strategy for (marginalised) rural regions has proved problematic, despite being in line with the national development strategy (Cooperation Strategy Central America 1993-1998) Central America: Thematic concentration of regional programme has been successful. In combination with a long-term experience it led to higher efficiency in the policy dialogue with limited resources (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005)
5) Sustainability		
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (<i>for closed programmes</i> : did the benefits actually continue?)? What were/are the successes and hindering factors ?	6.1.1 Exit strategies were defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets were reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures). 6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements. 6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) were closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.	n/a
5.2 Did SDC's bilateral cooperation interventions lead to scalable or replicable results (<i>for closed interventions</i> : Were those actually up-scaled or replicated?)?	6.2.1 Project approaches were scaled-up in the priority regions. 6.2.2 Project approaches were replicated outside the priority regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central America 1999-2005: Up-Scaling: The integration of bilateral project and pilot experiences into broader national programs was too often only addressed at a late stage, as part of the phasing-out process. Consequently, the strategy for up-scaling and alliance-building will have to be defined in the project design phase. Partners expect that Swiss Cooperation engages, building on pilot experiences, also in the implementation and financing of broader sector programs (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012)
6) Lessons Learned		
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	n/a
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	n/a
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central America: contradictions between long-term regional development programme and rapidly changing national policies --> need for adaptations and flexible approaches (Cooperation Strategy Central America 1993-1998) Central America: prioritisation as strategy for coherent national development strategies (Cooperation Strategy Central America 1993-1998) Central America: important to find a balance between prioritisation of focus countries and remaining flexible (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) Central America: replication of national project: less effort needed in conceptualisation, but not much faster in implementation (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) Central America: Combining new thematic sectors with already successfully running thematic programmes (Swiss Cooperation Programme Central America 1999-2005) Central America 1999-2005: In line with efforts initiated of mainstreaming the Regional Programme Portfolio, SDC should seek and continue for the sector concentration and programme consolidation in those fields where there is high level of positive experiences and where SDC is to play a leadership role. In the future the design of the Regional Programme should include sector objectives with verifiable impact indicators. It should be used as a tool to ensure that the single projects / programme contribute to the respective sector objective (performance matrix) (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012). Central America 1999-2005: Poverty reduction is still mainstreamed throughout the majority of the regional SDA development pro-gramme; however this issue should be focused even more at country level (country programme!), thus identifying the expected outcomes (impacts) at short, medium and longterm of the Swiss interventions (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012). Central America 1999-2005: The HIPC process, the elaboration and implementation of the PRS and the efforts made toward har-monization and alignment led Swiss cooperation to make valuable experiences and to gain leader-ship in these processes (budget support, "mesas"). It also showed how these processes are time and resources consuming (staff, budget) and that they will need additional resources to achieve the expect-ed results. SDA should keep on going to align and harmonize its programmes and projects, to active-ly seek for national / sector broad based programmes and country ownership. However, national part-ner institutions will need active and technical support to achieve these purposes. It will need and last a certain amount of time to have the majority of programmes / projects under the umbrella of future SWAPs or other broad based sector programmes under full responsibility and ownership of the nation-al institutions. One may recognize that all these processes are at a stage of "Hypothesis" and consequently, the success of the new modalities have to be tested!. Therefore, it is recommendable to rely on a balanced mix of instruments for cooperation, engaging in SWAPs or delegated cooperation, but maintain bilateral cooperation oriented toward knowledge generation with technical assistance and policy dialogue (Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Central America 2007-2012).

Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix - Cuba

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC’s bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
1) Relevance		
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC’s aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs ? Were the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In contrast to other countries in the region, the social situation in Cuba is not marked by extreme socio-economic inequality, nor by widespread poverty (2003 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2004-2006)• Motivation for Special Programme was primarily political, as - following the collapse of the Socialist bloc in Eastern Europe and the subsequent economic crises -, the country's transformation seemed immanent. Switzerland wanted to be a trusted partner during the political and economic opening. Cuban government at the beginning primarily focused on technological know-how and infrastructure. Over time local governance topics increasingly of interest. The rights discourse became possible thanks to trustful cooperation and effectively established political dialogue (2022, INT 4)• There is a high degree of correspondence with the policies of the Government of Cuba in terms of strengthening the municipal level so that it has the capacity to take on more tasks and functions. The [SDC] strategy is coherent with the guidelines established by the Government of Cuba and the relevance of the programme's orientation is confirmed (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy).• The Programme has made a name for itself through its highly useful, impactful and visible impulses on relevant issues (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba).• In the Cuban context, the focus on the two thematic priority areas (local development and economic development) with a low political profile, rooted in the local sphere and with an emphasis on participatory processes and concrete results has undoubtedly provided an adequate guiding framework (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba).• The Cuban context has required a guiding framework in which the Programme's implementation was flexibly directed towards the Cuban actors' own initiatives and conducted with prudence and flexibility [...]. At no time did the Programme attempt to impose a certain approach or point of view on its Cuban counterpart (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba).• The strategy allowed the contacts established in the pilot phase to be deepened and the Programme has been able to enter into socio-economic life at the local level on the basis of concrete solutions. [...] the Programme's strategy implicitly promoted a mode of operation that creates spaces for irreversible democratic and participatory processes, applied to community projects. The underlying impact hypothesis of this strategic approach was to overcome the country's isolation and contribute to a democratic and peaceful development process.• It is assumed that Cuba will continue to be a priority country for Swiss cooperation, which is mainly justified by the level of added value that our cooperation can provide in a very particular political context. Cooperation contributes positively to Switzerland's position in Cuba and presents an important basis for strengthening political and economic dialogue. In addition, Cuba is facing an increase in inequalities, poverty and vulnerabilities (2017 Cuba Cooperation Strategy 2017-2021).• SDC's work is highly appreciated by the Government of Cuba, which recognises its strategic approach, its results-orientation and its flexibility and speed in responding to priorities emerging from negative events (e.g. hurricanes, droughts, epidemics) and other changes of context (e.g. government reform programme), while maintaining its strategic framework and its focus on those most in need (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024).• The strategy as a whole is considered relevant. It fits very well in the current and expected context. The focus on strengthening local participation has led to strategic contributions in the areas of decentralisation and agricultural development. (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy).• [The Cuban strategy] is linked to very high profile government priorities, in particular capacity building for decentralised management, food production and housing, promotion of local democratic participation and social and gender equity (2022 Exit Co-operation Programme 2022-2024).• <u>The results of the year and of the impact framework PC 2017-2021 confirmed the relevance of the commitment to local development, which continues in the SP 2022-2024. The municipal level and citizen solidarity initiatives have remained active and have provided direct responses to the needs of the population in the midst of the severe crisis. Continuing to contribute to strengthening the autonomous management capacities of local authorities, the local productive fabric and citizen participation are presented as basic lines of action in the responsible exit. (2021 SDC Annual Report Cuba).</u>
1.2 In how far was SDC’s engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities ?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In 1998, the SDC’s Directorate Committee endorsed in principle an active Swiss presence in the transformation process in Cuba and found that a special programme would be useful (1999-11-18 Mission Report Pilot Special Programme Cuba).• The joint mission of PA2, the HH/SKH Division and the Latin America Section of SDC concludes that Switzerland's active presence in this process makes sense in terms of foreign and development policy (1998 Clarification Mission Report Cuba)• Cuba will continue to be a priority country for Swiss cooperation, which is mainly justified by added value that our cooperation can provide in a very particular political context. Cooperation contributes positively to Switzerland's position in Cuba and presents an important basis for strengthening political and economic dialogue. In addition, Cuba is facing an increase in inequalities, poverty and vulnerabilities (2017 Cuba Cooperation Strategy 2017-2021).
2) Coherence		
2.1 Was the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Programme consists of a wide range of different projects on different themes that go beyond the two priority areas. While successful [it is recommended for the future] apply stronger thematic focus and consolidate small projects into larger ones to strengthen cooperation and coordination at the level of counterparts (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba).• The 2011-2014 Swiss-Cuba cooperation strategy is characterised by a greater emphasis on systematisation and targeting. The focus on large projects represents an evolution from previous periods and is moving towards a "harvest" stage (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy).• There are synergies between many projects, primarily thanks to the municipal level as a gateway (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy).• Coordination between SDC international cooperation and humanitarian aid generally seen as effective and unproblematic. Example: The cooperation with the Humanitarian Aid colleagues was efficient and uncomplicated (2013 Final Report Regula Bähler, confirmed by interviews).• SECO already involved in Cuba before 1998 (Paris Club, public debt rescheduling) but without a programme of its own; elaboration of annual planning guaranteed coordination and alignment of SDC/SECO activities (2022, INT 4)• The current (third) Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy 2020-2023 and the Human Rights Guidelines 2021- 2024 are relevant for Cuba in their four main principles, with which this CP is aligned: (1) promotion of freedom; (2) strengthening the rule of law; (3) promotion of equal opportunities; (4) support for sustainable development (in line with the UN 2030 Agenda). This CP also responds to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) Regional Guidelines 2021- 2024 and the Swiss Strategy for International Cooperation 2021-2024, which determine the development objectives as well as the modalities for a responsible exit of Swiss bilateral cooperation in Cuba in 2024. (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024).
2.2 Was the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors ?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activities of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Formal coordination has been limited. Donor coordination has for the most part been ad hoc, informal and project-specific. Against the backdrop of rather limited donor pres-ence, such informal coordination has widely been considered sufficient and effective, especially with EU, the active member states, and the UN agencies (INT 13, 32).• The strengthening of networks of actors and the coordination with other cooperation agencies have gradually created more favourable conditions for the Programme's impact and open up the possibility of a sectoral policy dialogue (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba)• The high degree of alignment and coordination with other donors and the cooperation in the field of local development with UNDP have contributed to the harmonisation of instruments and visible impact enhancement (2007 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2007-2010) Formal donor coordination is only beginning to take place in Cuba. Informal consultation with other donors is usually project-related and intensive.The UNDP Programme for Human Development at the Local Level, PDHL, is the only programme that has a national coordination committee in which interested donors participate (2007 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2007-2010)

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
3) Effectiveness		
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors were achieved?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Programme is characterised by a limited volume, but demonstrates a decisive and crucial presence through its mode of operation and the significant effects it has achieved. [...] [It] has overperformed considering its limited financial means thanks to a relevant strategy that yielded remarkable results (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cub).• <u>The effects in the agricultural and housing sectors are the most significant.</u> It is worth mentioning that 22% of the country's farmers are participating in the new local innovation system proposed, with an average increase in agricultural yields of over 75%, that 15,000 farmers have a silo to store their harvest without loss, and that 7 municipalities have or are in the process of developing a self-supply strategy for food. In the area of housing, 40 municipalities currently have a workshop that can produce the equivalent of 200 to 400 new houses annually (2009 Evaluation of SDC Special Programme in Cuba).• In the field of agriculture, significant results have been achieved in terms of diversification and increased production. However, access to food is critical and ultimately depends on factors external to SDC projects (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy).• Specialists involved in the coordination and implementation of most SDC-funded projects participate in commissions and working groups, convened by the authorities, for the elaboration of new laws and policies complementing the new constitution (2021_SDC Annual Report Cuba).• <u>Consultancy support contributing to the preparation of key legislation:</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">- 2019 Constitution: recognises municipal autonomy, role of the non-state sector and mechanisms for direct citizen participation. Sanctions discrimination based on sex, gender, sexual orientation, colour, etc.- Territorial Development Programme (2020): formalises the Municipal Development Strategy (EDM) as a tool for decentralised local management.- National Plan for Food Sovereignty and Nutritional Education (2020) and State Plan to Confront Climate Change (2017): favour productive management with local resources, articulation between the public and private sectors, value chains and practices for adaptation to climate change and the use of renewable energy sources.- National Programme against Racism and Discrimination (2020) and Programme for the Advancement of Women (2021): recognise equity gaps associated with gender and race and propose targeted actions for their mitigation (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024).• At the local level, municipalities and institutions participating in SDC projects show economic and social results above the national average (2021_SDC Annual Report Cuba).• <u>Of the 75 municipalities implementing local development projects with SDC support, 61 (81%) increased their own budgets; 59 (79%) submitted their EDM to public consultation; citizen participation increased from 20 to 58% on average; 39 (48%) municipalities created citizen information and advisory services. Around 3 million people in municipalities with agricultural production projects have more and better quality products in local markets. The value chains of 9 agricultural products were improved. Energy from renewable sources was incorporated into the agri-food chains, increasing the annual electricity generated by 5 times. 1,277 women victims of gender-based violence (439 black women and 406 young women) received care in specialised services set up by SDC projects (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024).</u>• <u>The programme's gender mainstreaming work has been successfully implemented.</u> In particular, it is very well established institutionally with gender focal points at the municipal level. Several projects also have a gender-sensitive budget (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy).• Cooperation on gender gained prominence over time and yielded great success. On the one hand, this can be seen in legislative terms (as evidenced by SDC advisory in preparation of new Civil Code and Family Code). On the other, highly successful formats, such as the Gender Network "Masculinidad" with a Latin-America-wide outreach or cultural activities that attracted a large amount of attention and contribute to public discussion that question gender stereotypes (INT 5, 6, 32)• Outside the thematic priority areas, the mediCuba-Switzerland programme supported the Ministry of Public Health in updating and strengthening the health system with regard to non-communicable diseases (e.g. cancer), transmissible diseases (infectious diseases) and primary care in paediatrics and geriatrics. (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024).
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes were (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The first achievement is to have positioned SDC in a complicated context (2009 Review of SDC's Special Programme in Cuba).• [SDC] has acquired the reputation of a competent and reliable interlocutor (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba).• [The Cooperation Office has] a great capacity to link institutions and organisations with each other and with SDC. [It] is able to develop contacts and communication with a multitude of local and international actors, both formal and informal (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy).• The Swiss Programme demonstrates a high level of achievement of the expected results in both thematic axes (local development and sustainable economic development), confirming the consistency of the strategy elaborated from the evaluation of the pilot phase at the end of 2003 (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba).• The programme has achieved and is achieving strategic contributions to policy formulation (2013 Mid-Term Review of the cooperation strategy).
3.3 Which stakeholders were reached and how - and which were excluded and why? Which capacities were changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• High level political bargaining power, access to top political decision-makers and therefore contribution to key political processes (e.g. consitutional process, new legislation such as the Civil Code and the Family Code) (INT 5, 6, 13, 32)• Cubavisión Channel broadcast thirteen episodes of the programme "Cosas de Hombres" (Men's Things), which addressed high-impact issues such as fatherhood, machismo, feminism, health, sexuality and violence, among others, with an average audience of 5 million viewers per episode. With the collaboration of COSUDE, it served as a tribute to the 15 years of work of the Ibero-American and African Network of Masculinities RIAM, leader of the thematic in the country and one of our partners of the Plataforma Equidad. For three months, the Programme maintained a debate not only in traditional media such as the written press but also in social networks, which is very useful for the debates that are taking place around the Family Code and a greater participation of the male population (2021_SDC Annual Report Cuba).
4) Impact		
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security. 4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Most of the projects have achieved a significant impact in terms of opening up spaces for dialogue and the application of new concepts for local development, concrete solutions for sustainable economic development and, gradually, influencing government policies. (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba)• The Swiss special cooperation programme has shown a very good level of results. Although its financial volume is limited (between CHF 5 and 6 million per year), it has succeeded in asserting its presence in the country's 14 provinces. Its positive effects are recognised both at local level and by official bodies and other cooperation agencies present or returning to Cuba (EU, Spain). (2009 Evaluation of SDC Special Programme in Cuba).• Gender is a central theme of the cooperation strategy. Women in rural areas are now much more self-confident, leading projects, cooperatives or discussion groups, which four years ago were a matter among men. (2009 Final Report Herbert Schmidt 2005-2009)• Innovative work is being undertaken in favour of equity and respect for social diversity, while the dominant discourse tends to deny the factors that underlie inequality and difficulty in accessing power, such as racial affiliation, gender, territorial origin, etc. (2009 Revisión del programa especial de COSUDE en Cuba)• With its contributions, from 2000 to 2016, SDC has improved access to products and services for an estimated 4 million people, with priorities for women and disadvantaged groups (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024).

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today (<i>intended or un-intended</i>)? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion). 4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts. 4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The promotion of dialogue and debate at the local level, including on controversial issues, as well as access to new knowledge, contribute to better respect for fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and association (2007 Strategic Orientation Cuba_2007-2010) In 2006, a strategy for gender mainstreaming in programmes implemented by SDC partners was designed (2009 Review of SDC's special programme in Cuba). The approval of important regulations that were under discussion or in the process of being drafted for years is the most significant result of 2021 and which contributes to the final process of the CE 2017-2021 in terms of legislative progress of national impact such as: On 8 March the Council of Ministers approved the National Programme for the Advancement of Women (PAM) through Presidential Decree 198/2021. The PAM articulates objectives, lines of work and actions, from the economic empowerment of women, their representation in the media, legislation and law, and the fight against gender violence. The comprehensive strategy for the prevention of and attention to gender violence and violence in the family was approved on 23 June by the Council of Ministers, and the actions contained therein range from national to local-community level and address not only violence once it has occurred, but also its prevention. Enacted the Decree-Law 'On Working Women's Maternity and Family Responsibility' which extends benefits in this area to female employees in the state sector and grants for the first time equal rights to those in other forms of private sector management. These include guarantees for the enjoyment of the social benefit, monetary aid for medical certificates for pregnant women and women with sick children, and supplementary maternity leave. The law facilitates medical assistance during pregnancy, pre- and post-natal leave, breastfeeding, while protecting the father or another working relative who takes care of the child in the event of the mother's death. Preparation of the preliminary draft of the Family Code, currently in consultation with experts from different social and population sectors. This instrument is more advanced than the previous one on different issues, the most commented is its definition of marriage as the union of two people, which offers the possibility of forming diverse couples. In the case of women, it clarifies the distinction between gender-based and domestic violence and recognises the economic contribution of domestic work. These four legal instruments with an impact at the country level were part of the actions promoted by SDC in alliance with the Federation of Cuban Women FMC and through institutions that we support such as the UNJC, RIAM, Proyectos Todas y Palomas, OAR, CENESEX, among others, all partners of Plataforma Equidad (2021_SDC Annual Report Cuba).
5) Sustainability		
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (<i>for closed programmes</i> : did the benefits actually continue?)? What were/are the successes and hindering factors ?	6.1.1 Exit strategies were defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets were reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures). 6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements. 6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) were closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Swiss cooperation strategy recognises the existing system and focuses on increasing the human and institutional management capacities of development actions. (2009 Evaluation of SDC Special Programme in Cuba). The cooperation with a large number of different partner institutions gives the SDC programme an interesting position in the Cuban and international institutional landscape. Close cooperation between the Cooperation Office team and partner institutions ensures the conceptual and operational quality of the projects and increases sustainability. (2013 Mid-Term Review of the Cooperation Strategy)
5.2 Did SDC's bilateral cooperation interventions lead to scalable or replicable results (<i>for closed interventions</i> : Were those actually up-scaled or replicated?)?	6.2.1 Project approaches were scaled-up in the priority regions. 6.2.2 Project approaches were replicated outside the priority regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The avalanche of new rules, policies and tools for decentralised management has required an increase in project training actions for specialists and authorities at all levels, which has meant the production of more than 16 audiovisual materials, 68 printed or digital materials and more than 20 teleconferences and online training actions. In summary, the systematic follow-up and flexibility of action in the face of the changing context and opportunities, the attention to priorities emerging in the economic and health crisis, the use of alternative channels of exchange and monitoring, such as social networks, and the presence of the projects in spaces for political dialogue to position their innovative results, have been the keys to progress in the year's work (2021_SDC Annual Report Cuba).
6) Lessons Learned		
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Another success factor is also its continuity and certainly the professional and human quality of SDC taff. On this basis, the Swiss Programme has acquired a good reputation and high visibility (2006 Evaluation of the SDC Special Programme in Cuba) Impact must be sought through Cuban partner institutions. The state leadership shows a deep mistrust of foreign "interference". In contrast to other countries in the South, it is easier for the government to accept solutions from Cuban institutions, university institutes, NGOs or church organisations (2009 Final Report Herbert Schmidt 2005-2009). Partnerships for implementation or co-financing with other cooperation actors, especially UN agencies, the European Union, the Italian Cooperation and international NGOs such as Oxfam, have been a positive factor in the achievement of the objectives, either through increased financial contributions or implementation or thematic expertise (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024). [For some] projects a greater degree of delegation to national actors might be feasible. (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy). [It is recommended to] plan for the medium term in order to meet the formal requirements of the National Economy Plan [without compromising necessary flexibility in adjusting measures to arising needs] (compare 2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy). Cuba Programme generated great value for (little) money; much larger budgets less worth elsewhere - exit heavy loss for Swiss soft power (INT 3)
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cuba is a special context for development cooperation. (2009 Final Report Herbert Schmidt 2005-2009) Swiss cooperation has been characterised by its orientation towards tangible benefits for the population and its sustainability over time. (2022 Exit Cooperation Programme 2022-2024). Continuity in support and predictable long-term commitment distinctive feature of Swiss cooperation, which open up cooperation opportunities not available to other donors (INT 4, 13)
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusions of study</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Different ways of co-financing with other donors allow to leverage action and reduce the administrative burden on the Cooperation Office (2013 Mid-Term Review of the Cooperation Strategy). None of the long-term programmes with substantial budgets could be implemented in the planned period. There were always unforeseeable changes and (also politically motivated) interventions from the Cuban side, which resulted in major delays. It is therefore particularly important to prepare a "programme bleu" with realistic implementation options (2013 Final Report Regula Bähler, final). Regional advisors complement the expertise available in the Cooperation Office team [...] Joint "learning by doing" and occasional taking over of pending work by the advisors strengthen their credibility. (2013 Final report Regula Bähler, final) Adequate support of partner institutions: SDC programmes in Cuba are formally local mandates in most cases. However, their implementation often requires strong involvement, comparable in terms of workload to programmes run by the SDC itself (2013 Final Report Regula Bähler). SDC's policy [...] normally tries to limit its activities to one region of a country in order to create an impact at the level of that region. In the Cuban context it seems that there is more likelihood of impact if an approach or methodology is tested in different parts of the country, because in this way the partner institution will have more weight of argument to propose the tested approach as a solution for the whole country. There are indications that this mechanism is working; consequently, a regional concentration is not advisable. (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy). It is recommended to prioritise in the future those projects that contribute most to SDC's strategic objective (2013 Mid-Term Review of the Cooperation Strategy). International NGOs play an important role in organising logistical matters in the projects and take on a "project manager" type of role, which relieves SDC staff to a large extent [...who yet are] always heavily involved in the conceptual and quality aspects of the projects (2013 Mid-term review of the cooperation strategy). [Programme budget execution] has been hindered by several factors: the practically non-existent supply of goods and services in the country, which makes it difficult to acquire the indispensable inputs for the management of the budgets assigned to each project; the monetary reorganisation initiated in January 2021, which imposed the circulation of the Cuban peso as the official currency and forced the drafting of new contracts in national currency and in euros for all projects, generating a considerable delay in the payments to be made; the sustained blockade of our bank accounts at UBS and BFI, which makes it difficult to make payments and has forced us to look for slower and more laborious alternatives to make transfers to suppliers and disbursements to partners. (2021_SDC Annual Report Cuba)

Evaluation and Capitalization Matrix - Haiti

Historic Impact Capitalisation of SDC's bilateral cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean


Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
1) Relevance		
1.1 How and to what extent did SDC's aid in the specific country/sector respond to pressing multidimensional development needs ? Were the investments done coherently and proportionate in relation to the development priorities in the countries at specific periods of time?	1.1.1 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein clearly refer to development needs of the target group. 1.1.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein are in line with development priorities of the countries according to national development plans and/or sector strategies as well as to specific needs and requests of relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries. 1.1.3 Instruments, methods and chosen thematic focusses of projects are in line with defined overarching objectives.	The support SDC provided was relevant in the Haitian context, taking into consideration Haiti's priorities and being reflected in national strategies: • In Haiti, lifesaving needs far exceeded the initial offer from the international community. The range of activities supported by SDC (coordination, medical care, food security, water, and temporary shelter) was highly relevant (2011_Evaluation SDC Humanitarian Aid Emergency Relief) • Relevance is rated "High": SDC has maintained a clear line of support since 2011. The principal focus has been on reconstruction and resilience building; food security/agriculture and good governance. These elements are highly relevant to the Haitian context (2019_Independent_Evaluation_of_the_Linkage_of_Humanitarian_Aid) • The interim government has launched the preparation of an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Document Stratégique de Réduction de la Pauvreté Intérimaire (DSRPI) (Programme Humanitaire Suisse pour haiti 2006-2008) and commits itself to the content in November 2007 (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013) • The Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement national (PARDN) defines the most important measures to help mitigate the catastrophic earthquake damage. This was presented by the Haitian government to the donor conference in New York on 31 March 2010 (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013) • All actions during the next three years must be oriented towards the territorial, economic, social and institutional refoundation of Haiti. This is what the PARDN demands as a valid guideline for the country's development (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013) • The medium-term programme aims to support Haiti's own efforts to rebuild and promote the country's economic performance. The National Reconstruction and Development Plan (PARDN) and the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (DSNCRP) serve as a guiding framework. • SDC's strategic orientations have been developed based on the national priorities and needs defined in the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDN, 2010) (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017). • The 2022-2024 cooperation programme will continue to support the ongoing national strategies enshrined in the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (PSDH) (programme-cooperation-suisse-haiti-2022-2024_EN) • This HA programme aims to align itself with a harmonised vision between Haitian government and international community (Programme Humanitaire Suisse pour haiti 2006-2008) • Haiti itself, in addition to the HA label, wanted long-term cooperation (INT 23); • SDC's work is based on national laws and strategy; Le Plan National de Protection Prevention Social is supported directly (INT 24) • National strategies are implemented at the loval level "We have to support the plan that the government has in the provinces" (INT 24)
1.2 In how far was SDC's engagement in LAC in line with overall Swiss development cooperation priorities ?	1.2.1 Strategic documents at country or LAC level and formulated objectives therein refer to overall Swiss development cooperation strategies. 1.2.2 Strategic documents and formulated objectives therein at country or LAC level are in line with Swiss development priorities according to Swiss IZA strategies.	SDC's engagement in Haiti is in lign with the overall foreign policy approach of Switzerland: • In response to the catastrophe of the century, the Federal Council has decided to provide large-scale Swiss reconstruction aid to Haiti. Switzerland will provide a total of around CHF 36 million for reconstruction and long-term development cooperation from 2011 to 2013. This decision forms the basis for the present medium-term programme 2011 - 2013 and Switzerland is reaffirming its willingness to contribute to Haiti's reconstruction and is thus fulfilling the promise it made at the international donor conference "Towards a New Future for Haiti" in New York in March 2010 (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013) • Restoring and improving access to basic services remains one of the most important tasks of international cooperation and thus also of SDC (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013) • In a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2008, Switzerland and Brazil stated their intention to cooperate more closely in selected third countries, including Haiti. Not yet initiated (lack of operational presence on Brazilian side) (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013). • Since the earthquake, Haiti has been the main country of operation for SDC humanitarian aid (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013) • The SDC's programme in Haiti thus contributes to the general objectives of Swiss foreign policy: to work for stability in the world through international cooperation and peace-building activities, respect for human rights and the rule of law (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017) • SDC's commitment in Haiti is also linked to overarching foreign policy goals. As part of the international donor community, Switzerland assumes responsibility & makes its contribution to reconstruction. This has a positive impact on relations with other donors (France and USA) (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013). • Following "Fit-for-Purpose" approach (INT 23, 24)
2) Coherence		
2.1 Was the development cooperation in the specific country/sector coherent and complementary to other SDC activities (humanitarian aid, engagement in the field of peace and security, global programmes) as well as with the engagement of other Swiss development actors (e.g. SECO)?	2.1.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with other SDC/SECO activities. 2.1.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	Humanitarian Aid and Dedevelopemnt cooperation hamronized cooperation and created synergies in relevant fields of work. There is still potential to create even further synergies and complement each other's work: • The humanitarian programme has an office in the same building as the Consulate General in Pétion-Ville, sharing certain infrastructures and services. Possible synergies in terms of human resources (administration, driver) are under discussion (Programme Humanitaire Suisse pour haiti 2006-2008) • Exchange within the SDC (SAL, HA) and with the Political Directorate takes place on a regular basis as needed (PD II, PD, IV). Given the currently limited interfaces with other SDC areas (E, F, M), there is no need to formalise exchanges (Programme Humanitaire Suisse pour haiti 2006-2008) • To date, a drinking water project and a natural resource protection project, both mandated to Helvetas, represent, together with programme contributions to Swiss NGOs, the SDC's bilateral aid programme for Haiti (Programme Humanitaire Suisse pour haiti 2006-2008) • Since 1985, the SDC's NGO Section (Area E) has continuously contributed to financing Swiss NGO programmes in Haiti, the majority of which have been organised into the "Plate-Forme Haïti de Suisse" PFHS. Covers HA, development, human rights and democracy (Programme Humanitaire Suisse pour haiti 2006-2008). • Even though there were tensions, the cooperation was very good from beginning to end. Projects have worked well together. Example of good cooperation: Earthquake-proof school, staff taken over by Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA). (INT 23) • Excellent cooperation Switzerland has many years of experience in Haiti. Deputy Embassy has lived in Haiti for over 20 years and was previously head of Helvetas. He was able to influence the normative level and had many long-standing contacts.(INT 23) • Was the coordination/cooperation with local and Swiss partners strengthened? In Haiti, coordination was remarkably good, not only with implementing partners but also with all Swiss NGOs, funded or not. Information and guidance meetings were regularly held with support of the RRT. The Swiss-related humanitarian and development community emerged much stronger (2011_Evaluation SDC Humanitarian Aid Emergency Relief) • The integration of the embassy and the Co-operation Office also ensures the coherence of Switzerland's action in Haiti (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017) • The effective complementarity between humanitarian aid and development cooperation activities adds internal coherence and is highly appropriate to the context. In particular, this leads to considering all commitments, including humanitarian ones, from the outset with a view to development and sustainability (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017) • Collaboration with the Human Security Division has started and will be intensified in areas of common interest, such as rule of law, security and human rights. Complementarity between the humanitarian and development approaches is fundamental in the fragile context of Haiti to contribute to sustainable development results (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017) • The development of an (early) recovery response to the crises and disasters that hit the country after the emergency phase needs to follow a more synergistic and complementary approach between development cooperation and humanitarian aid instruments. In the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew, the A-PP should take advantage of the commitments initiated in response to the hurricane to demonstrate how to implement LRRD/Nexus in practice, particularly in the areas of agricultural production and local governance (Evaluation de pays - stratégie de coopération à Haïti 2014-2017) • We agree with the recommendation that development cooperation and humanitarian aid should work together in an even more synergistic and complementary way (Evaluation de pays - stratégie de coopération à Haïti 2014-2017) • The new CS will put special emphasis on the nexus between HA and SC to converge towards a common approach. • This common approach between HA and SC will be especially realised and applied in the development of new interventions, projects and programmes of both HA and SC (Evaluation de pays - stratégie de coopération à Haïti 2014-2017) • A tendency to maintain separate structures is and will remain a big hurdle. As everyone is focusing on their own project, with their own people, with their own ideas, it's a really, really big challenge to integrate this coherently and to really live the nexus and work together in a structured way. (INT 21). • Before SDC strategies: HA projects in Haiti were in fact DC, it was about labelling, about the organisational approach to the country (INT 21); the definition of HA projects lies on a broad spectrum and the difference between HA and DC often lays in a grey zone. With the fit-for-purpose approach the South Cooperation and HA are forced to find that grey area. Today, we are much closer in terms of alignining instruments (humanitarian aid, global cooperation and south cooperation) and thematical areas, including trasnversal themes: gender, conflict sensitivity, human rights etc. One example is that HA and DC have to fill out the same gender-template when designing a programme (INT 24) • Swiss engagement and cooperation has developed enourmously over the last years. "Fit-for-purpose" approach already for over five yeats (ensuring a cooperation to work efficiently, quick, effectively and flexible together/ together with partners). "Permanent back and forth between humanitarian and development cooperation" is seen as great opportunity and logical approach (Nexus). One exmaple is the response after natural catastrophes, DC in the affected region did not stop, but adapted (quickly) to share instruments (INT 24).

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
2.2 Was the development cooperation coherent and complementary to the engagement of other international development actors ?	2.2.1 Strategy and project documents illustrate coherence/ complementarity with activities of other international donors. 2.2.2 Synergy potentials were used and duplication was avoided during project implementation.	<p>The Swiss engagement in Haiti is perceived well and is highly appreciated. However, the fragmented donor landscape in Haiti and a lack of collaboration or exchange results in a challenging environment for coordinating efforts and complementing each others work:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diverse and chaotic delivery of assistance in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010 with relatively few critical issues on which the international community found a clear joint position (2011_Evaluation SDC Humanitarian Aid Emergency Relief). • There were difficulties after earthquake in 2010, with many donors. Different countries had different agendas, different priorities. Standards were not adopted. This made good coordination challenging. • Each NGO and actor took their own approach. No coordination. Rather exchange of information between actors (INT 23) • SDC"s own operations were also loosely coordinated with other main actors at Port-au-Prince and Petit Goâve level. However information on SDC activities remained barely known outside a restricted circle of partners. ECHO organised regular get-togethers of key donors (US, UK, Canada, Spain, EC) where Switzerland's absence was noted and regretted (2011_Evaluation SDC Humanitarian Aid Emergency Relief) • In Haiti, cooperation with WFP, ICRC and UNICEF was seen as satisfactory, considering SDC"s support. According to WHO, there was no direct and effective dialogue between SDC and WHO in the field of health. WHO, an organisation that could have provided insight on the health sector, did avoid potentially irrelevant donation of pharmaceuticals and guided SDC in its difficult negotiations about the reconstruction of the hospital in Petit Goâve. With regard to SDC"s support to OCHA, there was less institutional memory in OCHA/Haiti than in HQ in Geneva, which indicates that the impact of the cooperation was predominantly at global level (INSARAG and UNDAC mechanisms in particular). At this level, SDC"s coordination and influence are very strong. In general, participation in the clusters in Port-au-Prince was very limited in the emergency response phase (lack of time and limited return being a factor often mentioned). Operational coordination/exchange of information with UN local partners needs significant improvement. (2011_Evaluation SDC Humanitarian Aid Emergency Relief) • Efficiency: Medium/low. The office in Haiti is integrated, with all regional offices following suit. There is new leadership which is focused on developing an internal institutional culture that focuses more strongly on working collectively towards the reduction of fragility. However, despite Switzerland's best efforts to support coordination with other donors little practical results are visible. Most donors work independently of each other (2019_Independent_Evaluation_of_the_Linkage_of_Humanitarian_Aid) • Collaboration with multilateral organisations should be strengthened and used more to scale up Swiss cooperation project (Evaluation de pays - stratégie de coopération à Haiti 2014-2017) • The strengthening of inter-donor dialogue is central to the development of strategies in different sectors (water, agricultural production, vocational training, human rights). Through the "Ambassadors' Dialogue", Switzerland maintains an active watch to ensure a coherent and complementary approach by the donor community in the country. This helps to avoid duplication and redundancy in the bi- and multilateral co-operation in the country (Evaluation de pays - stratégie de coopération à Haiti 2014-2017) • Haiti cannot solely pull itself up and needs coordinated donor support; so far not coordinated (INT 21). • (Haitian) government is not "in the driving seat"; NGOs decide more than the ministers which leads to frustration; international coordination between UN and banks is not good. The fragmentation of the government is reflected in the landscape of international development actors, with different and intransparent interests (INT 24) • SDC has good cooperation with government and other donors; is perceived as a country without double agenda by government (national and local). This was mentioned by the Prime Minister (INT 24) • Therefore, interventions will need to strengthen the link between expected results and available resources; foster donor coordination using existing mechanisms in the country (while focusing on the areas of intervention of the cooperation programme); and systematise programmes for (internal and mutual) accountability (programme-cooperation-suisse-haiti-2022-2024_EN) • Switzerland is perceived as "honest broker", facilitating discussions on how each donor defines the nexus and their individual programs, e.g., in their role as Co-Chair of the donor group in Haiti (INT 24)
3) Effectiveness		
3.1 What concrete development results in different sectors were achieved?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<p>The successful assistance of SDC spans over various sectors, including strengthening of local partners, reconstruction, education, health and culture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to Interview 21, 23, 24, many individuals could be reached and helped directly. • Results were mainly achieved in reconstruction. Also in Culture many positive results can be seen and SDC's focus on culture promoted talks between Swiss and Haitians. Political influence has not worked so well (INT 23). • Results are shared in strategy documents (starting from Mid-Term Cooperation Programme) as well as in project evaluations. Some examples are: Health: The construction of six health centres for the Albert Schweizer Hospital improved medical care for 20,000 families in the Département Artibonite (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013); Education: The effective building of schools were mentioned in Mid-Term Programme 2011-13 and Cooperation Strategy 2014-2017, as well as trainings; Water: SDC funds helped to provide drinking water, according to 2014-2017 strategy, to 20,000 people in three rural municipalities, as well as to strengthen mechanisms for environmental protection of sources and user management of the systems. • Further selected results from Evaluation of 2018-21 strategy (Résultats 2021 de la stratégie de coopération 2018-2021_Vers.2): 5 communes in the South-East, South and Grand'Anse departments now have a communal development plan.; 5 town halls are equipped to carry out procurement processes in the framework of drinking water and sanitation projects (EPA); 11 municipalities have been supported in the implementation of the State's public policy in the decentralisation sector through the continuous strengthening of communal project management. 80 civil society organisations, including networks of grassroots community organisations, have benefited from a strengthening of their organisational and operational capacities; 6 drinking water supply systems in 3 communes of the South-East department are in the final stages of construction; 46 managers from national institutions (including 10 women) have been trained in integrated risk management; 320 families were supported in the reconstruction of their homes following Hurricane Matthew.; 2 community protection shelters were built and 2 others are under construction; 8 communes have received support in integrating risk into prevention processes; 14 local and communal civil protection committees and community response teams have been set up and are now operational. Further specific results from agriculture (water) and trainings are listed in overarching evaluation of strategy as well as in project evaluations. • The Embassy supported various initiatives by Haitian cultural actors and operators. In 2021, it supported the Port-au-Prince International Jazz Festival, the feature film FREDA, which was screened in Cannes, the "Tribute to 50 Haitian Women" initiative, and the "Kreyòl Jazz Project", which aims to promote Creole jazz. CHF 900,000 was allocated to the promotion of culture, and more than 50 initiatives were supported by Switzerland between 2018 and 2021 (Résultats 2021 de la stratégie de coopération 2018-2021_Vers and INT 24). Many successful examples of culture-events/projects (INT 24) • Resilience building, particularly at community and local authority levels, are noted in Haiti, as a central element to support systems change (2019_Independent_Evaluation_of_the_Linkage_of_Humanitarian_Aid) • The strengthening of local partners (NGOs, Red Cross and UN) is a major success of SDC response. However, it did not include local government coordinating mechanisms which were unwillingly marginalized by the international community in its response to the earthquake in Haiti (2011_Evaluation SDC Humanitarian Aid Emergency Relief) • Under the "lives saved and the suffering alleviated" criterion, the SHA was highly effective in Haiti (2011_Evaluation SDC Humanitarian Aid Emergency Relief) • In Haiti, SDC provision of medical care saved more lives than the entire international SAR effort and provision of safe water in Haiti was a lifesaver in the aftermath of the seism and probably reduced the impact of the current cholera outbreak – a crisis unrelated to the earthquake itself (2011_Evaluation SDC Humanitarian Aid Emergency Relief) • Effectiveness: Medium. There is a clear link between the 2013-2016 dispatch, where the aftermaths of the quake and the general fragility of the country are highlighted, and the support that has been given to Haiti. The support to Haiti was shifted, we are told via interview, in the aftermaths of the earthquake. The Swiss government committed supplementary funds to respond to the catastrophe and in the aftermaths the strategy was shifted towards more reconstruction and resilience building. This focus was again reignited in the aftermaths of hurricane Matthew. Since 2013, there has been a clear shift towards an ever increased effort to articulate humanitarian and development aid, but efforts to do so in practice have been few. It appears that programmes that have been able to bridge the divide have been highly effective in doing so, but this has not always been backed by a solid internal articulation and hence it is possible that opportunities have not been maximised (2019_Independent_Evaluation_of_the_Linkage_of_Humanitarian_Aid) • Interventions in the Local Governance area contribute to a better understanding of territorial governance by local actors. They facilitate the creation of innovative networks between government, civil society and the private sector. The governance of drinking water and sanitation (DWS) is one of the success stories that has enabled several municipalities to strengthen their roles and establish their authority. They are now involved in the effective implementation of EPA service works, thus improving access to services for the population. In addition, 80 civil society organisations, including networks, participated in training to develop technical and operational skills to better involve themselves in decision-making and the management of local public affairs. Local actors in three communes of the South East department have engaged in the integration of risks into their territorial planning processes and the strengthening of their decentralised preparedness and response system. This is done through awareness-raising activities and tools for better management of constructions and prevention infrastructures. (programme-cooperation-suisse-haiti-2022-2024_EN).
3.2 By means of which development approaches and instruments did SDC and its partners across the decades successfully contribute to improvements in the priority themes/sectors in LAC - and which did not achieve their intended outcomes?	3.1.1 Intended project outputs and outcomes were (not) achieved by means of selected approaches and methodologies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We agree with the recommendation that development cooperation and humanitarian aid should work together in an even more synergistic and complementary way. Nevertheless, we believe that the A-PP can already build on successful experiences in this direction, especially in the "post-Matthew" context. In fact, the course of the SET intervention ("Soforteinsatzteam") demonstrated the existence of complementarity between the emergency response (ER) and embassy arrangements. The dialogue during and after the EETS between Southern Cooperation (SC) and Humanitarian Aid (HA) also made it possible to develop a jointly funded and developed post-Matthew early recovery initiative. HA has also been heavily involved in the design of the SC-funded recovery programme (PURPOS). In this sense, the A-PP has started to use the actions and knowledge of the instruments to jointly contribute to recovery, showing concrete examples of nexus. These reflections should be continued and intensified in the framework of the new CS (Evaluation de pays - stratégie de coopération à Haiti 2014-2017). • From 2014, the interplay between horizontal and vertical (HA and DC) began to take effect and this gave Switzerland leverage. You can't replace that in 2-3 humanitarian projects. HA= Instruments to make a difference. In a joint office: on one level the political leverage and the possibility to intervene politically and below that the instruments that can be implemented (INT 21). • As a result of years of field work in the protected area, the SDC, through its partner Helvetas, was the first and only actor to acquire expertise that is practically unique in the country and that opens doors for policy dialogue in the responsible Ministry of the Environment. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) will take over Helvetas' experience in another conservation project in the South (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013) • Results were achieved (natural resources and risk reduction) thanks to a successful combination of control measures and dialogue with the populations concerned. The constructive collaboration with other influential technical and financial partners (TFPs) in this sector (IDB, UNDP in particular) makes it possible to envisage interesting leverage effects with regard to a specific ministry (Ministry of the Environment), which is otherwise weak and not always very dynamic (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017)

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
3.3 Which stakeholders were reached and how - and which were excluded and why? Which capacities were changed and how?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<p>Working together with the government on a local or municiple level was especially successful. Working with national government agencies resulted in more hurdles. In terms of capacity training, the biggest success was on local levels. The challange with generating results out of capacity building is, e.g. the high migration rate of young people:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• With a few exceptions, direct political contacts with Haiti were sporadic until the earthquake (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013)• Working with the government agencies is an extremely slow process owing primarily to factors that are out of Swiss control (extremely weak structures). This all results in a medium to low level of efficiency. However, this should be understood in context: there are no indications that a different approach would yield improved results (2019_Independent_Evaluation_of_the_Linkage_of Humanitarian_Aid)• Switzerland is a relatively small player. However, it can play an important role when it comes to innovation and specific know-how. This is demonstrated by the close cooperation with the Ministry of Education in the development of earthquake-resistant school buildings or the support of the Ministry of Environment for the adoption of a protection and use concept for the ecosystem of the Forêt des Pins (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013)• In Water/Governance Sector: In conjunction with the central structures of the National Directorate of Drinking Water and Sanitation (DINEPA), mechanisms for water treatment and quality control in rural collective systems have been developed and are being tested (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017; and INT 24).• First, more institutional initiatives were launched with the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) to support agricultural sectors (yams) and strengthen sectoral governance (statistical data on food security) (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017)• In addition to the areas mentioned above, the first partnerships were developed on an exploratory basis on human rights issues, such as the introduction of a gender quota in public institutions and in the electoral process, on violence against women or on the specific improvement of detention conditions for minors (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017)• Approach of helping individuals, rather than focusing on state; nevertheless cooperation with some ministries (e.g. Ministry of Reonstruktion) (INT 23)• Challenges of capacity building: corruption, strong migration "brain drain", criminality makes it difficult for capacities to be maintained (INT 23)• Capacities were build and people were trained, however there is a lot of pressure and a lot of (young) people are leaving (brain-drain). When X amount of people were trained, half of trained people left (Dominican Republic, USA, ..). Those who stay (tentatively elder people), want to move on and are using learned capacities, however in projects that focused on young people, many left (INT 24)• Mayors (that do not change quickly) were reached and some are very committed to their community. The intention is not to build paralell structures to the central government, but to show, best-practices on local level and attract ministers ("pepeople from the capital") into the provinces and show them results (e.g. vocational training in Jacmel).• Meetings with ministers (e.g. Minister of Education; Misnister of Agriculture) and showing how SDC assists in implementing national plans on local level (INT 24)• Challenge in working/reaching governement is a very buearocratic and formal system (INT 24)• Someone from the Haitian government is going to Geneva mid-december [2022] to represent Haiti at Effective Development Co-operation summit in Geneva (INT 24)
4) Impact		
4.1 How, and to what extent, did SDC's bilateral cooperation contribute to poverty reduction and/or the reduction of inequalities in its priority countries and regions in LAC?	<p>4.1.1 SDC's projects contributed to reducing poverty in relevant dimensions like health, education, basis services and security.</p> <p>4.1.2 SDC's projects contributed to effectively strengthening partner institutions and increasing resilience of the target group.</p>	<p>It is still very early to evaluate impact. The bilateral programme in Haiti is quite young and projects are now being terminated ahead of their planned completion date:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• SDC's bilateral programme in Haiti is a very young one. According to interview 21, a real coherent DC programme with a coherent development policy focusing on change processes only started in 2018. In 2020, it was decided that SDC is leaving Haiti. This short time-frame makes it difficult to measure impact (INT 21, 24).• According to interview 24, it was only after the earthquake (2010) "where we could really do something concretely" and in 2013/ 2014 where it was possible to slowly start operating. It is too early to measure real results and impact of the Southern Cooperation. Additionally, programmes were created for ten, twelve years that are now partially ended after four years (INT 24);• Impact on small levels in some communities (access to water and clean water for some households; no cholera) (INT 24)• some "embryonic" insights of impact in project "REGLEAU"; where reached people believe in what has been built (Interview 24). Reasons for success of REGLEAU: methodology that was well developed by HELVETAS. Communities that now have REGLEAU are prouf of its water system and other communities around have expressed intrest in it, too (INT 24).• The programmes that were developed were planned for the long term. Project cycles are usually three phases. Do you take people's perspective on a long-term change? The country is traumatised by many factors, is this the way to destroy trust? (INT 21).• An external evaluation in 2009 showed that the approximately 10,000 people affected are already benefiting from a noticeable, albeit for the time being still moderate, increase in income (DEZA Mittelfristprogramm Haiti 2011-2013)• Living conditions were improved in rural areas (technical agricultural improvements have enabled thousand families to ensure greater local food availability and to achieve a level of income equivalent to or higher than the national minimum wage ((Strategy for Swiss cooperation in Haiti 2014-2017)
4.2 What other longer-term key changes has SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC contributed to from 1961 until today (<i>intended or un-intended</i>)? How and to what extent did the interventions in LAC cause higher-level effects (such as changes in norms or systems)? How will the interventions contribute to changing societies in LAC for the better?	<p>4.2.1 SDC projects effectively contributed to changes in norms/systems (e.g. on gender and social inclusion).</p> <p>4.2.2 SDC projects contributed to aggravating/improving conflicts.</p> <p>4.2.3 SDC projects contributed to other significant (positive/negative) changes</p>	<p>There have been successful outcomes in the short term and on the individual level. Defining impacts results to be more challenging, as the time between planning and implementation is still short:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Switzerland is gradually being perceived as a partner which, in the future, may be able to play a role in facilitating dialogue, given its neutrality and good image ("honest broker") (Stratégie de la coopération suisse en Haiti 2014-2017)• Switzerland's good reputation helps with the implementation and results could be achieved even with a much smaller budget (INT 24).• "This review does not aim to evaluate the strategy on the basis of results, as our programmes are, for the most part, too recent to show expected effects" (NOTE SURLE DEROULEMENT DE LAREVUE A MI-PARCOURS DE LA STRATEGIE 2014-17)• Individuals could be helped but not much was changed at the macro level (INT 23).• In general, SDC's approaches were considered good. However, the approaches were designed for long-term work in Haiti to accompany systemic, structural changes. In the short time between planning (since 2014) and implementation, some positive project results (see effectiveness) can be seen, but it is difficult to identify impacts (INT 21, 23, 24).• success with scaling-up and institutionalizing standards and training programs nationwide that were first funded as innovations or pilot programs (SDC Evaluation 2015/1)
5) Sustainability		
5.1 To what extent are the benefits of the programmes, including closed ones, likely to continue after SDC funding ceases (<i>for closed programmes</i> : did the benefits actually continue?)? What were/are the successes and hindering factors ?	<p>6.1.1 Exit strategies were defined and implemented (e.g. discontinuation or reduction of measures when targets were reached or transfer of responsibility to national structures).</p> <p>6.1.2 Projects concepts generally consider national capacities necessary in order to build on project achievements.</p> <p>6.1.3 National (governmental and non-governmental actors) were closely involved in project implementation as partners/beneficiaries with a high level of ownership.</p>	<p>On one hand, the trust in Switzerland and projects such as REGLAEU and PROMES show promising potential of generating lasting effects, also through the pick-up of other donors. Some local structures are also expected to remain. On the other hand, ending SDC's engagement has resulted in some uncertainties on different levels:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• As described in 3.1, results focus on individual level; focus on community based approach. Some local structures remain (INT 24).• While the actual goal should be systematic empowerment of local actors, parallel structures and systems have weakened SDC's and other donors work (INT 21).• SDC strategy was focused on long-term processes and changes. To achieve these changes, it is not ideal to disrupt the process. (INT 21)• Projects who are being continued are not aimed at making an intitutional/structal difference (INT 21)• According to Interview 23: Timing for closing embassy not ideal (after Covid); programmes would be better protected with an embassy - better access to ministries (e.g. Earthquake-proof building in schools was only recognised by ministries because of DC labeling) (INT 23).• Until 2020, it was not clear whether South Cooperation is ending its engagement in Haiti, uncertainty made it difficult to plan for phasing-out. Information, also which programmes shall continue came piece-by-piece which made communication (with [project] partners) challenging, difficulty to create and have a clear strategic vision. Created uncertainty for SDC, staff, projects/programms, partners, government. Further questions of uncertainty (budget and other, incl. personell resources). Now it is clear, but not much time left (one year), as SDC is leaving Haiti one year earlier than other LAC countries. Uncertainty contributed to loss of credibility towards partners (Helvetas, Caritas) as well as "fear" of job-losses on (local) partner side (INT 24)• Yet, trust in Switzerland continues; even if positions change, some people stay in the country who are known and have long-lasting relationships. Communication strategy is to jointly appear as "Switzerland" without great differentiation DC/HA and to show that Swiss engagement continues (INT 24)• Switzerland's good reputation as a partner without a double agenda stays. Good networking and trust at local level, created by global vision of governance, which SDC reflects. Through this, SDC/HA is protected by local communities. HA and SDC appear as Switzerland; ongoing projects and HA can benefit from these established structures (INT 24). <p>According to Interview 24, three main impact/sustainability points:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Project REGLEAU (cf.4.1): Direction Nationale de l'Eau Portable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA) (national responsible body for warer) wants to spread the system all over the country. DINEPA now tries to continue the programme with monetary assistance from World Bank (around 80 million) and IDB; phasing over of methodology; also example of "Neus au contraire" - from DC to HA, however with less money from HA now to continue (INT 24)2. ProDoc with HELVETAS so that programmes can stay in portfolio and that it is possible to continue with overall goal - to do a real transformation3. Social Protection (Project: PROMES): Still in early stages, but objective of transformation. Interview partner 24 thinks it is possible to continue with HA. World Bank takes over in Grand d'Anse with same partners, but on a bigger scale. EU thinking of working on it in the North-West region (where SDC is not active)
5.2 Did SDC's bilateral cooperation interventions lead to scalable or replicable results (<i>for closed interventions</i> : Were those actually up-scaled or replicated?)?	<p>6.2.1 Project approaches were scaled-up in the priority regions.</p> <p>6.2.2 Project approaches were replicated outside the priority regions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Sustainability ranking: Medium. In Haiti it is clear that not providing support in a manner that aims to reduce fragility will lead to a never ending cycle of humanitarian interventions. In this way the shift is towards providing support that is able to address fragility as a way to address development; and secure progress made. However, this integrative approach is not yet applied across all projects and programmes. There are different views regarding which thematic areas are more or less adept to nexus, but all agree that government partners are essential, but require a considerable investment. (2019_Independent_Evaluation_of_the_Linkage_of Humanitarian_Aid)• State had neither staff nor resources and capacities to take over project (results) to replicate it on an overall level (INT 23)

Guiding Questions	Assesment Criteria / Indicators	Results / Comments on the assessment
6) Lessons Learned		
6.1 What did work well and what are considered the greatest failures of SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC?	<i>descriptive/illustrative</i>	<p>One of the aspects that worked really well was the combination of efforts by Switzerland to achieve the best possible outcome (e.g. integrate humanitarian and development assistance, combining rehabilitation/ infrastructure support and quality improvement in education, the role as implementer and funder). Potential room for improvement was noted in implementing an anti-corruption project in a corrupt context, establishing a coherent, long-term strategy, and the structured interaction between different interventions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Following an analysis of the results obtained, several lessons were drawn. One of the most important is the importance of favouring certain geographical areas of intervention by focusing on better coordination of actions. The territorial approach can contribute to increased synergies between the different programmes financed by Switzerland and to a significant improvement in results (programme-cooperation-suisse-haiti-2022-2024_FR; INT 24).• Considerable efforts went into individual small projects with small results instead of coherent long-term strategy. (INT 21)• Ensure structured interaction of different interventions, systematic empowerment of different actors (in all sectors) (INT21).• Factors that were relevant: comprehensive approach that integrates humanitarian and development assistance both in terms of programming as well as organizational structure in the Swiss Cooperation Office; combination of infrastructure/rehabilitation support and quality improvement in education as reflected in the vocational-skills development of construction workers; SDC's dual role as an implementer and a funder of programs carried out in one and the same country; the implementation of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States to overcome fragility, establish peace and stability, and to ensure equitably access to resources and services; the close collaboration with government institutions from the onset of the project (notably with the MENFP for the PARIS and the Institut National de la Formation Professionnelle in the CCR program) that ensured a successful scaling-up and institutionalization of the programs. (SDC Evaluation 2015/1)• SDC is able to show examples of successful non-corrupt cooperation with a very fragile country. This can act as an example for the cooperation with other very fragile states (INT 24)• Flexibility in instruments is seen as a great strength; also flexibility in programmes, including in the execution of programmes. HA/DC trying to achieve the same goals/same strategic orientation (INT 24)• Late communication and uncertainty of phasing out created challenges (cf. 5.1) (INT 24).• Positive leasson learned from Interview 24: Take Governance apporach and work locally first; strategic goal to focus geographically and thematically; working with local partners; Comité de Pilotage Stratégie on the ground (locally) and ministers come to visit; deconcentration from the capital, local governance and transparent work (Example: Mayor know what SDC is doing, knows themes and content; Nexus-approach (mixed teams HA and DC) to have joint humanitarian and development mindset• Failures: "La lutte contre la corruption"; (flight against corruption), (around 2018,19). The programme was well designed but had to be ended. Not possible to work alone on anti-corruption with counterparts involved in corruption. Switzerland wanted a basked-fond, but other partners did not want to join. Similar case with project PAPAH II and work with central bank- how is it possible to implement well-written projects in a corrupt environment of Haiti? However, important to continue to present/design such projects and to continue in taking risks (INT 24)
6.2 What lessons can be learned from SDC's bilateral cooperation in LAC in order to guide partner governments, other national and international partners in LAC that may step in after SDC to continue projects and programmes?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusion</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Focus on process support and not on implementation. Be clear with partners: What do you need in terms of a set of rules? What do you need in terms of infrastructure? What additional investors from the private sector? (INT 21)• Switzerland was well positioned and is perceived as independent. The focus of the work was on support processes and not ready-made formulas (INT 21)
6.3 What lessons can be learned for SDC institutionally and/or sectorally that may be relevant for SDC to improve development effectiveness in LAC and elsewhere? What have been enabling and hindering factors?	<i>descriptive/illustrative, overall conclusion</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Development cooperation in very fragile countries like Haiti is a long-term process; projects should be planned for the long term with a jointly developed long-term vision. Actors should be aware of their responsibilities and the complexity in fragile countries. What can the country afford, how are complex approaches (e.g. in the social sector) implemented and accompanied in the process in the long term? (INT 21).• Switzerland's role as honest broker, without double agenda and trusted long-term network helped in implementation and coordination (Stratégie de la Cooperation Suisse en Haiti 2014-2017; Interview 24). Switzerland is perceived as a credible cooperation partner (INT 21).• There is a need for conscious and open management practices. Leaders need to work to create a culture of transparent dialogue and mutual information exchange, with the space for different parties to voice concerns and shape strategies. SDC should proceed cautiously because of the time and effort involved, and only merge when conditions were right (Evaluation of the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts)• Time factor is fundamental for sustainable change (INT 21).• Geographical focus, focus on three departments and target programs to those three geographical areas (localizing aid, targeted support, better synnergies betwene programs and easier coordination between the offices, close cooperation with local actors (local government, NGOs, Civil Society) (INT 24).

Overview of SDC's engagement in LAC and thematic focus areas



ANNEX 10: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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